Heroes, not of their own accord (An examination of the publicity concerning the United States astronauts from 1959 to 1972) by Whye, Perry Michael
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1977
Heroes, not of their own accord (An examination
of the publicity concerning the United States
astronauts from 1959 to 1972)
Perry Michael Whye
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Journalism Studies Commons, Mass Communication Commons, and the Public
Relations and Advertising Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Whye, Perry Michael, "Heroes, not of their own accord (An examination of the publicity concerning the United States astronauts from
1959 to 1972)" (1977). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 16655.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/16655
Heroes, not of their own accord 
(An examination of the publicity concerning 
the United States astronauts from 1959 to 1972) 
by 
Perry Michael Whye 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
Graduate faculty in Partial fulfillment of 
The Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Major: Journalism and Mass Communication 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1977 
;; 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
THE BEGINNING 
NASA 
THE ASTRONAUTS 
THE FIRST r~EN IN SPACE 
FOUR MORE FOR MERCURY 
SUMMARY OF THE MEDIA AND NASA PAO DURING PROJECT MERCURY 
THE INTERIM YEARS 
FLYING, WALKING AND TRAFFIC COPS 
GEMINI 8: A LESSON IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
THE LAST OF GEMINI 
CONCLUSION OF THE GEMINI YEARS 
APOLLO: THE FIRE 
THE SECOND INTERIM 
THE FIRST OF THE SUN 
FINALLY, AN AMERICAN FIRST 
THE CHECK-OUT FLIGHTS 
THE MEN ON THE MOON 
IN THE SHADOW OF A GIANT: APOLLO 12 
THE LITTLE LM THAT COULD - AQUARIUS 
THE BREAKING OF THE ASTRONAUT IMAGE 
.... AND ONE FOR NOSTALGIA: APOLLO 17 
CONCLUSION OF APOLLO 
Page 
1 
4 
21a 
29 
59 
84 
135 
159 
182 
212 
220 
228 
243 
263 
273 
286 
298 
308 
328 
334 
347 
378 
382 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX A: THE PAO 
APPENDIX B: TIME CONTRACT 
ACRONYMS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
COSTS 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
; ; ; 
401 
410 
412 
423 
427 
428 
429 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
When the United States of America decided to send men into the black 
sky of space, the men selected were those who were qualified to go. But 
when those men accepted their positions, they also had to accept many 
things that went along with the occupation of being an astronaut, no 
matter how much they did not care for them--fame, adulation, hero-worship, 
people naming their children after them and their spacecraft, parades, 
speeches before governments, meeting heads of state--and trying to 
maintain their own lives as they had known them before becoming 
astronauts. 
The men had been chosen as astronauts because of their proven 
capabilities in relation to flight, not because of the public image 
they might portray. Yet these men found themselves being used by others 
in order to bolster their own images. The 1I 0 thers li were many and 
included the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
magazines, the United States of America, their home towns, their alma 
maters, plus many more organizations and groups. And in some cases, the 
astronauts used their occupations in order to boost their chances 
for obtaining jobs after leaving the astronaut corps. 
The portraits of the astronauts as being some sort of supermen or 
demi-gods were not fostered by the men themselves but by others. The 
media created the images of men that were larger than their real selves. 
The Public Affairs Office (PAO) of NASA was, in essence, to act as a type 
of resource library for the media, having material available for their 
use. The PAO was never supposed to actively push the astronauts into 
the spotlight. 
These areas have been discussed here and there in the media but no 
single cohesive record has ever been made about the publicity of the 
astronauts. The purpose of this thesis is to look at how the PAO and 
several American magazines displayed the astronauts to the American 
public. No attempt will be made to include how newspapers, radio and 
television publicized the astronauts. Discussing the media as a whole 
would be too broad a topic although they will be discussed to some 
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degree within this thesis. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 spelled out how NASA 
was to infonm the public. In part, it read: 
The aeronautical and space activites of the United States shall 
be conducted so as to contribute ..• to the expansion of human 
knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space. The 
Administration shall provide for the widest practicable and 
appropriate dissemination of information concerning 1ts activities 
and the results thereof. (54: back cover) 
Obviously a public relations office would be required in order to 
fulfill this charter and NASA set about creating one. The public relations 
office would have the task of showing NASA to itself through internal 
communications and newsletters, and to the country and the world through 
news releases and accommodating the media's desires. NASA needed public 
opinion in order to survive because its funding was determined by 
Congress. In 1970, NASA Administrator Dr. Thomas Paine explained that 
"an agency such as ours is completely dependent on public opinion and 
Congressional support." Thus, in order to remain intact, NASA had to 
make i tse 1 f look good to the people. (159: April 27, 1970) 
On the other hand, the magazines had no directive from the 
government to make the United States' manned space flights appear good. 
They reported what they saw. Yet some magazines seemed to be occasionally 
caught up in some sort of excitement and they passed it onto the nation 
and the world for everyone to see. 
The thought of sending machines and rockets into space was 
exciting in itself but the thought of putting men amongst the stars 
was practically unbelievable. It was something that humanity had 
dreamed of throughout its history. The technology required to put forth 
such an effort was also almost beyond belief, but not everyone could 
readily understand the language of the technicians who made the flights 
possible. Their reports were cold ink upon paper accompanied by 
thousands of seemingly meaningless equations, graphs and charts. But 
there was one thing that everyone could understand and identify with; 
that was the man who was going to lie in the top of a rocket, the man who 
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was gOing to soar weightlessly above the heads of all others he had left 
behind, the man who was going to gaze upon the first footprint ever left 
by a human upon another celestial body. The story was not the millions 
of miles of wires in the rockets, not the capacities of the fuel tanks 
that held liquid oxygen and hydrogen, not the computers that spoke 
numerical languages all their own: it was the man who everyone thought 
was important and idolized, and the media brought its attention to 
bear upon this type of man who had been labeled "Astronaut. 1I It was he 
who could sell NASA to the United States and the United States to the 
world. 
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THE BEGINNING 
Until the United States sent men to orbit the moon, it seemed as 
though the Americans were always behind the Russians in everything related 
to space. The Russians had put up the first satellite. They had orbited 
the first animal around the earth. They had fired the booster that put 
the first man around the earth. They had the first multi-man spacecraft 
in space. They had even hit the moon first with a satellite. It did not 
matter that it had crashed; it had hit the moon which was something more 
than what we had done. They had done just about everything first until we 
sent Apollo 8 around the moon that Christmas Eve in 1968. It was then that 
the crown of the king of the hill changed hands. 
From the orbital track circling the moon, the astronauts of Apollo 8 
sent televised pictures to earth, showing their accomplishment to everyone 
whom they had left a quarter million miles behind. To the people on 
earth, those men were the new American heroes. 
When the astronauts came back to earth, they held a news conference 
telling the members of the mass media from allover the world about their 
adventure. They wrote individual articles for an issue of Life magazine. 
They were ushered on tours throughout the United States and the world. 
They were famous: they were the first men to the moon. Heads 
of state honored their visits. Special sessions of governments listened 
to their words. 
The men had been chosen to do a job and they did it. For that, 
thousands of people lined parade routes to see them pass by in the 
open top automobiles. There had not been an accident during the flight 
that required any great heroism on the part of anyone of them. Yet 
there had been suspense if their equipment was going to work properly 
when called upon to perform. The men had done the job required of them--
circle the moon and come home to prove that the manned machines worked 
correctly. 
The crew of Apollo 8 did not go to the moon through their own 
efforts in the manner in which Charles Lindbergh had crossed the Atlantic 
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Ocean by himself 41 years earlier. Not only had they sat at the top of 
a towering Saturn V rocket when they were launched but also on top of one 
of the greatest supporting forces ever assembled for a peacetime effort. 
Because they were the most visible part of the organization, i.e., the 
people actually making the trip, they were the center of attention. Thus, 
for doing what had been asked of them by the rest of their organization, 
they were made heroes, something they had not asked for, but which was 
inevitable in the nature of their task. They could hush governmental 
bodies listening to them but they could not tell anyone that they were 
not heroes. The image of them as heroes had been instilled into 
practically everyone's minds but that had not been done by the astronauts. 
It was something that the astronauts could not shake no matter how much 
they might have wished to do so. 
They had been made into heroes long before they had been selected 
as astronauts. The relationship of the media and the space efforts had 
begun years before Alan Shepard fired off the pad for his l5-minute 
sub-orbital flight. To study this relationship, it is necessary to look 
at the history of the space program of the United States before any 
astronauts were involved in order to see the evolution of it_and the 
media's attempts to report what was occurring. 
The United States started experimenting with large rocketry 
immediately following World War II when many of the German scientists 
who had worked on Hitler's V-2 rocket program were brought to America. 
No emphasis was put upon the knowledge of these scientists by the Truman 
Administration as it was felt by the country's leaders at that time that, 
until 1965, America's deterrent force would consist of manned bombers 
and air-breathing missiles evolved from the German V-l. From the spring 
of 1946 until late 1951, more than three score V-2s were put together 
from components captured by the U.S. Army and launched from the White 
Sands Proving Groundsin New Mexico. They were heavily instrumented for 
research in the upper atmosphere and were not intended to insert any 
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satellites into orbital flight nor for intercontinental delivery of 
nuclear payloads (54; p19). 
In 1946, the Air Material Command of the Army Air Forces awarded 
a study contract for a long-range missile to Consolidated Vultee Aircraft 
Corporation (Convair) and, by the summer of that year, Convair had the 
designs for what was called "an Americanized V-2" although it was labelled 
"HIROC." This plan was scuttled in 1947 when the Truman Administration 
and the 80th Congress, consisting primarily of economy-minded Republicans, 
gave the newly-created Air Force the option of having funds for either its 
fighter-interceptors and long-range bombers or for the long-range 
missiles. The Air Force chose to eliminate the missile program although 
the test vehicle was nearly complete. The Convair engineers then used 
what was left of the original contract and conducted several static 
firings and three partially successful launchings. By early December, 
1948, the program vanished with the last whiff of smoke when the final 
test was finished (54: p22). 
Although the Air Force had become a separate service, the Army 
continued on its own missile program, viewing rockets as an extension 
of long-range artillery. In 1950, the Army moved its rocket group to 
the Redstone Arsenal near the town of Huntsville, Alabama. It was there 
that this group, headed by Dr. Werner von Braun, the most prominent of the 
Germans, developed a battlefield missile which was a derivative of the 
V-2. It was called the "Hermes C 1." Some changes were made and 
eventually the Hermes was renamed for its birthplace, "Redstone." It 
was made to be highly mobile for field deployment, stood 70 feet tall 
and had a diameter of six feet. Although it was designed by the Army, 
contracts were let for its manufacture by Chrysler Corporation (54: p21). 
While the Army was busy in Huntsville, the Air Force resumed efforts 
on its intercontinental missile program once more because of a change of 
thinking within the Truman Administration. One element causing the change 
was the exploding of a nuclear device by the Soviet Union in 1949; the 
other was the Korean War. Because of these events, the aopropriations for 
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u.s. weapon research soared and the missiles were on again, although still 
conservatively for the Air Force. Convair was awarded the contracts in 
January, 1951 and the project became known as IIAt1as" (54: p22). 
The Eisenhower Administration assumed control in January, 1953, but 
the attitude towards the efforts of the missi1emen remained virtually the 
same as it had been during the Truman years. The missile work continued 
slowly. In August, 1953, the first Redstone that had been manufactured 
at Huntsville took off on the series' maiden flight. It flew only BODO 
yards from the military's test range at Cape Canaveral, Florida (54: p21). 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, the Russians were working 
hard on their missile efforts. They were the first of the allies of World 
War II to use rockets on a large scale, primarily as a type of artillery 
to soften up areas intended for penetration by Russian troops. But soon 
after the war, the Russians turned their minds to developing longer-range 
missiles because of the situation in which they found themselves. They 
were ringed by countries friendly to the United States, and the U.S. had 
its B-29 bombers--planes with a proven capability for carrying nuclear 
payloads--stationed at bases in those countries. With the means to hit 
only those bases, the Russians desired something that could carry the 
war home to the American continent, a long-range weapon. With this 
in mind, the German rocket engineers that the Russians had captured were 
put to work, as Stalin said, to make !Ian effective strait jacket for that 
noisy shopkeeper, Harry Truman ll (54: pplB-20; 32: pplB-20). 
It was probably in 1954 that the Russians were beginning to work 
on a multi-stage missile project. Two years later, Nikita Krushchev was 
able to warn the world that Russian missiles with nuclear warheads would 
"soonll be able to hit any patch of ground on earth (54: pplB-20). 
In the United States, the Air Force did not care for the Army's 
attitude of design and development completely within the government's 
facilities and the Air Force continued to let Convair and its 
subcontractors handle the majority of its rocket engineering. Even a 
private missile research firm, Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, was hired to 
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oversee the systems engineering of the ICBM program for the Air Force. 
However, all the missile boosters in the U.S. were going for military 
purposes and, if the scientists, who were running out of relatively 
inexpensive rockets for their experiments, wanted to shoot heavier payloads 
into space, they would have to wait until the military also had a need to 
put up a comparable load. Between 1954 and 1955, the Army and the Navy 
proposed a joint effort to put a satellite into space but the Department 
of Defense shot down the plan, telling the Navy that it alone was to work 
with the civilian scientists. The Army was to do nothing. In August, 
1955, the United States announced that it would launch a series of 
"small, unmanned earth-circling satellites ll during the International 
Geophysical Year, which began on July 1, 1957 and would last for 18 
months. The information gathered from the satellites would then be 
turned over to the scientists of the IGY for examination. The statement 
was a two-edged sword. First, it gave the U.S. scientists the go-ahead 
to put a satellite in space but it also kept the scientists bound to 
using the non-military missiles. The reason was simple. If the 
scientists were to publicly reveal everything about their experiments, 
in accordance with the 1955 statement, and if they were using military 
boosters, they would have to compromise U.S. military secrets. Therefore, 
the Navy Vanguard Project, designed as a scientific civilian effort, was 
the only program underway to put a satellite in space (164: p8; 54: 
pp20-29) . 
In 1956, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson announced his 
policy defining the "roles and missions" of the services in regards to 
how they were to split up the missile assignments. The Air Force would 
have jurisdiction over any land-based missiles that had a range of more 
than 200 miles. This promptly put the Army·s Redstone missile out of the 
Army·s control. The Navy was to continue working only on intermediate 
range shipboard missiles, its Polaris submarine missile program and the 
Vanguard Project for the civilians (54: p25). 
Actually the Army was able to hold onto its Redstones but only 
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through the use of a ruse. The Army group changed the name of its projects 
to "Jupiter" and said that it was helping the Air Force with its project 
of the same name. Apparently the name change worked because von Braun 
was allowed to continue his Army work. On September 20, 1956, von Braun 
and his associates launched a "Jupiter-C" missile (really a modified 
Redstone) but instead of filling the upper stage with propellant, which 
would no doubt have the capability of putting a satellite in orbit, they 
had to fill it with sand. The Army general in charge of the group, 
~enera1 John Medaris, had been held personab1y responsible by the 
Pentagon to make sure that "no accidents II happened, such as a satellite 
going into orbit and beating Navy's Vanguard to the punch. Despite the 
success of the Jupiter-C launching, officials in Washington were not 
pleased and the orders came down through the Secretary of the Army: 
destroy the upper stages of the remaining Jupiter-Cs. However, the minds 
who devised the first ruse of changing names now devised another trick. 
They would agree to destroy the upper stages but they intended to let time 
do the job for them. Eight of the Redstones were then placed in a 
warehouse at the Redstone arsenal to await a chance for future use. Their 
time would come in a little more than a year (8: p17; 178: pp45-48). 
It was during 1956 at the Geophysical Year Conference in Barcelona 
that the Russians made their formal announcement that they, too, were 
going to launch a space vehicle during the IGY. An informal announcement 
had taken place the previous year when Russian aeronautical and 
astronautical expert Leonid Sedov told the world, a few days after the 
u.s. declared its space intentions, that the Russians were working in the 
same direction but with larger and heavier payloads than what the 
Americans had said would be their goals. At that time, most of the 
Western observers had cast aside Sedov's statements as being Russian 
braggadocio. In June 1957, the Soviet press announced the frequency on 
which the first Russian satellite would transmit its signals. By late 
summer, many American Sovietologists were making outright predictions that 
the Russians were about to launch a satellite and they were guessing the 
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date would be September 17, 1957 to honor the centennial of the birth 
of the grandfather of Russian rocketry, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky,(54: 
pp28-29) . 
On August 26, 1957, Tass, the official voice of the Soviet Union, 
declared that the Russians had successfully launched a "super long range 
distance intercontinental multi-stage ballistic rocket." An American 
general, upset at this news, supposedly remarked, "We captured the wrong 
Germans" (54: p28). 
A little more than a month later the Russians scored their first 
big space triumph over the rest of the world. Apparently using the 
same booster as they had in August, which was obviously a military rocket, 
they launched the first man-made satellite into orbit on October 4, 
1957. With its radio transmitting a beep-beep-beep to tell everyone 
that the Soviets were first in space, Sputnik I revolved around the earth 
once every ninety minutes. 
To the American public, Sputnik I was a threat and a shock. Never 
before had the American homeland been subjected to such a possible 
demonstration that war could be brought there by a foreign power. Gone 
was the security of the oceans that flanked the American continent. No 
Nazi bombers had ever appeared in the skies of the United States. The 
only damage done to the continent during World War II was by a few shells 
fired from a Japanese submarine and by some balloon bombs, which had been 
released in the Japanese islands and carried to America by the jet 
stream. The humiliating beep-beep-beep of Russia's satellite was 
clearly telling the Americans that the Soviet Union possessed the ability 
to bring the war home to them if the Russians so desired. 
In its October 14, 1957 issue, Newsweek told the American public 
that the Russians had achieved three objectives with its 184-pound 
satellite: 1). They had beaten the U.S. in "keen scientific competition" 
to put up a satellite; 2). They had impressed the world that had thought 
of the Russians as being technologically backward; and 3). They backed 
up their earlier claims that they would launch a satellite (122: October 
14, 1957). 
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The public was critical of the Eisenhower Administration yet the 
public had reason to blame itself. In a poll taken by the University of 
Michigan's Survey Research Center for use by the National Association of 
Science Writers in April, 1957, participants were asked if they had ever 
heard of satellites or artificial moons. Only 20% of the respondents 
said that they had, 26% had a vague notion and 54% said they did not know 
anything about such terms (12: p50). 
Former President Truman, forgetful of how his administration had 
treated the missile programs, signed a letter written by the Democratic 
National Committee charging the Eisenhower Administration with 
"complacency" and Ifai1ure" by letting the Russians fire their satellite 
into space first (122: October 21,1957). 
In a press conference on October 9, 1957, President Eisenhower 
made his first public remarks since the Russian space shot five days 
earlier. He seemed to have an ambivalent attitude towards the Russians 
success. To newsmen, he said that he congratulated the Russians for 
their achievement and then added that "our satellite program has never 
been conducted as a race with other nations. Rather, it has been carefully 
scheduled as a part of the scientific work of the International 
Geophysical Year" (164: p8). 
At the same time, Eisenhower said that lithe effect of Sputnik 
does not raise my apprehension, not one iota." But Eisenhower must 
have been affected somewhat because at a secret meeting of the National 
Security Council, held shortly after Sputnik I, he asked for a two percent 
increase in the $38 billion budget of the Defense Department. He said the 
increase would be used for a build-up of the missile programs.(122: 
October 21, 1957). 
But within the ranks of the Eisenhower Administration there was some 
disagreement on how the people there viewed Sputnik. The Undersecretary 
of State, Christian Herter, said he thought that the Russians had 
accomplished an "amazing feat.1I Other officials tried to play down the 
effects of Sputnik. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles stated 
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that "the Rusians have in fact done us a good turn, unintentionally, in 
establishing the concept of freedom of international space" by orbiting 
Sputnik over the airspace of all the world's countries which proved that 
they had approved the principle of Eisenhower's Open Skies Policy. 
Clarence Randall, a White House aide, called Sputnik "a silly baub1e ... in 
the sky." Secretary of Defense Wilson told reporters that Sputnik was 
a "neat scientific trick •.• nobody is going to drop anything down on you 
from a satellite while you're asleep, so don't worry about it" (12: p16). 
But the public did not believe everything told to it by the men who 
attempted to play down the Sputnik launch. The news had been a page one 
item on newspapers across the U.S. The only newspaper that was an 
exception was the Milwaukee Sentinel where the World Series of Baseball, 
which was being held in Milwaukee, occupied the top spot. Letters in the 
October 21, 1957 issues of Newsweek and Time showed the concern of 
Americans. While a few people still referred to the shot as a publicity 
stunt by the Russians, most were frightened by the implications. A poll 
taken six months after the launch showed that 91% of the Americans had 
heard of Sputnik; of those, 33% believe that the U.S. was in some type of 
space race. Another poll showed that 61% of the Americans believed that 
the next object in space would have "Made in USA" stamped on it (178: 
• 
p49; 111: October 4, 1957). 
Even a British newspaper, the London Express, had faith in America, 
stating that eventually the Americans would catch up to and surpass the 
Russians' space efforts. Therefore, said the Express, no one shoul'd worry; 
in effect, the newspaper was saying: "The Yanks are coming, the Yanks are 
coming." The London Daily Mail printed a cartoon showing Krushchev 
standing atop a prostrate world and pointing proudly to his moon in the 
sky and the Mail printedanotethatwhtle.IIIt is agreed that Russia's 
victory is chiefly psychological and dangerous as a propaganda weapon ...• 
... there is no reason to fear that Krushchev will take bigger steps •.. 
(12, p46;-159: October 21,1957). 
Obviously, the Russian premier was thinking along the same lines. 
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Before the satellite had been launched, he had made threatening moves 
towards Syria. Those actions disturbed Eisenhower and, in an unprecedented 
move, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles invited the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Gromyko, to his private residence to discuss the situation. 
Unfortunately, the date, set before Sputnik, was October 5, the day 
after the launch. At that meeting, Dulles told GromYko that the U.S. 
would go to war if Turkey was attacked, but he noticed his words 
had little impact upon the Soviet Minister (12: p47). 
The next day, Tass announced that the Russians had exploded a 
powerful hydrogen bomb at high altitude. This, coupled with Sputnik, 
apparently gave the Russians a reason to rattle their sabers. Members 
of NATO received threatening letters from Krushchev telling of nuclear 
destruction by ballistic missiles if they allowed the United States to 
continue to base its military forces on their soils. Even the U.S. 
was threatened in the same manner after Eisenhower told the nation that 
he was considering armed intervention in Lebanon's trouble with the 
United Arab Republic (backed by Russia) if the trouble persisted. Years 
before, Stalin had told his Politburo that someday \Ian intercontinental 
rocket could change the fate of war.1I In 1957, his words sounded as if 
they were coming true (12; pp47-51). 
There was resentment in the Pentagon, too, because more had not been 
done earlier by the Americans. Lt. General James M. Gavin, a proponent 
of space exploration, said that there was IIdeep and widespread anger ••• 
in some quarters that our scientists had not done better .•.• This degree 
of ignorance of what the Soviets were capable of doing, with no apparent 
comparable capability on our part, was totally unacceptable to the 
American people •.• II (12: p45). 
At the Redstone Arsenal, on the night that Sputnik I found its 
way into orbit, von Braun was having supper at the Officers Club with 
then-Defense Secretary Designate Neil H. McElroy. A phone call took 
von Braun away from the table and when he returned, he told McElroy the 
news of the Russian shot. Von Braun pleaded to be given permission to 
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launch a satellite, using one of the eight missiles in the warehouse 
McElroy preferred to wait 90 days rather than to try a launching 
immediately. Finally, on November 8, 1957, von Braun received the 
official orders for his rocket group to proceed with their project, 
code-named 1I0rbiter ll (8: p19). 
Something that might have changed the minds of the administration, 
whi ch had not wanted the mi 1 itary to pu.t any 5 ate 11 i tes into orbi t before 
the civilians did, was the launching of another Russian satellite. On 
November 3, Sputnik II took to the skies carrying a live dog, named Laika. 
The satellite was radioing back telemetry that Laika was alive and well. 
Now, the criticism poured down upon Eisenhower's Administration. He moved 
up a national address on space and science, by a week and was privately 
shaken by the news. Vice-President Richard Nixon wanted to beef up the 
U.S. Information Agency in order to counter the Russian propaganda 
concerning the space shots. Even critics of Sputnik I, who had claimed 
that the first shot was nothing more than a heavy radio transmitter, 
fell silent with the news that Laika was living in space (122: November 
11, 1957, November 11, 1957). 
The Russians, too, received some protest from animal lovers when it 
was learned that the Russians were not going to bring Laika back alive 
but let her slowly die in space since there was no way for a satellite to 
return safely at that time. The transmissions from Sputnik II fell 
quiet days after the launch, signalling that Laika had passed away. 
The Russian stories about the satellite did likewise (122: November 18, 
1957; 159: November 18,1957). 
But the protest aimed at Eisenhower was far harsher. despite the 
fact that the President had not only given McElroy the go-ahead to let 
von Braun's team work on their project but also ordered an acceleration 
of the Vanguard Project. Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Baines Johnson 
(D-Texas) ordered spec~al Congressional hearings to study what had gone 
wrong with U.S. space efforts. The space programs had been a favorite 
subject of the Texas senator since 1949 when he had served on a committee 
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studying them and he would continue to be instrumental in their direction 
throughout his political life. Into the hearing room carne many prominent 
people to testify before Johnson's committee. Among those who spoke were 
Dr. Edward Teller, the father of the H-bomb; General James Doolittle, 
chairman of the Scientific Advisory Committee; General Curtis E. LeMay, 
commander of the Strategic Air Command; and von Braun. The picture 
painted by the witnesses before the senators was one of confusion. Those 
who testified pointed their fingers at everyone else and at other 
organizations; no one wanted to be blamed along with the Eisenhower 
Administration. But the hearings had only begun when the U.S. was hit 
with another setback. This was one of its own making (12: pp49-54; 
178: p54). 
On December 6, 1957, the Vangaurd Project attempted to launch its 
satellite in full view of the world, in keeping with Eisenhower's 
public policy. At the end of the countdown, the combination Viking-
Aerobee-Hi rocket rose about four feet off the pad and the first stage 
blew apart in a ball of fire. The nose cone, containing the satellite, 
fell 75 feet away from the pad, splitting the ~-pound sphere like an 
egg. To a woman reporter who saw it later after the fires were out, it 
was like a wounded animal beeping pathetically. She suggested that someone 
kill it to put it out of its misery (98: December 16, 1957). 
The explosion on the Vanguard pad caused the government to search 
for scapegoats. It was regarded by many to be a national disastor and 
who had reported it to the nation but the media? They had been tipped 
off about the launch by the Navy and reporters had swarmed into the 
launch vicinity at Cape Canaveral. much to the dismay of the members of 
the launch team. It seems that the idea of inviting the media had 
originated with Murray Snyder, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Public Affairs, who said he was only responding to Congressional pressure 
for less secrecy about the Vanguard program since it concerned no 
military secrets. McElroy thought Snyder's idea was good and he passed 
it along with his approval. So did the White House. But all levels of 
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government denied having anything to do with the publicity that had been 
built up before the launch. The Navy Public Information Officer (PIO) at 
the Cape who had helped to play up the launching was fired from his 
position for inviting the media to watch the disastrous launch. Newspapers 
in other countries called the fizzle heard 'round the world by various 
labels: "Dudnik, Kaputnik, Flopnik, Stayputnik," and many more. While 
Russia sent the u.s. condolences, its representatives in the United 
Nations offered the U.s. representatives technical assistance if the 
Americans wanted it. It is presumed that the U.s. refused the offer 
(163: December 16, 1957; 122: December 16, 1957). 
Because of the blame laid upon the media, reporters at Cape 
Canaveral began to suffer. Many of the sources that reporters had used 
before the Vanguard launch were now dried up. Local police, acting at 
the request of the base commander, Major General Donald Yates (who had 
worked with Eisenhower during World War II), kept photographers away 
from vantage points overlooking the base. During these early shots, 
Ralph Morse, a photographer for Life, had set up his camera with a long 
telephoto lens in a deserted house five miles north of a launch site 
and the police swooped down on him. Pointing out that he was on private 
property, Morse convinced the police to leave him alone. The next day, 
Morse returned to the site and so did the police. This time, Morse's 
argument failed to sway them since they now held the title to the land 
in their hands; it had been sold overnight and Morse was swept away 
(98: April 2, 1965; 122: February 15, 1958). 
Faced with the tactics of General Yates, members of the media 
found their hands tied. There was little or no information coming out of 
the Cape that they could report. But then Yates gave them a break. He 
told them he would make a deal. He would give them advance information 
and schedules of launches only if they would not report about the 
interservice rivalries nor publish any advance news about the launches. 
The general did not want another public buildup such as what had happened 
during the Vanguard fiasco. The reporters checked with their editors on 
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Yates' conditions and those who agreed were given credentials to report 
at the Cape. Even the members of the media apparently did not want 
things botched up a second time because more criticism would be thrown 
at them. Life appeared to be editorializing when it said that the U.S. 
should take a cue from the Russians and not announce any missile launchings 
until after they had taken place. Despite the agreed upon restrictions, 
there was a minor slip-up which the media took upon themselves to correct 
before Yates cut them off completely. What had happened was that Darrell 
Garwood of the International News Service had sent a wire story to the 
effect that another Vanguard attempt would take place on either January 
23 or 25, 1958. Immediately the United Press' Charles Taylor, acting 
under orders from his New York headquarters, filed another story, 
clarifying the INS article. Taylor wrote that another missile launching, 
"possibly a Vanguard," was scheduled for late January. Yates never took 
any action regarding the slip. The media had vindicated themselves 
(98: December, 16, 1957; 122: February 15, 1958). 
In January, 1958, a Jupiter-C, one of the eight missiles that had 
been stored in the warehouse at Redstone, arrived at the Cape and was 
erected on its launching pad at night to prevent it from being seen by 
the prying eyes of newsmen. When daylight arrived, the missile and 
and its gantry were shrouded with tarps to protect against the 
photographers who were stationed miles away on the beaches. It may 
seem that Yates was gOing back on his word but this author thinks 
otherwise. No doubt the reporters who had agreed to his terms knew 
about the missile but Yates still had to contend with those newsmen 
who had not accepted his conditions and might report occurrences at the 
Cape to the public. Because of this possibility, Yates ordered the 
secret moves surrounding the preparations. The blackout was almost 
complete. Only one reporter, Chris Butler of the Orlando Sentinel, 
reported anything about the missile being set up at the Cape (97: p60; 
8: pp24-26). 
Gordon Harris, a Public Information Officer at the Cape working for 
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the Army group, was allowed to prepare a special press release kit about 
the upcoming mission. Harris recalls in a letter: 
Joe Jones ... set out for ~Dr. James~ Van Allan to get the dope 
on his experiment which was the most important discovery of 
Explorer I / the name of the satellite to be launched by the 
Jupiter-C and was designed to detect radioactivity around the 
earth~. Together we assembled a kit of 100 double-spaced pages, 
describing the rocket (with security limits), the mission, 
experiments, etc. Jet Propulsion Laboratory of Cal Tech, an 
Army contractor, assembled the satellite and also prepared 
publicity material plus a l6mm color film. I reviewed the JPL 
input and the Pentagon went over our product plus JPL's. Defense 
censors removed the term "Army" from our copy wherever possible. 
When we finally got approval, we reproduced about 200 copies for 
hand out after a successful launch. They were hand carried to 
our quarters at the Cape . 
... Air Force had set up a viewing site on the Cape for the 
first time for Vanguard--same area would be used by press watching 
the Army launch. 
Army's information people in the Pentagon and I urged Medaris 
to put an information type in the blockhouse. He would talk over 
an open phone line to a guy at the press site, who would relay info 
to the press, and to a large Pentagon room where military and 
civilian personnel would assemble. Medaris had Dr. Kurt Debus, 
launch director, place a three-legged stool beside the phone and 
headset just outside the firing room. He put me on the stool with 
the admonition, "If we hear one peep, out you go!" So I reported 
what occurred during the last two hours before liftoff--giving 
names of key blockhouse players, etc., etc. The press did not 
hear my voice directly ..•. But no one put any restrictions on what 
I said (70b). 
Harris was ordered to keep his voice calm and cool though. This 
was a precedent for the later, much-publicized "Voices" of Mercury 
Control, Gemini Control, Apollo Control and Mission Control (8, p26). 
On January 31, 1958,84 days after von Braun had been given 
permission to launch his missile, the modified Redstone bore through the 
atmosphere putting the 3l-pound Explorer I into orbit. At that time, 
the U.S. did not have the tracking network that it had in the mid-sixties 
and after launch, there was no confirmation of orbit for about 90 minutes 
when the radar at the JPL in California detected Explorer I coming over 
the far horizon. It was 1 a.m., February 1 when officials connected with 
the shot held a press conference at Patrick Air Force Base near the Cape. 
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As the missilemen walked down the aisle, 200 reporters stood and 
applauded their efforts. The officials told the reporters practically all 
they knew about the mission and the press kits were distributed to the 
members of the media. Two hours after the launch, President Eisenhower 
told the nation that the United States had orbited a satellite 
successfully. During his speech he also took a slap at the Soviet Union 
by announcing that the information gathered from Explorer I would be 
immediately turned over to the scientists of the IGY, something that the 
Russians had yet failed to do with their information from Sputniks I 
and II. Eisenhower avoided saying that the launch had been accomplished 
by the Army as he still considered satellite launches to be a civilian 
task. But everyone knew who had put up the missile. If they did not, 
the next issue of Newsweek clued them in with a picture of the missile 
on its cover; the photograph showed the Jupiter with the darkly-painted 
word "ARMY" clearly stenciled on its white side (l22: February 10, 1958; 
8: p26; 98: February 10, 1958; 70b). 
The February 10, 1958 issue of Newsweek contained seven pages 
describing the U.S. shot in comparison to the five it had carried about 
Sputnik I in early October. The U.S. had a space triumph and now the 
media could spread the word about it as much as they wanted. 
On March 17, 1958, Vanguard finally achieved orbit and its signals 
confirmed what scientists had always thought but had been unable to prove; 
the earth was not a perfect sphere. On March 26, Explorer III joined 
the other two U.S. satellites in orbit (Explorer II had failed on March 
5 when a fourth stage failed to ignite) (54: p30). 
Through the scientific use of its satellites sending back 
information about the space surrounding earth, the U.S. was creating 
a first for itself. It was a small bit of salve for the wounded egos 
of many Americans. The general populace became much more aware of the 
space programs, if the entries in the Reader's Guide to Periodical 
Literature are an indication. In the 1955-57 issue, the Guide listed 
only 57 entries under the category labelled "Space Flight." There is 
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no section on space vehicles or astronauts. In the next issue, 1957-59 
"Space Flight" had 278 entries, of which 52 discuss flights to the moon; 
the word astronauts had not appeared, but "Space Vehicles" contains 
15 articles. In the 1959-61 edition, 274 entries fill the "Space Flight" 
section and, of those, four discuss flights to Mars, three about shots 
to Venus and 59 deal with moon flights. Now, 309 listings are shown under 
"Space Vehicles," taking up nearly four. pages. Only one appears under 
"Astronauts" and that is a reference. By the 1961-63 issue, the Guide 
had eight of its pages devoted to "Space Flight," seven-and-a-half to 
"Space Vehicles and 68 headings under "Astronauts." If a person was to 
judge from the Guide alone, it would be possible to say that after Sputnik 
the press had caught the fever of going into space. It was the next 
frontier. 
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NASA 
Contrary to what some people may believe, the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration was not created solely to support manned 
space flight nor did it come out of nowhere. NASA was born in 1958 
through the legislative efforts of many people but it was also part of 
the evolutionary process of a much older organization. 
That older organization came int~ existence under circumstances 
in 1915 that were similar to those of 1958. As the European powers were 
busy battling each other, it was easy to notice that the United States 
had lost the edge of aerial leadership that it had had until 1908. As a 
measure to regain that lead, a research group was created with the title 
of liThe Main Committee." Its name reflected the thinking of President 
Woodrow Wilson who desired not to give any of the Europeans the idea that 
America was abandoning its neutrality. At the first meeting of liThe Main 
Committee," the 12 unpaid men who made it up decided to change the name of 
their organization to the IINational Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
(NACA)" (54: p8). 
As NACA established itself, it became more concerned with 
aerodynamics rather than trying to research new means of propulsion for 
airpl ffies or the construction of materials for airframes. Through this 
type of research, NACA gave the U.S. air superiority in all fields during 
the decades of the twenties and thirties. This was because NACA was not 
only helping the military but also civilian aircraft manufacturing firms 
and the National Bureau of Standards. Because of its efforts, NACA 
developed a high reputation for originality and thorough research 
and that reputation would follow it until 1958 when the former "Main 
Committee II would become yet another name with another purpose that might 
have been beyond the comprehension but not the dreams of the twelve 
originators who had started NACA on its way in 1915 (54: p6). 
During its first five years, NACA depended upon the military to 
provide test facilities and, in 1920, the committee moved into its own 
accommodations at Langley Field, Virginia. By 1939, NACA was still 
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relatively small for a governmental agency. There were no more than 
550 employees and the budget topped four and a half million dollars. 
With World War II on the horizon~ a person might think that NACA would 
have been busier in its research but President Roosevelt was trying to 
appear neutral. Only nine months before Pearl Harbor was attacked~ NACA's 
chairman ordered research begun on jet-powered propulsion systems. NACA 
started to grow beyond the limits of Langley. It acquired two more plots 
of ground to conduct its research; one was near Cleveland, Ohio, and 
the other was 40 miles south of San Francisco at Moffett Field. When 
the war came, instead of conducting original research, NACA was now 
busy "fixing" and "cleaning" the designs that the armed forces of the 
U.S. had pushed into use posthaste without much testing (54: pp6-10). 
When the war ended, NACA was experimenting with faster types of 
propulsion systems and, in order to gain information about the effects of 
high speed flight upon materials and aerodynamic designs, the agency 
started using small missiles that were launched from its Wallops Island 
Station off the Virginia coast. This pilotless research area of NACA was 
headed by Dr. Robert R. Gi1ruth who was later to become the director of 
NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center for eleven years (54: p10). 
In 1952, the country was at war again, this time in Korea, and 
NACA found itself relegated once more to "fixing" and "cleaning" the 
designs that the Air Force and Navy were already using. While working 
with the mill itary on thoc:;e proj ects, NACA' s Committee on Aerodynami cs, 
possibly the most influential of the divisions within NACA, made a 
decision on June 24 that NACA should set up a study group to look at 
"space flight and associated problems." Two years later, NACA approached 
the Air Force and the Navy with plans for creating a high speed plane to 
study the upper atmosphere. What NACA wanted was a triparte relationship; 
the Air Force and Navy would supply the finances, NACA would act as the 
overall technical director and the Air Force would be responsible for 
finding a contractor along with supervising contruction and design. The 
project would ultimately become known as the X-15. This was still not 
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enough for some of NACA's planners. They felt that NACA should pursue a 
course of study designed to look at the problems of flight through the 
speed necessary to escape the earth's gravitational pull --25,000 mph--an 
undreamed-of speed for that time. Definitely, someone at NACA was 
thinking of the agency becoming involved in work in outer space (54: 
pp56-58) . 
However, so was the Air Force. General Thomas S. Power, the 
commander of the Air Force's Air Research Development Commission (ARDC), 
advocated a project, labeled as the X-20, or Dyna-Soar (for Dynamic 
Soaring), which was to be a step beyond the X-15. The X-20 would be 
"eventually capable of useful intercontinental military and cOll1T\ercial 
transport and cargo operation. 1I The real purpose of getting the X-20 
study going was because once the study was underway and could show 
something to higher officials, then getting money for the "general 
technical work" would be easier. In late 1956, ARDC sent an invitation 
to NACA asking for its cooperation in studying the program with the Air 
Force. NACA accepted the terms, being careful to not allow the 
research for the Air Force to stop NACA's own research programs on outer 
space (54: p69-71). 
The next year, about a week after Sputnik I took to the skies, 
Secretary of the Air Force James H. Douglas appointed a committee of 
55 academic and corporate scientists to "propose a line of positive 
action" for the Air Force regarding space exploration. By the end of 
October, the committee reported that the Air Force, naturally, should be 
put in charge of all activities related to space. The Air Force kept 
pushing for its future in space; on December 10, 1958, four days after 
the Vanguard fiasco, Lt. General Donald L. Putt, the Air Force Deputy 
Chief of Staff, ordered a "Directorate of Astronautics" to be set up 
within the Air Force under the leadership of Brigadier General Homer 
A. Boushey. But this action ran into opposition from the very beginning 
when officials within the Pentagon, including Defense Secretary McElroy 
did not like it. The New York Times reported that Defense Department 
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officials were referring to the Air Force's actions as trying to "grab 
the limelight and establish a position." Only three days after Putt's 
"Directorate" had been set up, it was cancelled because of the opposition 
to it (54: p73). 
The X-20 project continued despite the loss of the Directorate of 
Astronautics and it, too, suffered a setback but one of smaller magnitude. 
The NACA researchers realized that the ,spacecraft was far too heavy for 
the boosters that were then available and suggested that the Air Force 
look to other means for the time being to place a man in earth orbit. The 
alternative called for a wingless spacecraft, which some in the military 
referred to as lithe man in the can" project. Once again, ,NACA found itself in 
the position of helping the Air Force instead of working totally independent 
with its own ideas. Paul Haney, who was to become of one NASA's more 
notable PIOs during the sixties, observed, that during those years, NACA 
was a "mechanical handmaiden to the Air Force" (66; 54: p72). 
Apparently there were those in the nation who did not feel that 
the space efforts were proceeding in a correct fashion. In mid-October, 
1957, the American Rocket Society called for a civilian agency to take 
charge of U.S. space activities. The following month brought another 
request for the same suggestion, this time from the National Academy of 
Sciences. On January 23, 1958, the Senate Preparedness Committee, which 
had been set up by Lyndon Johnson to investigate why the U.S. was lagging 
behind Russia in space, produced a summary of its findings. Among the 
17 recommendations was one implying that a space agency should be formed. 
By April, 29 bills or resolutions had been introduced in Congress in 
regards to the formation of some sort of organization to manage the 
nation's space tasks (54: p77). 
In early February, 1958, Eisenhower's Administration was trying to 
solve the problem. At the time, NACA had the attitude that it did not 
expect "more than its historic niche in Government-financed science and 
engineering. II The people in NACA were working for the space role but they 
still wished to retain their IImechanical handmaiden ll role with the 
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military; all they wanted was a bigger lump of the space research. 
On March 14, NACA took on more research when it aligned itself 
formally with the U.S.A.F. to work at drawing up plans for manned orbital 
flights but this was a plan by NACA officials to simply obtain sanction 
for the work that its scientists had been working on anyway through the 
past years for their own agency (54: p86). 
On April 2, 1958, Eisenhower deltvered a message to Congress calling 
for the organization of a "National Aeronautical and Space Agency" which 
would evolve out of NACA and take responsibility for all space activities 
except those associated with military projects. He stated that the 
authority of that organization would rest with one man as its head and 
he would be advised by a 17-member "National Aeronautics and Space 
Board. II The "Board" was something akin to the original "Main Corrmittee" 
of NACA but the most important thing about the proposal was that the 
President wanted the power of the agency centralized in one man and not 
spread out to a committee as NACA was then using for its control. In the 
same message, Eisenhower directed NACA and the Defense Department to 
review the projects which were under the control of the Advanced Research 
Project Agency (ARPA), an agency that had been set up in February, 1958, 
by McElroy to manage all of the existing projects. The committee of NACA 
and Air Force officials was to determine which of ARPA's projects would 
be transferred to the new and upcoming NASA. The representatives on the 
committee, including some from the Bureau of the Budget, agreed on all 
aspects of their discussions except one--who was to take charge of manned 
space flights. On the same day that Eisenhower made his suggestions to 
Capitol Hill, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Thomas D. White, 
was at work on another plan to benefit his service. That day he received 
approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an Air Force manned space 
venture. There is an ironic twist here. There was a high possibility 
that NACA would become NASA because of the bills before Congress yet NACA 
continued to help the Air Force with its news plans coming down from 
General White as well as the plans for the X-20 Dyna-Soar project (54: 
p90-9l). 
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When the bill was being discussed in Congress, it became apparent 
that the agency would ultimately be a civilian one and that its nucleus 
would be formed from NACA. That was almost evident by the amount of NACA's 
work that was related to space; by early 1958, more than half of NACA's 
research was dedicated to space flight. Many of the NACA employees 
preferred to work on the space efforts as an independent agency but there 
were also those on the committee who did not care to be by themselves but 
wanted to keep doing what NACA had always been doing, performing research 
for the military (54: pp84-85). 
The Air Force was still continuing on its own projects though. 
During April, 1958, various officials within the Air Force's ARDC were 
working on what was called "Man in Space Soonest (MISS)," which was 
actually a four-part program. The first part was to put a man into orbit 
through various steps. The second phase was to duplicate the first step 
but more intensely with more sophisticated spacecraft capable of 
enduring fourteen-day flights. The third aspect involved unmanned 
lunar landings and missions to provide reconnaissance for the fourth phase 
when men would land on the moon. The final year in this time table was 
set for 1965, far shorter than what actually happened. The estimate of 
the cost came to about $1.5 billion, about sixteen times less than what it 
would finally cost the U.S. for the entire effort to put man on the moon. 
The idea was imaginative. Later it became true in pretty much the same 
way of the Air Force proposal, but this version was very naive in relation 
to the time and money it would take before astronauts would walk upon the 
moon's surface (54: pp92, 96). 
On April 30, 1958, the Convair people showed up on the scene once 
more with their missile program that had been on and off since 1948. 
This time it was proposed to the Air Force that the service use Convair's 
Atlas as the launch vehicle for the manned space shots. Lt. General 
Samuel Anderson, commander of ARDC, recommended against it because he did 
not respect how one of Convair's associates had done its work and, upon 
Anderson's advice, General LeMay dropped the proposal. But time would 
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prove best for Convair, like it had for von Braun's Redstone, and, 
eventually, the Atlas was accepted by the Air Force for the MISS program 
and various other satellite shots along with NASA's Project Mercury 
(54: pp92-96). 
On July 16, 1958, both Houses of Congress passed the bill sent to 
them by Eisenhower. Despite the passing of that bill, NASA was not told 
that it had the man-in-space program a~d, because of that omission, MISS 
was still given a chance for survival. In an attempt to insure that the 
Air Force would hang onto the man-in-space aspect of the space programs. 
ARPA suggested that the Air Force scale down its budget requests if that 
service expected to continue with its wishes. But two days after the bill 
passed, NACA Director Hugh Dryden played his cards to Eisenhower's 
Science Advisor, James R. Killian, and gambled for the right to take the 
man-in-space projects. Dryden's message read, in part: 
The assignment of the direction of the manned satellite 
program to NASA would be consistent with the President's message 
to Congress and with the pertinent extracts from the National 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 ... (54: pIal}. 
Although Dryden wanted the manned projects for NASA, he also wanted 
to avoid a head-on clash with the Air Force leaders who still desired to 
keep MISS alive (54: pIal). 
The Air Force made a last ditch stand for the green light on the 
manned orbital aspects of MISS on July 24 and 25, 1958, when ARDC made 
a series of urgent appeals to the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air 
Staff and the non-military ARPA for funds for MISS. The ARPA Director, 
Roy Johnson, was not swayed by the appeals and held off with his approval, 
saying that the members of the Eisenhower Administration were not yet 
convinced of the military's need to be in space. Johnson knew that if 
Eisenhower signed the bill, which he gave indications of doing, then NASA 
would be given $40 million. It would thus be foolish, reasoned Johnson, 
to give the Air Force another $50 million, which is what it was requesting 
through ARDC, to do essentially the same thing that NASA had in mind 
(54: pp97-98). 
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Finally, President Eisenhower, on July 29, 1958, signed the bill 
that brought NASA into existence. However, there were some changes in the 
bill that had occurred during the time from when he had sent the bill to 
Congress and when it was returned for his signature. The large 17-member 
advis'ory board had been \,/hittled down to a five-to-nine member National 
Aeronautics and Space Council. The revisions also called for a IINational 
Aeronautics and Space Administration ll rather than an lIagencyll and the 
IIAdministration ll was to be headed by a team of two people, and administr 
administrator and a deputy. A civilian-military liaison committee was a 
was added to NASA, the members of which would be appointed by the 
President. This committee would insure the exchange of information 
between the space administration and the armed forces. Other amendments 
allowed the organization to hire a number of people through means other 
than the civil service roster and NASA was instructed to IIcooperate with 
other nations and groups of nations." And then there was one phrase which 
determined the future of NASAls public relations, 
The aeronautical and space activities of the United States 
shall be conducted so as to contribute ••• to the expansion of human 
knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space. The 
Administration shall provide for the widest practicable and 
appropriate dissemination of information conerning its activities 
and the results thereof (54: Back Cover). 
These changes were made primarily through the efforts of Senators 
Lyndon Johnson, Styles Bridges, the ranking Republican (New Hampshire) on 
JOhnsonls committee, and Democrat John W. McCormack (Massachusetts), who 
was the House Majority Leader and the Chairman of the House Select 
Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration (54: p98). 
Eisenhower, acting on the advice of Killian, decided not to select 
Dryden for the number one seat of NASA. There were many who considered 
the apolitical chairman of NACA to be the best choice but Eisenhower picked 
a solid Republican, T. Keith Glennan, to be NASAls first administrator. 
Glennen had been the President of the Case Institute of Technology in 
Cleveland at the time of his nomination and had been a member of the 
Atomic Energy Commission. With Glenn as administrator, Dryden would be 
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the overseer of NASA's technical and scientific endeavors. As designed 
by the bill, NASA would also absorb the more than 8000 employees of NACA 
as well as that organization's $100 million budget. In addition to those 
items, NASA would also assume control of the Vanguard and Explorer 
projects (but the Army would hold onto von Braun and his associates until 
1960), and various other projects related to the Army's and Air Force's 
programs. Another $117 million came from the Defense Department where 
this money had been allocated for purposes related to space. Still, the 
bill never did say who was going to take charge of the man-in-space 
venture (54: p99) 
Under Eisenhower's Administration, the Air Force was allowed to 
continue working on its Dyna-Soar project in conjunction with NASA but 
MISS was taken away from Air Force control. True to his words about 
separating the military from the civilians in relation to his "space 
for peace" line of thought, Eisenhower gave the nod to NASA to start 
thinking about putting a man in space through its own efforts. The 
date when Eisenhower made this decision is not recorded but it is thought 
to be around August l8~ 1958, three weeks after he signed the bill. 
About a month and a half from the time Eisenhower told NASA that 
it could assume control over putting a man in space, NACA finally 
became NASA on October 1, 1958. There was no great occurrence to mark 
the day for the employees. They simply left NACA one night and, when they 
returned to their offices the next morning, they found themselves working 
for NASA, a research organization that,-for the first time, was working 
for itself and not someone else. 
29 
THE ASTRONAUTS 
Only one month after NASA was created, its aeromedical experts met 
at Langley and drew up plans for obtaining pilots for its man-in-space 
program, as of yet unnamed. The plan called for the services and 
representatives from private industry to nominate a pool of 150 men for 
pilot selection. From this group, six would be chosen. A month 
later, on December 22, 1958, NASA Project A, announcement No.1, was 
drawn up as a draft invitation for people to apply for the civil 
service position of research astronaut-candidate "with a minimum starting 
salary range of $8330 to $12,770 depending upon qualifications." The 
title for the project at the time of this announcement was "Project 
Astronaut." Many qualifications followed in the statement but the whole 
idea was changed, when, over the Christmas holidays, President Eisenhower 
decided to limit the selection to military applicants only. His 
reasoning was that since military pilots were already cleared for security 
purposes, they would conveniently satisfy all security conditions. The 
qualifications were pared down to seven items: 
1. Age, less than 40 
2. Height, less than 5 feet, 11 inches 
3. Excellent physical condition 
4. Bachelor's Degree or equivalent 
5. Graduate of test pilot school 
6. 1500 hours total flying time 
7. Qualified jet pilot (54: pp131-137). 
Even though the announcement for applications on December 22 
referred to the program as "Project Astronaut," there was discussion 
within the ranks of the officials at NASA and Washington as to what the 
name of this project should be. "Project Astronaut" was preferred by 
Robert Gilruth, now the Director of the Space Task Group (STG) for manned 
space flight, as it emphasized the man in the spacecraft but Gilruth was 
eventually overruled by others who did not like the title, thinking that it 
would draw too much attention upon the personality of the astronauts 
involved in the programs. For that reason, the project was renamed 
"Project Mercury," which was suitable because of the symbolic associations 
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that went along with the Olympic messenger's image. The media did not 
seem to pay too much attention to the selection of "Mercury" as a 
project name. In the New York Times the announcement of the name was 
buried in a story about the selection of a rocket engine for the moon 
flights (120: August 12, 1960). 
Project Mercury began to pick up speed during the early part of 
1959. It received top priority from Cpngress and Eisenhower which made it 
unnecessary to shop for the lowest bidder for parts. This priority rating 
also brought new attention to Mercury. In Cape Canaveral, the rockets 
assigned to NASA were now to have the words UNITED STATES painted to their 
sides. Glennan hoped that the military services would follow suit but 
they retained their names on the sides of their launch vehicles (54: p136). 
Meanwhile, astronaut selection was going through several steps. One 
hundred and ten men were found suitable for application; five of them 
came from the Marines, 47 from the Navy and 58 from the Air Force. This 
list was slimmed down to 69 by the middle of February, 1959. Two weeks 
later, the number was down to 36 men and, of those, four withdrew from the 
competition. The remaining 32 were given tests determining their mental 
and physical abilities and, to alleviate any fears that they might have 
had, the applicants were told that their parent services were never going 
to see the results of those examinations, something the men who were 
rejected felt might affect their future when they returned to flying with 
the military. Then the number dropped to 18. Gilruth then ordered the 
selection board to pick only seven men to be the final choices and the 
board complied with his wishes. The men who survived the final cut were 
called and asked if they still wanted to stay with NASA; there were seven 
affirmative replies. Gilruth forwarded his recommendations of the seven 
through the channels up to Glennan and the administrator approved (54: 
pp159-183). 
NASA's Director of Public Information, Walter T. Bonney, had 
been head of the Public Affairs for NACA for nine years before transferring 
to NASA along with most of the other NACA employees. He knew what the 
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future held for the men who had been selected as the nation's first 
astronauts and he warned Glennan that NASA should expect a lot of fanfare 
to develop around the men. Bonney then asked the Air Force for one of its 
more reputable PIOs, Lt. Colonel John A. "Shorty" Powers. Bonney wanted 
Powers to work with the astronauts and his choice seems to be well thought 
out. Powers had been a pilot with the Air Force since World War II and 
he had also flown missions during the Berlin Airlift and in Korea 
before becoming an effective public relations officer for the military. 
Some of Powers' earlier tasks in the area of public relations had been to 
soothe the nerves of a public concerned about the new sounds of the jet 
age, including sonic booms. When the space programs entered into history, 
Powers was assigned to the Air Force projects and it was there he was 
working when he was reassigned to NASA, initially for a period of three 
years (14; 54: pp62-63). 
Walt Bonney needed Powers and many other personnel to cope with 
the upcoming increased publicity that would accompany Project Mercury and 
the astronauts. Bonney wrote, in a letter to NASA Historian Eugene Emme: 
It was absolutely impossible to announce, in advance that the 
u.S. was going to send men into orbit in an open program, and 
then expect no public or press attention -- especially when the 
Russians had announced they were doing the same thing, but behind 
closed doors (14) 
At a meeting of the astronauts, before they were announced to the 
public, Powers was introduced to them. Even though he really did not 
know them very well at that time, he could sense what was going to 
happen once their names were made public. He warned them that they 
had better call their relatives and close friends to warn them of 
the "impending onslaught of media people probing for their relationships 
and digging for nice little anecdotes •... " The astronauts at first chose 
to believe that such a thing would not happen to them. Only one of 
them had had any previous experience with the media when he had set a 
speed record for jetting across the U.S. a few years before. Powers 
told them that shortly after the announcement of their names to the 
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public, it would be only a short time before the press moved in on 
others whom the astronauts knew. One of the astronauts, Lt. Commander 
Walter M. Schirra, Jr., of the Navy, did not particularly want to call 
his parents in Hawaii. Powers, knowing of the Honolulu Advertiser from 
past experience, bet Schirra a steak that, within an hour of the 
announcement, the Advertiser would have reporters asking Schirra's parents 
about his childhood. Powers does not remember collecting the steak but 
he remembers that his prediction was accurate (126). 
Powers tried to explain the future of the astronauts to them at 
that meeting and more that followed. Powers writes, in a letter to the 
author: 
I was able ... to make the troops understand that (a) The 
American people needed a psychological lift at that particular 
time. Sputnik was whirling around with its maddening beep-beep. 
(b) People all around the world seemed in a state of shock and/or 
disbelief that the Soviets had flown the first artificial satellite 
while America floundered in its own introspection. And finally, 
(c) People of all countries had been reading science fiction, much 
of it involving men travelling in space, for hundreds of years. 
Americans, in particular, had a built-in thirst for fulfillment 
of all those science fiction dreams combined with the identification 
of new national heroes. They I-the astronauts 7 never did really 
accept the hero bit because they felt they were simply doing their 
job as an extension of what all of us had been doing for a number of 
years--and that was the extension of the flight envelope (126). 
On April 9, 1959, the seven men were introduced to the public for 
the first time at a press conference presided over by Glennan. The men 
were to be called "astronauts," for in the same manner that aeronauts 
and aquanauts had sailed two types of oceans before them, the astronauts 
were to go somewhere that no one else had been before. The press looked 
at the astronauts dressed in civilian clothes and tended to forget that 
they were actually military test pilots. The words spoken by the 
astronauts were no great, profound statements. They appeared to look like 
the average, white American male who was married, had a family to look 
after and held a degree. There was nothing surprising about them other 
than the fact that they were not surprising (54: p160). 
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The men who were introduced as astronauts were: Lieutenant Colonel 
John H. Glenn, Jr., who was the only representative from the Marine Corps 
and was the ranking officer among the astronauts; Lieutenant Commanders 
Schirra and Alan B. Shepard, Jr., with Lt. Malcom Scott Carpenter of the 
Navy, and from the Air Force came three captains: Donald K. IIDeke ll Slayton, 
Leroy Gordon Cooper, Jr., and Vi rgil 1. "Gus II Gri ssom. They were 
officially assigned to duty with NASA.~s test pilots, which was another 
way of saying that they were astronauts (54: p164). 
The words of Powers were coming true relatively fast, according to 
Captain Grissom's wife, Betty. She had been shopping at a local grocery 
store near their home when the first reporter-photographer team found her 
in the aisles. They had gone to her house to look for her shortly after 
hearing the announcement, did not find her there and, upon asking the 
neighbors where she was, headed for the grocery store. They were from 
Life. Because she did not want to create a scene in the store, Mrs. 
Grissom invited them to the house. Shortly after they sat down, the 
doorbell rang and another news team pushed into the house. Mrs. Grissom 
wrote of the incident later: 
After that, it was a continual stream of writers, ohotographers 
and television crews .... , What do the boys think ... ? How does it 
feel to be the wife of a hero ... ? Are you proud of your husband 
husband ... ? One reporter, so eaqer to transmit his interview ... 
set up his typewriter on the trunk of his car in the driveway 
and began tapping out his story .... Where had they come from, 
this mob of reporters? What lines of communication had vectored 
them into position to strike so quickly with word and camera? 
It was almost frightening that the privacy of an ordinary 
person could be violated so swiftly and thoroughly" (59: pp61-64). 
Henry Still, who later co-authored the book Starfall with Mrs. 
Grissom, writes that Captain Grissom did not appreciate the treatment 
his wife and sons had received at the hands of the press that first 
occasion and, in their reluctance to deal anymore with the media, Gus 
and Betty Grissom "gave the impression of hostility to the press, 
whereas in actuality they did not feel their personal lives were 
important or should be bared to the world. This mistake caused newsmen 
to bear down harder on Gus, and he avoided interviews whenever possible 
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He simply did not realize he had been named a cold war diplomat to the 
world as well as ambassador to space" (59: p62). 
The men who were called astronauts were becoming more popular than 
some of the NASA officials had envisioned. They had renamed the project 
from "Astronaut" to "Mercuri' to take the emphasis off the men but it 
seems as though that effort was a failure. Jim Grimwood, a NASA 
historian, writes: 
Perhaps it was inevitable that the "crew-pool" members of 
the STG were destined for premature adulation, what with the 
enormous public curiosity about them, the risk they would take in 
space flight, and their exotic training activities. But the power 
of commercial competition for publicity and the pressure for 
political prestige in the space race also whetted an insatiable 
public appetite for this new kind of celebrity (54: p160). 
Powers was asked more questions about the men than about 
what was going to put them in space. Most of the questions were rather 
simple, which dictated the type of answers Powers had to give. The 
reporters wanted to know what the astronauts ate ~or breakfast, who 
among them had been Boy Scouts, who came from Ohio, what did their 
wives think of all this commotion, what were they really like? As 
Grimwood states, "Such questions provoked many to abandon asking how 
these seven came to be chosen and for what purpose they were entering 
training" (54: p164). 
Mrs. Grissom observes: 
NASA and other government officials were equally amazed by the 
furor in the press. To some it was downright embarrassing. 
The astronauts were not intended to become a personality cult ... 
(59: p163). 
About a month after the astronauts were selected, Walt Bonney 
drew up a policy that would, over the years, be the cause for much 
debate amongst the media and government officials. He knew that the 
Public Affairs Office (PAO) of NASA would handle the technical aspects 
of what the men were doing but there was also a personal side to the 
stories of the men and he wanted to clarify hO\,I the astronauts were to 
handle such dealings. 
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POLICY CONCERNING MERCURY ASTRONAUTS 
The Mercury Astronauts have been detailed to NASA by their 
respective military departments pursuant to an agreement approved 
by the Presiaent which makes them subject to the regulations and 
directives of NASA in performance of their duties. 
It is recognized that the experiences of the Mercury Astronauts 
through all phases of Project Mercury, from the commencement of 
training to accomplishment of orbital flight, will be of great 
interest to the public. NASA has therefore adopted the following 
policy on disclosure of information concerning the experience of 
the Mercury Astronauts: 
1. All information reported by the Mercury Astronauts 
in the course of their official duties which is not classified to 
protect that national security will be promptly made available to 
the public by NASA. 
2. Public information media will be granted frequent 
accessibility to the Mercury Astronauts for the purpose of 
obtaining information from them concerning their activities in 
Project Mercury. The timing and conditions of interviews with 
the Mercury Astronauts for this purpose will be controlled by the 
NASA Director of Public Information so as not to interfere with their 
performance of official duties. During such interviews, the Mercury 
Astronauts will be directed to disclose all information acquired 
in the course of their activities in Project Mercury, except 
information classified to protect the national security. 
3. While detailed to NASA for duties in connection with 
Project Mercury, the Mercury Astronauts 
a. may not, without the prior approval of the NASA Director 
of Public Information, appear on television or radio programs or in 
motion pictures; 
b. may not, without the prior approval of the NASA Director 
of Public Information, publish or collaborate in the publication 
of writing of any kind; 
c. may not receive compensation in any form for radio, 
television, or motion pictures appearances, or for the publication 
of writing of any kind, which involve reporting to the public their 
performance of official duties in any pase of Project Mercury; and 
d. may not endorse commercial products. 
4. The Mercury Astronauts are free, singly and collectively, 
to make any agreement they see fit for the sale of their personal 
stories including the rights in literary work, motion pictures 
radio and television productions, provided such agreements do not 
violate the foregoing restrictions (148). 
On May 8, 1959, Bonney submitted the policy statement to the White 
House for the President's staff secretary, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, 
to look at. It arrived on Goodpaster's desk after receiving the 
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endorsement of John A. Johnson, the General Counsel for NASA. Johnson 
wrote a note accompanying Bonney's policy statement that the Department 
of Defense had no "clear-cut" regulations of this type upon its 
personnel but it was understood that the Defense Department was considering 
a policy similar to this one for military personnel on missions "of 
extraordinary public interest." Therefore, if NASA was questioned about 
the policy, wrote Johnson, then NASA should state "our policy in this 
situation is consistent with the DOD policy" (81; 71). 
Johnson also recommended that the astronauts should be informed 
if the policy was accepted by the White House and, after that, then the 
media were to be told the conditions. Goodpaster approved of what had been 
laid before him and a race far below the heavens of space was 
about to begin (81; 71). 
Bonney's reasoning was this: 
I could see it coming. That weld have seven astronauts 
each peddling his story to seven different magazines or seven 
different publishers. Which would mean instead of working as 
a team, they'd all be jockeying for position. Because the man 
who made the first flight would be worth $100,000 and the rest 
of them would be worth $500. So I went over and saw Leo OIOrsey" 
(8: p32). 
C. Leo DeOrsey (written as D'Orsey by some people) was a prominent 
Washington, D.C. lawyer who represented Arthur Godfrey and Edward R. 
Murrow among other show business and sports figures. At Bonney's request 
the lawyer took the job of representing the astronauts in negotiating 
the sale of their personal stories, if someone wanted to buy them (8: p32). 
Colonel Powers writes of the situation as it was then: 
The astronauts worked for the government and their activities 
carried out in connection with that employment would be reported 
in great detail and in a timely manner. But their personal lives 
were their own property to expose or dispose of as they saw fit .... 
From the NASA point of view, we urged the seven and Leo to set up 
a situation in which we could eliminate the personal profit motive 
from the competition for a seat in a spacecraft and, simultaneously, 
give the men and their families a firm basis for maintaining the 
privacy of their homes and personal lives. The policy for 
separation of the personal from the official was stated officially 
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and publicly by NASA at the time Leo was identified as the legal 
counsel--which he did, by the way, at no fee or expense to the 
astronauts or their families or the government! He never got a 
dime (126). 
Powers is correct. It is well-documented in various papers that 
DeOrsey was never paid anything for working with the astronauts. 
Bonney went to the astronauts, who were now stationed at Langley 
Field, and talked to them about organizing themselves as a unit to sell 
their personal stories. He did not want to see "John Glenn write for 
Life, Alan Shepard for Look and Gordon Cooper for the Post and their 
wives for various women's magazines. 1I He told the men, IINow look, you 
can do it any way you want. But this is what I think you ought to think 
in terms of ll and they agreed (8: p32; 26: May/June, 1973). 
In late May, the seven astronauts and DeOrsey signed an agreement 
naming him as their lawyer and setting the conditions for how they were 
to operate together. It reads: 
AGREEMENT made this 28th day of May, 1959, among MALCOLM SCOTT 
CARPENTER, LEROY GORDON COOPER, Jr., JOHN HERSCHEL GLENN, Jr., 
VIRGIL IVAN GRISSOM, WALTER MARTY SCHIRRA, ALAN BARTLETT SHEPARD, 
Jr., and DONALD KENT SLAYTON (hereinafter referred to as MERCURY 
ASTRONAUTS) and C. LEO DeORSEY (hereinafter referred to as AGENT). 
Witnesseth: 
Whereas the above mentioned MERCURY ASTRONAUTS have volunteered 
to participate in Project Mercury of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration; and 
Whereas the above named MERCURY ASTRONAUTS have been selected 
after exhausting testing, to engage in this project; and 
Whereas the above-named MERCURY ASTRONAUTS have valuable rights 
to their personal stories of their ballistic and orbital flights in 
connection with this project as well as personal stories pertaining 
to all phases of this project; and 
Whereas they agree that a joint effort for the sale of such 
rights appears to be the most practical approach; and 
Whereas they agree that representation on their behalf in this 
connection should be obtained. 
Now, Therefore, in consideration of the mutual convenants of 
the parties hereto, it is agreed as follows: 
1. The MERCURY ASTRONAUTS have selected C. LEO DeORSEY to 
represent them in the sale of the rights. 
2. The MERCURY ASTRONAUTS transfer all of their personal rights, 
in and to their personal accounts of the ballistic flights and the 
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orbital flights made by them in connection with Project Mercury, as 
well as personal rights in the literary work, motion picture, 
radio, or television productions, including personal appearances for 
compensation (other than those in line with their official duties) 
to C. LEO DeORSEY of Washington, District of Columbia, as their 
agent, with all rights to contract in their behalf as in his sole 
discretion he decides if for the best interest of the MERCURY 
ASTRONAUTS. Said DeORSEY will be guided by the policy concerning 
MERCURY ASTRONAUTS, copy of same is attach hereto. 
3. C. LEO DeORSEY will distribute the proceeds equally to the 
MERCURY ASTRONAUTS, or their designees, immediately after receipt 
by said C. LEO DeORSEY. Should any of the ASTRONAUTS withdraw 
from the project voluntarily, before termination of same, his 
share shall be forfeited in all amounted to be distributed 
thereafter, and shall be di~ided equally among those remainlng. The 
rights of the withdrawing ASTRONAUTS shall be the property of those 
remaining in consideration for the payments made to him prior to 
withdrawing. 
4. It is distinctly understood that this includes the rights 
of the person or persons selected and who make the flight or flights 
in connection with this project. 
5. Said C. LEO DeORSEY agrees to serve the MERCURY ASTRONAUTS 
without compensation and will also personally defray all expenses 
incurred by him in this project. 
Signed and sealed this 28th day of May, 1959, 
(Signed by the seven astronauts and DeOrsey) (148). 
Powers writes of what happened during the following summer months: 
Leo then announced--with our approval--that the personal 
story was available for sale to the highest bidder. At that time 
both Walt and I worked very hard to reiterate the stated NASA 
policy and to establish firmly our plan to report the official 
program in minute detail as promptly as humanly possible and in 
total openness. At that point, the battle was joined. The wires 
and some of the major papers across the country howled like stuck 
pigs, even though they too had an opportunity to bid on the story 
(126). 
How many publications actually bid on the personal stories is not 
really known. Bonney told historian Emme that the Saturday Evening Post 
considered looking into the bidding. Ed Diamond, a science editor of 
Newsweek at that time, said in a conversation that Newsweek never 
considered bidding and believes that Look entered into the competition. 
Only one magazine was known to enter into the arena to buy the astronauts' 
personal stories and that was Life, the picture child of Henry Luce. It 
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has been recorded by historian Grimwood that Life was the "highest" bidder 
for the stories. Several other publications also use the term. Powers 
uses the term in writing about NASA and the media but the then-editor 
of Life, Edward K. Thompson (later editor of the Smithsonian) writes that 
"Life never said it was the highest bidder. Ask NASA, which had to approve 
the bids" (157; 126; 54: p237; 14; 31). 
There are other sources that say Life won the contract for the 
personal stories not just because of the money it offered to the 
astronauts but because of the job it could do in helping to publicize 
NASA. Life was well-equipped, some say the best equipped, magazine 
(it could publish a story within a week of the time that it happened) 
in the business. As can be expected, Luce's fantastic image builder 
was well-respected by the government since it could be utilized to display 
its space efforts (178: p137; 26: May/June, 1973). 
Whatever was the case, Life was awarded the contract to publish 
the personal stories of the astronauts. On August 24, 1959, Life told the 
world what it had accomplished in a two-page spread written by 
then-Publisher Andrew Heiskell. Under the headline that liTHE ASTRONAUTS' 
OWN STORIES WILL APPEAR ONLY IN LIFE," Heiskell's opening statements 
read: 
When one of these men becomes America's first space voyager, 
you will read his personal story. And furthermore, the lives 
of these seven men--and their wives--wi1l lend between now and 
the day on which one of them becomes the first American--perhaps 
the first human being--to orbit in outer space, will in itself 
be one of the most absorbing dramatic human stories of our time. 
Life--and 'Life alone--will bring you that personal story in the 
words of the men and the women involved (98: August 24, 1959). 
Neither NASA nor Life announced what the contracts had been sold 
for but Life's news brother, Time, in an issue that came out the same 
week, spilled the beans. The astronauts were receiving $500,000 for 
their stories, said Time. This figure was not reported officially until 
about two years later. In that same issue, Time explained the contracts 
to the American public, saying: 
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... newspaper chains, magazines and radio and television 
networks and television networks bombarded NASA with bids for 
exclusive rights to the great adventure story .... The men early 
decided on the seven-way split on the common sense ground that only 
one man could be first up, the other six will probably follow him 
(159: August 24, 1959). 
Two things are interesting about the Time article. One is that 
Time claimed that NASA was "bombarded" with bids, which is something a 
researcher would have trouble proving to be true. It was also stated that 
the astronauts had been told by DeOrsey to negotiate separately for 
television and movie rights. It might not seem significant that Time was 
the magazine to announce the exact amount that Life was going to pay to 
the astronauts since Time is in the same parent organization as Life but 
a person should remember that they were still two very separate magazines 
with separate staffs. Leo Janos, once one of Time's Houston Bureau 
chiefs, recalls that Life would not share information with the staff of 
Time, sometimes causing the Time staffers to resort to raiding the files 
of Life's offices and trying to pry information out of Life's editors and 
reporters (79). 
Dora Jane Hamblin, who wrote stories for Life primarily during the 
Apollo era (she also wrote some during Mercury), recalls in a letter: 
Time and Life did, particularly in New York, treat each other 
as competitors despite common parenthood. In bureaus, because 
they were small, we often shared information but back at home base 
some files were limited to one magazine. This was the case with 
astronaut materials--it was Life that paid, and Life alone which 
received the "exclusive" materials on the men and their families. 
Time, of course, covered the space program the same as other media 
but its reporters were excluded from the "inside the horne" and 
"personal stories" of the astronauts. The rigidity with which 
this rule was applied varied depending upon who was in Houston. 
During my era, which was Apollo only, I did often dispense tidbits 
to Donald Neff, the Time guy at the time--because I liked him, 
found him a fine and honorable journalist who never tried to break 
the Life contract (some Time guys did), and because he helped me 
with some of the technical stuff .... I did not show Neff my files 
to Life, but I would feed him a few items of "color" about the 
guys and their families before each flight. He was scrupulous 
about never revealing where he got his color (64). 
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Amy Musher, of the Editorial Offices of Time, replying for the 
editors, wrote in 1977: 
Although the contracts Life signed with the original seven 
astronauts were exclusive with Life, some of the information was 
shared with Time. They also shared some information about the 
astronauts from other sources, but because the format of the 
magazine was different, the coverage was accordingly different. 
As for Time's reporting the dollar figure of the Life contract, 
we considered it an appropriate story for our Press section. This 
information was not "hushed Up" by Life; it was provided to us by 
our sister publication for the ... story (115). 
The contract with Life not only afforded the astronauts and their 
families money along with added publicity for them and NASA but it also 
gave the astronauts something else--privacy. Because of the contracts, 
the astronauts could simply refuse to talk to any reporters (except those 
from Life) who were asking questions about the astronauts' personal 
experiences. It was a beautiful shield. Mrs. Grissom writes of the 
wives of the seven men: "I really hate to think what would have happened 
if we didn't get that publication money. I don't know if the wives would 
have been trying to outdo the other ones to get to the press. I really 
don't know what would have happened" (59: p220). 
Dora Jane Hamblin writps in a letter: 
... 1 do not believe that the contract blocked other magazines 
from writing effectively about the astronauts or the program .... 
I think the contract did enable almost all of the wives to ward 
off importunate reporters and to keep their private lives more 
private. It was a good shield for them, and it was used as a 
shield by the men when it came to "fami1y 1ife" type of interviews. 
But they always remained available to the general press for 
interviews about their work (64). 
NASA could run interference for the astronauts when they were at 
work but the space administration could do nothing to protect their wives 
from the reporters. This;s where the contract possibly worked best as 
a shield. Mrs. Grissom had been asked by a reporter from a publication 
other than Life if the contract was worthwhile and she replied yes, 
because it helped her to avoid having to conduct numerous interviews; if 
she allowed one outside interview, then she would have to give hundreds 
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more. She explained further: 
From the viewpoint of the seven, this was a fair and ideal 
arrangement. NASA had approved because it precluded a situation 
in which the men might have gone off in individual directions in 
response to competitive bidding for individual story rights. The 
astronauts probably were the hottest "property" in publishing 
and Life magazine·s ability to crow about its "exclusive ll stuck 
1ike-gall in the throat of every other newspaper and magazine 
publisher in America. They complained bitterly and turned their 
reporters loose on NASA. The press would seek out any flaw in the 
space program and publicize it in photo and print. It may have been 
this fortunate "mistake ll that helped keep the space program as 
honest as it was" (59: p65). 
Obviously, the Life contracts also caused NASA, Life and the 
astronauts and their families another problem that Mrs. Grissom 
referred to: criticism by the rest of the media about the arrangement. 
Most of the media cried foul. NASA pointed out that everyone had had 
the chance to bid for the stories but Life had won. That paint is 
somewhat debatable. Life had won all right but had it really outbid 
others, if there had been any others? DeOrsey's price for opening bids 
was $500,000, exactly what Life paid. The highest bidder had bid only 
the beginning price, which leaves some room to doubt that there had been 
any bidding at all. This is not to say that there were some shenanigans, 
just that no one else had bid on the stories. Therefore, NASA was 
correct; everyone else had had their chance and had not taken the 
astronauts and DeOrsey up on the offer, thus the media should not complain 
about the contracts. 
Alfred Friendly, who was then the managing editor of the 
Washington Post, complained that lithe story of what Mercury astronauts 
do in Project Mercury belongs to the public. It cannot be sold by 
anyone to anyone ll (26: May/June, 1973). 
Walt Bonney came back with the defense that Friendly was right, as 
stated by the official policy released the previous May. The astronauts 
had to tell all the world what happened officially during their flights 
but they did not have to say one word about their personal feelings if 
they chose not to do so. But the astronauts had chosen to tell their 
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personal stories to Life for a price and NASA defended the decision 
as being totally appropiate. As far as many people in NASA's PAD were 
concerned, the contract took a load off their backs since they would 
not have to manage the private lives of the astronauts (26: May/June, 
1973). 
Some of the media said that NASA had made a blunder in its relations 
with the press. Jay Holmes writes in his book, America on the Moon, 
Although the project gained the benefit of regular 
publicity for the astronauts in one magazine, the contract had 
the effect of discouraging favorable publicity elsewhere. 
Magazine and newspaper editors, who are subject to the same 
frailties as the rest of the human race~ often took the attitude 
that a favorable story about Project Mercury would have the 
effect of advertising a regular offering of an opposing magazine. 
As a result, the majority of popular magazines ignore the subject 
of men in space except for an occasional article (73: p79). 
Holmes appears to be correct. A number of technical and aviation 
magazines carried many articles about the technological aspects of the 
space ventures but not that many general circulation magazines wrote 
about the astronauts, those being primarily (not in any order), Life, 
Newsweek, Time, National Geographic and U.S. News & World Report. Look 
and the Saturday Evening Post offered the American public very little 
about the program, all the way through the moon flights. 
Astronaut Alan Shepard describes his view of the situation in 
a letter: 
... NASA and the U.S. Government are not in the business 
of promoting people and the molding of images. I am sure there 
have been notable exceptions ... it would be a disservice to the 
public if every Federal agency turned to Madison Avenue to provide 
support for its particular project. Therefore NASA tried to 
be as impersonal and dispassionate as it could be in presenting 
the need for man in space and the tremendous technical benefits 
which have helped, are helping and will help our society .... 
However, back in 1959, a wise man in NASA recognized that 
most reporters could never understand technology, interpret it 
properly or make it sound exciting. Those who did would be big 
at Aviation Week but that would never sell the American people or 
Congress. The relationship with Life was viewed as an outstanding 
way of publicizing the individuals and generating support in a way 
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which a Federal agency could never do directly, legally or 
practically. The subsequent in-fighting of the competitive 
media only enhanced the results .. ~! 
Our lawyer suggested that purely personal observations, if 
expressed at all, be reserved for Life. Most people followed 
this suggestion realizing that it helped fulfill the contract, 
created more conversation among competing media, and therefore, 
more copy and interest (145). 
Shepard also seems correct. There were many articles in the 
magazines and the newspapers about the contract, hence more publicity for 
NASA and the astronauts. 
Thomas O'Toole, a reporter from the Washington Post who wrote many 
articles on space, criticized many of the press for the way they wrote 
their stories. He said that the stories that were written about the 
astronauts were done only while the missions were going on or had just 
finished, which was fine, but the writers neglected to follow up on the 
missions with later stories about what the missions had accomplished on 
the technological end. O'Toole finds this omission to be a great 
detriment (124). 
While the official, and real, position of Life and NASA was that 
Life was only going to print the personal stories, somehow the word had 
not been transmitted to the advertising department of Life. On September 
9, 1959, in an issue of the New York Times, an ad, taken out by Life 
read: 
The editors of Life take great pride in announcing that the 
personal stories of America's Astronauts will appear only in 
Life. The conquest of space has been one of man's most persistent 
dreams since he first looked up and saw the stars. Now these 
seven brave men have embarked on that great adventure. 
Beginning today, their own stories ••. in their own words .•• will 
be published eKclusively by Life .... (120: September 9, 1959). 
The key word was "exclusive" and the rest of the media registered 
strong protests. So did NASA. Powers writes, "Life's promotional 
advertising gave us the fits when it gave every indication that the only 
place the public could really get the astronaut story was in Life--which, 
of course, was not true." However, Life apparently believed it retained 
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the right to call its astronaut stories "exclusive" not only during those 
years but even after the magazine folded. A book, The Best of Life, 
containing many photographs from all the years that Life existed, was 
published in 1972 by Time-Life Corporation and, on page 120 of that book, 
it is still claimed by the editors that the stories written by the 
astronauts for the magazine were lIexclusive." Life was told, but it never 
comprehended or blindly tried not to comprehend, that its stories were 
not "exclusive." Whatever was the case, the battle with Life and the rest 
of the media was to last several years, practically until both the moon 
program and Life faded into history. 
The contract that caused all of the fuss follows: 
AGREEMENT, dated this 5th day of August, 1959, between LEO DE ORSEY 
and TIME INCORPORATED, a New York Corporation (hereinafter 
referred to as Time). 
It has been officially announced by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration that, in connection with its Project 
Mercury, the Astronauts, numbering seven men, have been selected, 
after exhaustive testing, to engage in experimental space flight. 
Time wishes to obtain the rights in and to the personal accounts 
of the ballistic flights and the orbital flights made by the 
Astronauts, and rights in and to the personal stories of their 
wives and families in connection therewith. Mr. DeOrsey has 
informed Time that he owns said rights and has submitted to Time 
a copy of an agreement between him and the Astronauts and their 
wives authorizing him to negotiate the sale of said rights. 
It is therefore agreed between Mr. DeOrsey and Time as 
follows: 
1. Time shall have all rights of every kind throughout the 
world in and to the personal stories of all ballistic and orbital 
flights made by the Astronauts during the course of and in connection 
with Project Mercury. Likewise, Time shall have all rights of 
every kind throughout the world in and to the personal stories of 
the respective wives of the Astronauts in connection with their 
experiences and life during the course of Project Mercury. 
2. As soon as convenient after the execution of the agreement, 
Time will assign a writer from its publication LIFE to visit 
with and observe the family life, training, social, and 
professional incidents of the Astronauts prior to the ballistic and 
orbital flights and, immediately after said flights, to spend a 
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reasonable time with the Astronauts to obtain their personal 
impressions of their flights. It is understood that at no time 
shall the Time writer interfere with the training and conditioning 
of the Astronauts preparatory to their space flights. 
3. In general, each personal account or story of the seven 
Astronauts will consist of biographical material of the individual 
Astronaut and his family and the experiences encountered by the 
Astronauts and their families during the course of their training 
and during the ballistic and orbital flights. However, it is 
agreed that Time will not publish any material which may be 
deemed restrictive or secret by the officials of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration or by the Defense Department. 
4. Because of the widespread public interest in Project 
Mercury and the experiences to be encountered by the Astronauts 
and their families, it is recognized that the wives of the Astronauts 
may be approached to write articles for media other than those 
published by Time. In the event that such offers are made and such 
articles are written or collaborated in by the wives of the 
Astronauts, such offers may not be accepted nor such articles 
published without the prior written consent of Time. 
5. Time may use photographs of the Astronauts and wives and 
families and such biographical data as it deems fit in connection 
with promotion and advertising instituted by Time with respect to 
their stories. 
6. In consideration of the foregoing, Time will pay to Mr. 
DeOrsey on account of the Astronauts up to an aggregate of 
$500,000 under the following conditions: 
(a) $105,000 upon the execution of this agreement; 
(b) $140,000 upon the successful completion of the first 
ballistic flight; 
(c) $175,000 upon the successful completion of the first 
orbital flight; and 
(d) $80,000 when it is announced by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration that Project Mercury is completed. 
7. Immediately upon publication of the manuscript of the 
Astronauts' stories in book form by Time or its authorized agents, 
Time will assign to Mr. DeOrsey the copyright in said work for the 
purpose of his selling television and motion picture rights to said 
work. From the sale of said television and motion picture rights, 
Mr. DeOrsey shall pay to Time the sum of ($00,000) plus ten 
percent (10%) of the net proceeds of said sale. However, it is 
understood that in no circumstances shall the television rights in 
said work be exercised earlier than ninety (90) days after the 
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publication of the work in book form nor shall the motion picture 
rights be exercised earlier than one hundred eighty (180) days 
after publication of said book. 
8. Time shall have the right to produce and use a reasonable 
amount of motion picture footage of the Astronauts and their wives 
and families in connection with the publication of their stories 
by Time with the approval of Mr. DeOrsey, and such approval shall 
not be unreasonably withheld. 
9. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has 
recently announced a policy of public information and general press 
coverage with respect to Project Mercury and the official activities 
of the Astronauts. The interpretation of said policy by the 
officials of NASA will greatly influence the type of story or 
stories that Time wishes to publish. If at any time during the 
course of Project Mercury, in the judgment of Time, it is decided 
that the value of the personal stories of the Astronauts and their 
wives is badly impaired or lost, Time may terminate this agreement 
by paying to Mr. DeOrsey on account of the Astronauts the sum 
of ($00,000). 
10. It is recognized by Time that Mr. DeOrsey is acting on 
behalf of and solely in the interest of the astronauts and that 
he has no personal interest in the proceeds to be paid him hereunder 
by Time. It is therefore understood that he shall not be liable 
personally to Time for the performance of this contract other than 
that he will be appraised of any disputes that may arise between 
Time and the Astronauts relating to the performance of the contract, 
and his corporation may be sought by Time to help settle such 
disputes. 
11. This agreement shall be construed under the laws of the 
State of New York. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed and 
delivered this agreement on the day and year first above written. 
ACKNOWLEDGED AND AGREED TO: 
(signed by Leo DeOrsey and Robert T. Elson for Time, Inc.) 
(160). 
It should be noted what the contract said, other than what has 
already been discussed in this paper; for all purposes, Life was 
entitled to preflight and postflight briefings by the astronauts and their 
families so Life could obtain stories about their personal feelings; that 
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Life could not interfere with the astronauts' official functions; that 
NASA and the Defense Department virtually had a clause giving them the 
right of censorship (something that would be used by NASA in the 
future); that none of the astronauts nor their wives could write anything 
for publications other than those owned by Time, Inc., unless approved 
by Time, Inc.; that Time, Inc., could break the contract if NASA went too 
far with its official policy written in May, 1959; and that Life could 
send reporters into the homes of the astronauts before and after the 
flights, not during the missions. Perhaps the most notable item 'about 
the pay is to realize that it was not broken down chronologically but 
rather by how NASA was going to conduct its program. Each astronaut 
would receive $15,000 as soon as the contract was signed; $20,000 when 
Alan Shepard went on his fifteen-minute flight in May, 1961; $25,000 
when John Glenn returned from his three orbits and $11,428.87 when 
Project Mercury was announced as being finished in the summer of 1963. 
Each astronaut would earn nearly $71,500 over a period of four years 
on top of his regular service salary which was supplemented by flight 
pay, as are all flight personnel in the military. 
Starting in the fall, Life published a series of stories by and 
about the astronauts. The stories that were written about the men were 
largely done by Don A. Schanche, who later went to work with the Los 
Angeles Times. Some other stories were written by Loudon Wainwright. 
Both men claim, as does Edward K. Thompson, that there was never any 
editorial direction to the writers of Life as to hbw they were to 
portray the astronauts. The stories that Life's writers wrote did not 
have to be approved by NASA nor the astronauts; the only stories that 
had to be approved by NASA and the astronauts were those written by 
the astronauts to make sure that the stories contained nothing official 
which had not been released by NASA previously; otherwise Life might 
indeed have an exclusive story (165; 136; 158). 
During the fall of 1959, the stories written by the astronauts 
dealt mainly with the training that they were going through. describing 
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how they felt about the entire procedure. Cooper wrote of his personal 
background and described the difference between ballistic and orbital 
flights. Schirra wrote about the astronauts and how they related 
among themselves: IIWe avoided getting into arguments of a personal nature 
but we've never avoided arguments of a technical nature. 1I Glenn took 
the Life readers through the Mercury spacecraft verbally and complained 
about the selection of the first man in space: liAs to how far in advance 
of the first flight the man should know he's going, I'm not in agreement 
with the argument that says word should be delayed until the last possible 
moment. ...... we're all big boys now. 1I Shepard made notes of the 
psychological testing: III'm not my own favorite subject and it has always 
been difficult for me to analyze my feelingsll (98: September 14, 1959). 
The wives got into the act in another issue of Life, telling the 
world what they thought of the whole Mercury affair, their husbands being 
astronauts, the families' attitudes towards fame and other aspects. Renee 
Carpenter broke the news that when her husband had been called and asked 
to volunteer for astronaut duty, he was at sea so she volunteered him 
(98: September 21, 1959). 
But all of those articles and the subsequent ones by Life, tended 
to paint the astronauts as a group of super Boy Scouts, with fresh faces, 
dedicated to their work and who did everything right. It was a portrayal 
that Christopher Kraft, the flight operations director for Mercury and 
the following programs, described as such in an interview: 
This was good for the program but it was tough on the men. 
They were like the Saturday afternoon football heroes and it 
became difficult for them to survive this. Their image was 
important as it kept the program appearing good; their image was 
the highlight of the program (93). 
Don Schanche gives his view in a letter: 
... the deal Life made with NASA and the seven individual 
created a strong bias toward the "Boy Scout" image, because all 
~ieces under the astronauts' bylines had to be approved by them 
as individuals, as a group and by Shorty Powers and whomever 
happened to be in charge at the moment in Washington ..•. The 
astronauts did not resent the Boy Scout image, but were the main 
architects of it, as Alan Shepard, above all, will recall. 
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Frankly, I couldn't blame them at the time and don't now. They had 
a Life man (during my time, at least) with them virtually all the 
time, at home and on the road, and it would have been difficult 
for normal, robust test pilots to manage any kind of normal lives 
if they had to worry constantly about every indiscretion observed 
(136). 
Loudon Wainwright also has his impressions of the image of the 
astronauts, which he records in a letter: 
... the astronauts were co-conspirators in the production 
of stories that made them look like Boy Scouts and all alike. They 
may not have admired the results, but they fought hard, with very 
few exceptions to keep the material free of wrinkles and distinct 
personal flavor (165). 
During this time, Powers was exposing the astronauts to the media 
but insists he was creating no images for the public. He writes: 
The very nature of the work generated all kinds of images in 
the minds of the media beholders. It was the kind of work 
restricted to only seven people in the whole country although 
there were many, many members of the military performing many 
of the same kinds of tasks in one way or the other. During my 
tenure, my effort was to bring the media into the training or 
flight situation at the site of the training to both demonstrate 
the acitivites where possible and to explain what we were doing 
and why. If it was image building to expose seven particularly 
healthy, curious, intelligent, gung-ho test pilots at work, I 
plead guilty.... __ 
In addition, if anyone told him L an astronaut-1 how to act, 
it certainly wasn't me. My only position in this regard was to 
try to train them to recognize media representatives by name, 
to anwer questions as directly and clearly as possible. I did, 
however, let them know that I needed to know if they got arrested 
or got themselves involved in any other kind of situation so 
that I could at least be prepared to be responsive to media 
query (126). 
Schanche comments about Shorty Powers and his relationship with 
the astronauts and the media: 
Shorty helped to teach them, but Glenn, Shepard and Schirra 
were pretty good at PR before Mercury. Glenn was a record-setting 
test pilot of note, with two wars and a lot of press conferences 
behind him, and Al and Wally had been much the same route although 
less intensely. Carpenter was a natural. Cooper never learned 
(in my time); Deke Slayton was always Deke, which was his best PR, 
and Gus Grissom, bless his soul, learned slowly .... In my view, 
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Shorty was extremely valuable to NASA and the astronauts--he kept 
both out of a lot of trouble a less skilled practitioner couldn't 
have handled--but he tends to exaggerate his role as a teacher (136). 
Powers might not have been creating any images; most evidence 
seems to back his statements. But some areas of NASA besides the 
astronauts were also grabbing the attention of the public. These included 
the technology of the program and various members of the primate family. 
On May 28, 1959, the same day that the astronauts agreed to have 
DeOrsey as their lawyer, two small monkeys were placed in the nose cone 
of a Jupiter-C and fired off a launching pad at the Cape for a short 
l5-minute flight through space. One of the monkeys which had been 
scheduled to go on the trip had caused a problem for NASA before the 
launch. The NASA PAO had announced that one of the monkeys was an 
Indian-born rhesus (the other was a squirrel monkey). Immediately the 
Indian Embassy warned Washington that millions of members of the Brahman 
religion might find it offensive that one of their religious symbols was 
being blasted into space. Washington ordered a change in the monkeys and 
NASA found a Wisconsin-raised colony of rhesus monkeys, several generations 
removed from their Indian homeland, from which one was picked to go on 
the flight. Not wanting to have a personality cult develop around the 
monkeys, NASA officials simply named the monkeys Able (the Wisconsin-
born rhesus) and Baker (the squirrel monkey) (54: p156). 
The flight took the monkeys 300 miles high at a speed of 10,000 
mph and they were recovered safely by the Navy 1500 miles downrange 
from the Cape. At that time, NASA was using coded transmissions for its 
messages. The ship that picked up the monkeys had a powerful voice 
transmitter but its coded transmitter was having difficulty that day. 
The questions kept going out from the Cape, "Are the monkeys alive?" but 
the coded answers were garbled and difficult to understand. Finally, 
the order went out to forget the code and the question was asked again. 
The answer came back immediately, "Yes, yes." 
That raised a dilemma for the officials on the land. Did the 
message mean that both monkeys were alive or that the radioman on the 
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ship had been overly enthusiastic? Two officials discussed the 
situation. "If we go in there," said one referring to the press room 
where the media were waiting, "and say both of them are alive, and one 
of them is dead, what then?" 
"Well then," came the answer. liThe goddamned thing will just have 
to have died after we got the message. 1I 
Actually, both of the monkeys were alive and well. They were 
brought back to land where they were examined. But Able was killed 
when a civilian doctor improperly removed the electrodes embedded 
under his skin. The stuffed body now resides in the Smithsonian Institute. 
Baker resides comfortably at the Marshall Space Center (which was then 
the Redstone Arsenal) in a colony of monkeys (8: pp35-36; 54: p156). 
The next year was a relatively quiet one for the astronauts. They 
kept writing for Life about their personal ideas and the rest of the 
press kept complaining. But 1960 was a year for testing missiles topped 
with Mercury spacecraft and for politics. 
On July 29, 1960, a Mercury spacecraft rode atop an Atlas missile 
for what was designed to be a suborbital test of the launch vehicle 
and the spacecraft. About a minute after liftoff, the missile blew up. 
At first no one knew if either the missile or the spacecraft had caused 
the accident and speculation was kept down. Two months later, the 
official report came out, blaming the Atlas. An interesting note is 
that NASA tried to salvage something out of the wreck in its report. It 
stated that while none of the main objectives of the spacecraft had 
been met, that 1). the spacecraft had remained structurally intact 
until it hit the water; 2). the instruments had functioned fully 
during the flight (only one minute long); and 3). there had been some 
vibration of the spacecraft but it was non-destructive in nature (54: 
p277-278) . 
Unfortunately, NASA had also picked the day of the launch to 
announce that NASA was drawing up plans, codenamed "Apollo," to send 
men to the moon. Obviously the announcement should have been timed 
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for another day but a person could also look at the announcement as 
showing NASAls determination to continue despite setbacks. 
Another setback occurred on September 26, 1959, when another 
Atlas, this time carrying a lunar satellite, failed severely. This 
began to cause some apprehension amongst the NASA officials about using 
the Convair product as a launch vehicle yet a third Atlas had successfully 
flown 9000 miles for a bull Is-eye landing in the Indian Ocean on 
September 19~ 1959 (54: pp270, 285). 
As for the trip to the moon, Eisenhower came close to telling the 
nation that there would be no more man-in-space flights to anywhere 
once Mercury was completed but he was guided away from this statement by 
Glennan who knew what damage a statement of that sort would do to NASA. 
So Eisenhower diluted his message to say that he was rejecting Apollo for 
the present. When someone told the President that giving money to the 
space programs was worth the investment, drawing an analogy to Queen 
Isabella's funding of Columbus I trip to the New World, Eisenhower bluntly 
replied that he was "not about to hock his family jewels" for such 
causes. Then his administration chopped down NASAls request for money 
for 1962, taking out all the beginnings of the Apollo program. As far 
as Eisenhower was concerned, going to the moon would not prove a thing 
such as advancing the prestige of the United States. There are some 
people today who think that Eisenhower was smarter than what many people 
of that day thought (178: pp72-73). 
But the Democratic opposition did not care for Eisenhower's 
thoughts about space. That party's presidential candidate, Senator 
John F. Kennedy, chose to make space into a political issue. He was 
calling for a "New Frontier" which did not totally relate to space but 
space was included as what he saw as his frontier to be conquered. He 
said that Eisenhower had disgraced the nation by letting the Russians 
score several firsts, that there was a "missile gap" in which they had 
more missiles than we did, including missiles for peaceful space 
exploration. In Oklahoma City, Kennedy declared that "I will take 
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my television black and white. I want to be ahead of them in rocket 
thrust." At Pocatella, Idaho, he attacked the Republicans for ··letting 
the Russians be first in space ..• first around the moon and first around 
the sun •••• I think it is up to us to reverse that point" (149: pl14-ll5).1 
What Kennedy mayor may not have known was that the missile gap 
was turning towards the Americans· favor. While the Russians had been 
concentrating on few missiles with large 57-megaton warheads to scare 
the Americans into submission, America had been building a number of 
missiles with smaller warheads which put the U.S. ahead of the Russians 
and in a far superior position in the ICBM race (32: p28). 
Republican contender Vice-President Nixon met the challenge by 
defending the record of the Eisenhower Administration. He even wrote 
some comments on his thoughts about space for the magazine Missiles and 
Rockets but only some weeks after Kennedy had done the same thing; both 
had been invited by the editor to do so. As is known, Nixon lost the 
election by a very slim popular vote margin and it is regarded that the 
space race was not a deciding factor as it figured little in the televised 
debates or elsewhere (54: p284-285). 
On November 21,1960, the media were ready to cover the launching 
of the first Mercury spacecraft that had been mated to a Redstone missile 
(coded MR-1 by NASA for Mercury-Redstone, Number 1. The Mercury-Atlas 
series would be known as MA.). At nine in the morning, the engine 
of the Redstone started but suddenly cut off after the rocket had risen 
no more than five inches. The rocket settled back down at a 23-degree 
tilt amidst the exhaust and everything that followed this turned the 
launch into a comedy of errors. The computers told the spacecraft·s 
escape tower that it was time for it to jettison, so the escape rockets 
fired, sans spacecraft, 4000 feet in the air and landed 400 yards away. 
1A petty point here but the Americans orbited a satellite around 
the sun first, by accident, when Discover I missed its planned 
target, the moon, and, by laws of nature, swung into solar orbit. 
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Then the drogue parachute popped out of the top of the Mercury spacecraft 
three seconds after the escape tower had fired off. Next came the main 
parachute followed by the reserve parachute. Finally, the spacecraft's 
sensors told more circuits that "this is the end of the ride" and, as 
planned if the spacecraft had landed in the sea at the end of a successful 
flight, the spacecraft started spurting out green sea dye. To PIO Paul 
Haney, " .•• it looked like Mrs. Murphy's washing machine gone berserk" 
(66) . 
To find out what had gone wrong with the rocket, Haney went to one 
of the control officers, a military man, in hopes he could then explain 
to the media why the launch had failed. The launch officer, who was not 
accustomed to announcing that anything had been launched unless there was 
"fire in the tail," (that is, unless the missile had been successfully 
launched. If there was no fire, there would likewise be no announcement) 
could not understand Haney's request. "What do we have to tell the press 
anything for?" he asked Haney. "It didn't launch" (66). 
The eventual explanation was that there had been a mix-up with 
two electrical plugs attached to the rocket's tail (54: P296). 
Just a few weeks later, the shot was not only rescheduled but 
reclassified as MR-IA, since there was already an MR-2 in the works. 
That date was December 21, 1960 and everything worked perfectly. 
Four weeks after Kennedy was elected, Walter Bonney left NASA. 
In his place as Director of Public Affairs moved Shelby Thompson. 
Thompson and Paul Haney, who actually worked with the PAO in Washington 
but went to the Cape for the launches, drew up plans to create a news 
pool for Project Mercury. Bonney had been against this thought and so 
were others in NASA's hierarchy. When Haney presented the formalized 
plan to Glennan in January, 1961, the NASA Administrator accepted it. 
The plan was for a pool of three reporters to be'put in a critical spot 
covering the launches. One of the people would be from the magazines, 
a second from the newspapers and the third would be representing the 
electronic media. Together they would send messages to the rest of the 
media which were to be gathered in a central spot. Glennan asked some 
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of the others in the NASA hierarchy for their opinions and discovered 
that he and Thompson were the only people voting for the poolls 
implementation. Since Glennan cast the biggest vote, the plan was 
stamped, 1I0.K. T.K.G. II and the pool was a reality in time for MR-2 
(66; 67). 
Another aspect related to NASAls public information was the 
genesis of the IIVoice of Mercury Control.1I Whereas Gordon Harris had 
spoken to an intermediate at the press site during the launch of 
Explorer I, plans were now laid for the PIO in the control room to 
speak directly to the members of the media over a loudspeaker. The middle 
man was gone. The precedent set by Harris had now become set procedure. 
Still, the media were not permitted to monitor live talk within the 
control room and that rule would hold for many more years (66). 
Before the launch of MR-2 there was much speculation that the 
Mercury spacecraft would have a chimpanzee as a passenger. In order to 
hide any confirmation of that rumor from the media, Cape officials 
quartered the rocket engineers and technicians on the Cape grounds so they 
would have no contact with the reporters. However, someone forgot to tell 
the medics of the mission who signed in at the local motels. The 
Cape officials had to confide in the media again: there was indeed a 
chimpanzee going in the spacecraft and not a human as some reporters had 
heard in some rumors being circulated around the Cape (8: p35). 
Ham, the chimpanzee, was the third aspect of MR-2 that dealt with 
NASAls publicity in a manner similar to the Able-Baker shot 20 months 
before. The Associated Press later reported: 
The space agency was concerned about public reaction to the 
flight of a chimpanzee. If the animal were lost, it could arouse 
bad feelings, especially among animal lovers. If the chimp 
received prior publicity, became sort of a personality, the ill 
effects would be heightened ll (8: p37). 
Even the name of the chimp was important to NASA. He had 
originally been named Chang but that was changed to Ham (for Holloman 
~ero~edica1 School at Holloman Air Force Base, the chimpls home) because 
NASA wanted to avoid the anger 1I0f every Chinese laundryman in 
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America" (8: p37). 
The launch, on January 31, 1961, was nearly perfect. There was an 
unexpected boost by the escape rockets firing a bit prematurely to leave 
the spacecraft, causing the spacecraft and Ham to fly a bit faster than 
planned. Instead of going only 115 miles highs Ham reached an altitude 
of 157 miles above the earth and landed 132 miles further downrange 
than had been calculated. Sixty miles from the nearest ship, Ham lay 
in the spacecraft getting pummeled by waves. STG officials decided to 
dispatch Navy helicopters to the scene rather than wait for a ship. When 
the helicopters arrived, the crews found the spacecraft taking on water 
and sinking. When the spacecraft was picked up, it was estimated that 
about 8000 pounds of water were onboard, almost a premonition of 
another flight yet to come. However, Ham was okay. He had performed the 
tasks assigned and taught to him at Holloman s pulling certain levers 
when certain lights lit on his control panel in order to prevent himself 
from receiving mild electrical shocks. When he was brought back to the 
Cape, he was wearing a jump suit and diapers, "looking as cute as heck," 
one person remembers (54: pp312-316; 8: p37). 
On February 21, 1961, the second Mercury-Atlas combination (MA-2) 
roared off the pad at Canaveral, duplicating what MA-l was supposed to do 
before that missile had blown up. MA-2 performed perfectly and Robert 
Gilruth "became a young man again." At a press conference later that day, 
Gilruth told the press that the flight had been livery successful" and 
then pulled out an announcement to finish the day. In alphabetical 
order, he told the newsmen the names of the three astronauts who were 
being considered for the first manned flight for Project Mercury. 
They were Glenn, Grissom and Shepard (54: p322). 
Gilruth's statement, followed by a photograph of the three men on a 
Life cover, caused some hard feelings among the other four astronauts. 
The men had always considered themselves to be operating as a team, 
specifically from the days when Bonney had banded them together for 
publicity purposes. But now Gilruth was dividing them into us and them 
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groups, something that none of the astronauts cared for, particularly 
when Life flashed its cover shot. Gilruth tried to soothe the feelings 
of the remaining four astronauts by telling them that they were in 
prime contention for later missions, including the best of them al1--the 
first orbital flight. Whatever the feelings of the astronauts were, the 
kept to themselves. As Wally Schirra commented years later in an 
interview, "There are certain matters that we regarded as family matters 
among the astronauts and, like a family, there are certain things we 
don't talk about (140; 59: p80). 
During February, von Braun talked with his chief of public 
information about the way that the press had conditioned the American 
public into believing that the astronauts would not ride a spacecraft 
until everything was 100% perfect regarding their survival. "There is 
not such a thing!" said von Braun, and he stated that future press 
releases should tell the public that there "is a risk" but one that was 
no greater than flying new aircraft. After von Braun made his statements, 
his information officer, Bart J. Slattery, met" with Colonel Powers, 
representing STG, and Paul Haney, of NASA Headquarters, to plan 
information about future flights so as to avoid "over-emphasis or 
over-optimistic assumptions relating to future manned flights" (54: p328). 
On March 24, 1961, another Mercury-Redstone took to the skies. 
This was not classified as MR-3 but MR-BD as it contained a boilerplate 
mold of the Mercury spacecraft and the flight was intended to test the 
missile, not the spacecraft. Other things were tested as well. A 
rescue crew sat 1000 feet from the launch site in an armored personnel 
carrier, as might be required during a manned launch, to see if the crew 
could stand the noise and vibration. At 12:30 p.m., the MR-BD lifted 
off the pad and the whole configuration hit the Atlantic 307 miles away, 
and sank. The sinking was part of the plan. The test revealed that 
all the major booster problems had been worked out and now the 
Mercury-Redstone combination was ready to fly with men on board (54: 
Pp328-330) . 
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THE FIRST MEN IN SPACE 
While the Americans were shooting monkeys, empty spacecraft and 
and satellites into space~ the Russians were not sleeping. On the day 
after MR-BD's flight, the Soviets announced that they had launched and 
recovered the fifth of their Korabl Sputnik series, this one containing 
a dog named Zvesdochka, or Little Star. On March 28, the Russians had a 
display at the Soviet Academy which consisted of the puppies of the 
dog Strelka who had been in space during the summer of 1960. Along with 
the pups were four other dogs which had been into space and recovered 
successfully. On April 10, 1961, rumors reached the ears of foreign 
correspondents in Moscow that the Russians had placed a man in space 
but no one in the Soviet hierarchy was saying anything officially yet. 
That same day, at Langley, there was a report that at least 50 more 
chimpanzees would have to be shot into space by the Americans before a man 
was put up. Gilruth remarked that if that were the case, then the 
Mercury program should move to Africa (54: pp330-33l). 
The evening of April 11,1961 found President Kennedy at the 
baseball stadium in Washington, D.C., to throw out the first baseball of 
the major league season. After watching the Senators play the Chicago 
White Sox, Kennedy went home, via the high speed motorcade, leaving the 
rest of the fans to cope with the snarled traffic around the stadium. 
When Kennedy arrived at the White House, Major General Clifton, who was 
responsible for seeing that the President obtained intelligence reports 
promptly, asked the President if he wanted to be awakened during the 
night should the Russians launch a man into space; there were reports 
that the event would happen that night. Kennedy said, "No, give me 
the news in the morning," and retired (149: ppllO-112). 
Tass, the official Russian news agency, broke the news early in 
the morning hours: 
The world's first space ship Vostok with a man on board, has 
been launched on April 12 in the Soviet Union on a round-the-earth 
trip. The first space navigator is Soviet citizen pilot Major 
Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin. Bilateral radio communication has been 
established and is maintained with Gagarin. 
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The time of that message was 9:07 a.m., Moscow time, or 1:07 a.m. 
in Washington, D.C. At 1:35 a.m., the phone rang in the home of Pierre 
Salinger, President Kennedy's press secretary. The caller was Dr. Jerome 
B. Weisner, JFK's special assistant for science and technology. He told 
Salinger that U.S. intelligence had said that Gagarin was in space. 
Weisner asked if anything should be said yet; Salinger said no, not until 
the Russians reported the flight. 
At 2 a.m., the New York Times called Salinger. The Times reporter 
had heard Radio Moscow and he wanted to know if the report was true. 
Salinger told him that he would have to wait for confirmation from 
Weisner before he could say anything. 
Gagarin landed at 10:55 a.m., Russian time, but Radio Moscow 
chose not to announce his landing until 12:25 p.m., Moscow time, which 
was 4:25 a.m. in Washington. At 5:30 a.m., Weisner called Salinger to 
tell him that it was true; Gagarin had become the first man in space 
(149: p1l2; 159: April 21,1961). 
During those same early morning hours, a reporter called Shorty 
Powers at his home near Langley to obtain his reaction to the news. As 
it was reported in Time, Powers replied, "If you want anything from us, 
you jerk, the answer is that we were all asleep." Paul Haney and Chris 
Kraft state that Powers used much more powerful adjectives than "you 
jerk" when he addressed the reporter (159: April 21, 1961; 66; 93). 
Powers' version of the incident is this: 
I had had a typically rough and long day. I had ended up 
entertaining some media people at the Officer's Club at Langley 
(the only place where booze was available in dry Virginia) and 
picking up the tab, of course, out of some mythical expense 
account. I finally got home and ... stretched out on the couch in 
my den and fell asleep. I thought I had the program all put to 
bed for another day. I was aroused by the phone ringing. I picked 
up the phone and heard a gent identify himself as representing 
the United Press who then asked me if I knew that the Russians 
had sent a man into space. I allowed as how I did not know of 
such an event. He assured me that the story was true and went 
on to say he wanted a comment from me, one from Bob Gilruth and 
one from each of the astronauts and that he wanted those comments 
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in twenty minutes. I admit my comment, "Don't you know it's 
three o'clock in the morning, you jerk? If you want something 
from us, tell them we're all asleep." And he put it on the wire 
verbatim. I might say that it was one of the very few times I was 
quoted completely accurately., I was, of course, castigated by 
nervous bureaucrats in Washington--but after a few days was 
vindicated by the realization on the part of many that my comment 
meant more than even I had intended. The U.S. had indeed been 
asleep at the technology switch (126). 
It is understandable why Powers reacted as he did with the requests 
that were laid upon him and, more than likely, anyone else who was in 
his position at that time would have reacted likewise. 
Mercury Flight Director Kraft said in an interview years afterwards 
that hearing the news of Gagarinls flight was the lowest point of his 
career with NASA. He added, "Powers I quote at 3 a.m. was correct. We 
were asleep ... " and Kraft did not mean in bed either. He meant the entire 
nation had not been aware of what was happening (93). 
Seconds after awakening that morning, Kennedy called Salinger and 
asked about the Russian space shot. Yes, said Salinger, they had done 
it. Then Kennedy gave Salinger permission to call the media and read a 
prepared statement congratulating the Russians (149: pll3). 
James E. Webb, the new Administrator of NASA who had been appointed 
by Kennedy to replace Glennan in February of that year, appeared on n 
national television that morning at 7:45 to extend his congratulations 
to the Soviets for their achievement and, while expressing NASAls 
disappointment at not being first, he assured the nation that Mercury 
was progressing without being herded into posthaste action by the 
Soviet shot (54: p332). 
In New England, reporter Doug Gray of Time hustled Soviet 
astronomer Leonid Sedov into a blue Cadillac for a trip to New York 
City from Providence, Rhode Island. Sedov had planned to fly the 
distance but Gray wanted a scoop for his magazine and, impressing 
the Soviet scientist with the Cadillac, changed his mind about how to 
go to New York. Gray talked to Sedov for several hours, gleaning 
information from him for a Time article (159: April 21, 1961). 
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Time woke up cover artist Boris Chaliapin at 8 a.m. to tell him 
the news along with the fact that the editors wanted a new cover for 
the next issue, due on the presses that night. Although a cover picture 
usually took three days to complete, Chaliapin completed the painting 
of Yuri Gagarin in 12 hours. He used photos supplied to him by Time, 
and showed the Russian cosmonaut with a Mercury spacecraft in the 
background as the hammer head of the traditional hammer and sickle of the 
Soviet Union. Chaliapin could not have known what Gagarin's spacecraft 
looked like; it was never revealed until 1965 (159; April 21, 1961). 
That afternoon, Kennedy called a press conference and congratulated 
the Soviets and Major Gagarin. Then Kennedy said, "Our Mercury' 
man-in-space program is directed towards the same end." During that 
press conference, Kennedy also emphasized that the de-salinization of 
ocean water was more important that spaceflight. He was beginning to sound 
a bit like the man whom he had replaced. In a message to Krushchev, 
though, he suggested that the U.S. and the Soviet Union work together 
with their space programs (164: pp22-23; 159: April 21, 1961). 
As before, Congress did not take the matter lightly. The next 
day, Webb and Dryden, who had been re-appointed as the Deputy 
Administrator of NASA, were roasted by the House Space Committee as they 
attempted to explain why the U.S. was behind the Russians. It was the 
Sputnik debacle again. It was the very thing that Eisenhower had done 
and now his critic, Kennedy, was on trial by the public. As Powers 
wrote, the Kennedy people came down on him for his 3 a.m. statement 
but his words had proved true. The letters to the editors of Time and 
Newsweek in their issues of April 21 and April 24,1961, respectively, 
were almost duplicates of those sent to the magazines in October, 1957. 
~ carried a story about a rumor trying to discount what the Russians 
had done, saying that the son of a famous Russian aircraft designer had 
orbited the earth three times and crashed with serious injuries before 
Gagarin was sent up. There was also a remark in Time by an official 
of the Mercury program that "if somebody at the top two years ago had 
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simply decided to push it" the U.S. would have had the first man in space. 
Newsweek wrote that, in 1959, a Russian magazine had mentioned that 
Russian pilots were training for space flight and, even after Gagarin's 
flight, the Soviets had not mentioned anything about any other cosmonauts. 
There was also a slap at the u.S. from Gagarin, which was echoed by 
Krushchev: "Now let the capitalist countries catch us." As Newsweek 
pointed out, not since Lindbergh had any nation been captivated by one 
man; now the Soviet Union was such a nation with such a man. He appeared 
before the Soviet Presidium at the Lenin-Stalin tomb, an event which was 
televised live not only to Russians but to all Europeans and taped for 
later showing on U.S. networks. It was a time for introspection by the 
Americans again. Kennedy agreed with Gagarin, saying, "We are behind ... 
the news will be worse before it is better, and it will be some time 
before we catch Up" (159: April 21, 1961; 122: April 24, 1961; 54: 
pp332-335). 
Thomas Wolfe, in Rolling Stone years later, describes how the press 
reacted to John Glenn's statement, made in response to a question 
about the Russian success II'Wel1, the Russians just beat the pants off 
us, that's all.' and the reporters would scramble for the phones and 
teletypes, 'Did ya hear what he said? Did ya hear? "I (131). 
Kennedy took the blow heavily. He had attempted to use space as a 
campaign topic and he had not lived up to what he had promised. 
According to Hugh Sidey, the Washington correspondent for Time, when 
Kennedy assumed office, he appeared to know little about space and 
seemed "1ess interested in it." An advisor told Kennedy, "If we aren't 
first on the moon, we had just as well give Up." When Gagarin rode 
his Vostok spacecraft around the earth, the administration of the New 
Frontier knew that the United States could no longer rely upon its 
superior equipment to impress the world; the nation had to do something 
for prestige. A NASA official delivered a warning to the Democrats! 
"Kennedy could lose the 1964 election over this" (149: pp99-118). 
Kennedy took action a couple of days after Gagarin orbited the 
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earth. On the evening of April 14, he summoned his closest advisor, 
Theodore Sorenson, Dr. Weisner, Webb, Dryden, David Bell (the Director 
of the Bureau of the Budget) and, for some reason, Hugh Sidey. Perhaps 
the Time reporter was there because he was a close friend of the 
Kennedys or perhaps Kennedy was trying to impress the reporter with his 
knowledge of space. If the reason was the latter, then Kennedy failed 
because, in his book John F~ Kennedy, Sidey paints JFK as being largely 
ignorant of what was happening j'n outer space. 
Kennedy sat with the six men in the Cabinet room. The President 
was not in his usual position but occupied the seat of the Secretary of 
the Interior. Kennedy wanted to know what the nation could do. II Can 
we go around the moon before them?1I asked the President. IICan we put 
a man on the moon before them ..• ? When will Saturn L-a rocket designed 
for travel to the moon-1 be ready? Can we leapfrog L-one program ahead 
of another -1?1I 
Dryden answered by saying that the U.S. could put together a crash 
program to place men on the moon but the cost would be high--$40 billion. 
The political Webb made a misjudgement when he tried to praise the President, 
saying, IIWe are doing everything we possibly can, Mr. President. And 
thanks to your leadership and foresight we are moving ahead now more 
rapidly than ever •.•• 11 
Kennedy cut him off. liThe cost,1I he said. with a wave of the 
hand. IIThat's what gets me. 1I 
After some more discuSSion, Kennedy decided to hold off any 
decisions at that moment. He said: 
When we know more, I can decide if it's worth it or not. If 
somebody can just tell me how to catch up. Let's find someone--
anybody. I don't care if it's the janitor over there. if he 
knows how. There's nothing more important ll (149: pp84-85, 91, 
118) • 
But Kennedy had other things on his mind besides the space program. 
The Communists were forcing a coalition government in Laos, which was 
a loss for the U.S., and three days after Kennedy had met with the small 
group that evening, a group of Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs 
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on Cuba's southern shore in an attempt to overthrow that country's 
Communist leadership. That mission failed and it was pointed out that 
the nighttime invasion, the first in modern history, had been backed by 
the U.S.A. That, coupled with the situation in Laos, was not weighing 
easily on Kennedy's mind. 
When Kennedy had assumed office in January, he had appointed his 
Vice-President, Lyndon Johnson, as the head of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Council, since that had been Johnson's area of interest for 
so long. Now, on April 19, Kennedy and Johnson held a private 45-minute 
discussion and Edward Walsh, Johnson's chief space advisor, believes it 
was then that Kennedy decided to do something with the space programs on 
a prestigious scale. The next day, the President sent Vice-President 
Johnson the following statement: 
In accordance with our conversation, I would like for you, 
as Chairman of the Space Council, to be in charge of making an 
over-all survey of where we stand in space. 
1. Do we have a chance pf beating the Soviets by putting 
a laboratory in space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a 
rocket in space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to 
land on the moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with 
a man? Is there any other space program which promises 
dramatic results in which we could win? 
2. How much additional would it cost? 
3. Are we working twenty-four hours a day on existing 
programs? If not, why not? If not, will you make recommendations 
to me as to how work can be speeded up? 
4. In building large boosters, should we put our emphasis 
on nuclear, chemical or liquid fuel, or a combination of those 
three? 
5. Are we making maximum effort? Are we achieving necessary 
results? 
I have asked Jim Webb, Dr. Wiesner, Secretary McNamara 
I-of the Defense Department-I and other responsible officials to 
cooperate with you fully. T would appreciate a report on this at 
the earliest possible moment. 
John F. Kennedy 
Despite the fact that when he was campaigning, he had spoken of 
the U.S. being in a space race with the Russians, Kennedy never said 
anything like that in public as President except for one occasion on the 
66 
day after he had sent Johnson the April 20th directive. On that day, 
at a press conference, Kennedy told the newsmen gathered around him, 
"If we can get to the moon before the Russians, we should" (178: p87). 
But Kennedy was not the only political person thinking along those 
lines. In July of the previous year, the Democratic-controlled House 
Committee on Science and Astronautics proposed a schedule that was more 
accelerated than what NASA was thinking: "NASA's ten-year program is a 
good program as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough .... A 
high priority program should be undertaken to place a manned expedition 
on the moon in this decade." The last sentence of the Committee's report 
would be heard again in the future,_coming from another source to whom it 
would be attributed in history books (178: p7l). 
Johnson, upon receiving Kennedy's note, set about meeting with 
a number of persons from the military, NASA and private industry. When 
he was through, he had what he and Kennedy wanted: an agreement from all 
of them to go to the moon. For some reason, the public was never 
consulted nor were any polls taken to determine if the nation wanted to 
undertake such an effort. A Gallop poll, taken after Kennedy announced 
the decision to go to the moon in late May, found that 58% of the 
American population was opposed to having such a project. Even the 
nation's scientists were not totally overwhelmed by the thought of going 
to the earth's captive planet. Ed Welsh, Johnson's assistant on the 
Space Council, said, "If the scientists had had any influence, the space 
program would have been about one-third the size it has been" (178: 
p89). 
Wiesner, Kennedy's science advisor, was ordered to dream up 
something like desalinization or feeding the hungry, "which could be 
done on earth ... L-but~ would be as good as space in propaganda terms," 
remembers Wiesner, a man who had been invited to some meetings concerning 
space but who was rarely listened to by the government officials. Knowing 
that there was no hope for anything short of the moon for Kennedy, 
Wiesner told the President that he should never refer publicly to the 
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moon venture by man as being scientifically useful. After Kennedy told 
the nation that the U.S. was going to the moon, he took Wiesner's advice 
and never said anything more about science and the moon (178: p89). 
The media was busy writing and saying many things, not so much about 
Kennedy but about who was going to take the first manned ride into space 
from Cape Canaveral. Since March 25, the press had been speculating that 
John Glenn would be the man. Actually, unknown to the media until much 
later, the person chosen was Alan Shepard, who had been picked by Robert 
Gilruth in late March. The only others who knew at that time were the 
other astronauts, Webb and Dryden (48; 54: p349). 
The publicity of the manned shot was mounting, especially after 
Gagarin's flight, but in the back of everyone's mind was the memory of 
the large public buildup before Vanguard I blew up on the pad only 
two-and-a-half years before. Senators John J. Williams (R-Delaware) 
and J.W. Fulbright (O-Arkansas) had the opinion that the flight should be 
postponed from its announced date and then carried out under a cloud of 
secrecy; they did not want another publicized failure in case something 
went wrong. However, not all of Congress felt this way. Most of the 
representatives on Capitol Hill preferred to stick to the American 
tradition of allowing the media to cover events of a large and popular 
nature. It was also in the back of the Congressmen's minds that the 
Russians had been conducting their shots in secrecy and were receiving 
international criticism for not having a more "open" program (54: p350). 
Kennedy did not want the event televised live to the nation because 
he was still worried about another failure being broadcast to the world 
and Gilruth had to go to bat to allow the television networks to cover 
the launch. With others backing him, Gilruth said that there was no way 
to keep the media out of the event and not make the media mad at the 
Kennedy Administration and NASA for the rest of time. Kennedy relented 
and the television cameras were set up to transmit the image live across 
the nation. But the media still did not know who the astronaut was. 
Gilruth felt that if he let the media know who the man was, Shepard 
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would have been subjected to undue pressure and excessive publicity that 
would accompany the announcement (48). 
On May 2, the first countdown began for MR-3 but it had to be 
canceled when inclement weather caused a delay of at least 48 hours. 
Only then did Shepard's name become known to the public when he left the 
hangar where he had been suited up. The press howled loud and clear; 
they had wanted Glenn to be the first man. A number of reporters 
complained to Washington about the choice. Some said that the only 
reason Shepard got the nod was because he was a Navy man, as had been 
Kennedy. Gilruth defended his choice which, he said, was based upon 
advice from his medical, training and technical assistants. He was also 
not about to change his mind because of the media (48; 54: p350; 137). 
There were 480 newspeople at the launch site, spewing out 83,000 
words a day to an expectant nation. Haney had his press pools working 
again but there were some newspeople who complained that the pools were 
oriented towards the electronic media. New York Herald-Tribune's Senior 
Editor Earl Hubell wrote up a "Petition of Wrong-doings" and passed it 
around for other print media representatives to sign. Eventually the 
print media reporters were allowed to send some of their own along with 
the radio-television crews. There were ten pool sites but trouble 
developed as not all of those people in the pools were faithful to their 
agreements and filed "exclusive" reports from -their pool positions for 
their own parent organizations. Nevertheless, some of the media still 
worried about something e1se--another Vanguard I happening and that they 
would be blamed for a fiasco again (66; 48; 122: May 15, 1961). 
The members of the media received press kits prepared by NASA PAO 
that described the shot, what it was supposed to accomplish and how it 
was gOing to be done. Those kits had been assembled by Haney and Powers 
one night when they had sat down and hammered out on typewriters 
everything they knew about Mercury that they felt would be useful to the 
media. The kits contained about 12,000 words and were issued only a few 
days before the launch. At about the same time, Powers assumed control of 
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the "Voice of Mercury Contro1." Like what had happened during MR-2 on 
a limited basis~ Powers would broadcast to the reporters over a loudspeaker 
from the control room. This would cause very little delay~ at least less 
than that to which the reporters were accustomed (66; 54: p350; 122: May 
15, 1961). 
During the days before the launch, the media also had some unexpected 
fun from astronaut Gordon Cooper. NASA had arranged for him, in a space 
suit, to show the reporters how the first astronaut would approach his 
rocket. In full view of the media, Cooper walked towards the gantry~ 
grabbed a gi rder and then mocki ngly screamed, "No! I don I t wanna go! II 
The members of the media thought the scene was quite hilarious. NASA did 
not and neither did the officials in Washington (159: May 24, 1963). 
On May 4, the countdown started in the evening hours and continued~ 
with planned holds~ through the morning of the fifth. At 1:10 a.m., 
Shepard awoke and had breakfast with members of the operations team, 
his physicians and his backup astronaut, Glenn. He entered the transfer 
van to go to the pad at 3:55 a.m. On the way over~ he had his suit 
purged of oxygen and Gordon Cooper, no longer joking, briefed him on the 
flight status. Shepard, though, felt like joking as he talked with Gus 
Grissom. Shepard ran through the list of items it takes to become a 
good astronaut: courage, intelligence and four legs. "Why four legs?" 
asked Grissom. Because NASA thought it would be too cruel to send up 
a dog, replied Shepard (54: pp350-351; 19). 
When Shepard left the transfer van at the gantry, he was photographed 
from only a few feet away by Life photographer Morse, who was no longer 
being chased off deserted property by the police in the Cape area. 
Shepard appeared to be not the least bit bothered that his name had 
become known to the nation; as Paul Haney put it in words later, 
the astronaut thought the secrecy had been "kinda neat and didn't care 
if the public knew who he was or not" (33; 54: pp350-35l). 
Before sunrise, he entered his spacecraft, named "Freedom 7" and 
was sealed inside. Contrary to what some people may have concluded, 
Freedom 7 was not chosen as a name related to the seven astronauts. 
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Shepard said that he decided upon the name because the spacecraft was the 
seventh one manufactured by McDonnell Corporation in St. Louis and it was 
atop the Number 7 booster for the beginning of what was supposed to be 
seven flights. IIWhat better name or call-sign could I choose than 
Freedom 7?1I asked Shepard of an interviewer years later (54: p342). 
In Washington, the mood was one of apprehension. The President had 
been meeting with the National Security Council and he canceled the 
session for a short while to adjourn to his personal secretary's office 
to watch the launch on television. The members of the Council stood 
gathered around Mrs. Evelyn Lincoln's desk, watching the live broadcast 
which was to begin only two minutes before the launch but had been on for 
some time because of the holds. Vice-President Johnson opened a telephone 
line directly to NASA Administrator Webb lito try to be closer to the soul 
of the project. II Sidey writes of the men's feelings: 
As Shepard waited for the end of the countdown ... the New 
Frontier in Washington was frankly nervous. A disaster on the 
launching pad would further discredit the bruised administration. 
But there was no choice .... Project Mercury had to go ahead 
(149: pp57-158). 
Shepard appeared to be very calm about the long holds that were 
delaying his launch. At one time he called to the controllers, "I'm 
cooler than you are. Why don't you fix your little problems and light 
this candle?" But there are indications that Shepard was not all that 
cool. He had been in his spacecraft for over four hours when the last 
hold was passed and there had been no relief for him. The urine collection 
device was considered to be rather primitive and, either because of that 
or because of the tenseness of the situation, his underwear became wet. 
But, according to NASA historians, "the suit air regenerating system 
worked very well" (59: p86; 54: pp350-352). 
At 9:34 a.m., before a television audience of 45 million people in 
the U.S., Alan Shepard left the American soil as no man had done before. 
The statistics of the flight are simple enough to record: the flight 
lasted only 15 minutes and 22 seconds; of that time, he was weightless 
for about five minutes; Shepard was subjected to a gravitational pull 
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causing him to weigh more than 12 times his normal weight; he flew 116.5 
miles high at a maximum speed of 5180 mph; landed 302 miles downrange 
from the Cape; and, during the flight, he had looked for stars and found 
none but he could recognize land masses below him. But of all the 
statistics concerning his flight, one fact appealed to the American 
public: Shepard was the first American in space (54: p34l). 
Leaving the spacecraft in the water, Shepard was taken by helicopter 
to the deck of the aircraft carrier Lake Champlain where he received a 
round of applause from his fellow Navy men. He then went into 
seclusion with a medical team. There was an interruption and Shepard 
was summoned to the flag-bridge. He found a telephone waiting for 
him; President Kennedy was on the other end of the line, calling 
spontaneously to congratulate Shepard. No doubt, Kennedy was relieved 
that the New Frontier now had a success to its credit (54: p36l). 
Sidey describes the impact of Shepard's flight as a "gentle, 
cooling rain in a drought .... The country had a hero and for the moment, 
Laos and Berlin and Kennedy and Krushchev were all forgotten. Alan 
Shepard was the man who counted" (149: pp157-158). 
NASA had a similar view, according to the official history: 
"Although the seven member corps of astronauts had combat records and 
test-pilot experience to their credit, one of them at last was 
truly a hero and not just a celebrity" (54: p361). 
Gilruth collected formal congratulations that were pouring in 
from allover the world for Shepard and passed them around for his staff 
to see. The messages had come from kings, scientists and everyday 
people. It was a refreshing difference from the year before when the 
STG Director had passed around only one favorable story. 
NASA was also being praised about another aspect of the 
flight--the lack of secrecy surrounding it. The Russians were taking a 
beating on the international scene because of the massive publicity 
that had taken place concerning Shepard's shot. A number of Turkish 
journalists called upon the Soviet Consul General for a comment after 
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they had viewed the films of Gagarin's and Shepard's flights. "In the 
Shepard film," the journalists told the ambassador. "We followed all 
phases of his flight, but in yours, we followed only Krushchev. \~hy don't 
you show us your spaceflight toO?" Tass replied that the Russians were 
"mainly interested in the people's excitement and reaction. This is what 
we wanted you to see." Krushchev was reportedly upset by Shepard's 
flight; even though it was less of one that Gagarin's had been, it was 
greater in terms of publicity that Shepard had received (54: p361). 
Time had cover artist Boris Cha1iapin busy again for its next 
issue and when it arrived on the newstands, there was a painting of 
Shepard against the black-blue sky of space on the cover, without his 
spacecraft and looking a bit dazed. An advertisement by B.F. Goodrich 
was placed near the story of Shepard's flight; it showed an "astronaut" 
wearing his B.F. Goodrich space suit while preparing for launch. 
Other ads related to the space efforts of U.S. industry were beginning to 
crop up in many magazines, such as Time, Life, Look, U.S. News & World 
Report and Newsweek (159: May 15, 1961). 
Newsweek did not print a cover picture of Shepard on the May 15, 
1961 issue; instead there was a photograph of Carol i ne Kennedy. But 
plenty of material inside that issue let the readers know about the 
space flight. Its story about "Test No. 108" or MR-3, as Shepard's 
flight was also called in official terminology, contained an acronym 
that was used seven times in the text and that acronym came to be 
associated with Shepard and all flight since that time: "AOK" (122: 
May 15, 1961). 
The phrase came from the Voice of Mercury Control. William 
Shelton, a writer for many publications and author of many books on the 
space age, writes, II'AOK,' reported Colonel Shorty Powers over the 
loudspeaker. 'Astronaut Shepard reports all systems AOK 'II (144b: p146). 
Shepard never did say such a thing, nor, possibly did Powers mean 
that Shepard had said it, even though it may have sounded like that is 
what Powers meant. The phrase had been in use around the space port for 
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several months. Documents written four months before Shepard's flight 
contain "AOK.II NASA historians write that the term came about because 
the letter IIAII is very distinctive and easy to hear over the somewhat 
static-ridden communications channels and it added some emphasis to what 
may have been a hard-to-hear IIOK.II But, whoever started the use of 
"AOK,II it was Powers who gave it widespread use (54: p575, fn 37}. 
Because of his use of the term, Powers brought the wrath of 
Shepard upon his head. As Paul Haney describes the situation, Shepard 
did not like to be upset by what the Navy commander considered to be 
someone below him and even more so because Shepard did not like anyone 
"who tried to compete with what he thought was to be his thing. 1I 
According to several sources, the contempt of Shepard for Powers 
continued for a long time. At a gathering held years later, Shepard 
reportedly waited until Powers had a bit too much to drink and then 
publicly humiliated the colonel by asking if he was feeling IIAOK?II 
(66; l44a). 
Shepard, perhaps, might have been better off if he had simply 
accepted what Powers had said as coming from his own lips rather than to 
complain about someone he considered to be stealing the spotlight from his 
flight. The magazine writers seem to have regarded the phrase as 
coming from Shepard but his complaints about Powers have led to tales 
about the Navy commander's pettiness. If Shepard had kept his mouth 
shut about the affair, this author possibly would never have had reason 
to discuss it in this thesis. 
Not only did Shepard resent Powers but it appears that he also 
resented the media. To many people, Shepard appeared icy calm and some 
of the writers were ready to attribute that to his upbringing in New 
Hampshire. But William Shelton tells of a time when, at the Cape, 
Shepard walked into a bar where there were 14 journalists whom Shepard 
knew. He chose to ignore them and sat by himself instead of socializing 
with them. He resented the presence of the Life reporters and 
photographers in his home during his flight but he allowed them in to 
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fulfill the obligations of the contract that earned him $20,000 when 
he came back from space. The authors of Journey to Tranquility describe 
Shepard as lIa tough, prickly character, Lwho /' had the timeless 
arrogance of the fanatical pioneer. 1I At the early press conferences, 
Shepard insisted on fielding all of the questions thrown at the 
astronauts by reporters, putting his fellow companions ill at ease since 
they realized they were looking rather dumb. They were never considered 
to be a talkative group anyway. Shepard's attitude towards them 
might have been shaped when it was announced that Shepard was the man for 
the first U.S. flight and the media demanded that Glenn be the first media 
to go into space. There was some disagreement, anyway, between Shepard 
and Glenn as to how the astronauts were to conduct themselves and maybe 
the media's favoritism towards Glenn heightened Shepard's feelings. This 
is speculation. Perhaps the reasons go further back than what has been 
written here. Shepard discusses some of his feelings in a letter to the 
author: III apologize if my personality shows since it has nothing to do 
with the success of manned space. The fact that some find it interesting 
and some don't is only of academic interest ll (145; 144; 71; 178: pp141, 
144) • 
Judging from the tone of his letter (part of which was reproduced 
earlier in the thesis), it would seem that Shepard did not regard 
the man as being an important element to NASA's public image and that he 
preferred to have nothing to do with the press as his contribution to 
NASA's public relations policy. Unfortunately, as students of Watzlawick's 
communications theories know, one cannot not communicate; thus Shepard's 
silence may have been interpreted by the media as being hostility. 
But, for a while, Shepard was the hero in the eyes of the nation. 
With the rest of the astronauts in attendance, he journeyed to Washington 
D.C. on May 8, 1961 to receive NASA's Distinguished Service Medal from 
President Kennedy. After the Rose Garden ceremony which had been 
attended by many government and NASA dignitaries, Shepard travelled down 
Pennsylvania Avenue for a parade that had been announced only a short 
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time before. Hugh Sidey refers to Shepard as lithe man who triumphed 
when this country needed a triumph.1I Veteran Washington Post reporter 
Eddie Folliard, who had attended Washington's parades for nearly half a 
century, delivered his judgment as to how Shepard's parade, albeit on 
short notice, was the largest he had ever seen. About 250,000 people 
turned out that spring day to see the astronauts. As Fo11iard wrote, III 
think these people are genuinely hungering for a hero. It's been so 
10ngll (149: p159). 
The press supplied the public with many stories about space now 
and Congress sensed that the public was caught up in the mood for space 
exploration. The men on Capitol Hill started thinking about increasing 
the dollars earmarked for NASA; they wanted to be on the good side of 
their constituents (54: p362). 
In the May 12, 1961 issue of Life there appeared a news story about 
Shepard's flight accompanied by another story written by his wife, Louise. 
It seems as though, according to Tom Wolfe, that the Life reporter who had 
been in the Shepard household during the mission to write the magazine's 
story had had some difficulty. Writes Wolfe in an issue of Rolling Stone, 
IILouise was doing all right but one of the Life people got so nervous, so 
upset, he started throwing up. He was a wreck., Pretty soon Louise and 
everybody else are trying to help this guy out, bring him around so he 
will be in shape to get her reactions ll (131: January 4,1973). 
In the next week's issue of Life, the personal story by Shepard was 
published. It was a chronology from the time that he started his 
training until he finished his flight. The story, as read years later, 
does not appear to have any unusual qualities but, as Paul Haney points 
out, a person must remember the times during which this article and 
subsequent ones by the other astronauts appeared. At those times, says 
Haney, the articles were considered IIquite somethingll and were sought out 
by many readers. It would appear, therefore, that Life had played its 
cards correctly and had the public buying its publication. Yet, there 
were signs of disharmony between Life and Shepard because of his 
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reticence to allow a reporter and a photographer into his home. Life 
claimed that the astronaut was not holding up his end of the agreement 
1 (98: May 19, 1961; 66; 146). 
It would appear that Shepard was correct in being strict about having 
any reporters and photographers in his house during the flight. The 
contract had specified that Life could "observe the family life ... of the 
Astronauts prior to the ... f1ights and, immediately after said flights ... 
(Section 2 of the 1959 contract}.11 The contract also stated that lIeach 
personal account or story of the seven Astronauts will consist of 
biographical material of the individual Astronaut and his family and the 
experiences encountered by the Astronauts and their families during the ... 
flights (Section 3 of the 1959 contract}.11 Nowhere in the contract is 
it stated that the Life representatives could have access to the family 
during the flights, only before and after; it was up to the astronaut 
and possibly his wife (Section 4 of the 1959 contract), to provide 
accounts of what happened in the household during the flights (160). 
Life was not the only publication to run a personal story about the 
first U.S. manned space flight. U.S. News & World Report carried two 
"eyewitness ll accounts in its May 15, 1961 issue; one report was done at 
the launch site by one of the magazine's reporters while the other story 
was written on the deck of the aircraft carrier Lake Champlain. 
National Geographic, in its September, 1961 issue, which was already 
underway at the magazine's headquarters in May, contained a story written 
by the astronauts I personal physician and a story written by Shepard. 
The article by Shepard was not a breech of the contract with Life; what 
the editors of National Geographic had done was to use the remarks made by 
Shepard at his post-flight press conference where he described his flight 
to the public, as was required by Bonney's policy of May, 1959. The 
photographs used in that issue of National Geographic were mainly 
supplied to the magazine by NASA but there were also several shot by the 
magazine's own photographers--Oean Conger and Luis Marden. There was even 
ILife also had a similar problem with Gus Grissom during his 
Mercury flight in July. 
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a photograph~ on the page used by the editors for their comments~ of Conger 
on a plane with Shepard~ after the astronaut had returned to earth, shaking 
hands. Paul Haney says that the National Geographic photographers shot 
many worthwhile photographs~ as is evident in the September articles, but 
Haney adds that some of the NASA photographers resented the presence of 
outside photographers doing what the NASA photographers considered to be 
their work (118: September, 1961; 66; 163: May 15, 1961). 
In all, during 1961~ there were only eight articles listed in the 
Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature under Shepard's name. Four of 
those stories appeared in Life (one of which was written by him); one 
in National Geographic; one in Time; one in U.S. News & World Report; and 
the other in Newsweek (127: March~ 1961-February, 1962). 
There may not have been much about Shepard in the magazines on an 
overall basis in relation to his flight but the media was carrying the 
message to the people about the space efforts of the U.S. Kennedy sensed 
that the population was eager to carry forward the attack on space. He may 
not have known how much the Americans wanted to do with space; if the 
public wanted to send men to the moon or still further beyond but, on May 
25, 1961~ he committed the nation to a goal. He appeared before Congress 
that day to deliver a "Special Message to the Congress on National Urgent 
Needs." Excerpts from it follow: 
... if we are to win the battle that is now going on around the 
world between freedom and tyranny, the dramatic achievements in 
space which occurred in recent weeks should have made this clear to 
us all, as did the Sputnik in 1957~ the impact of this adventure 
on the minds of men everywhere who are attempting to make a 
determination of which road they should take .... Now it is time ... 
for a great new American enterprise ... to take a clearly leading 
role in space achievement~ which in many ways may hold the key 
to our future on earth .... 
Recognizing the head start obtained by the Soviets ... and 
recognizing the likelihood that they will exploit this lead for 
some time to come in more impressive successes, we nevertheless 
are required to make new efforts on our own. For we cannot 
guarantee that any failure to make this effort will make us last. 
We take an additional risk by making it in full view of the world, 
but as shown by the feat of astronaut Shepard, this very risk 
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enhances our stature when we are successful .... 
I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving 
the goal before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon 
and returning him safely to the earth. No single space project in 
this period will be more impressive to mankind, more important for 
the long-range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult 
or expensive to accomplish .•.. 
But in a very real sense, it will not be one man going to the 
moon ....... it will be an entire nation ... . 
... all of you have lived through the last four years and have 
seen the significance of space and the adventures in space and no 
one can predict with certainty what the ultimate meaning will be 
of mastery of space (164). 
John Barbour, of the Associated Press, writes about Kennedy's 
feelings about space, which seem to have changed after Gagarin's flight. 
liTo John Kennedy, the competitor, faced with Communist threats in 
Southeast Asia, with shameful defeat in Cuba •...... the moon was a goal, 
something the eye could see" (8: p2). 
Edward Diamond, then Newswee~'s Science Editor, describes the 
atmosphere that prevailed: 
Eisenhower was a general and he always knew that the 
generals always wanted more, more, more and he said, "No!" With 
Kennedy, the mood was, liThe Russians are coming! The Russians are 
coming!" And this gave way to the sudden buildup of the military ..•. 
Kennedy was dedicated to whip everything and this was before 
everything went sour like Vietnam and riots and other things. 
Everything was go, go, go. We had Robert Frost reading poetry 
to us and John Glenn making us feel good. It was a fantastic 
time .... We didn't need any instructions as to how to write our 
stories. Everything was "Beat the Russians!" It was all very 
go, go (31). 
The "go, go" spirit kept NASA moving too. A second Mercury 
spacecraft was resting atop another Redstone missile at the Cape in 
preparation for another manned shot in mid-July. The spacecraft, the 
eleventh from McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, contained some modifications 
which made it different from Shepard's Freedom 7. One of those changes 
involved the hatch design. The official history of Project Mercury, 
entitled This New Ocean, devotes almost an entire page to the 
description of this new hatch, perhaps because of what happened at the 
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end of the mission. Shepard's hatch had weighed 69 pounds and was 
activated by a latch mechanism. The hatch on Capsule No. 11 contained 
explosive charges but weighed only 23 pounds, an important consideration 
for later orbital versions of the spacecraft, which No. 11 almost was 
except for a few items. The explosive hatch could be activated quickly by 
the astronaut but he had to first remove a locking pin from knobbed 
plunger that was six to eight inches from his right arm as he lay in his 
contoured couch. When the plunger was hit by the astronaut's fist, 
it would cause the hatch to be jettisoned at least 25 feet away from the 
side of the spacecraft (54: p368). 
On July 15, 1961, Gilruth confirmed reports that Air Force Captain 
Virgil IIGus ll Grissom would fly the second manned U.S. shot and that Glenn, 
once more, would be the backup pilot. Apparently Gilruth harbored no 
more reservations about keeping the names of his pilots from public 
knowledge before a launch even though he had given the news on short 
notice. 
The launch had been scheduled for the next day but bad weather 
forced a 48-hour delay and the media, along with the workers at the Cape, 
stood down. Finally, on July 21, MR-4, christened Liberty Bell 7 by 
Grissom, roared off the pad. Essentially the mission was a repeat 
performance of Shepard's flight with only minor differences. The flight 
of Liberty Bell 7 went smoothly all the way from launch through 
splashdown with only a few things slipping behind schedule but nothing 
caused any great disruption to the plans. 
The spacecraft heeled over on its left side when it hit the water 
and then righted itself. To Grissom, it appeared watertight as he lay in 
it, being bounced around by the waves as the helicopters flew to where 
the spacecraft floated. Awaiting his pickup, the astronaut pulled the 
locking pin from the hatch mechanism and rested in his couch. Through 
various accounts, which he wrote for many publications, Grissom 
describes what happened: 
I was lying on the couch, waiting for the helicopter's call 
to blow the hatch. I was lying flat on my back at this time and 
turned my attention to the knife in the survival pack, wondering 
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if there might be some way I could carry it out with me as a 
souvenir. I heard the hatch blow--the noise was a dull thud--and 
looked up to see blue sky out of the hatch and water start to spill 
over the door sill (144b: ~177). 
Grissom was lucky that he had already unstrapped himself from his 
couch after landing. Realizing what had happened, he quickly hauled 
himself out of the sinking spacecraft to fall into the water without his 
helmet. There was a watertight seal near the neck of his space suit but, 
unfortunately, there were also a couple of valves for his air supply, which 
he had left in an open position. So, as he watched his spacecraft sink, 
he found himself sinking as well. Angry and scared, the astronaut started 
looking for help. One of the crewmembers of a helicopter saw the 
captain's predicament and threw him a "hor~e-collar" rescue sling. As soon 
as he was aboard the helicopter, Grissom put on a life preserver. He had 
had enough for one day. 
The other helicopter, attempting to save Liberty Bell 7, 
was having difficulty. The helicopter could carry only 4000 pounds but 
now the water-laden spacecraft weighed 5000 pounds, threatening to pull 
the helicopter down with it. With no choice, the helicopter pilot let the 
spacecraft loose, allowing it to sink in waters more than 15,000 feet 
deep. 
What was perhaps the most agonizing aspect of the spacecraft 
sinking is that 1000 feet away from the scene was an Air Force plane 
carrying an inflatable collar that pararescueman Master Sergeant Nick 
Kilmus said could have held up the spacecraft and kept it from sinking. 
But the Navy never called upon the Air Force for help and the sergeant 
could only watch the spacecraft sink (98: June 18, 1965). 
The media reported the incident to the world, which was another 
indication of the openness of the U.S. space program. Although the 
tone of the articles about the mishap showed sympathy for Grissom, there 
were some people in private quarters who felt that the accident was a 
result of Grissom's carelessness. As Shelton puts it, Grissom had been 
on somewhat cordial terms with the press until that time, then he became 
"furious" after the sinking and antagonistic towards the media. Grissom 
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denies that the sinking affected him although he said the spacecraft was 
"the first thing live ever lost in my life." Through the rest of his life, 
the fate of Liberty Bell 7 followed him.l lventual1y, during Gemini 3, 
when given the chance to name that spacecraft for his second flight, 
Grissom chose liThe Unsinkable Molly Brown ll as his way of showing that he 
was not affected by the loss of his first spaceship. The NASA officials 
were not amused by his choice of names for Gemini 3 and they asked for 
an alternative. Grissom then suggested IITitanic. 1I IIMolly Brown ll 
remained the name for Gemini 3. There are some people, such as 
Robert Gi1ruth, who believe that the name choice IIshows how deeply it 
L-the sinking of Liberty Bell 7J got to himll (48; 98: July 28, 1961). 
As for Grissom's relations with the media, he describes his view in 
a book written by him but published after his death in 1967: 
This whole thing L-writing a book I may come as sort of a jolt 
to the press crew who've covered our country's space programs from 
the beginning. To some of them, I'm known as Gloomy Gus or the 
Great Stone Face because I tend to clam up at press conferences. 
But trying to field questions from a bunch of hard-nosed, experienced 
reporters is a lot tougher than sitting down in front of a 
typewriter ll (61: p.xi). 
Henry Still, coauthor of the book Starfal1 with Mrs. Grissom, 
cOl1l1lents in the book about Grissom, writing, 1I ••• spending time with 
representatives of the press L-Was something that I Grissom considered 
a waste of time, distracting him from more important work ll (59: p62). 
On the same day as the sinking of Grissom's spacecraft, he 
received a call from President Kennedy, something which was to become 
practically a standard procedure between all astronauts and their 
presidents in the future. Kennedy also had picked the day to sign a 
bill for NASA's expanded funds, not to be confused with his request of 
May 25. NASA was seemingly cursed with having good news announced 
IGrissom's best piece of evidence that he had not fired the hatch 
Was the lack of a bruised right hand. The other Mercury astronauts who 
flew orbital missions with the explosive hatches suffered skinned right 
hands when the plungers kicked back after being hit: witness a photograph 
in Life, March 2, 1962, clearly showing Glenn with bruised knuckles, 
something that the cutline to the photograph explains. 
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on days when there was also some bad news, such as the announcement of 
Project Apollo on the same day when the first Mercury-Atlas launch blew 
up in 1960. There would be similar occurrences throughout the manned 
space flights to the moon. 
When Kennedy made his remarks about the NASA bill, he also spoke 
about the open publicity around the mission. lilt's significant," he 
said. "That this flight was made before the eyes of the watching world, 
with all the hazards that that entai1s." It was also a significant 
switch for a President who had not wanted the first launching of the 
Mercury series televised because of a fear of failure. Kennedy was 
learning the value of having an open space program (164: p27). 
On July 28, 1961, Grissom's personal story appeared in Life. In 
that article, he gave his version of the sinking, which is almost 
identical to every other description he gave for other publications and 
writers. Maybe because of the mishap, Grissom's Life article seems more 
interesting than the one that Shepard had written and it may have been 
the first chance for the public to read what Grissom had to say about the 
incident, other than his official report, which had already been made 
public. l What Grissom wrote in Life appears to be a condensation of the 
official report, which is what Shelton used in his bOQk. Following his 
article in that issue was a story about his wife's view of the mission. 
In total, there were just as many stories written about Grissom's mission 
as there had been about Shepard's flight. Two of the articles appeared 
in Life; two more appeared in Aviation Week and Space Technology, a 
technical magazine concerned with the world of aviation; two more in 
U.S. News & World Report; one in Time; and one in Newsweek (127: March, 
1961-February, 1962; 98: July 28, 1961). 
While the loss of his spacecraft may have affected him and some 
lAlthough coincidences run throughout NASAls history, Time was 
slightly prophetic when a footnote to the May 12, 1961 story about 
Shepard's flight pointed out the hazards of water landings by the 
astronauts. The footnote told of a Navy high-altitude balloon project 
that also landed on the water one week before Shepard's fliqht and that 
one of two Navy ballonists participating in the mission drowned when their 
gondola sank. 
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others, it did not interfere with the Progress of Project Mercury but 
accelerated it somewhat. The NASA officials considered that MR-3 and 
MR-4 had gone so well that they cancelled the remainder of the Mercury-
Redstone flights, MR-5 and MR-6 after some prodding by the astronauts. 
This meant that the next flight would be an orbital mission. All hopes of 
that mission, planned for three orbits, beating the Russians at a 
multi-orbit record were dashed on August 7, 1961 when Russian cosmonaut 
Cherman S. Titov successfully completed a day-long, l7-orbit flight. 
As was becoming the habit of NASA, the space administration also had an 
announcement--that the earliest date for a U.S. manned orbital mission 
had slipped back to January, 1962. A third announcement that day came 
from Congress, which was better than what either the Russians or NASA 
had said, as far as U.S. space-watchers were concerned. Congress had 
approved $1,671,750,000 for NASAls 1962 fiscal year. It was a significant 
jump for NASA. In 1958, it had received only $220 million; in 1959, 
$325 million and in 1960, between $600-700 million. Now, for the first 
time, NASA had cleared the billion dollar mark on its way to the moon. 
As Ed Diamond put it,. everything was "go , gO." 
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FOUR MORE FOR MERCURY 
On September 13, 1961, another Mercury-Atlas unmanned missile 
(MA-4) took to the skies for a successful three-orbit flight, making it 
only the second MA test out of four to succeed. Although the flight was 
considered so good that Gilruth made mention that a man could have 
survived it, there was no astronaut or even a chimp aboard. All that had 
been in the spacecraft was a "crewman simulator" designed to duplicate 
the life support requirements of a human if an astronaut had been there 
instead. During the press conference that followed the flight, Mission 
Director Walter C. Williams said that the next flight, MA-5, would not 
carry a man either but probably another chimpanzee. Some of the media 
apparently chose not to listen to Williams and started to speculate that a 
man would be on the flight that was scheduled for later that fall. NASA 
Administrator Webb did not like the idea of sending up another chimp and 
sent a note to the members of the STG asking if another unmanned shot was 
really necessary in light of the fact that the Russians had already orbited 
two men compared to none for the U.S. A Washington reporter took notice 
that Kennedy's advisors did not like the thought of another flight with a 
simian onboard because of possible Soviet and domestic ridicule (54: 
pp38l-390). 
To stop the rumors in the media, Paul Haney told the public that, 
liThe men in charge of Project Mercury have insisted on orbiting the 
chimpanzee as a necessary preliminary checkout of the entire Mercury 
program before risking a human astronaut" (54: p397). 
Meanwhile, halfway across the country from the Cape, NASA was moving 
ahead in another area. Six days after MA-4, Webb announced that NASA's 
STG would be moving its headquarters from Langley Field to Houston, Texas 
where a new Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) would be built upon a 1000 
acre tract of land leased to the government by Rice University. 1 
Criticism, as can be expected in such a situation, popped up immediately 
with cries of political influence. This would seem plausible. 
Vice-President Johnson was a native Texan as was the U.S. Representative 
IThe value of the nearby land shot up after the announcement. land 
which had been $300 per acre was up to $10,000 if it was near NASA grounds. 
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for Houston, Albert Thomas, who headed one of the subcommittees for the 
House Appropriations Committee; and Olin E. "Tiger" Teague of the House 
Science and Technology Committee which dealt with NASA, although his 
district was to the north and west of Houston. NASA denied that the site 
selection had been political. The official history of Project Mercury 
points out that the site near Houston was selected on ten points: 
... avai1ability of educational institutions and other 
facilities for advanced scientific study, electrical power and other 
utilities, water supply, climate, housing acreage, proximity to 
varied industrial enterprises, water transportation, air 
transportation and local cultural and recreational resources (54: 
p390) . 
The day after Webb made his announcement, members of the STG flew 
to Houston to acquire 100,000 acres of office space to temporarily house 
the STG until the new MSC was complete. When the STG left Langley it 
reassembled in Houston, if reassembled is the word, because the Manned 
Space programls headquarters was scattered throughout eleven buildings 
in Houstonls east side and maps were a necessity for anyone trying to find 
their way around the headquarters. Eventually, NASA set up an information 
relocation center in its Houston PAO in order to assist the STG employees 
who were relocating to Houston from Langley (54: pp390-392). 
For a while it was a tale of two cities. Newport News, Virginia was 
bitter about the loss of a major industry and Houston was welcoming the 
new organization with Texas-style celebrations. Local business leaders 
of Houston sent representatives to Virginia to expound upon the virtues 
of the Texas coast to the employees at Langley. The first office of the 
STG would move into Houston in October, 1961 and it would be another year 
before the move to the temporary quarters was complete. Many more months 
would pass before the new facilities southeast of the city were finished 
and the NASA employees could transfer to them (54: pp390-392). 
There were some people in Texas who tried to make the most of NASAls 
coming to Houston. Houston real estate man Frank Sharp offered the 
astronauts $245,000 worth of free homes located on the western side of 
Houston. This seemed to be a nice gesture on the part of the Houston 
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Home Builders Association. The astronauts' lawyer, C. Leo DeOrsey, tried 
to figure out a way to handle the deal. Glenn says: 
Leo stewed over this one for a couple of weeks trying to get 
some official advice. He couldn't get it, so he accepted the offer 
on our behalf and then the roof fell in and everyone who had been 
noncommittal jumped on Leo's back (178: p46). 
There are a couple of explanations as to why the deal fell through. 
One suggestion is that Glenn caused the collapse of the offer. He had been 
in Washington to try to explain the gifts to some NASA executives and it 
appeared that he was winning the case for the astronauts. But there was 
one item that did not appear to be logical; the new MSC was on the 
southeast side of Houston, about 30 miles from the Sharpstown subdivision 
in which the houses were located. What then, one NASA official asked of 
Glenn, did the astronauts intend to do with their new homes? Glenn 
answered, "Well, we don't intend to live in them because they're too far 
away from the Center. We'd reckon to keep them a year and then sell 
them. II The NASA officials were not too impressed with Glenn's statement 
(178: pp146-147). 
Another possible. reason for the collapse is given by writer Henry 
Simmons who says that a Washington reporter, John Finney, "got hot about 
the deal, called the White House and asked, 'Aren't you concerned about 
this?' Later it was reported that, 'The White House is looking into the 
deal,' and it fell through" (150). 
Whatever caused the fall, the astronauts had to refuse the offer 
for the free homes, worth about $35,000 apiece. As Shorty Powers put it, 
the astronauts were still very naive in the business world and they had 
to be protected. But later, they would strike out on their own and at 
least one would become a millionaire by investing wisely the money 
earned from Life (178: pp146-l47). 
The move to Houston was not the only thing on NASA's mind as other 
areas continued to function. As Haney states it, Project Mercury was 
virtually run out of an airplane during the moving process. On October 
27, 1961, a Saturn I of von Braun's creation was launched. It stood 
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163 feet tall and let loose 1.3 million pounds of thrust when its engines 
were ignited. By comparison, the Atlas being used for Project Mercury 
had about a million pounds less thrust than did the Saturn I. Because the 
noise of the launch had been anticipated in advance, the Audubon Society of 
Brevard Country, Florida (surrounding the Cape) had asked the Air Force to 
warn away some rare birds which nested around the launch pads. A few days 
before the launch, some Air Force men managed to flush out 21 of the rare 
spoonbills, a type of stork, and the Audubon Society expressed its 
appreciation for the cooperation. The noise was also anticipated by the 
humans and the Air Force public affairs officers at the launch site. 
Lt. Colonel Ken Grine and Major John Whiteside, passed out earplugs to the 
members of the media who had come to watch the launch (54: p398; 97: 
p188). 
The media surmised that a descendant of the missile that left the 
Cape that October 27 would someday be the launch vehicle to carry men to 
the moon. But that was still many years away and was still a dream to 
many people (54: p398). 
Two days after the Saturn I was launched, three chimpanzees and 
12 medical specialists arrived at the Cape to jOin the colony of two other 
chimps and their handlers who were already there. Of the primates, the 
one called Enos was the one selected to make the venture on MA-5. Enos' 
qualifications read almost like that of an astronaut as Captain Jerry 
Fineg, Chief Veterinarian for the mission, described Enos as a "quite cool 
guy and not the performing type at all." Enos had not come to NASA via 
the circus route as did the other chimps and he was capable of handling 
more complex procedures than Ham of MR-2 fame had been able to accomplish. 
Enos was to ride in a Mercury spacecraft in a pressurized couch-container 
of sorts that had a series of levers and lights within its confines. The 
tasks for Enos were four-fold: the first problem was one where he had to 
tUrn off a series of lights with two levers, otherwise he would receive 
a series of mild electrical shocks; the second was having to pull a lever 
no sooner than 20 seconds after seeing a green light so that he could 
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receive a drink of water, but no shocks were to be given if Enos reacted 
too quickly, his punishment would be only a lack of water until the test 
repeated itself a short time later; the third portion of the tests also 
had no penalty but the chimp could receive a banana pellet if he pulled a 
lever exactly 50 times; and the fourth test would be to select the odd sign 
from groups of circles, triangles and squares in order to avoid receiving 
shocks. These tests were not to be conducted continuously to allow 
Enos to relax for short periods during the flight (54: p401). 
On November 29, 1961, Enos was launched atop MA-5 for what was 
supposed to be a three-orbit flight. However,_ some of the automatic 
flight controls began to act erratically after an essentially good first 
orbit (Enos nor any other chimp had control over the spacecraft) and 
Flight Director Chris Kraft decided to bring Enos back down at the end 
of the second orbit (54: pp402-406). 
Enos was possibly happier than any of his ground-bound human 
controllers about coming back to earth early. His psychomoter tests had 
been running well for the flight but the fourth set of tests started to 
fail after the first orbit had been completed. Because of that man-made 
error, Enos was shocked on the bottom of his feet at least 79 times even 
though he pulled the correct levers. As John Barbour of AP writes, Enos 
went a bit crazy because of the malfunction and almost tore his 
couch-container apart. But this is not the reason why Kraft ordered the 
space flight cut short by an orbit. The medical records show that Enos' 
body temperature may have gone up anyway because of his frustration, not 
because the environmental controls were acting up too. Whatever was the 
case, Enos was plenty mad when he returned to earth. "Enos was not nasty 
beforehand," remarked one NASA official but when Enos was returned to the 
Cape from the recovery area, he was contained in a strong cage and not 
brought out for the media to see for some time, according to Barbour. 
When the reporters started clamoring to see the chimp, the military 
officers who had brought him home seemed reluctant to fetch him. Finally 
a sergeant was ordered to bring Enos out into view. When Enos was 
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gingerly brought out, the members of the media applauded and smiled at 
what one reporter called a "four-legged, hairy, ugly thing ... showing 
his teeth." The fact that Enos was showing his teeth possibly scored a 
coup for the PAO as the reporters thought Enos was smiling. ActuallY he 
was ready to amputate the closest human hand held near him. Fortunately, 
nothing like that happened. The press descibed Enos as being better 
behaved than had been Ham, who had become upset after his flight when the 
flashbulbs and lights of the television crews had frightened him, 
causing him to become so unruly that it took three handlers to calm him. 
But Enos just "smiled" through his session with the press, convincing 
everyone he was "happy." It was good public relations for NASA (54: 
pp406-407; 8: pp37-38). 
At the press conference following MA-5, the media sat through the 
technical descriptions of the mission and then a reporter asked: who will 
fly the MA-6 mission? No one thought that there would be an answer since 
Gilruth announced the names of the previous astronauts just before their 
launches. But this time Gilruth told the reporters that Glenn was the 
prime pilot for the next mission and Scott Carpenter was the backup pilot. 
As if that was not enough, Gilruth then said that Deke Slayton was the 
main astronaut for the MA-7 mission and Wally Schirra would act as the 
backup astronaut in case Slayton could not go. It was a welcome change 
from the previous method of announcing who was going on what flight but, 
to a degree, it also brought along what Gilruth had initially feared before 
Shepard had been launched: "pressure and hoop-lah" by the media (54: p407; 
48) . 
According to writer Tom Wolfe, the astronauts did not know how the 
public was going to react to Glenn's flight. The men thought that 
Shepard's flight was the mission to have a lot of public attention, 
not Glenn's. But Glenn saw things differently. In Life he wrote, "I knew 
the pilot of a successful orbital mission was going to get a lot of 
attention. II Because of this, Glenn was concerned about the attention 
he was receiving and complained to President Kennedy, saying that the 
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attention which the nation had focused upon him was distracting the public 
from the real essence of the flight, that is, the scientific value of 
MA-6. But the President played down the personal attention that the 
astronaut was receiving, telling the colonel that, in the public's eye, 
Glenn and the flight were inseparable. Glenn tried to water down the 
importance of his flight in relation to the others by saying that MA-6 
was nothing more than a "Look, rna, I'm here," kind of thing and that the 
. " 
following flights would be more important. This and other attempts to 
shift the spotlight away from Glenn failed (8: p44; 98: March 2, 1962; 
131: January, 4, 1973). 
Glenn was not the only person who realized how the media was handling 
his flight. So did Colonel Powers, then head of Project Mercury's PAO. 
Several months before the original launch date, Powers and his staff had 
prepared a "Public Information Operating Plan," which gave estimated 
dates by which certain parts of the mission were to be accomplished. 
Powers then advised the members of the media which areas they might 
want to report as sidebars to their stories about the mission. This also 
gave the reporters a better understanding of the mission so they could 
pass that information along to their audiences. The Mercury PAO also had 
news release handouts ready for the media as well: these covered 
practically all parts of the mission such as what the astronauts would eat 
for breakfast on the morning of the launch as well as a technical 
description on how the attitude controls of the Mercury spacecraft worked' 
(54: p419). 
On December 5, 1961, NASA Headquarters sent notice to magazine and 
newspaper editors that the space administration was ready to accommodate 
up to 400 reporters who desired to cover the launching of Glenn from Cape 
Canaveral. The exact date of the launch was not mentioned in the notice 
and the only indication of when it would occur was that the launch would 
happen "either late this year or early the next." On December 7, 1961, 
NASA dampened everyone's spirits by announcing that there was no longer 
hope that MA-6 would be launched before New Year's Day. That announcement 
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came as a bit of relief to some though; the personnel of the recovery 
forces were then allowed to go on Christmas leave, something that they 
had been worried about if the flight was attempted during December (54: 
p419). 
It was also in December that D. Brainerd Holmes, in charge of the 
Manned Spaceflight Office in NASA Headquarters in Washington, put Apollo 
on a timetable for development and created a change in the way the PAO 
was operating. From this time on, the public relations of NASA would be 
run by an Assistant Administrator for NASA·s Public Affairs. Under him 
would be the Office for Public Information and the Office of Technical 
Information and Education. Below the Office of Public Information would 
be the Public Affairs Office for Manned Spaceflight. There, the direct 
lines of control stopped. At each of the nine NASA centers, a Public 
Affairs Office was set up under the immediate control of the centers· 
directors; and under each PAO at the centers would be a Public Information 
Office. The PAOs and PIOs of the MSC, Marshall Space Center (formerly the 
Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville), Cape Canaveral and Goddard Space Flight 
Center (in Greenbelt, Maryland near Washington, D.C. which provided 
support of manned missions as a backup control in case Langley could not 
handle the missions for some reasons. Later Houston would control the 
missions but that would not be until 1965) were under the indirect 
control of the PAO for Manned Spaceflight in Washington. For a chart 
illustrating the relationship of the offices, see Appendix A (67). 
While the Public Affairs of NASA was reorganizing itself, Powers 
was moving his PAO to Cocoa Beach to establish a news center off the 
military premises of the firing range. Some of his men were to pass out 
fact sheets to the newsmen, others were to photograph the launch and other 
aspects of the mission and still more were supposed to take technical 
questions from the reporters and ferret out the answers for them. At the 
news center, advisories were also prepared for the newsmen--these reports 
gave the correspondents the progress of the mission as the time for the 
intended launch came closer. But instead of the anticipated 400 reporters, 
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up to 600 appeared, many clad in colorful beach attire. To some people, 
the atmosphere around the launch was like a circus; the reporters were 
tanning themselves on the beaches and interviewing important officials 
connected with the flight, gobbling up whatever Powers reported and 
the result was thousands of words per day pouring from the Cape to the 
rest of the world (54: p420). 
Reporters came not only from the U.S. but also from 13 other 
countries. The Voice of America was preparing to broadcast the flight 
in 36 languages throughout the world and it would also prepare a film of 
the mission for distribution through 107 countries in 41 languages. Never 
before had a scientific event been covered in such fashion. 
On January 23, 1962, the launching of MA-6 was postponed on a 
day-to-day basis because of the weather. Then the people gathered on the 
beaches on the morning of January 27. At 20 minutes before ignition, 
Walter Williams, the mission director, cancelled the launch because of the 
weather again. The new date was now February 1. The media held on and 
on January 30, a defect was found within the missile systems and the 
earliest date possible became February 13, which was announced to the 
media on January 31 (54: p420). 
The reporters were at wits' end because of the delays. They had 
gone to the Cape expecting to be there only for a short time and did not 
think about doing any real in-depth stories. As Powers recounted yea~s 
later, the delays proved to be beneficial. News about what hat Glenn's 
wife, Annie, was wearing were beginning to become old and the reporters 
found themselves finally having to understand the technicalities of the 
mission in order to provide stories that would satisfy their superiors. 
Another reason for the improved stories was so that the reporters could 
justify their expense accounts while on somewhat of a Florida vacation. 
For many of the newsmen, the two-week wait was too long and they left the 
"sick bird," as Walt Williams called it, in the care of its technicians 
(54: p420). 
Many of the media were upset by the delay for another reason. It 
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was costing them money. Estimates for each day's delay cost'the 
broadcasters about $50,000 in addition to the $2 million that they had 
already spent. For the print media, the costs were not so great but they 
could be crippling as well since their losses were about a third of what 
the broadcasters were having to spend. It would not have been surprising 
to have heard that a publication folded because of the expenses incurred 
while waiting for the shot (54: p592, fn32). 
In Arlington, Virginia, across the river from Washington, D.C., a 
small ruckus had taken place near the Glenn home on January 27. Inside 
the Glenn household with the invitation of the family was Life's Loudon 
Wainwright, who the Glenns thought to be more of a friend than a writer, 
although having him there also helped to fulfill the terms of the Life 
contract. When the news of the cancelled flight came through the media, 
the Glenn family felt a sense of sadness along with the rest of the nation. 
So did Vice-President Johnson. He wanted to drop by the Glenn home and 
express his consolation to the Glenn family in a time of disappointment and 
frustration. The Vice-President wanted to be accompanied by a television 
crew to film the event but one thing was in the way--the writer from Life. 
Johnson wanted Wainwright out (no doubt, so did the television people) 
and Mrs. Glenn said no, Loudon was her friend and he was going to stay put. 
Wainwright, seeing the situation that was developing, offered to go but 
Mrs. Glenn said no again, he was a friend of the family's and he should 
not be pushed out by anyone, no matter who it was. She also pointed out 
that the contract with Life gave him another reason to remain in the 
house. There the Vice-President sat in his limousine a couple of blocks 
away, waiting for the Life writer to leave. Intermediaries did not take 
Mrs. Glenn seriously because of her lisp but she held her ground, keeping 
Wainwright in the home, which was surrounded by other reporters on the 
outside. Johnson's aides, seething by this time, bent some arms at NASA 
and had a call placed to Glenn, who had come down from his spacecraft 
after being in it for five hours. As Glenn was having the suit taken 
off him, he took the phone and talked to his wife about the problem. 
94 
Then, he responded in a way that must have sent Johnson's assistants 
climbing the walls in anger. "Look," Glenn told his wife. "If you 
don't want the Vice-President or the TV networks or anybody else to come 
into the house, then that's it as far as I'm concerned and I'll back you 
all the way" (131: January 4, 1973). 
Johnson retreated from Arlington, leaving Wainwright in the Glenn 
home. For the time being, it was Life--1, Vice-President Johnson--O. Then 
NASA Administrator Webb jumped into the fray. He was incensed about 
Wainwright's presence in the home and called Glenn. First, Webb told Glenn, 
the Vice-President wanted to pay a private visit to Mrs. Glenn to express 
his sorrow about the postponement (which seems odd in the light that 
Johnson had television crews ready to march in with him) and, second, if 
there had been an accident at the Cape, the Life crew (a photographer had 
been along with Wainwright) would have been recording the Glenn family in 
a moment of anguish, which then might have been spread across the pages of 
Life for the world to see. Webb wanted an explanation. Glenn fired back 
that Wainwright and the photographer were friends of the family and that, 
if the Glenn family wanted them to be there, the men from Life could stay 
there. Webb then called Life editor C.O. Jackson and stated his strong 
conclusion "that it was not in the public interest to have a Life writer 
and photographer in the Glenn home during the flight." Jackson also 
fought back with an explanation that Life had been "pushed around" by 
NASA and that the magazine had not received its money's worth (how a person 
can figure out what Life esitmated it should receive for its dollars is a 
rather hard thing to calculate unless one uses column inches, perhaps). 
Jackson also stated that Life had done everything "above the board and in 
the open, and the only reason that Life had the contract was because 
I-the editors I were willing to put the money on the line." Jackson 
persisted, saying that NASA had constantly made the astronauts available 
"to the press, for television appearances, etc., in such a way that 
everything had been in the public domain with practically nothing left 
for Life. The Administrator backed down. The score was now Life--1, 
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Webb--O (26: May/June, 1973). 
Jackson's last point is something to study. According to the policy 
of May, 1959, NASA had the right to disclose everything about the public 
aspects of the missions and to make the astronauts available to the media 
for interviews while they were at work and at press conferences. Indeed, 
that left little for Life to handle. But Life was the one who said it 
had the "exclusive" stories, not NASA. NASA had a policy that the Life 
articles which were written by the astronauts could not contain anything 
that had not been officially released about the technology of-the missions 
since the mechanics were not personal information. Because of this, the 
"personal" stories were held up by NASA (but not those written by Life's 
staff writers) until after the post-flight press conferences so that Life 
could not scoop anything that might have been said by the astronauts at 
those press conferences. But in the situation between Wainwright and 
Vice-President Johnson, Editor Jackson was apparently in the right; 
Wainwright had been invited to the house as a friend and a reporter 
(which was Glenn's viewpoint) and, thus, did not have to be approved by 
NASA, only the Glenn family. 
After the flight had been cancelled on January 31, Glenn, like the 
reporters, went home for a few days with his family. While in Arlington 
he stopped across the Potomac and visited President Kennedy, answering 
many "semi-technica1 questions about the plans and systems for the orbital 
flight" (54: p421).1 
When February 13 rolled around, the media apparently still did not 
believe the launch was going to take place as the weather was bad again. 
Only one-third of the previous number of newsmen bothered to assemble 
that day. For their trouble, they were given a briefing by Powers, who 
had been joined by Haney from NASA Headquarters, two Air Force officers 
who were connected with the launch operations of the Atlas launch vehicle 
and a representative from McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, which 
manufactured the spacecraft. The weather continued to be inhospitable for 
~ launch until February 19, when the skies cleared. Immediately, the 
lIt is not believed that Glenn visited Vice-President Johnson during 
this return visit to Washington, D.C. 
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operations crew began a countdown that would last for just over ten hours. 
At 6:03 a.m. on the morning of February 20, 1962, Glenn entered his 
spacecraft, which had been named in a family contest as Friendship 7. 
Somehow it suited Glenn's image. Miles from the gantry and the Atlas 
stood 50,000 spectators on the beaches; some had been there since the 
first attempts and had organized temporary trailer towns complete with 
mayors of some sort. Across the nation, another 100 million people watched 
their television sets, more than twice as many as had watched Shepard. The 
reasons for the increased number of viewers may be that the long wait had 
aroused the national interest or that the media had done a good public 
relations job on the man that many of them had been backing for so long. 
Glenn had been at the top of the missile before and wondered if 
this time the launch would continue until the end. He remembered years 
later that he waited for the voice of Walt Williams to come through his 
headphones telling him the mission was postponed once more. But Glenn 
never heard Williams that day. Instead another official told Glenn, 
IIWe're on automatic sequence. 1I According to Glenn, "I was beginning to 
get a little surprised. This thing was getting serious. The initial 
reaction was to reply, 'Wait a minute, let's not carry this thing too far. 
If we're not careful this thing is liable to light .... '" {1l7; Kennedy 
Space Center Story: p208). 
At 9:47 that morning, the wisps of liquid oxygen that shrouded the 
missile were replaced by the flames of power which hurled Glenn into 
orbit. As the missile climbed, Shorty Powers, back in his position as 
liThe Voice of Mercury Control ll apparently forgot about the now-old "AOK" 
acronym and cheered out for the public to hear, "Glenn reports all 
spacecraft systems go! Mercury Control is go!" (54: p426). 
As he streaked around the world, Glenn turned his spacecraft about 
to face backwards and became the first American to witness a sunset 
while flying higher than lOa miles. Mercury's official history reads, 
IIAwed, but not poetically inclined, the astronaut described the moment of 
twilight simply as 'beautiful.'" In the shadow of the earth, Glenn 
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looked for stars, found them and also a bright spot on the earth below--
the citizens of Perth, Australia had turned on their lights for Glenn to 
see. As he appeared over Hawaii, the spacecraft's attitude controls began 
to suffer the same malfunction that had forced Enos' MA-5 down early. Now 
came the chance for man in space to prove his worth (54: p426). 
Meanwhile, on earth at Arlington, Virginia, loudon Wainwright sat 
with the Glenn family again with life photographer Michael Rongier at his 
side. Five thousand people gathered in New York City's Grand Central 
Station to watch a giant television screen showing aspects of the mission. 
When a department store in Atlanta had opened for business, 150 people 
stampeded inside, not to buy goods but to rush to the television sales 
area so they could watch the launch. Brandeis Department store in Omaha, 
Nebraska had no business as there were no customers. It was nearly the 
same everywhere (8: p47; 26: May/June, 1973). 
It was during Glenn's first orbit when the ground controllers 
noticed that a signal coming from the spacecraft was indicating that the 
heat shield was loose, meaning that it might separate upon reentry. Glenn 
was not told about this possibility yet he became suspicious when he was 
asked by every ground station that he passed over to make sure that the 
landing bag deployment switch was turned off. At the same time, he was 
occupied with keeping the spacecraft in the correct attitude during the 
flight, which had been a problem with Enos's Mercury spacecraft. 
Although Glenn was not informed about the trouble with the heatshie1d, the 
rest of the world knew because of television and radio (54: p430). 
The second orbit was performed without any further difficulty and 
during the third orbit there was even some time for Glenn to joke with 
Gordon Cooper, who was stationed at Muches, Australia tracking station. 
Glenn told his ground~based partner that the three orbits should 
qualify him for his Marine requirement of at least four hours of flight 
per month. Then, when Friendship 7 passed over Hawaii he received an 
order to put the landing bag deployment in the automatic mode and, if 
_a certain light came on, then Glenn was to retain the retro-rocket package 
IThe trouble with the attitude controls was totally independent of the 
trouble with the deployment of the landing bag. 
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in hopes that its straps would hold the heatshield in place until 
aerodynamic pressure would take over after the straps were burned away 
during the fiery reentry. Only then did Glenn, through his own 
calculations of the orders which he had been receiving in relation to the 
deployment of the landing bag, realize the situation (54: pp429-431). 
Upon hearing the news of the possibly-loose heatshield, Senate 
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) dismissed what was left of the 
Senate and retreated to hear further news about the mission's progress 
(8: p52). 
Over California, the retro-rockets fired as programmed and the 
astronaut felt as though he was almost going back to Hawaii because of the 
"kick ll he was given. Upon feeling the first sensations of gravity 
beginning to work on him, Glenn ejected the retro-package and a strap and 
other flaming chunks of the package flipped by the window of the 
spacecraft. As he entered the atmosphere, the superheated air became 
ionized through natural process and cut the radio communications. The 
world waited because no one knew what the outcome was. Eventually, Glenn's 
Glenn's voice came through to Mission Control: II Boy , that was a real 
fireball" (54: pp431-432). 
Friendship 7's parachutes popped out at 28,000 feet instead of 
21,000 feet but that was okay with Glenn, who had begun to think that 
his spacecraft might begin to tumble in the air of earth. A few thousand 
feet lower, the heatshield finally let loose, as it was supposed to do, 
and the landing bag dropped into place to cushion the shock of the 
spacecraft hitting the water. After the spacecraft hit the water, 40 
miles short of its intended recovery zone, it was brought aboard the 
Navy destroyer, Noa, with Glenn still inside of the spaceship. Warning 
the sailors to stand clear, Glenn hit the plunger of the hatch mechanism, 
receiving bruised knuckes in the process, and the hatch blew off the side 
of the spacecraft, allowing the Navy men to help the astronaut leave his 
dark Friendship 7. Outside of the spacecraft, Glenn received a phone 
call from President Kenndy. The President had to shout, as did Glenn, 
99 
because of the bad connection and, when Glenn thought the conversation 
was finished, he hung up, leaving Kennedy still talking until he realized 
that the Marine colonel had left the line. Then, he hung up his 
phone in the Oval Office (149: p289). 
The millions of people who had been watching their television sets 
through Glenn's recovery now turned them off but the interest did not die 
there. The flight was only the beginning of a love affair between John 
H. Glenn, Jr., and his nation. When the astronaut was heading for 
Grand Truk Island, postmasters, who had received sealed packages from the 
Headquarters of the U.S. Postal System earlier that year, now received 
orders to open those packages and sell the contents. Overnight, stamps 
showing Friendship 7 bathed in sunlight on one side above a blue and 
gold world appeared on envelopes across the U.S. Congratulations poured 
in from all nations. The usually staid Tass gave Glenn a 71-word 
description for its readers. Radio Moscow, after blasting the U.S. for 
detaining better relations between the Americans and Cuba, told Russian 
listeners that Glenn had orbited the earth and added a footnote that 
his' flight came ten months after Gagarin had done the same thing. Yet the 
Russians jammed the Voice of America which could have told the Russians the 
same news live during the mission (8: pp54-55). 
In India, the national election took a back seat to Glenn's flight 
which became the prime interest of the information disseminators there. 
South American newspapers reported that the space gap was closed or almost 
closed. The African press expressed a sense of relief that the balance of 
power had shifted towards the United States. In Europe, the press 
mentioned that the U.S. had kept the entire flight free of politics and 
had not used it to try to sway neutral countries nor those opposed to 
the u.S. Krushchev sent word that he would like to see a joint 
U.S.-Russian coalition work on space travel, which Kennedy welcomed 
(54: p434; 8: p57).1 
lIt was not until May, 1972 that President Richard Nixon and Russian 
Party Chairman Alexei Kosygin signed an agreement to perform a joint 
mfssion. That mission, called Apollo-Soyuz, flew July 15-24, 1975 and 
inv61ved three American astronauts and two Soviet cosmonauts. 
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At home, the magazines and newspapers were glvlng the astronaut 
wide coverage. Many magazines praised not only Glenn but the leadership 
of the Mercury program. Aviation Week and Space Technology, while 
praising the guidance of Gilruth, blasted Life and the astronauts by 
writing about the IIleaders of this technical team who did their work on 
civil service pay and sold no serial right to national magazines ll (10: 
February 26, 1962). 
To some later writers, the flight of Friendship 7 seems to have 
marked the end of an era. Tom Wolfe describes it best: IIGlennls flight 
was the peak of One Nation under God and REACH FOR THE STARS ..•.... L-his~ 
flight was a unity of brotherhood, space exploration, purity, national 
unity, spirit of adventure, uplift of the American soul ... 11 (131: Janua~y 
4, 1973). 
What Glenn had visualized before the flight was now coming true; he 
was receiving a lot of attention. On February 26, he and his family 
journeyed to Washington, D.C., where, with Vice-President Johnson (who 
apparently had forgiven or respected Mrs. Glenn for standing up to him) 
alongside of them in an open car, they travelled in a parade for which 
250,000 people turned out, despite a cold rain. After the parade, Glenn 
went to Capitol Hill. As he entered the joint session of Congress being 
held especially in his honor, the first astronaut to orbit the earth was 
introduced by Fishbait Miller, the doorman of the Senate, who called out 
IIMr. Speaker, Lieutenant Colonel John H. Glenn Junior of the United 
States Marine Corps.1I Glenn started to speak and noticed his lS-page 
speech was out of order. Quickly he found the first page and, as he 
described the event many years later, lithe first time anyone in the 
audience started to clap, I let them have full rein until I got the pages 
reorganized. II For 20 minutes Glenn spoke to the hushed audience 
delivering a speech that had been written by him and other members of 
his family. He swept his eyes through those gathered in the galleries 
and saw people who had worked on the flight. He introduced them to the 
legislators. At one point, he did not want to go on with his speech until 
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he saw that Walt Williams was properly introduced. Tears glistened in 
the eyes of many there and when Glenn finished his speech, applause 
rained upon him from all who were present. When Glenn left the Capitol 
Halls that day, he was destined to return but not as a visiting 
astronaut (98: March 9, 1962; 54: p435; 8: p58; 117: Kennedy Space Center 
Story, p21O). 
On March 1, Glenn and his family, with Johnson still in attendence, 
went to New York City where the mayor had proclaimed that day to be 
"John Glenn Day." At Glenn's invitation, the other astronauts and their 
families came along too. The ticker tape parade was like none before. 
Tons of confetti poured down on the men who rode in the convoy of open 
convertibles. The photographers of many magazines could not get a clear 
shot because of the paper that filled the air. As Tom Wolfe writes, the 
astronauts were "bowled over II by the people of the Big Apple. The 
astronauts had not expected such a turnout of people who were crying, 
waving flags and hanging over the expressway railings to get a glimpse 
of the men. Some of the astronauts were impressed when they looked at the 
curb~ and saw them filled with shoes, shoes, shoes. That night the 
entourage went to see the play "How to Succeed in Business Without Really 
Trying. II When the astronauts entered the theater, the audience received 
them with a standing ovation. The next surprise came when the astronauts 
realized that the lines of the show had been rewritten here and there 
with references to their space flights. Of that day, Wolfe writes, "That 
parade for John Glenn was the final act of innocence for America;" after 
that, the nation edged into the "police action" in Vietnam, which would 
eventually absorb the entire nation in a mood far different than the one 
in which Glenn had left it (131, January 4, 1973; 54: p435; 98: March 9, 
1962). 
The next day, Glenn went to an informal reception held in his honor 
at the United Nations. Following that, he returned to his hometown of 
New Concord, Ohio, on March 3 and, in a town which usually had a population 
of 2300 people, 75,000 eager fans greeted the astronaut and his wife. 
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As Annie Glenn observed, lilt doesn't seem like he's my man. Now he's 
everybody's hero.1I 
Life put on the works for Glenn. Matter of fact, it had been doing 
so since its December 8, 1961 issue when there was an article about 
Glenn being the first American chosen to orbit the earth which was 
followed by another issue (February 2, 1962) which contained a biography 
of the new American IIhero.1I In the March 2,1962 issue of Life, a ten-page 
article by Wainwright of what had happened in the Glenn household during 
the flight was published along with photographs of the mission. On March 
9, 1962, Life came out with Glenn's personal story of the flight of 
Friendship 7. That issue also contained stories about his trips to New 
York City, New Concord, to Capitol Hill and an article about his daughter, 
Lyn. Because of his flight, Glenn and the other astronauts earned 
another $25,000 in their bank accounts from the vaults of Life. 
If Al Shepard and Gus Grissom had been considered to not be too. 
receptive to NASA's public relations, Glenn was just the opposite. As 
writer William Shelton spoke about him, IIGlenn was perfect for Shorty 
Powers. II The head of the Mercury PAO got Glenn out of the astronaut office 
and into the field on public relations trips across the country. Although 
these trips were to help bolster the image of NASA, they were 
unintentionally forming the hero image of Glenn as well--something which 
the other astronauts did not appreciate. Wally Schirra came out publicly 
to state that Glenn should quit his appearances, get back to his job at 
NASA and return to being an astronaut rather than some sort of public 
figure (144; 159: October 25, 1968). 
Glenn never felt as though he was that much of a hero to anyone. 
A few years after his flight he was interviewed by the Italian journalist 
Oriana Fallaci. He told her: 
Heroes, superman, nonsense. I feel absolutely normal myself, 
absolutely ordinary. And, consequently, I really cannot understand 
what people see in me that's interesting. Like when they ask me: 
how does it feel, John Glenn, to be a star? I truly don't feel 
like a star. Yet it seems inevitable that they should think of me 
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as a star, a superman, a hero .... The fact is that people are 
always fascinated by anything new, new work, new explorations, 
especially if one risks losing his life by them (41). 
On March 14, 1962, in a conversation with Administrator Webb, 
President Kennedy seemed to agree with Schirra that the parades had to 
stop. In a memo, dated March 21, 1962, Webb told Gilruth, among others: 
In a discussion ... with President Kennedy, he made it very 
clear that he felt that in our space program we were running 
behind the Russians, that he hoped we could preserve the public 
impression that our astronauts are at work for the next flight 
with all their energy and vigor and that the parade celebrations 
and :0 forth wer~ behind us. He expressed some concern that even 
an L astronautls~ appearance such as that at Gridiron would not be 
regarded as a special occasion, and approves specifically the 
actions we are taking with the Department of Defense to establish 
procedures under which schedules and arrangements are to be 
submitted through channels and agreements reached in line with the 
policies of the two agencies. 
I explained the policy we have with respect to technical 
meetings, with a few efforts at the motivation of youth towards 
science and technology and careers in related areas, and also the 
NASA-sponsored technical meeting at Seattle in May. I also pointed 
out that in order to preserve the appearance of the whole program 
and the group, we had suggested Shepard for the magazine-publishers 
meeting and Grissom for the editorial writers, and the President 
agreed this was O.K. but hoped we would hold all of this to a 
minimum and do no more of it unless it were absolutely necessary. 
In discussing the program beyond the three-orbit Mercury, I 
pointed out we should try to set up a governmental program of 
insurance or other recognition of the hazards and nature of this 
program and thereby preclude any further arrangement such as the 
contract with Life magazine. The President authorized me to 
prepare a program that would take care of the kind of things the 
Government should do in this case and agreed that we should avoid 
the appearance that the protection of these men and their families 
had to be taken care of by some private arrangement. 
Therefore, I hope Gilruth and Cox L the author has been unable 
to determine who Webb is referring to here~ can meet at some 
appropiate time to consider the arrangements for the next astronauts 
group and make recommendations. I am particularly anxious that 
these arrangem~nts be carefully exami~ed by both Dr. Dryden and 
John Johnson / NASAls General Counsel/to be certain that we 
foresee all opportunities and problems and establish in advance 
procedures for handling these. 
Jim Webb (172). 
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This memo brings up the subject of insurance and seems to imply 
that Life was supplying life insurance for the astronauts, which, for those 
who have studied the relationship of Life and NASA will know, did happen 
but actually at a later time. Until 1963, no publications offered_the 
astronauts any kind of insurance. What Webb is indicating here is 
that the money given to the astronauts by Life offered the men a means to 
buy greater premiums than they could have other bought with the pay of the 
their regular military salaries. Jack Riley, of the PIO in Houston, and 
Haney state that, during those early years, the astronauts had the option 
of buying government insurance which was offered to them under the same 
terms that any pilots in the military were offered. 
In the meantime, another storm of sorts was brewing at NASA. On the 
day after Webb had met with Kennedy about the aforementioned memo, NASA 
made an announcement that Deke Slayton would not be making the flight on 
MA-7 because of an "erratic heart rate." He had been replaced by Scott 
Carpenter (which seems odd since Wally Schirra was Slayton's backup pilot). 
The announcement caught many journalists off guard, especially those who 
had been producing stories about Slayton's background for their 
publications. Immediately, the questions arose as to how any astronaut, 
touted to be the perfect human, could have a heart condition and not have 
it known by the doctors. To further complicate the matter, Gordon Cooper 
threatened to quit the astronaut corps if Slayton was grounded. Slayton 
was not grounded from flights in the earth's atmosphere but was prevented 
from participating in space flights (54: pp440-441). 
Actually, the doctors had known of Slayton's condition for some time 
as it had been monitored by doctors as he whirled around in a .. centrifuge 
in August, 1959. Worried about the condition in 1959, the astronauts' 
physician, Dr. William Douglas, consulted with the Chief of Cardiology 
Service at the Phi1de1phia Navy Hospital and was assured that it would not 
affect Slayton during his duties as an astronaut. Apparently Douglas was 
not totally satisfied and he next went to the Air Force School of Aviation 
Medicine with Slayton where a member of the staff there voiced the opinion 
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that Slayton should not be assigned to a flight and who wrote a note to 
Webb years later stating that view. In the fall of 1959, Douglas informed 
Gilruth about Slayton ls heart who, in turn, informed NASA Headquarters. 
Douglas then informed the Air Force Surgeon General but was told by the 
Surgeon Generalis office that he was to take no action. Slayton ls file 
became a dormant case and, in November, 1961, the captain was selected for 
MA-7 (54: pp440-441). 
In the first part of 1962, Webb remembered the memo from the Air 
Force doctor at San Antonio and he ordered a review of the case. Dr. 
Douglas convened a board to look over the situation and they pronounced 
Slayton fit for the flight. Then Webb referred the case to three 
nationally known heart specialists who said that if an astronaut with a 
heart that did not IIfibrillate" was available, then that astronaut should 
be used for the mission (54: p441-442). 
At a later press conference, Slayton refrained from naming the three 
civilian doctors who had suggested that he be replaced. Douglas then 
returned to the Air Force when his three-year tour of duty with NASA 
was up. Some newsmen thought that this was an act of bitterness--they 
had known that Douglas had been pulling for Slayton all of the time and 
did not know that the doctor had sat in on the reviews concerning the 
astronaut. Although he was taken off the roster for flights, Slayton 
retained the title "Astronaut." In September~ 1962 he became Coordinator 
of Astronaut Activities at MSC. He never did lose his desire to get into 
space. Even a year-and-a-ha1f after Mercury was finished and Project 
Gemini was underway, Slayton still had his hopes, which he told to a 
newsman: "Il ve never been grounded and 11m not now. I still hope to get 
my chance to go beyond the atmosphere" (54: p442).1 
While the Slayton problem was being handled by NASA, officials of 
the Kennedy Administration were taking a look at the Life contract. 
1S1ayton finally flew on Apollo-Soyuz, July 15-24, 1975, as the 
Apollo docking module pilot for the mission. 
106 
Theodore Sorenson writes in his book Kennedy that the President IIdid not 
approve of the rights granted them by his predecessor to make large profits 
through the exploitation of their names and stories while in military 
service ll (26: May/June, 1973). 
Apparently Kennedy forgot that he had been in the government's 
service as a senator from Massachusetts when he wrote his book Profiles 
in Courage, which, no doubt, brought some money into the senator's 
pocket from the sales. 
On April 17,1962, Walter Sohier, Assistant Deputy General Counsel 
for NASA, wrote a memo about a meeting that day between several officials 
of NASA and the Department of Defense. It read in part, lilt is NASA's 
intention not to approve contractual arrangement of the Life magazine 
variety in the future .... 
said to have been placed 
May/June, 1973). 
In this way, no segment of the press can be 
in a privileged or exclusive position ll (26: 
That memo may have induced some heart attacks in the hierarchy of 
Time, Inc., but the policy stated by Sohier never went into effect because 
of problems that could not be handled well. Some technicians at the Cape 
earned more than the astronauts. There were some suggestions that the 
astronauts could be released from the military and become civilian 
employees like X-15 pilots Neil Armstrong and Joe Walker, who were 
then receiving $16,000 and $18,000 a year respectively. But those 
incomes did not compare with what the current astronauts were earning. 
Glenn was the highest paid at $13,800 a year for a lieutenant colonel with 
flight pay but he had also earned $60,000 from Life by that time 
and stood to earn another $11,000 when Mercury was finished. Thus, for 
four years' work performed between 1959 and 1963 (when Mercury finally 
ended), Glenn earned somewhere in the neighborhood of $125,000 whereas 
Armstrong earned only half that amount. Even the low end of the 
astronaut pay scale during those years was respectable. As a captain, 
Gus Grissom was paid about $105,000 for those same four years when the 
Life payments are included with his salary. Why would an astronaut 
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want to become a civilian and give up the Life arrangements at the same 
time? 
Preparations were underway for Carpenter's upcoming MA-7 but the 
astronauts were also beginning to "man the barricades," as Sherrod 
wrote in a review of the history of the relationship between Life and 
NASA, published in the Columbia School of Journalism Review during the 
summer of 1973. On May 3, 1962, Administrator Webb made a note that 
the astronauts had made contact with Vice-President Johnson at his Texas 
ranch near San Antonio where they complained to him that Uthey had been 
cut from behind in connection with the Life contractU when they heard 
the intended death knell of their very lucrative source of money. 
In early May, Glenn had to take time off from his duties of 
helping Carpenter for his flight and from the astronauts I battle for their 
Life money. Cosmonaut Gherman Titov had arrived from the Soviet Union 
on a goodwill tour of the U.S. and Glenn was to be his host. The following 
story, related by Haney, illustrates some of Glenn's concern about 
publicity for NASA and the United States. 
Glenn had been showing Titov around the country and no matter what 
Glenn showed the cosmonaut~ the Russian would always tell Glenn that 
there was something bigger in Russia. This irritated Glenn and he 
remarked that the Americans had something the Russians did not--barbecue. 
Later, at a reception at the Russian embassy one evening, Glenn was going 
through a reception line and, when he stood near Titov, the cosmonaut told 
the surprised Marine colonel that the Russians were coming--to Glenn's 
Arlington home that night for a barbecue. Realizing the bad publicity 
that might result if he backed down, Glenn beat a hasty retreat for his 
home. He sent out friends and a neighborhood policeman for food and 
rushed about gathering braziers for the roast. As Glenn was doing this, 
Haney and others from NASA were leading the Russians to Glenn's home via 
a very circuitous route to give the astronaut more time. When the convoy 
finally pulled to a stop in front of the Glenn home, the barbecue pits 
were going full roar and Glenn was photographed greeting Titov at the 
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front door as if that was an event that happened every day. 
Then the paint of the carport ceiling caught fire from the heat of 
the grills and, with no translations needed, the people attending the 
intended roast formed a bucket brigade to douse the flames. Included in 
the chain of bucket carriers was Soviet Ambassador Andrei Dobrynin. After 
the fire was out, Titov conceded to Glenn that the astronaut was right: the 
Russians did not have anything quite li~e the barbecue Glenn was hosting. 
"But tell me," THov asked of Glenn, "is it always necessary to set the 
house on fire for this thing you call barbecue?" (66). 
When Titov left the U.S., Glenn possibly breathed a bit easier and 
resumed his struggle alongside the other astronauts against NASAls 
hierarchy, who wanted the contract to be non-existent in the future. 
In the middle of the fray surrounding the contract, Scott Carpenter 
left the earth on May 24, 1962 at 7:45 a.m., ending the smoothest countdown 
to that date in Mercury's history. Down the way from the Cape was 
Carpenter's family in a beach house watching the launch; it was the 
first Mercury family to do so during the series. The previous families 
had remained at their homes in Virginia during the shots and monitored 
the progress of the men's flights from there. At the beach house was 
Life photographer Ralph Morse and a writer from the magazine, attending 
to the family and watching the moves of the Carpenter household. The 
interest in the flight seems to have been somewhat down from Glenn's 
flight as 40 million people chose to watch Carpenter go on what was 
essentially a duplication of what Glenn had done (54: pp447-448; 98: 
June 1, 1962). 
As Carpenter soared into orbit, he was amazed by the clarity with 
which he could see details on the earth below. He spoke of seeing a boat 
on a river by following its wake and also of seeing a truck on a dusty 
road. The astronaut also told of the uselessness of the periscope in the 
Mercury spacecraft, preferring that on longer flights it should be taken 
out to make more room for fuel, water and oxygen. The temperature in his 
suit started to rise and, although he told the ground controllers that he 
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was comfortable, he made several attempts to lower the suitls temperature. 
Carpenter also stood his spacecraft. Aurora 7, lion end," that is, with its 
nose pointed towards the earth, and he found the view "exhilaratinq." Then 
began the "tragi-comedy" of the flight, as the authors of Journey to 
Tranquility called it. Instead of behaving like the stoic astronaut all 
seven had been painted to be, Carpenter chose to take the tourist route 
and burn his fuel on needless maneuvers, so much in fact that flight 
director Kraft threatened to order to him to return at the end of his 
first orbit. Carpenter slowed down his motions but not enough. Wasting 
his fuel, he kept maneuvering about as he was enthralled at the sights 
of the space sunsets and sunrises. At one time he told the controllers 
to hold off obtaining his blood pressure (which he had to tell them) as, 
IIIl ve got a sunrise to worry about. live a beautiful sunrise through the 
window. I III record it so you can see it" (54: pp446-449; 178: p148; 
122: June 14,1965). 
Carpenter later wrote in the book We Seven about his initial 
revolution around the earth: 
It was on this first pass ... that I used up a lot of my fuel. 
I kept trying to move the capsule around from one position to 
another so I would not miss anything and so I would be in a better 
position to take pictures (19: p333). 
By the time the second orbit was finished, Carpenter was far behind 
the flight schedule because of his excitement about the views that were 
confronting him as he revolved around the earth. His forgetfulness led 
to several complications with the flight plan. The main problem was that 
he had forgotten to switch off the automatic controls when he started 
manually maneuvering the spacecraft, thus expending twice as much fuel as 
called for, so that by the end of his second orbit the fuel tanks held 
less than half their allocations, far short of what had been intended. 
With little fuel left, Carpenter began to plan for his reentry. In 
doing so, he stowed some equipment and bumped the cabin wall. Immediately 
a shower of frost particles flew from the outside of the spacecraft. This 
ended a question that had arisen during Glennls flight when that astronaut 
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had seen what he termed IIfireflies li accompanying his Friendship 7. From 
Carpenter's action, it was deduced that the IIfireflies li or IIfrostflies li 
were caused by frozen particles of urine that had been dumped overboard, 
forming what was to be called by later astronauts as IIConstellation 
Urinus. 1I But there was something else more important than looking at the 
IIfrostflies li outside his window and that was looking at his fuel gauges. 
Positioning for reentry, Carpenter had 40% of his fuel left, which was 
good considering the amount he had burned up during the first two orbits. 
But as he prepared to come back to earth, he again forgot to fly with 
either the automatic system or the manual systems and, consequently, he 
practically drained the manual fuel tanks dry while leaving himself 
only about 15% fuel in the automatic system's tanks. Worried about this, 
he had to be twice reminded by Gus Grissom to put down his helmet's 
faceplate to seal his suit. Nevertheless, the views still offered 
Carpenter some relief from his plight; he called out, III can make out 
very, very small farm land, pasture land below. I see individual fields, 
rivers, lakes, roads, I think. I'll get back to reentry attitude. 1I 
Clearly, Carpenter was a person who was visually oriented rather than 
mission oriented (178: p148; 54: p454). 
On his way down, ground controllers listened to Carpenter's wails 
about his fuel supply. III hope we have enough fuel,1I he cried as the 
reentry began. One NASA official, upon hearing the pitch of Carpenter's 
voice, wondered aloud, 1I0oes he think he is changing his sex?" (178: P148). 
Having fired his retro-rockets manually since the automatic system 
for that function was not working properly, Carpenter had triggered them 
three seconds late and overshot his landing site by 250 miles (which was 
actually better than if the faulty automatic system had tried to fire 
the retro-rockets) (54: p454). 
As soon as Carpenter hit the water, the recovery forces knew 
where he was but the media did not know and they immediately made this 
into a news event, playing upon the heartstrings of millions as the u.s. 
now had a IIlost astronaut. 1I Life photographer Morse photographed Mrs. 
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Carpenter in various states of agony as she listened to television 
and radio announcements about the unknown state of her husband's fate. 
The thought of a misplaced astronaut conveniently removed all thoughts 
from the public mind that Carpenter had botched up what would have been 
a relatively easy flight. 
Carpenter knew it would be some time before anyone would get to him 
and he wanted to leave the now stifliQg interior of the hot spacecraft 
as it rode up and down with six-foot ocean swells. Instead of opening the 
side hatch and encountering the same trouble that Grissom had, Carpenter 
chose to remove some paneling and exit through the neck of the spacecraft 
(which was an alternate way to leave) to inflate a life raft and await 
the recovery forces (54: p456). 
The tragi-comedy continued. A private Piper Apache from Puerto Rico 
appeared and its pilot photographed Carpenter in his life raft. Upon 
landing in Puerto Rico, the pilot had his film confiscated. He "had 
violated the airway zones," record NASA historians (54: p456). 
Then, out of Carpenter's range of vision, an Air Force plane dropped 
two pararescuemen who popped up near Carpenter's raft, surprising him. 
They inflated two more rafts. The astronaut offered them some of his 
space food; the men declined his offer but they did drink some of his 
water. Without a radio to tell anyone about Carpenter's condition, the 
three men bobbed around in their rafts. Two more containers were dropped 
from the planes; one was a life raft which burst upon hitting the 
water and the other contained no radio, just a battery, causing one of 
the frogmen to make some comments that Carpenter later declined to 
repeat to newsmen (54: p456). 
Meanwhile, the media were making an issue of the interservice 
rivalry. The pilot of another Air Force plane, an HU-16 Albatross 
amphibian, told NASA that he could land and pick up the astronaut but 
NASA said no, wait for the Navy. Actually, the decision at NASA was not 
on the basis of which service would do the better job but on the thought 
that the Albatross might break apart in the choppy water. That decision 
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was made by Rear Admiral John L. Chew who based his opinion on past 
experiences. Finally, three hours after arriving in the water, Carpenter 
was plucked upwards by a helicopter and taken to the aircraft carrier 
Intrepid, where he landed a little more than an hour 1ater. 1 The 
traditional phone call from the President came and Carpenter told him 
that he was sorry for not having aimed better on his reentry. At the 
beach house near the Cape, Morse photographed Renee Carpenter laughing at 
the news that her husband was safe. After the recovery of the astronaut, 
she told the press, "We [the wives / often feel emotionally drained and 
we tend to fall back on such words as happy, proud or thrilled and we feel 
so much more" (8: p60; 54: pp457-458). 
That IIS0 much more," though, was reserved for Life which contained 
an article that showed all of her moods during the mission. A week after 
her story, Life printed the astronaut's personal story (98: June 1, 1962, 
June 8, 1962). 
The events that happened following the flight almost repeated those 
which had happened after Glenn's flight, despite President Kennedy's 
desire to play down the astronaut's achievement in the interest of science. 
Soviet Premeir Krushchev cabled congratulations to Carpenter. But flight 
director Kraft, in an interview years later, admitted that at the time 
he wanted to be sure that "Carpenter never flew again" because of how the 
astronaut had handled the flight. In spite of Kraft's feelings, Carpenter 
was awarded NASA's Distinguished Service Award at the Cape by Administrator 
Webb. Then he returned to his home town of Boulder, Colorado, where he 
spoke to the university he had never graduated from (Carpenter was the 
only astronaut without a college degree) and he facetiously remarked to the 
Boulder crowd that his reentry qualified him to complete the course in 
heat-transfer, which was the only course that he needed to complete years 
earlier to graduate from the college of engineering at the University of 
1Not only could the Air Force have beaten the Navy but so could have 
a tramp steamer which was closer than any other ship, but NASA, aware of 
what type of public image that could create, refused to consider such 
a thought (178: p148). 
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Colorado (91; 54: pp458-459). 
The next day, he was driven through the streets of Denver where 
300,000 people turned out to see him. He also went to the White House 
to meet the President and from there went to New York City where, at 
the Waldorf Astoria, former Presidents Herbert Hoover and Harry Truman 
stood with him in a reception line. To the former resident of Colorado, 
the post-flight activies were somethi~g. to behold but his mind had never 
left space. In his official report, Carpenter wrote, " ... 1 anxiously 
await another mission. 1I It was never to come. Kraft held true to his 
words and eventually Carpenter found himself flying what NASA personnel 
term an LSD--a Large Steel Desk. Then he suffered some injuries in a 
motorbike accident in Hamilton, Bermuda, which also ~imited his chances 
for further flights. Years after his flight, he was assigned to the Navy's 
Sealab project. He became practically the first man to explore the inner 
and outer reaches of earth. In 1968, he left Sealab as well, content to 
leave future explorations to others. The latest known occupation of 
Carpenter is that he is in the wasp breeding business in California where 
his wasps are used as a form of pest control for valuable crops (54: 
pp458-459; 178: p149; 91). 
But while the flight of Aurora 7 still engaged the world's interest, 
the men who were lined up on both sides of the issue surrounding the Life 
contract quickly resumed battle. During the summer of that year, Life's 
editor, Edward K. Thompson, was invited to a meeting with Webb and several 
other high governmental officials. At that meeting, Webb asked Thompson 
to later write him a letter, explaining what the Life editor thought were 
the major points of their discussion. The majority of Thompson's letter 
of July 13, 1962 to Webb follows: 
We first reviewed the benefits to the astronauts and to NASA 
from Life's coverage of Project Mercury. It was agreed that the 
benefits included substantial protection to the astronauts and their 
families both from a monetary standpoint and from the standpoint 
that they were relieved of constant requests by many members of the 
press during their arduous training program. The fact that they 
had sold their personal stories to Life was recognized by the rest 
of the press--I'll admit not with unalloyed delight. 
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With respect to NASA, it was agreed that Life assigned competent 
and trained journalists to do the stories which were published. 
Life's coverage of Project Mercury was constant and included many 
stories not covered solely by the contract with the Astronauts. This 
resulted in well written, knowledgeable stories published in a 
magazine of several million circulation, which is read by 
approximately 30,000,000 people each week in the United States. 
NASA was, therefore, provided with intelligent, well written and 
highly educational coverage of its projects, including Mercury. 
Moreover, the articles published in Life were serialized 
throughout the world in the most noted magazines and newspapers 
published overseas. It is not possible to determine the exact number 
of people who became acquainted with Project Mercury through the 
publication of the Life serials, but it is estimated that 
approximately 50,000,000 to 70,000,000 people (in addition to 
Life's U.S. audience) had the benefit of reading the stories 
published in Life. 
We discussed the possible embarrassments to NASAls programs 
resulting from Life's publication of the Astronauts I stories. You 
generously pointed out that at no time did Life interfere with 
press coverage in interviews or otherwise of the Astronaut's official 
stories. The general press, therefore, was able to obtain well 
rounded coverage, interviews, photographs, etc. You stated that you 
had been interviewed by various members of the press and that 
objections were made to the exclusivity of the Life contract. I 
pOinted out that Alfred Friendly, on behalf of the American 
Asscciation of Newspaper Editors, investigated suspicions that Life 
was getting unauthorized official material, denied to others, as-a-
result of the contract. His conclusions gave Life's editorial 
department and NASA a clean bill of health, although he did cite one 
case where Life's promotional department overstated what we were 
getting. --
We then discussed arrangments which possibly could be made 
with the current Astronauts and those selected for Projects 
Gemini and Apollo. While the number of Astronauts participating in 
these projects is still undetermined, it was estimated that there 
would be approximately twenty in number. Although it was recognized 
that there may be a problem with one or two of the new group, it 
was decided that it is possible that the new group and the old would 
act together as the current seven Astronauts did to share whatever 
monetary benefits might be forthcoming in realization of the sale of 
their personal stories. 
It was suggested that if the group did manage to get together 
and pool their interest in the sale, an agent be appointed to 
represent them to accept bids from the general press for their 
personal stories. This would be competitive bidding, and in no way 
would Life seek a preference in connection therewith, and of course 
all bets would be off if the White House promulgates new rules. 
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There are several ways suggested for this: 
(a) A bid on the personal stories of the Astronauts in each 
project in which they are engaged; 
(b) Bids on the various flights in which the Astronauts will 
participate; and 
(c) A bid on a time limit basis to cover the personal stories 
of the activities of the Astronauts during that period of time. 
It was not decided which would be the best formula. 
We discussed what governmental prohibitions there may be to the 
Astronauts selling their personal stories on this basis. It was 
agreed that the same right of review by NASA be in effect in any 
publication of the Astronauts' stories. Mr. Johnson I-NASA's General 
Counsel-I stated that, on the basis of current governmental rulings, 
there was no illegality involved in the Astronauts selling their 
personal stories in a manner related above. It was decided, however, 
that any policy that would be adopted by NASA would be discussed with 
the White House •... 
I will be in touch with you to see if, after Life's experience 
in Mercury, we can contribute anything more to shaping up the new 
programs, in which we are interested as Americans as well as journalists. 
Edward K. Thompson (158) 
At the time of this writing, this author has no materials concerning 
what Administrator Webb's reactions were to this letter. As Mike Collins, 
a later astronaut, wrote about Webb, the Administrator of NASA "was dead 
set against it I-the contract I, and had so ruled. It was a closed issue 
until John Glenn caught President Kennedy's ear ... " (24: p52). 
Glenn did that only a few days after Thompson sent his letter to 
Webb. Kennedy, who according to biographer Sorenson, "personally liked 
Glenn immensely" and invited the astronaut to spend a weekend with the 
Kennedys at their Hyannisport retreat on Cape Cod. During a couple of days 
of water skiing and relaxing with the First Family. Glenn was asked by 
Kennedy what he thought of the pending White House refusal to permit any 
contracts of the type that then existed between Life and the astronauts. 
Glenn spelled it out for the President and his brother, Robert, who was 
then the U.S. Attorney General, in the following manner: 
The astronaut contract did not have anything to do with 
Project reporting. official information or flight experiences. 
What it did cover was the personal background of each man, his 
family, his children and their attitudes, his church relationship, 
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his childhood remembrances, and his by-lined personalized "human 
experience" view of the mission outside of normal scientific and 
project reporting. In other words, these were the interesting 
sidelines to the real historical accomplishment of each flight. 
To know these details and feelings of each man and his family, 
it was obviously necessary that we open our homes and private 
portions of our lives to reporters to whom we would otherwise deny 
access. As with other people, we looked upon our "homes as our 
castles" and did not feel we had the obligation to open our homes 
to a random public parade of reporters unless there was another 
reason for it. However, I was certainly willing to do that if I 
could be recompensated for the trouble enough to know that my 
children could be guaranteed an education I could not otherwise 
afford or we could enjoy some of the things we did not have on the 
basis of straight military pay scales. I did not deny the old 
argument that a soldier going into combat might share an equal 
danger with astronauts but I felt that if there was enough interest 
in that soldierls home life, background, childhood, etc., to 
reporters, then he too should have the right to receive compensation 
for opening his home, his family, and his innermost thoughts to 
public scrutiny that would not otherwise be availabl,e. The 
difference was that this was a new project, a new human experience, 
in which the world was tremendously interested. A sideline or 
adjunct to history in this completely new area of human experience 
would probably be lost to the future if there was no contract. 
I stressed repeatedly that this in no way interfered with 
official reporting or experiences on the flight. That was government 
and public property, obviously. The personal story of each man and 
his family was the only thing for sale. In other words, the right 
to come across my front door step and expect reasonable free access 
to detai Is therein was the only thing at issue. 
President Kennedy said this was certainly the first time he had 
ever really understood what the contract covered. He agreed this 
made sense and guessed they should reconsider their previous 
decision (50). 
Within the government there existed an ad hoc committee 
composed of several high officials of NASA and the Department of 
Defense, including Hugh Dryden; Robert Gilruth; Walter Williams; John 
Johnson; O.B. Lloyd, Director of Public Information for NASA (after 
having headed NASA PAD from February, 1961 until December, 1961 following 
Shelby Thompson, who had left in early 1961 after spending only four months 
in that position): B. Brainerd Holmes; and Walter Lingle, special 
assistant to the administrator for public affairs (the new head of the 
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the PAO of NASA was Dr. Hiden T. Cox, who had replaced Lloyd). Also 
believed by the author to be on that committee was Cyrus Vance of the 
Defense Department. It was Lingle who drew up a paper, dated July 26, 
1962, for the committee, mindful that not many people favored the 
extension of the Life contract. In this paper he pointed out that there 
were some advantages to the contract, saying that: 1. the contract had 
handled the astronauts well, gave them money for their stories and the 
astronauts loved the "uncritical stuff" that Life printed about them; and 
2. excepting the contract, "It is probable that a great deal of the 
material about their families ... would not have appeared at all ... ; this 
has been of real value to our public affairs program" (26: May/June, 1973). 
On July 30, the committee had before it the recommendations of 
Colonel Shorty Powers. He said that the astronauts were more managable 
as a group than individually--which was more advantageous in dealing with 
the media; that the contract eliminated competition for flights because 
of the stories that might have otherwise been associated with those 
missions; that NASA controlled what the astronauts were writing; and that 
lithe inclusion of the wives in the contract eliminated the problem of the 
Government having to 'manage' their affairs" (26: May/June, 1973). 
On August 30, 1962, Lingle and several others from NASA went to meet 
Kennedy, who was backed by his advisors, Sorenson, McGeorge Bundy and 
Pierre Salinger, the White House Press Secretary. At the beginning of the 
meeting, the President stated that he IIfelt the astronauts should be 
permitted to continue to receive some money for writing of a personable 
nature inasmuch as they seem to be burdened with expenses they would not 
incur were they not in the public eye." He added that "there should be 
strict control of their investments ... L-citing / the proffer of homes in 
Houston as an example that should be avoided in the future. II Although 
they were opposed to the idea, the President's advisors and his press 
secretary gave in, saying only that the present policies should be 
"tightened Up" (26: May/June, 1973). 
As one of those present there, Richard Callaghan, one of Webb's 
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assistants, made notes of the four items that Kennedy wanted covered: 
1. to make available to the media a more comprehensive presentation 
of the official aspects of manned space missions at press conferences; 
2. to give the press more access to NASA installations and personnel, 
which included the astronauts, as long as this expansion of coverage 
did not interfere with NASAls operations; 3. to edit the astronauts I 
personal stories closer than had been before; and 4. to keep publishers 
from claiming that they have "exclusive" material from the astronauts for 
publication (26: May/June, 1973). 
On September 16, 1962, the media was let in on this decision by 
by the government. Interestingly enough, O.B. Lloyd told the press that 
the decision did not mean a change in NASAls policies about the astronauts 
selling their personal stories, which was in direct opposition to 
everything that NASA had stated in the spring of that year. In a story 
in the Washington Evening Star, William Hines wrote that none of the 
astronauts nor Colonel Powers were on the ad hoc committee and that the 
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people on the committee had heard from various members of the media, 
including Turner Catledge, managing editor of the New York Times; Don 
Schanche, of Life (who wrote the original articles about the astronauts 
in 1959); and an unidentified radio and television network president. 
It was not known if the medials representatives agreed with the committee 
or even with each other on the final decision. Hines described the new 
policy as being basically the same as the one drawn up by William Bonney 
in May, 1959 but with some changes which included: 1. that all interviews 
with the astronauts would now be controlled by NASA Headquarters in 
Washington rather than by Colonel Powers in Houston; 2. that a second news 
conference with the astronauts would be held after their flights--at this 
conference, the media would be represented by a pool of their members 
who would meet with the astronauts "in a more relaxed atmosphere" rather 
than at a regular press conference with bright lights and many reporters 
(Hines noted that this type of "more relaxed" interview was possible 
even before this new policy. All that a reporter had to do previously 
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was to contact NASA and ask to obtain an interview with the astronauts 
lion an exclusive basis." Hines continued~ "Such an exclusive interview can 
still be obtained under the new policy provisions. "); and 3. that no 
publication can use the term "exclusivell in relations to stories written 
for it by the astronauts (167: September 17, 1962). 
It might seem contradictory that Hines mentioned that reporters 
could request "exclusive" interviews yet no publication would be allowed 
to claim that it had an exclusive story written for it by the astronauts--
until the wording is examined closely. Hines meant that interviews with 
the astronauts could be labelled as being "exclusive" although the stories 
that were written by the astronauts (not the interviews given by them) 
could not be called "exclusive." 
Hines also reported about the section of the policy statement 
regarding future investments made by the astronauts. He quoted that 
section in his article and added some further explanation: 
"No investments will be made which might create the impression 
that any participant in this program placed in a position from 
benefiting from the activities or decisions of NASA itself." Mr. 
Lloyd said the intent of this provision was to prevent situations 
from arising where "it might be implied" that conflict of interest 
exists. In future, he indicated, the NASA Administrator or a 
designated official will scrutinize all astronaut business deals 
in advance of their consummation (167: September 17, 1962). 
The issue of the contracts with publications for the personal stories 
of the astronauts had finally been ironed out. Even though there were 
still those people in the government and in the media who opposed the 
idea of allowing government employees to sell their personal thoughts as 
astronauts now clearly had the right to do so and still do at present. 
Since that date, there has been no significant change in NASA's policy 
regarding the subject. 
Although the contract issue may seem to be a large event during the 
summer months of that year, it was not of great importance in comparison 
to the main mission of NASA. After Carpenter's flight, some Congressional 
leaders and members of the media were speculating that the next Mercury 
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flight should and would be an all-day flight designed to pass the mark 
made by Titov earlier in the year. Clearly, prestige was on the minds 
of the lords of Capitol Hill and the media. But NASA would have none of 
it. On June 27, 1962, NASA Headquarters announced that the MA-8 mission 
would be launched possibly in September and would last no more than six 
orbits. Named as the primary astronaut for the mission was Wally Schirra 
and his backup was Gordon Cooper (54: p460). 
About a month after the announcement, Schirra began training 
specifically for the mission. He continued to work in the simulators, as 
did Cooper, throughout August. Then, on August 11, the Soviet Union, with 
its customary lack of prior announcement, launched another cosmonaut into 
space. As Major Andrian Nikolayev orbited the earth, NASA officials read 
the reports about his mission. The next day, the space "gap" became a 
"gulf" as Vostok IV was also successfully launched with Lt. Colonel Pavel 
Popovich as its pilot. Shortly after the launch of Popovich, Nikolayev 
reported that he could see Vostok IV in the airless environment with him. 
Western observers noted that the two cosmonauts flew as close as three 
miles and as far apart as 300 miles. Those observers also listened in on 
the conversations between the cosmonauts and deduced that a rendezvous was 
at hand, although there was never an attempt to do that as it turned out. 
On August 15, the men landed only six minutes apart and Nikolayev now 
claimed the world record for time in space with a total of 64 orbits, or 
more than 95 hours flight time in the weightless void (54: p462). 
Some NASA officials discussed the possibility of adding more 
maneuverability to the Mercury spacecraft, something that would require 
at least 400 additional pounds of equipment and fuel. Flight director 
Kraft observed that the extra weight might prevent the Atlas missile 
from placing the spacecraft into orbit and, beside, some people wanted 
to know, what would the astronaut rendezvous with? An answer came back 
suggesting the astronaut could come close to one of the passive Echo 
satellites. Gilruth and his lieutenants then scratched the thoughts of 
a maneuverable Mercury spacecraft from everyone's minds and went back 
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to work on Schirra's flight (54: p462). 
During the preparations for MA-8, NASA announced on September 17, 
1962, that nine more astronauts were to join the ranks of the others 
who were already known to the public. On the day of the announcement, 
Powers introduced the veteran astronauts to the media first , starting 
in the reverse order of their flights. When he came to Shepard, Powers 
said, "And finally, this is Alan Shepard, the man who's been screaming for 
years, • But I was fi rst! • II The aud i ence 1 aughed but all the reporters saw 
on Shepard's face was a cold, hard expression. 
Powers went on to introduce the nine new astronauts to those present 
and those watching on television. They were: Neil A. Armstrong, Frank 
Borman, Charles "Pete" Conrad, James A. Lovell, Jr., James A. McDivitt, 
Elliott M. See, Thomas P. Stafford, Edward H. White II and John W. Young. 
Four were from the Air Force, four from the Navy and one, Armstrong, was 
a civilian. The names of virtually all of them were destined to become 
well-known to the American public through the media. Armstrong was to 
be cast into the role of being, perhaps, the most remembered astronaut of 
all time. Another, See, would die in a plane crash only weeks before 
he was to be launched. Gilruth called the second group of astronauts lithe 
heart of our program to the moon" (54: p602, fn 50; 22). 
The naming of the second group caused a bit of a problem for the 
media. Now they had to differentiate between the veterans and the 
newcomers. In a logical manner, the first group became known as liThe 
Original Seven," liThe Seven" and liThe Mercury Astronauts. II The second 
group became known as almost anything that the media labelled them. 
After tnat press conference, Schirra flew back to the Cape to 
prepare for his flight. Among the astronauts, Schirra was known as 
something of a fun-loving practical joker. Despite remarks that he did 
not relate well to the media, Schirra seems to have the personality that, 
even if he did not get along with the media as was reported, he was 
admired just the same. One writer described him in the following manner: 
"Hollywood would dream you up, stern, perfectionist, handsome, ladies 
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sigh, men envious ... " (155: December, 1968). 
As for his pranks: during a physical, Schirra tinted the water of a 
five-gallon jug with iodine and handed it to a nurse, saying it was his 
urine sample. Another time, some medics had been following Schirra around 
during a training session in which he wore his helmet and space suit. 
Knowing that the medics were always eager to collect samples of anything, 
Schirra gave them a beaker full of beer, also claiming that it was urine, 
"and it threw the medics off for three days,1I remembers Glenn. Schirra 
also wisecracked that he did not care to be launched atop a rocket that 
was built by the lowest bidder for the government (117: Kennedy Space 
Center Story, p209). 
Schirra spoke of his humor years later in an interview: 
You need some levity to break the tension around the work. 
Most of the people who were working with us were nervous about 
things. That's because they didn't know everything about what we 
were doing and, since I knew more than they did, I could joke 
about it .... To communicate with people, you have to be 
friendly (140) 
Perhaps because of Schirra's sense of humor, people responded to 
him in kind. When he arrived at his spacecraft, Sigma 7, for launching on 
the morning of October 3, 1962, the astronaut found an automobile ignition 
key hanging from a safety latch. Then, while stowing his gear, he 
felt in the IIglove compartment II beneath the instrument panel for his 
astronomical charts and felt something soft to the touch. Schirra 
discovered that someone had put a steak sandwich onboard--something that 
was very welcome after being on a bland diet for weeks--but he knew it 
was contraband and, with assumed sorrow, he handed it to a technician 
who was standing near the hatch (54: p472). 
Hours after he was sealed in, Schirra was launched at 7:15, 
culminating a countdown that was even more perfect than Carpenter's had 
been. When the rocket kept propelling him higher and higher, more than it 
should have, Schirra ended up in an orbit that was 176 miles high at a 
speed of 17,557 miles per hour, faster and higher than any astronaut had 
gone before (54: pp472-486). 
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The flight was the most perfect of the flights to that date. During 
his six orbits, Schirra carried out a variety of tasks during the mission: 
letting the spacecraft take care of itself by putting its flight attitude 
controls in the automatic mode ("Chimp configuration," Schirra told ground 
controllers); making observations of tests being performed on the dark 
side of the earth with flares (Schirra saw nothing but lightning); and 
to conserve his fuel as tightly as he could. When he accidentally 
shot out two percent in a quick maneuver, Schirra apologized to those on 
the ground for limy boo-boo. II Li ke Carpenter, he found himself impressed 
with the views from space but he was not overwhelmed. It seemed to 
Schirra that he was no higher than he had flown in a jet; IIS ame old 
deal, nothing new,1I Schirra told debriefers later. IIMight as well be in 
an airplane at 40-50 thousand feet altitude ll (54: pp472-486). 
As Schirra flew over the U.S. for the fourth time, Glenn passed 
along a notice that, during that pass, Schirrals voice was going to be 
carried live over radio and television networks. A person must remember 
that at this time Shorty Powers still had to pass along commentary from 
the control room because live transmissions from the astronauts to their 
ground controllers were not yet permitted. With Glenn acting as his 
second man, Schirra chatted up a storm on which the U.S. public could 
eavesdrop. 
Schirra: Just came out of a powered-down configuration where we had 
the ASCS inverter off. It came up in good shape and will stay on 
now for the rest of the flight. The amps and volts are reading 
properly.... 11m coming towards you inverted this time, which is 
an unusual way for any of us to approach California, I'll admit. 
Glenn: Roger, Wally. You've got anything to say to everyone 
watching you across the country on this thing? We're going out 
live on this. 
Schirra had already been told by Glenn that he was live but 
the space-borne astronaut seemed to ignore that since he continued 
with his technical chatter. Now he changed his conversation. Note the 
difference after Glenn reminded him about the live transmission. 
Schirra: That sounds like great sport. I can see why you 
and Scott like it. I'm having a trick now. I'm looking at 
the United States and starting to pitch up slightly with this 
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drifting rate. And I see the moon, which I'm sure no one in the 
United States can see as well as I right now. 
Glenn: I think you're probably right. 
Schirra: Ha-ha. I suppose an old song, "Drifting and Dreaming" 
would be apropos at this point but at this point I don't have a 
chance to dream. I'm enjoying it too much. 
Glenn: Things are looking real good from here, Wally. 
Schirra: Thank you, John. I guess thai what I'm doing right 
now is sort of a couple of Immelmanns / an aerobatic looping 
maneuver / across the United States (54: pp472-486). 
Schirra ended his talk with or to the U.S. there and continued his 
conversation with Glenn in private, telling him that he was fascinated 
by the view of the airglow--sunlight bouncing off the top of the 
atmosphere at the fringes of the world below him. Later, he relaxed 
from the regular chores of his flight and exercised with a bungee cord 
during his fifth orbit. Towards the end of his sixth orbit, Schirra 
completed his retrofire without the aid of ground controllers and he 
noticed that he had slightly more than half of his fuel supply 
remaining. On the way down through the atmosohere, the Navy commander 
noted that the superheated air around him glowed green (Carpenter had 
noticed this too) and then he saw a three-foot strap whip by the 
window, causing him to exclaim, liMy gosh, that's the same thing John 
saw" (54: pp472-486). 
As he streaked through the air, the sailors on the ships below 
heard several sonic booms and then saw a white contrail. Schirra waited 
until he was at 15,000 feet before he popped his main parachute out 
and he then settled into the waters of the Pacific Ocean within view of 
the ships' crews and the reporters who were also on the ships. It was 
the most perfect landing to that date. Schirra was within 4.5 miles of 
his target. Someone at NASA who knew Schirra remarked that the aircraft 
carrier Kearsage, which was to pick up the astronaut, was possibly the 
one who was more than likely 4.5 miles out of position (54: pp472-486). 
When Sigma 7 had hit the water, it had gone "way down" and then 
bobbed to the surface. Schirra elected to remain in the spacecraft and 
asked for a whaleboat to come out from the carrier to tow him to the 
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Kearsage's side. When the spacecraft finally arrived alongside, a line 
was attached to Sigma 7 and and aircraft crane hauled Schirra onboard 
the ship's aft starboard elevator. Once he was safely aboard, Schirra 
hit the plunger, skinned his knuckles and exited the spacecraft that had 
been his home for the past nine hours. As he left the deck, the old 
question that all astronauts hated was yelled out to him by some reporters: 
"How do you feel, Wally?" 
Schirra casually flipped a hand in the air and said fine. He 
appeared to be tired to the reporters but examining physicians said that 
the astronaut was not overly fatigued. There were some unusual symptoms 
that crept up during the examinations, although, which had not appeared 
in the other astronauts. Schirra's blood pooled in his feet and legs when 
he stood. His pulse also went to 100 heartbeats per minute when standing 
and only dropped to 70 when he lay down. By the next morning, Schirra 
was back to normal {54: pp472-486).1 
For three hours, Schirra was welcomed by the leis of Honolulu when 
he arrived there and then he flew to Houston for further debriefings and 
a press conference. From Houston, Schirra went to his hometown of Oradell, 
r~ew Jersey for a parade and then to Washington, D.C., to receive NASA's 
Distinguished Service Award. The ceremony in Washington might have been 
a little shorter than the previous ones but this was not because Kennedy 
was frowning upon public activities. The President was more occupied 
with other types of missiles than the type which had propelled Schirra 
around the world six times. What happened in the middle of October, 1962 
possibly educated more Americans about missiles than had the entire space 
program because it was then that Kennedy found himself confronted by 
offensive missiles stationed in Cuba by the Soviet Union. 
The Cuban missile crisis took the headlines for many days and news 
of NASA was put in the background. In mid-November, NASA released an 
1Schirra was obviously feeling fine soon because shortly after the 
flight he sent the government a bill for his flight, computed on a 
so-many-cents-per-mile basis, which came to a few thousand dollars. NASA 
fired back a bill to him for the cost of the booster, which was a few 
million, and Schirra dropped the facetious matter. 
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announcement about the next manned mission--the astronaut to fly in MA-9 
would be Gordon Cooper and he would be backed by Shepard. According to 
Time, NASA officials "had been reluctant to give him {-Cooper / his chance. 
They tabbed Cooper as something of a complainer, as unpredictable, and 
as indifferent to building the 'public image' demanded of the astronauts" 
(159: May 24, 1963). 
Cooper had a love for fast cars (so did Grissom who was fond of 
speeding down the roads and highways and, together, the two men had an 
interest in an Indianapolis racer) often travelling at speeds in excess 
of 100 mph. Some of the other astronauts were similar. Cooper's fondness 
of speed would cause some headaches between him and NASA officials in 
the future and he was remembered as the astronaut who jokingly screamed, 
"I don't wanna gO!" when demonstrating to newsmen before MR-3 how an 
astronaut would approach his spacecraft. There were reports that Shepard 
might fly instead of Cooper but those rumors were squelched when Schirra 
promised to make a "public ruckus" if Shepard was assigned to the flight 
(159: May 24, 1963; 59: pl38). 
There had also been some discussions that Cooper's flight was not 
necessary. Some observers mentioned that NASA should quit Project 
Mercury while it was ahead, saying that the reputation of Mercury was good, 
so why ruin it if Cooper's mission failed? Others argued that it would 
severely tax the resources of the Hercury team if its members had to cope 
with an all-day flight. But NASA officials pointed out that when Mercury 
had begun in 1959, the STG had set a target of an 18-orbit mission and 
that is what they still wished to accomplish, no matter if it did fall 
short of Russia's records for total number of orbits by a single person. 
On November 9, 1962, the senior staff of the MSC decided to increase the 
number of orbits to 22 from 18; immediately the staff of Gilruth, which 
was still scattered allover the east side of Houston, began to work 
harder on the plans for MA-9, scheduled for late April, 1963. For 
NASA, it was the beginning of the end for the first American 
space program. Already, plans for future flights py two men in one 
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spacecraft, to be called Gemini, which, some years before, had been 
inserted between Apollo and Mercury. 
Cooper called his spacecraft Faith 7 and that raised some eyebrows 
around the image-conscious space administration. IISuppose that, for some 
reason, we lost the capsule at sea," said one NASA official. IIThen it 
would come out reading something like 'The United States today lost 
Faith .... 11 But the name stuck (167: April 19,1963). 
Inside the spacecraft, some 183 changes were being made in the days 
before the flight. The 76-pound periscope, after much downgrading by 
previous astronauts, was finally removed. There were additions to the 
amounts of liquids that would be carried for the cooling systems, the 
fuel tanks and for the drinking water. Also, a load of cameras came 
onboard, including, for the first time, a television camera. While it 
may be thought by many Americans that Apollo 7 was the first spacecraft 
to beam television signals back from space, Cooper's slow-scan television 
camera was actually the first equipment devised to transmit images to 
earth from a spacecraft (54: p490). 
Because of all the changes in Faith 7, Cooper pleaded some ignorance 
with reporters. The media had complained that NASA had IImuzzledll the 
astronaut but, on February 8, 1963, he appeared before a press conference. 
He admitted that he could not explain all of the difficulties that Convair 
was having with his Atlas booster and he tried to make the reporters 
understand that the mission would last only as long as it went okay "for 
as long as twenty-two orbits" (54: p490). 
Another aspect of Cooper's flight is that he bought life insurance 
for the mission. It was the first time any of the astronauts had bought 
a commercial policy in connection with a flight. Aetna Casualty and Life 
Insurance Company announced in the spring of 1963 that it had sold 
$100,000 life insurance policies to each of the Original 7 astronauts and 
the company was planning to insure the nine new astronauts as well. NASA 
historians commented that the fact that someone was willing to insure 
Cooper gave proof that people had faith in the missions. As can be 
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expected~ the premiums were no doubt high but one Aetna official described 
the rates as "similar to rates for other unusual occupations." But they 
were not the highest~ being comparable to those "of steeplejack 
climbing." As with all life insurance companies, the astronauts had to 
take physicals before they were issued their policies. The thought of 
them doing so seems rather superfluous (168: May 9, 1963). 
While NASA was preparing for the last Mercury shot, so were certain 
members of the media. It must be remembered that the 1959 contract which 
Life had signed with the astronauts was good only through the end of 
Project Mercury and now that the end was in sight, Field Educational 
Enterprises Corporation, publishers of World Book Encyclopedia, began 
to show interest in acquiring the personal stories of the astronauts. 
Field had not thought of the acquisition on its own but only when it was 
approached by Jim Godbold, who had been the photographer director of 
National Geographic. Godbold had drawn up long-range plans in 1962 to 
obtain the rights to the astronauts I personal stories up and through the 
moon landings but his thoughts were not for himself. He was looking for 
any publisher who might be interested in his plans. It was in October, 
1962 that Godbold approached the editor of the Chicago Sun Times, saying 
that Field should approach the astronauts about forming such a contract 
with them. Field1s executives liked what Godbold was trying to market and 
hired him away from National Geographic. In April, 1963, Field1s 
President, Bailey K. Howard, told the world that he was offering the 16 
astronauts $3.2 million for their personal stories over the next eight 
years. This would amount to $25,000 per astronaut per year--not taking 
into consideration that there might be other astronauts added to the 
operations of NASA during those years. What Field hoped to glean off the 
astronauts would be resold to other organizations as well as be used in 
Field1s publications. The contract intended to cover stories written by 
the astronauts for newspapers, magazines, books (including stories written 
for children1s books) and appearances for films, television shows, radio 
broadcasts and recordings. Field offered Life the U.S. and Canadian 
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rights to the stories for $800,000. Field would retain the rights for 
foreign syndication. In addition to this, Field would also ante up 
another $5000 per astronaut to buy each a $100,000 life insurance policy 
(26: May/June, 1973). 
The contract may have sounded like heaven to the astronauts but for 
NASA and the critics who had originally attacked Life's 1959 contract, the 
$3.2 million proposal was just too muc~. The howl from the media went up 
immediately. The chairman of the Senate Space Committee, Senator Clinton 
Anderson, asked Administrator Webb to clarify the government's position on 
the matter. The President of the Associated Press, Ben McKelway, told 
Webb, "somehow the way this thing is developing is wrong from the 
standpoint of the country." A number of newspapers shared the same opinion 
and battered NASA in their columns (26: May/June, 1973). 
The media is not the only place that there was a conflict going on. 
The men who handled the public affairs of NASA were having a problem too. 
Just before Cooper was to be launched, the new assistant administrator for 
NASA's public affairs, Julian Scheer, came on deck. 1 Scheer came to NASA 
from North Carolina with a newsman's background. He had been a reporter 
for years and had covered the Mercury shots along with other reporters. 
Roy Neal, of the National Broadcasting Company for whom he had been 
covering space missions for years, says that Scheer came to NASA to take 
over the PAO and also to perform a hatchet job on Colonel John A. Powers. 
The clash seemed inevitable. Scheer had always thought that Powers had 
favored the electronic media throughout the years (so did many people in 
the print media, yet Powers had been cleared of all charges by the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors which had investigated Powers' handling of 
the media) and several people in the hierarchy of NASA wanted to see 
Powers go for a variety of reasons, some of which might have been 
IS cheer had been a consultant to NASA since November, 1962 and 
replaced Dr. George L. Simpson, who had served as the head of the PAO from 
September, 1962 to March, 1963 (although he remained with NASA until 
November, 1963). Haney writes that Simpson returned to his old job of 
teaching sociology at the University of Georgia "with head shaking and 
slobbering slightly after an unnerving year or so in Washington" (67; 
123a). 
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jealousy from not being exposed to the media enough to suit their egos. 
{126; 11gb; 137} 
The new head of the NASAls public affairs asked Powers for a copy of 
the flight plan for the MA-9 mission so Scheer could make copies to give 
to the print media. Scheer said this was only fair since the electronic 
media already had copies of the plans. Powers was in a trap. He knew 
that the network people had the plans, obtained through various means, 
but Headquarters had prohibited him from distributing any flight plans 
to anyone. Therefore he was helpless even though he asked to release the 
flight plans, according to Neal. Because of this, Powers refused to give 
Scheer the plans, saying that Scheer would have to issue a direct order 
to him if he wanted those plans.(13?; 11gb; 126). 
III order YOU,ll said Scheer 
Powers I reply was curt. IIFuck you. I quit. 1I 
IINo,1I shot back Scheer. IIYoulre fired ll (137). 
Powers I version of the situation follows: 
I had access to the flight plan and recommended that I be 
permitted to release the flight plan, or at least a santized version 
of it. The response from the management was--IIHell, Shorty, these 
guys will be second guessing us all the way from lift-off to 
splash if you do that.1I I finally persuaded the power that be that 
I had to provide at least an outline of significant events which I 
did. At the same time, I found that certain people were being wined 
and dined primarily by network television people and in the process 
had been persuaded to give copies of the complete flight plan to the 
nets on a covert basis. Naturally the net people had to brag about 
having the plans to others which brought down the wrath of every 
other media on the scene upon my balding pate. It was perhaps one 
of the most difficult situations with which I was confronted in the 
program. None of the management people would admit to having handed 
the flight plans out, the network people wouldn't tell me where they 
got them and management would not authorize me to make a general 
release of the flight plan (126). 
Neal says that the firing of Powers was part of the struggle 
between Houston and Washington to see who would control the manned space 
flights. One part of this struggle concerned the public information and 
where it originated. There were powers in Washington that preferred for 
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all of the news of NASA to be announced in Washington rather than in 
Houston. Another part of the struggle was illustrated by Neal in a 
conversation: 
While the missions were going on, George Mueller I-who succeeded 
D. Brainerd Holmes as the head of the Office of Manne~Space Flight-I 
was ho1cling meetings in Washington to make in-flight decisions. -
Kraft wanted control in Houston because his people were the ones who 
had worked through the development and training and they knew what 
was going on, not the people in Washington.... rt was a power 
battle. Kraft won the right to control the flights from Houston. 
Powers lost (l19b). 
The fact that Powers lost was not too well-received by others in the 
Mercury group, especially Gi1ruth, who still considers Scheer's actions 
"not very smart.1I Gilruth complained to Scheer that MA-9 could not go on 
without Powers and insisted that Powers be reinstated (48). 
Scheer, in an interview years after the incident, said: 
Gilruth was[upset I. He was saying that the flight cou1dn ' t 
go on without Powers. ~i1ruth accused me of this because there 
a public affair~ man was not at the console L-of the Voice of 
Mercury Control I. I'thought, 'This is ginger-peachy. I I couldn't 
imagine how one-man could stop the launch (137). 
According to Haney, Gilruth was so upset that Scheer was "fucking 
around with my conmand" that when Haney introduced the two men at a 
restaurant, Gi1ruth threw a punch at Scheer for an opening statement (66).1 
Once everything cooled down, Powers was back on the job after being 
fired, rehired, quitting and rejoini'ag several times over the period of 
a few days (Haney describes this time as being very trying and the author 
believes him). Yet, it became apparent to Powers that he could not 
handle the "Voice" by himself since the flight was going to last up to 
22 orbits which would be about 34 hours. Powers had never trained anyone 
else for the position so, three days before the launch, Haney decided to 
help Powers as the second "Voice," even though he had no experience 
with announcing under broadcast conditions (66). 
IAccording to the chain of command, as set up by D. Brainerd Holmes 
in late 1961, Scheer was crossing direct lines of command by firing 
Powers. The relationship between Powers and the Headquarters PAO was 
only an indirect one so it would seem that Gi1ruth had every reason to be 
upset with Scheer's actions. 
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Cooper began his 22-orbit, 34-hour-and-20-minute flight at 8:04 a.m. 
on May 15, 1963. Like other astronauts, he could pick out very minute 
details on the earth, 100 miles below. Cooper saw smoke from chimneys 
and could determine which way the wind was blowing below by watching the 
drift of the smoke. He could also see very thin country road~ winding 
through the countrysides. His flight included the first satellite to be 
launched from a manned spacecraft. It was a six-inch sphere that contained 
strobe lights. Launched during his third orbit, the small, flashing 
satellite was not immediately viewed by the astronaut but on his fourth 
orbit he spotted it and realized that he indeed had launched a 
subsatellite. As Cooper remarked about it later, "I was with the little 
rascal all night." In addition to that satellite's lights, he was able to 
see another strobe, rated at 44,000 watts, that was on the ground in 
South Africa as part of an experiment for his mission (54: pp494-502). 
After conducting a variety of experiments, Cooper took a six-hour 
nap during his 10th to 13th orbits around the earth. When he awakened, he 
noted that he did not feel disoriented by sleeping in space. Later, during 
his sixteenth orbit, Cooper called down to earth to express his greetings 
to a meeting of African leaders gathered in Ethiopia. He was also busy 
shooting photographs for a definite purpose: the planners of Apollo 
wanted some photos to aid in the designing of that project's guidance and 
navigations systems (54: pp494-502). 
Cooper attempted to use his 10-pound television camera to show the 
public what space flight was all about but the image was not good. One 
journalist described the scene: liTo most viewers, it was barely possible 
to pick out Cooper's helmeted face because of the inadequate lighting in 
the capsule and the slow-scanning technique." The image was acceptable 
on the monitors at mission control but when it was retransmitted to the 
networks, the scene disintegrated into mush (122: May 27, 1963). 
Towards the end of the mission, during the 21st orbit, there 
occurred a short circuit that left the automatic stabilization and 
control system without electricity. Without this system, Cooper would 
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have to position the spacecraft very accurately by himself in order to 
fire the retro-rockets and return to earth. Then the level of carbon 
dioxide began to rise in his suit, causing him to remark, "Things are 
beginning to stack up a little" (54: pp494-502). 
Using a scale which had been imbedded into his cabin window for 
assistance, Cooper positioned the spacecraft in a 34-degree pitch-down 
attitude and, with the assistance of Glenn, via radio, the astronaut fired 
the retro-rockets. There was no question that, without a man at the 
controls, the spaceship would have been lost. But, as it was, Faith 7 
plummeted through the friction of air and landed safely in the warm 
waters of the Pacific (54: pp494-502). 
In the same manner as Schirra, Cooper waited to leave the spacecraft 
until he was aboard the deck of the Kearsage. His landing was also as 
accurate as Schirrals. Said Cooper, "Right on the 01 1 Bazoo" (98: May 24, 
1963; 54: pp494-502). 
But before he left the spacecraft, Cooper was examined by a 
physican as he lay in his couch. When he stood, it was noticed that he 
too was suffering from the same effects as had Schirra and he was also 
dehydrated from the flight, having lost seven pounds since launch (54: 
pp494-502) . 
After going through the physicals and debriefings required of all 
returning astronauts (including a meeting with some writers from Life), 
Cooper left for public appearances and parades in such places as 
Honolulu, Cocoa Beach, Houston and Washington, D.C. Following the parade 
in Washington, Cooper found himself in the same position as Glenn had 
been the year before--in front of a joint session of Congress to whose 
members he read a brief prayer he had written while flying through space. 
Then he was off for a ticker tape parade in New York City (neither 
Schirra nor Carpenter received one in the Big Apple) where he was 
greeted by one of the largest crowds ever. Over 2900 tons of tickertape 
fell on the motorcade and, if the weight of paper is used as a basis for 
determining which parades are successful, then Cooper did well. Glenn 
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held the record at 3474 tons, General McArthur came in second with 3249 
tons, Cooper third and Lindbergh fourth with 1750 tons (when NYC was much 
smaller) (54: p501). 
Henry Luce, the head of Time, Incorporated, whose favorite project 
was space, showed his colors for NASA when Time printed, "Had Faith 7 had 
not a man aboard, it would have burned ......• I-which is I a dramatic 
rejection of any argument that machines alone and not men will be the key 
to the future explorations of space" (159: May 24, 1963). 
Upon Cooper I s return, he and the other fv1ercury astronauts started 
lobbying for another Mercury flight that would have been even longer than 
Cooper's had been. At his post-flight press conference, Cooper spoke of 
NASAls ability to "e10ngate this I-his I mission." When Cooper and his 
fellow astronauts were in Washington, they met with Kennedy and argued 
for MA-10, which would help kill the lB-month void between Mercury and 
Gemini and also would provide more medical data. But Kennedy said that 
he should not make the decision. The President preferred that NASA hold 
the responsbility in deciding the fate of the intended 72-hour, 4B-orbit 
flight that would cost the U.S. taxpayers another $10 million. It is 
not known if the astronauts were bucking for a flight for their remaining 
astronaut, Slayton, or wer.e simply trying to have another flight. 
On June 12, 1963, after consultations with his advisors, 
Administrator Webb announced, "we will not have another Mercury flight," 
as he sat before a meeting of the Senate Space Committee. Project 
Mercury had come to an end. 1 
1With the end of Project Mercury came the end of the 1959 Life 
contract after another $80,000 had been paid to the astronauts upon 
Webb's announcement. 
135 
SUMMARY OF THE MEDIA AND NASA PAO DURING PROJECT MERCURY 
When Project Mercury commenced in 1959, none of the astronauts 
apparently thought of themselves as becoming public figures and 
celebrities. As Shorty Powers stated, the men only thought of themselves 
as pilots of another sort who were extending the flight envelope. They 
did not appear to anticipate the media being at their doors within hours 
of the public announcement of their names but they learned rather rapidly. 
They learned that they had to maintain an image of sorts and that 
maintaining those images helped to maintain their employment (i.e., NASA) 
because NASA was and is dependent upon public support. In 1973, the 
American public realized that even a Pr.esident can be toppled when the 
public support is eroded by disbelief. 
Not unpredictably, the astronauts came across to the public as 
heroes. The authors of Journey to Tranquility have their opinion about 
what generated this hero worship: 
The first and most truly heroi£ phase of the space age ended 
in the summer of 1963. / The years / were, to the public eye, 
the years of the astronaut; a period when this strange new breed 
of man was established as something larger than ordinary human 
life, with gallantry and nerve beyond the common experience. 
This was partly due to the sheer novelty of the Original 
Seven and the ruggedness of some of the. character among them. 
But partly too, the nature of the Mercury program was responsible. 
Somehow one man in a capsule, alone in the totally unfamiliar void, 
more easily acquires heroic status than two or three men facing 
the ordeal together. By himself, he bears some resemblance to the 
old adventurers, opening their solitary paths through jungles and 
deserts •••• The last flight of the Mercury series .•. was the last 
appearance of the astronaut-as-superman (178: pI58). 
The fame of the astronauts spread like wildfire. Nothing like 
this had ever happened before with any project in the world. Because of 
the increasing publicity which grew almost explosively, most of NASA 
was caught unprepared. There was one part of NASA that was not caught 
unaware by what was happened and that was the Public Affairs Office 
staffed with men like Powers, Haney and Bonney. Don Schanche, who wrote 
the first articles about the astronauts in Life, writes: 
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NASA PIO under Walt Bonney definitely did not bumble. It was 
grossly understaffed, but professional. After Bonney left, it 
stumbled with growing-pains for_a while, but managed remarkably 
well during my time I 1958-1960 I. Individuals, especially Paul 
Haney and Shorty, were open and-honest with me at all times, and 
very quick to respond to my needs. It wasn't just the Life 
connection, because they handled matters the same way with me later 
when I was at the Saturday Evening Post ( 136). 
Many of the media were anxious t? get to this new type of men who 
reporters were playing up as heroes. Howard Simon, who was then a 
reporter and later became the managing editor of the Washington Post, says 
that the first astronauts were like the first child of a family; like 
that initial child, the men were given a lot of attention and this 
overwhelmed them to the point of being abnormal. This could be expected 
since the media were interested more in the men than in the technology of 
Project Mercury (151). 
Unfortunately, the seven astronauts were cast into a general mold 
by the media. Witness the following confusing words which appeared in 
a 1959 issue of Life: "Though they were picked from the same general 
mold, the seven astronauts are seven individuals .... But individual 
differences are subordinated to the main interest of all" (98: September 
15, 1959). 
The astronauts did not think they came from the same mold at all. 
In an interview in 1976, Deke Slayton said: 
As a career field, the astronauts were homogeneous. The 
first groups were test pilots. They were all alike even though 
they were from different countries. They are all individuals 
but their career lumped them all together (152). 
Even in their book, We Seven, which the Original Seven astronauts 
wrote for Simon and Schuster, a subsidiary of Time, Incorporated, one of 
the men described that they would often make trips together to various 
contractors who were working for NASA and to different centers of NASA. 
This tended to make the astronauts look as though one of them could not 
think without the other six being near him and possibly also cast them 
into a mold of all being the same. In the book it was written that: 
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We tried to avoid going around like a patrol of Boy Scouts 
or "those Seven Little Dwarfs from Mercury." We tried to 
behave, instead, like seven vice-presidents of a company (19: p92). 
Gordon Harris, the PIO who broadcast the launching of Explorer I 
to a fellow PIO at the press area and acted as a type of preliminary 
Voice of something-or-another, offers his opinion about the media and 
the astronauts: 
I believe the mags, TV and press generally went overboard 
on the first group of astronauts. Some of the excess is 
understandable. After all, these were the first Americans--and for 
a while some thought the first men--scheduled to fly into space. 
They were good copy because they were articulate, highly trained 
pilots and competent officers in their own right. The media 
seemed to forget they were human beings and as such might not be 
100% perfect, without spot of sin, etc., etc. The public wanted 
desperately to identify heroes, no question about that--maybe a 
reaction to the Cuban mess, I don1t know. JFK seemed to encourage 
the hero treatment--applying it personally to guys like Glenn. 
And NASA did nothing to discourage it; on the contrary (70b). 
Although it seems that NASA did nothing to discourage the hero cult 
from being built around the astronauts, the refusal to put down this cult, 
was, in essence, an agreement to it. A number of people have commented 
that the astronauts were never instructed on how to behave, yet at the 
same time others claimed just the opposite. Paul Haney states that he had 
heard that Powers had pulled rank on the astronauts occasionally to have 
them do some things but this cannot be substantiated (the only astronaut 
that Powers might not have outranked would have been Glenn, who was the 
same rank as Powers but still might have been behind him in date of 
promotion). Powers writes, " .•. if anyone told them how to act, it 
certainly wasn1t me" (66; 126). 
Robert Gilruth, Director of the MSC during those years, said in an 
interview that the only instruction he ever gave to the astronauts on 
maintaining a certain image was to never refuse a request for an 
autograph. Gilruth explained that the reason for giving the order was 
because when he was a youngster, he had been upset when Charles Lindbergh 
had driven by in a car with the window shades pulled shut, disregarding 
the people wanting to see him; Gilruth did not want anybody to suffer 
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the same feelings if the astronauts held the same attitudes (48). 
Maybe because of the lapse of time, some of those people involved 
may have forgotten about a letter written by Gilruth to the astronauts in 
late 1962, following the introduction of the second group of astronauts. 
There is nothing damaging in this letter which would indicate that the 
officials would have anything to hide. It seems rather forthright and 
innocent (especially the second paragraph), spelling out how the 
astronauts were to regard their actions in front of the public. 
The Administrator of NASA has announced a policy which 
permits astronauts or those selected for astronaut training to make 
contracts for the sale of stories of their personal experiences 
and those of their families, including rights in literary work, 
motion pictures, radio and television productions, provided such 
agreements do not violate certain stated restrictions and are 
approved by the Administrator of NASA. 
I am sure that you are fully aware of the public position which 
each of the astronauts occupies because of the intense interest 
throughout the world in our nation's manned space flight program. 
I am also sure that you realize, just as I do, the necessity for 
refraining from any activity which might possibly raise questions 
of propriety or bring discredit on the program or on anyone closely 
identified with it. It is imperative that we do everything possible 
to avoid even the shadow of a doubt concerning the motives of the 
astronauts, the propriety of their actions, or any possible conflict 
of interests concerning them. 
For this reason, if any astronaut should become a party to a 
contract of the kind referred to above, it is requested that he give 
the most careful consideration to these necessities, and also keep 
them in mind in considering the form of any investment he may 
make. 
The very existence of such a contract will inevitably draw 
public attention to all investments made by the astronauts, 
regardless of whether the funds involved are derived from the 
contract or from some other source. In particular, it is my hope 
that no investment will be made which might create the impression 
that any participant in this program is placed in a position of 
benefiting from the activities or decisions of NASA itself. 
I trust that you will guide your conduct accordingly and that 
in case of any doubt you will not hesitate to seek my advice (49). 
Obviously, Gilruth's letter reflects more upon the thought of the 
astronauts becoming involved with contracts but the thought of their 
public behavior is noted, not so much in how they are to behave in public 
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but in what they might do that could become public information and might 
be misinterpreted by the media. Gilruth wrote of investments and this 
covered many things. The news of the houses in Houston that had been 
donated to the astronauts brought criticism upon the astronauts as did 
the news in late 1962 that the astronauts had pooled their Life earnings 
and bought a motel, "The Cape Colony," near Cocoa Beach. It had opened 
in time for Schirra's shot and became the media center for that mission. 
Although the astronauts did not allow their names nor photographs of them 
to be used in the publicity for the motel, the business became well-known 
because of their ownership. Again, the criticism apparently had its 
effect and the astronauts backed out of the motel business (lO: July 25, 
1963). 
Wally Schirra offered his views upon the investments made by the 
astronauts during those early years: 
The first astronauts had no preparations for becoming heroes. 
Powers helped us out but the person who helped us a lot was Leo 
DeOrsey, our attorney. He kept us clean and said, 'Don't mess with 
testimonials.' We paid taxes and played it straight all the way. 
We were offered the houses in Houston ... and we gave those 
houses away but we invested in the motel legally with our money but 
the press raised such a fuss that we had to back out of the 
ownership of it. 
It seemed as though a person can't be a hero and make money 
too (140). 
Whenever investments are mentioned, the name of Alan Shepard must 
invariably come into the discussion. Most of the astronauts probably 
had investments here and there, as do many Americans, but Shepard was 
the one whose investments were best known. Arriving in Houston, Shepard 
linked up with a car dealer, Bill McDavid, whose dealership was the 
third largest in the world and who also supplied the astronauts with 
cars at cost prices. McDavid took over the ownership of a bank in 
Day town and, as his nephew, Dan Boone, describes it (McDavid is now 
dead), his uncle "was smart enough to know Alan wanted to get in on the 
same kind of financial matter, so he brought him in. Shepard, of course, 
had some notoriety and this was a situation where they had to be careful 
not to capitalize on his public image" (178: p143). 
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Although they did not try to "capitalize" on Shepard's image, the 
name drew a response nevertheless. Boone continues: 
At the time he L-Shepard-j went into the business, the_First 
National Bank in Day town had r~orters from Life and Time L possibly 
the first publications to know / and, hell, television cameras 
and the works. So they got public notoriety for their bank and they 
had stock offers and people writing from allover the country 
wanting to buy stock. So that was a $20 million bank in Day town 
and ... all of them recently made a ton of money out of it. I know 
Uncle Bill made a half million dollars at least (178: p143). 
With the help of the President of the Day town bank, Lee Brazefield, 
Shepard then bought controlling interest in the Fidelity Bank and Trust 
Company in Houston, something he later sold to McDavid. Eventually 
America's first astronaut in space also sold his interest in the Day town 
Bank. With some of the dollars they had earned from their investments, 
Shepard and McDavid bought a $200,000 private airplane. Together, they 
flew to several auto dealership conventions held in Detroit and Las Vegas. 
Shepard also became involved in the oil business; four of the six wells 
he invested in came up wet. He was also the only astronaut not to buy a 
home in the area near the MSC, preferring to live in an apartment near 
downtown Houston for a while and later buying a $150,000 home near the 
exclusive River Oaks section of Houston--a suburb with broad streets 
where the houses are recessed far from the pavement behind brick and 
steel fences and where large, lush trees covered with moss stand over 
limousines parked in the drives are not an uncommon sight (178: p143). 
Shepard, the first astronaut-millionaire (who had earned only 
$141.38 for his 15-minute flight as flight pay), was said to be resented 
by others in the astronaut corps because of his lifestyle but also for 
other reasons that are to be explained later. It seems that Shepard did 
not really care what the public image of him was made to be; just as long 
as he kept his dealings above board and stayed clean in all that seems 
to have concerned him. But there were others in the Original Seven, 
especially Glenn, who preferred to maintain a good image for the public. 
Tom Wolfe, who wrote an article for Rolling Stone about the 
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astronauts and used a so-called "Inner Voice of the Astronauts" as his 
narrator, states: 
He L-Glenn:! was arguing that we had to cut out the crazy 
sky-jockey day-to-day living ..• of which there was plenty .....•. and 
some of us would say, "What the hell, John. We're here to do a job 
and on this job we have to set a terrific example, you're right 
about that. But what we do on our own time is our business, not 
the American people's." And the argument would drone on ....... about 
how we were also going to be in a position to wield power and how 
people might follow us blindly, and so we had an obligation to keep 
this power under check at all time .... The American people looked 
at all the insane, spastic rockets blowing up and then at us and 
said, "Those are brave lads. They haven't resigned yet ... !" One 
reason that John was already so concerned about our national image 
however, was that he probably just assessed he was going 
to be chosen for the first flight (131: January, 1973). 
It seems as though the astronauts belonged in two groups on how they 
thought their public image should be. On one hand was what might be called 
the good-guy set of Glenn, Cooper and Carpenter (who, one NASA official 
said, looked upon Glenn as a mother-father figure). Glenn was the type 
who did not smoke, drink nor swear and was a person with whom the American 
public could identify easily. This caused Glenn to earn the title of 
"Mr. Klean" from some of his fellow astronauts. Said Glenn of the 
astronauts: "Th ere was no escaping our role as symbols, particularly 
for young people, our nation's future." (178: p141; 39: January, 1973). 
On the other end of the scale from Glenn was Shepard, attended 
closely by Grissom and Slayton. They seemed to have the attitude that 
they were there only to do their jobs. If the media wanted something 
from them, then let the media try, was the apparent attitude. Schirra 
seemed to float around between the two groups, perhaps being the most 
human of them all. At times he griped about the publicity yet he 
understood the necessity for it; some reporters disliked him yet others 
related well to the easy-going astronaut of Sigma 7 (178: P141; 39: 
January, 1973). 
There were rivalries. Schirra wrote that there were arguments 
concerning the technology but the quarrels were never on a personal nature. 
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Slayton says, "We put a big premium on who got the first flights in 
Mercury and 11m afraid the competition was a bit keen at times. II There 
existed indications of personal disagreements. Schirra does not care to 
talk about what he calls "family matters." Some people say that the 
biggest rivalry of all was between Glenn and Shepard, which began when 
Shepard was chosen for the first flight, continued when the press called 
for Glenn to go instead of him and increased further when Glenn became 
the first hero in America after many years of the U.S. not having one. 
NASA and New York City gave Glenn a ticker-tape parade--something that did 
not exactly endear him to the hearts of Shepard and Grissom. The rivalry 
went on for years, even when President Johnson gave a dinner for past and 
present astronauts at the White House following Apollo 8's orbits around 
the moon; Glenn was absent and one excuse for his not being there was that 
the plans for the dinner were drawn up in Houston in the office of the man 
who was in charge of all the astronauts--Alan Shepard (98: September 27, 
1963; 178: pp141-142). 
One thing that seems to have complete agreement among the astronauts 
is that they like the money from Life. The contract with Life caused much 
argument among the media, the government and NASA but it held together 
through the Mercury program until the time when Mercury finally came to 
an end. The contract offered the astronauts more than money but it is 
worthwhile to study the monetary impact of the contract. The astronauts 
were celebrities existing on the pay scales of military officers, which 
at that time, ranged from a little over $8000 to $13,700 per year. 
Public relations duties for NASA took them away from their homes and 
families in addition to the times that they were away because of the 
duties associated with their missions. The astronauts had to buy 
civilian clothing and stash their uniforms away (this was done in 
accordance in keeping the appearance of NASA as being a civilian agency 
but they still had to buy their uniforms, as do all military officers. 
Only enlisted personnel are issued clothing.). The life of celebrities 
could have drained the financial reserves of the astronauts quickly if 
143 
they had not had the money from li fe . Tom Wolfe wri tes, II ••. a Merc ury 
astronaut ... on top of the world but the L-telephone~ bill staggers 
you .•. fifty dollars! America's first astronauts were the most 
poverty-stricken VIPs in the country. II Gordon Cooper states, liThe Life 
money is all that kept our heads above the water. II Reporter Jerry Bl edsoe 
wrote in Esquire, IIEverybody thinks the astronauts were so wealthy. It was 
a bunch of baloneyll (131: January 4,1973; 39: January, 1973). 
As noted earlier, some of the astronauts, notably Shepard, did put 
away their money and use it wisely. Some, perhaps, did not. But some 
Americans obviously thought that all who were connected with the astronauts 
became rich too. The thought of the astronauts as being rich comes as no 
surprise; it would seem that all celebrities are rich and since the 
astronauts were celebrities, they were supposed to be rich. Even later 
astronauts thought about this facet of being astronauts when they entered 
the program over the next several years following the end of Mercury 
(77: p18l). 
Colonel Powers writes that people seemed to think he also prospered 
because he was so closely associated with the astronauts and was virtually 
as famous. He also describes the life in general for the men of Mercury. 
We all paid dearly for our participation in the U.S. 
man-in-space program in terms of total loss of privacy and, at least 
in my case, financially. I did not have a Life contract and survived 
on the relatively meager salary of an Air Force Lt. Col. with travel 
expenses being paid at the rate of $11.00 per diem. Management 
and the White House did everything but order us to wear civilian 
clothes so we got no clothing allowance. In terms of personal 
stress on family relationships--total committment--which is what we 
and all of the others in the manned spaceflight team had--meant 
gross neglect of family affairs--wives L were-1 left home to cope 
with children and society by themselves etc. took its toll. It 
cost me a family. It (the program) did indeed change my whole 
life. After I left the program, the opinion of most people seemed 
to be that somehow or other I had amassed a fortune through my 
participation in the program and that I should therefore travel to 
their conventions and such and give of myself freely ••• without 
ever receiving any return (126). 
The astronauts, even with the money from Life, were not especially 
wealthy. Glenn could not afford to buy life insurance for his flight, but 
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the astronauts' lawyer, Leo DeOrsey, wrote out a check on his account 
that would be given to the Glenn family in case the colonel did not return. 
The check was for $100,000. 
Mrs. Grissom writes: 
One man, who had no connection with the space program except 
friendship, put it this way.... "You know what they got paid? 
Their military pay. That's it and the amount they got from Life 
magazine was peanuts compared to what they were entitled to.--
The guys were hurting and everybody's crucifying them ... " (59: p65). 
The astronauts were not the only persons concerned with the money. 
Jerome S. Hardy, formerly of Time and Life, comments about those early 
years from the viewpoint of the editors of Life: 
As publisher of Life, I was present when we made that 
controversial contract with the astronauts. I was instrumental 
in organizing the first tour of business executives of the space 
program. I winced at the bills which came in as we continued to 
cover the space program, as I guess no other medium in the country 
did. I think I can say, not boastfully, that Life did as much to 
glorify the space program during the Sixties as anyone (9: March, 
1971) . 
Hardy's statement brings up another point about Life's coverage. 
Did that magazine really contribute anything of value to Project Mercury? 
Many people said that Life did contribute since it showed the men while 
also showing some of the technology involved with the missiles and 
spacecraft of the program. Robert Gilruth feels this way: 
Life was a big, big plus for us. It gave the astronaut~ _ 
privacy yet it let the public into their private lives .... L Life / 
was a good thing. It gave us the best possible exposure. It 
was a friendly, powerful1magazine that showed the astronauts with 
their best foot forward. And the dollars it gave the astronauts 
helped them cope with the extra expenses (47). 
Flight director Chris Kraft offers his comments about the coverage 
of the astronauts: 
The magazines and NASA created the American hero out of the 
IHaney says that reporters from competing magazines agreed with 
this viewpoint. 
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astronauts. This was good for the program but it was tough on the 
men. They became something like the Saturday afternoon football 
hero and it was difficult for them to survive. Their image was 
important to everyone. They were the highlight of the program (91). 
The picture painted by the editors and writers of Life is considered 
very one-sided. The authors of one book give their opinion: 
Given the Life treatment, astronauts have emerged from the 
beginning as lovable, freckled heroes with sons on the college 
football team, reassuring commercials for white teeth, God and 
baseball hats. 
The only trouble with Life's interpretation was the lack of 
life breathed into its subjects. There was also much irritation 
among reporters who took a dim view of the astronauts I doors being 
banged in their faces when the American taxpayer was spending 
$24,000 million to go to the moon. But that was a minor problem 
by comparison with the fact that all astronauts began to sound 
alike; machine-men cheerfully facing torture, danger and perhaps 
death for their country. 
In fact this picture did them little justice. Some of the 
Original Seven astronauts were far more interesting than that. 
As test pilots, they were uniquely well qualified for work which 
demanded bravery, stability, endurance, team spirit and a sharp 
mind in blurred conditions. But they were also flesh and blood 
(178: pI40). 
Years after he left office, Administrator Webb told this author in 
an interview that he liked Life (more than likely after his initial 
anger with it) because of its international issues, which did much to 
promote the U.S. space program abroad (170). 
Life was also proud of the way that it could have the news, 
the photographs and the personal stories about the astronauts out to the 
newstands and in the mailboxes of its subscribers. Editor C.D. Jackson 
wrote an editorial following the flight of MA-9, saying, "With almost 
newspaper-like swiftness, Life gave 7,000,000 neaders across the nation 
a unirque view of Cooper's triumph. No other magazine attempted to do it 
so swiftly after the event. None could" (98: May 31, 1963). 
Apparently, sometimes neither could Life. The second group of 
astronauts were selected in the summer of 1962 and introduced to the 
public on September 17 of that year but it was not until September 27, 
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1963, a whole year later, that Life finally carried a story on the type 
of men these new astronauts were. It has been said that the rest of the 
press was $500,000 behind Life but it can be said that Life was sometimes a 
year behind the events, at least in this case. 
Because Life had a virtual monopoly on the private lives of the 
astronauts, its writers also had the inside track on knowing what the men 
were really like. But it appears that they might have been less than 
candid in covering the astronauts and their families. Wolfe's Inner 
Voice of the astronauts talks again: 
The Life writers were with us so much, they were like part 
of the family.... I'm sure they wanted to make things as 
smooth as possible for us like everyone else. Even if they 
could have printed candid accounts of our personal lives, 11m not 
sure they could have brought themselves to do it if they thought it 
might have shaken us, given the atmosphere that prevailed at the 
time" (131: January 4, 1973). 
Writer Don Schanche of Life, who penned the first articles on the 
Mercury astronauts, tends to agree, saying that, since there was a Life 
reporter usually with the men everywhere they went during the early years, 
it would have been hard for the astronauts to have lead normal lives 
IIIf they had to worry about every indiscretion observed" (l36). 
The thought that the Life reporters might have been a little less 
than honest about the astronauts may be right. There seems to be, in fact, 
in most magazine articles through mid-1963, a hero cult built around the 
astronauts. There is very, very little written about anything that any of 
the astronauts might have done which was wrong. Criticism of them, aside 
from that about their acceptance of the Life contract and their 
investments, is almost non-existent. None of the magazine writers or 
editors that this writer has communicated with has mentioned about 
receiving any instructions on how to write their stories about the 
astronauts. It should be remembered that the entire country was in a 
mood, as Ed Diamond said it, of "Go, gO!" Some writers have said that 
they knew of wrong-doing~ that some of the astronauts did that might be 
frowned upon by the public but the writers considered what the astronauts 
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were doing in space was far more important than what they were doing on the 
ground. Wolfe corrments again: "There was no way [that Luce, the head of 
Time, Inc., was going to permit~ anything ... get into life that presented 
us as anything but c1eancut Brave Lads or our wives as anything but 
Primly Stable" (131: January 4, 1973). 
Don Schanche does not believe that Luce was behind the initial 
creation of Brave Lads and Primly Stable: lilt was not Luce who thought 
of them as "his boys" but Edward K. Thompson, then managing editor of Life. 
Luce only met them once during my term ('58-'60) at a cocktail party in 
New York three months after they were named. Maybe he got interested 
1 ater" (136). 
The PAO of NASA was not going to present the astronauts as Brave 
Lads but then NASA was not trying to present any image of them at all 
except as men who were hard at work. Powers maintains that he created no 
images, that he just opened the doors and showed the astronauts as they 
were to the media. Powers had a difficult time in the beginning. There 
had been nothing like Project Mercury in the past that anyone in the PAO 
could draw upon for guidance. Powers' first office was next to a boiler 
room and had pipes running across his ceiling and along one wall. Powers 
also had no staff for the PAO of Project Mercury; he was by himself at 
the outset. The members of the PAO of both Mercury and NASA found 
themselves in an unenviable position--they had to inform the public about 
the space program yet protect the astronauts from the pressures of the 
members of the media who were constantly wanting access to them (126; 
39: January, 1973). 
One way that some of this pressure was alleviated was through the 
introduction of Friday morning interviews. Deke Slayton had started this 
in 1962 when he was head of the astronaut corps. The rules were simple; 
the reporters contacted the PAO to request the interviews and the 
astronauts would be available on Friday mornings to meet the reporters. 
The astronauts would be inaccessible during the rest of the week (except 
to Life but that was only while the astronauts were at home) unless there 
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was a scheduled press conference. Other rules were that the astronauts 
were not to wear their uniforms since NASA's appearance was to be that 
of a civilian governmental agency and that the reporters were to be 
accompanied by members of the PAO during the interviews. Jack Riley, 
of the PIO in Houston, says that the presence of the PIOs during the 
interviews was "primarily to keep the records straight as a witness. 
Some guys wanted to make sure that they were not misquoted by the 
reporters. II Riley added that the PIOs were not there to intimidate either 
the reporters or the astronauts. Undoubtedly, their presence might have 
cut short any off-the-record remarks made by the astronauts. As can be 
expected, reporters did not take too kindly to having a public affairs 
person with them while talking to an astronaut. 1 The practice of having 
a PIO present for the interviews was finally stopped in 1968; after that 
time, they only sat in on an interview when they were requested to be 
there (152; 129; 69: p202). 
Powers admits that there were mistakes on the part of those people 
working for him but he also points out that the members of the media 
made mistakes too. He writes, "In many cases where they could not 
comprehend what we were telling them, they chose to fabricate their 
own stories" (126). 
The astronauts did not care to have the media continually chasing 
them for interviews. Powers continues: 
I saw occasional fits of temper and frustration on the part 
of the astronauts over what they felt was interference with their 
business and invasion of privacy. At the same time, I was well 
aware of the role 'and function of the media and of our 
responsibility in government to report our activities. It was 
often a very delicate balance and there were occasions for friction 
but usually they I-the astronauts-I took out their frustrations on 
me rather than on-members of the media group .... The one single and 
1Actually, the PIOs were required to be present at interviews of 
all NASA personnel, not just the astronauts (129). 
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very rigid guideline was that I could never do anything which would 
in any way interfere with the pilots' preparation for or conduct of 
their flights. And that includes psychological interference as well 
(126) . 
The PAO had the responsibility for portraying other people in 
Project Mercury and NASA besides the astronauts. There were many people 
behind the scenes who were just as important, if not more important than 
the astronauts. Gordon Harris writes of how these other people were 
sometimes treated by the different PAOs: 
I distinctly remember Haney telling Scheer at one of our 
Washington meetings that he had to get publicity for his boss, the 
flight controllers, etc., etc. The name of the game seemed to be to 
play down von Braun, boost the astros (who were becoming more 
difficult to live with from the PR standpoint) and the JSC 
leadership. Haney did a good job in that res'pect (70b). 
Powers also comments upon the same subject, promoting the people 
at NASA other than the astronauts: 
Few, if any, media people were interested in talking to the 
Gilruths, Fagets or Pilands or others. The reasons for that 
attitude were two-fold: On the one hand, the public could identify 
with the guy who would eventually have to sit on the hot seat of the 
spaceship as opposed to the brain ,which produced the bird in the 
first place; second, the media people were just not prepared for 
the technical aspects of man-in-space and the engineers and 
technicians had never been called on to explain their work in 
layman's terms (126). 
There was also the problem that many of the people in NASA had come 
from a background where they had no need to deal with the press and had 
been accustomed to keeping their mouths shut because of the previous 
secret projects they had worked on. But some of these people, once they 
realized what was going on around them, also strove for personal 
recognition in the media. Those who wanted this recognition achieved it 
by arranging to have personal backgrounds written up on them and passed 
along to the members of the media. In addition to this, the members of 
the industries which supported NASA also wanted to make sure that they 
were noticed by the public. Ads concerning U.S. space efforts by private 
industry suddenly blossomed across the pages of magazines when the U.S. 
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entered the space race. It was as if overnight many companies in the 
U.S. suddenly linked up with the nation's space programs but these same 
companies would avoid the limelight whenever something would go wrong. 
The best example of this is to observe North American Rockwell's 
behavior following the Apollo fire in the early spring of 1967--to be 
covered in detail later in this thesis (126).1 
The PAO had its troubles from outside and within. First, the 
relationship with Life never ceased to cause headaches for the members 
of NASA's public relations staff. Life ran the word "exclusive" in one 
of its stories again after it had been told not to do that and Haney 
insisted that the editor, Ed Thompson, remove it. Thompson did not want 
to as the magazine was due on the newstands the morning following Haney's 
visit. Haney insisted and again Thompson said no, explaining that he could 
not stop the publication of that issue because he had authority to make 
decisions within a certain cost limit and stopping the presses to change 
some plates was above that cost. Therefore, either Luce or C.D. Jackson 
would have to decide. As it turned out, the plates with the forbidden 
word on them were scrapped and Life appeared one day late that week. This 
was a rare Qccurrence though (66). 
Powers, during the Mercury years, and later Haney, had the 
responsibility of reading the material which the astronauts wrote for 
Life to make sure that nothing technical was included in the stories that 
had not been discussed with the rest of the media. Haney said that if 
a story revealed that an astronaut's child had thrown up, then that was 
fine but there was to be nothing technical slipping through under the 
previously mentioned basis. Haney also remembers that sometimes the 
relationship between the staffers of Life and NASA took on comical 
proportions, such as the time when one Life employee did not want 
anything to make it appear that Life was in collusion with NASA 
concerning the personal stories; the man would instruct Haney to leave 
1North American Rockwell was the manufacturer of the Apollo 
spacecraft involved in the fire. 
151 
the stories in the plant basin of a lobby of a certain building. Later, 
the Life employee would steal into the building to pick up the envelope 
containing the stories and hope that they had not been seen (66). 
In 1959, Alfred Friendly, managing editor of the Washington Post, had 
blasted NASA for allowing Life to make a contract with the astronauts. 
NASA later invited him to review the situation and he reversed his decision 
about the matter. He wrote in the Bulletin of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors: 
Lifels story was more complete, more interesting, and better 
presented than stories on Project Mercury presented elsewhere. 
But--unless there are some shenanigans not now evident--it appears 
to have done it by the expenditure of money, manpower, space, 
brains, and ingenuity, rather than by favored or indiscriminatory 
treatment. Nothing in the story seems to be in violation of NASAls 
policy. And, except for the question •.. about federal employees 
writing for pay about the work they are already being paid for, 
there would seem to be no grounds for complaint that NASA acted 
unfairly or in a discriminatory fashion (26: May/June, 1973). 
But not all publications agreed with Friendly. Until the last 
vestiges of the Life contracts disappeared in the early 1970s, opponents 
of Life would continue to blast away at those involved with the contracts. 
Life was not the only pain in the neck for NASAls PAO. There was 
also a war between the electronic and the print media. As mentioned, 
JUlian Scheer accused Powers as favoring the electronic media, something 
which Powers denies on an overall basis. 
One incident that brought accusations of favoritism upon Powers I 
head happened during one mission. The colonel describes the situation: 
_ ... 1 gave a 3D-second warning of an impendin~ announcement 
L to the electronic media and not the print media-1 from 
Mercury Control. We solved that by simply requiring the networks to 
pipe that alert to the press stand--something I should have thought 
of but didnlt. Mr. Patterson of the Atlanta Constitution was the 
leader of that ill-conceived and unnecessary hassle (126). 
Roy Neal, of NBC News, in an interview, remembered some of the 
competition with the following thoughts: 
In most cases, the electronic media was far better staffed and 
prepared better to roll with the news when it happened. The print 
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media didn't have to get the news out exactly when it happened. The 
mainstay of the print media would be the wire services. 
An example of this was Shepard's flight during which I was the 
electronic pool producer. We wanted communications from the recovery 
ships of the splashdown and the Navy couldn't guarantee this. So 
we installed two types of radios out there at our expense. One was 
the production circuit for our own closed channel communications and 
the other one was broadcast for direct transmission from the ship. 
Later, when Kennedy called Shepard ... on the ship, the President 
preempted the communications circuits I-except those of the 
electronic media pool-I and we all listened in. Even Powers had to 
listen in on this since it wasn't on his communications loop. The 
print media asked about this afterwards. 
So I, Haney and Powers talked to them. We told them we had 
built a I-communications~ truck {-which picked uR the transmission 
from the ship and re-channe1ed them to the pub1ic~ because of our 
requirements to get the news out as it happens, which was something 
they didn't have to do immediately except to their editors. The 
truck had not been built by NASA at government expense. This 
calmed the waters (119b). 
And finally, there was trouble within the ranks of NASA's news 
handlers themselves. There was a furious change of command of the PAO 
from late 1960 until March, 1963 when Scheer took over. Bonney, who had 
been in charge of NACA's public information office for nine years when 
NASA was formed, stayed there only until November, 1960. According to 
Paul Haney, Bonney said, "he had so much scar tissue from the U2 thing 
six months earlier that he wanted out and quiCk."l Next came Shelby 
Thompson who was the Acting Director from November 15, 1960 until 
February, 1961. Following him was O.B. Lloyd who remained in the head 
position until December, 1961 but remained with NASA doing other activities 
until 1969. Dr. Hiden T. Cox lasted only until June 30, 1962 as the 
Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs. O.B. Lloyd returned to the 
top spot to plug a gap of two months until Dr. George L. Simpson 
arrived to take charge on September 1, 1962. Simpson was the last 
person before Scheer arrived, who assumed command on March 21, 1963. 
1Gary Francis Powers had been shot down by the Soviet Union while 
flying over Russia on a spy mission in an American U2 reconnaissance 
airplane which was supposedly being used for a peaceful NASA project. 
The first press release by NASA simply said that the plane was missing 
while on a mission over Turkey. This is what Haney is referring to 
because it later became evident that the U.S. was guilty of spying. 
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Scheer would remain in the top position of the PAO until halfway through 
the Apollo missions. Having someone in the head office who was going to 
stick around for longer than six or nine months poss1bly soothed a few 
nerves among the staffers who worked in the public affairs office (67; 
123a). 
But other nerves were soon frazzled. The confrontation between 
Scheer and Powers took place. Scheer did not believe that the members of 
the PAO should be in front of the media but, rather, they should show the 
media around and stay behind the scenes. This was the beginning of the 
downfall of Colonel Shorty Powers (137). 
Powers came to NASA from the Air Force in 1959, at which time 
NASA had only four centers: Cleveland, Edwards AFB (California), Langley 
and Goddard. Haney comments on the PAO at the beginning: 
The PIa was virtually non-existent. It was done mostly in 
and from Washington. Everything else was classified or the 
centers acted like it was. About 1960, Huntsville came along. 
The Cape was set up as a center the same year •••. In the late 
fifties, Langley had been in existence for more than 40 years and 
I don't think it had ever issued a press release •..••.• manned 
space had 90% of the money and 190% of the interest. From a 
bureaucratic point of view, it was wisest to treat all center PIOs 
as equals, at least for pay purposes (67). 
Although the pay of the PIOs was equal, the amount of exposure that 
each obtained was something else with Powers definitely having the most 
exposure to the public of all the PIOs and that was because of his position 
as spokesman for Project Mercury. The description of the colonel are 
many and varied. Some people respected him highly, other despised him. 
He was a remarkable man and quite often a controversial one. The 
American public identified with Power's voice, which Saul Pett of AP 
described as being, "deep, resonant, portentous ••• with its slight touch 
of Armageddon and tight-lipped restraint ••• " (32: p89). 
Haney says that Powers was "an embarrassing, dynamic person .•. who 
was on stage all of the time," which clashed with Scheer's beliefs that 
his personnel should remain out of the picture in relation to NASA's 
projects and other personnel who made the news. The relationship between 
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Powers and Haney was a "tempestuous one," to use Haney's words. Haney 
was working for the PAO in Washington as the head of the Public Affairs 
for Manned Spaceflight and Powers was at Houston (or at langley while 
Mercury was still there) as the head of Mercury's PAO. There was no direct 
line of command between the two men. Haney said that Powers often tried 
to go around him by going to Gilruth and having the head of the MSC agree 
with him on things that Haney did not like. There was a time, Haney 
remembers, when he and Powers were communicating over the telephone daily 
and, by the end of the daYf they usually forgot what they had discussed 
in the morning. To alleviate this problem, they resorted to using 
teletype machines so they could have a written record of what they 
discussed. In one session, when the two men were not seeing eye-to-eye, 
the symbols above the numbers on the upper-case shift were flying through 
the teletype lines (obviously the men did not care to use expletives 
in their typed discussions). Finally, Haney typed out a message and no 
reply came back from Powers. Haney typed out a question asking Powers 
what was wrong. Still, there was no answer. Haney says he then 
typed out, II 1 Come on, you little *,1 or something to that effect and then 
the telephone rang." The caller was Powers who announced, "I don't have 
a teletype." He had become so irritated that he had thrown the machine 
out of his office (66). 
Chris Kraft recalls that there were times when Powers would accompany 
him to press conferences, offering advice and coaching Kraft on how to 
conduct himself with the reporters. At times, says Kraft, "Shorty gave me 
hell about my speeches," and the flight director adds that he never 
resented Powers for the advice. Kraft remembers 'that there was one thing 
that Powers told him which was occasionally helpful: "He taught me to 
say 'shit' when I didn't want the television cameras on me anymore 
'-during the press conferences r (93). 
Whatever was the case against him, in the summer of 1963 Powers 
was fired from his position as the head of the PAO of Project Mercury. 
"That was a lousy kind of trouble," remembers Gilruth. liTo fire someone 
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in the public eye" (48). 
Powers was not fired from the military and NASA in the total sense 
of the word. He was transferred to another position, one less visible 
to the public. But the New York Times. took notice of this and gave 
Powers' transfer page one treatment. However, when D. Brainerd Holmes, 
the man responsible for starting Project Apollo, left NASA abruptly only 
weeks before Powers was transferred, the New York Times had given his 
leaving only passing notice (32: p89). 
Powers writes that he has never 'known the exact reasons for his 
dismissal from the MSC post, something he was bitter about. It was 
mentioned to him that he would become a "special assistant" to Gilruth. 
Powers states, "Obviously, I was being told that I was being installed in 
a closet where I would have no function." But the colonel had another 
seven to eight months left to serve in order to be eligible for 22 years 
of military service. Because of this, he accepted the position under 
Gi 1 ruth (126). 
Powers remained in Houston for a short time longer but, he writes, 
"apparently someone in Washington decided I had too many friends in the 
media and industry and couldn't be trusted in Houston and stay quietly out 
of the scene. So I was surrmoned to Washington .... " This was done 
at the request of Scheer, who says that he wanted Powers there with him, 
despite warnings from many people that Powers "would stab me in the back," 
says Scheer. "If he did anything damaging behind my back, I don't know 
about it" (126; 137). 
Webb had a talk with Powers upon his arrival in Washington. The 
essence of that talk, says Powers, was a sermon on the mount regarding 
how all things change. Powers was then put in charge of the design and 
construction of the U.S. Space Park at the 1964-65 New York World's Fair. 
Scheer said that Powers' efforts on that project were "excellent, first 
rate." In May, 1964, after being the Voice of Mercury Control, being a 
public information officer for the Air Force Ballistic Missile Program 
and doing a variety of other functions throughout his military life, 
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Colonel John A. "Shorty" Powers retired quietly (126; 137). 
Despite the initial confrontation between Scheer and Powers~ there 
are several reasons to believe that Scheer was not the person who really 
wanted Powers out of the picture. Haney attests to this view and Scheer 
says that a majority of personnel in the upper echelons wanted Powers 
fired. In all aspects, it appears that Scheer tried to help Powers out 
of NASA in a manner that was far easier, than some people would have liked 
to have seen him leave. Scheer's actions of easing Powers out possibly 
helped to prevent worse publicity for NASA than what Powers' firing from 
MSC had already caused (66; 137). 
Powers was almost joined by Haney in May, 1963. After Cooper's 
flight, Haney decided that he wanted to leave his job and go on to better 
things. International Business Machine was offering him a position as the 
Director of the Federal Systems area~ a new field of IBM. The offer paid 
well, about $30,000 which was twice as much as Haney was earning at NASA 
but he decided he would stick with the government for a short time more 
(which actually lasted until 1969) (66). 
With Powers out of Houston~ Webb asked Haney if he wanted to go 
there to take over the PAD of the MSC. Haney, who had not been seeking the 
position~ agreed and left for Houston in the last quarter of 1963. But he 
made so many trips back to Washington for conferences at NASA Headquarters 
that he felt as though he had never left the Capitol City. Because of 
that, Haney maintained his memberships in several clubs and continued to 
hold onto his Washington, D.C. area credit cards (66). 
When Haney arrived in Houston, the attitude of the nation towards 
space was beginning to change. Wolfe states that the parade for Glenn was 
the last moment of innocence for Americans but, more accurately, it might 
have been around the time of Cooper's flight. Glenn's parade was the 
bigger one, true, but Cooper's came at the end of this nation's first 
program designed to ultimately put men on the moon. The end of Project 
Mercury seemed to be the end of our space exploration in the romantic 
sense of the word "exploration." After Cooper returned from space, 
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perhaps before, the nation knew that it had the capability to put a man in 
into space and recover him successfully. It seems to be that the nation 
was like a child with a new toy--the first time around, the toy is 
exciting but, after awhile, it is just another toy to be put back in 
the box with the others. 
Schirra's flight might illustrate this pOint more clearly. When 
he was launched, there was trouble for some people in deciding what they 
were going to watch on television that day because the flight of MA-8 
was being shown on two of the networks while the third network carried 
the World Series of Baseball. At the end of the mission, during the 
recovery, the televised pictures of one network showing the recovery of 
Schirra were cut into to show parts of the World Series. This seems to 
indicate a switch in the Inentality of the network executives who might 
have thought that the public was becoming tired with space flight. 
When Project Mercury was begun, it stood out from the rest of the 
government as being an effort that was totally civilian--peaceful in 
nature. But as time went on and the nation became more involved with that 
far corner of the world called South Vietnam, the entire government was 
dragged into the arena for criticism. This included NASA, although NASA 
had nothing to do with the war except to offer distractions from it 
occasionally through the future years. 
President Kennedy died in November, 1963. Perhaps that was the 
end of America IS innocence. It certainly was the end of the Camelot years 
and the beginning of the barbecue era. No one knows what would have 
happened had Kennedy not been assassinated; there are too many "ifs" 
to consider before offering speculation on that. Whatever, when 1963 
finished its 365-day life span, some of the gleam of NASA seems to have 
faded slightly. It would still remain for some more years until a fire 
at Cape Kennedy (renamed by President Johnson for his predecessor only 
days after the assassination) would force a nation to re-evaluate what 
it was doing. Through it all, though, the astronauts would remain a 
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special breed of men, far separate from the rest of the human race, as 
they were portrayed by the media. There was something about them that 
never failed to attract attention. 
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THE INTERIM YEARS 
There was almost a two-year gulf between the last Mercury mission 
and the first Gemini flight, manned by Gus Grissom and John Young. 
Although it may have appeared to the public that Gemini began only after 
Cooper returned from his orbits, the second u.S. space program had 
actually been in existence as a concept since 1959 (and in name since 
January, 1962). Gemini, named after the constellation which represented 
the twins of astrology, seemed to symbolize, to NASA planners, the 
two-man crews of the spacecraft. The program was primarily concerned with 
three areas of study: 1. the effects of long-range and long-lasting 
'missions upon the machines and the men who would pilot the spacecraft; 
2. the techniques of rendezvous and docking procedures which were 
necessary for later Apollo missions; and 3. the development of a program 
that was more complex than Mercury and would require more team work 
to make the program work (this would then be evaluated for use during 
the Apollo program). The two years of waiting were filled with 
technological development within the space administration and there were 
also developments of another nature as well (55: p14). 
Shortly after the end of Mercury, Administrator Webb wrote Field 
President, Bailey K. Howard, about the contract proposed in the spring of 
1963. Webb suggested that the $3.2 million contract was unacceptable 
in part, because "the impreSSion of emphasis on personal gain or 
commercialization ... would not contribute to the nation's interest but 
would work against it" (26: May/June, 1973). 
Webb may have been influenced by the pressure exerted on him by 
the media, as described earlier, and he might have listened to his people 
within NASA. Webb's Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization 
and Policy Planning, George L. Simpson (formerly head of the PAD), had 
written a memo to Webb on April 24, 1963, saying that the contract "has 
many dangers. It is a contract for general exploitation. This is rare 
and not desirable to government employees" (26: May/June, 1973). 
There were two other points that were not in Field's favor as seen 
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by NASA. One was that Field had desired an eight-year contract including 
a separate set of contracts to cover the wives of the astronauts {that 
suggestion did not originate at Field but with C. Leo OeOrsey who 
mentioned this thought to Howard in"a letter dated April 17, 1963).1 
John Finney of the New York Times attacked this concept several times and 
Field eventually dropped the thought. The second item fouling the 
proposal was that Field had offered a f.lat fee for the astronauts plus 
royalties from what Field would sell. NASA did not mind the flat fee 
but the space administration balked at the thought of royalties as this 
might encourage some of the astronauts to perform sales work to give 
promotional assistance for Field (32: p95; 29; 10: July 25, 1963). 
On July 9, 1963, Field announced that it was backing out of the 
negotiations. The reason given by Field for the withdrawal was that NASA 
had not accepted an lIunreasonable delay" clause in the documents, i.e., 
that NASA would have to pass on the stories to Field within a certain 
amount of time after receiving them from the astronauts--this was so 
Field could receive the stories while the events were still news. NASA's 
only reply to this charge was to say that it was only a minor dispute. 
The space officials did not say what their biggest disagreement was (159: 
July 19, 1963). 
Shortly thereafter, Webb gave Field another crack at getting the 
contract by sending Howard a letter saying that there was still a chance. 
The Field President replied on July 17, 1963, indicating that he was 
willing to accept Webb's offer by proposing a new contract which was 
scaled down from the first proposal. Field now wanted only the rights 
to the astronauts' personal stories to use in books and newspapers. This 
also gave an "invitation ll to Life to stick its nose into the bargain 
as it could represent the magazines and Life jumped into the pool. 
Together, Life and Field formed a partnership and submitted their 
IOeOrsey continued to represent only the Original Seven astronauts. 
The second group now had Harry Bratten, of Phi1delphia, working for them 
as their counsel. 
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proposals to NASA. In mid-September, 1963, NASA accepted the new terms 
and, for $520,000 per year for four years, the two journalistic 
corporations could have their cake and eat it too (26: May/June, 1973; 
52). 
Each of the corporations wrote a contract with the astronauts and 
through their lawyers Bratten and DeOrsey. The contracts were virtually 
identical with minor exceptions. In looking at them on an overall 
basis, the contracts spelled out that Time, Inc., would have the right 
to publish the personal stories in Life, Life International and Life 
Espano1; the copies of Life for U.S. and Canadian distribution would 
be made available to the public four days before any other publications 
would appear (i.e., by Field) and only one day before any other 
publications would appear in the rest of the world. However, Life 
International and Life Espanol would have to wait for ten days after 
Field's foreign publications were printed before they could carry stories 
written by the astronauts. On the other hand, Field would have the 
right to publish the personal stories in books and newspapers throughout 
the world and in magazines outside of the U.S. and Canada except those 
printed in association with Life (44; 160). 
The contracts were primarily elongated versions of the Life 
contract of 1959. Rules were spelled out stating under which conditions 
the contracts could be dissolved, how the astronauts were to contact Field 
and Life if they wanted to tell their stories to any of the rest of the 
media, how the publishers could not disrupt the normal operations and 
training of the astronauts and how the lawyers were dismissed from 
any responsibility (yet they could be called to help if there were 
any disputes between the corporations and the astronauts) (44; 160). 
The contracts covered the possibility of more astronauts joining the 
astornaut corps and a basic difference between the 1963 and 1959 contracts 
was in how the astronauts would be paid. The 1959 contract used program 
dates as a way to pay the astronauts; the 1963 contracts used a time 
element--every September 1 the astronauts would be paid a certain amount. 
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Since Field and Life announced that they would pay the astronauts 
$520,000 per year, it would seem that the 16 astronauts who were then in 
the employment of NASA would earn $32,500 per year but this was not so. 
The 16 astronauts would earn only $16,250 ($6,250 from Life and $10,000 
from Field). This was done in order to allow for expansion of the 
astronaut corps without diminishing the amount of money that the 
astronauts would earn. Thus, there was room for 16 more astronauts before 
the ceiling of $520,000 per year was reached. After that time, the 
active astronauts would divide the $520,000 evenly among the families 
(which included the families of astronauts who died while on duty)-(44; 
160). 
Something that was not mentioned nor implied in the contracts was 
the matter concerning the insurance the publishing companies were also 
willing to provide for the astronauts. Field and Life chose not to buy 
policies for the men but, if any astronauts died accidentally while on 
assignment to NASA, then the publishers would pay the survivors $100,000 
($50,000 from each corporation). It may not have been cheaper for the 
journalistic organs to underwrite their own policies for the astronauts 
rather than to pay insurance policy premiums based on risk rates. During 
the next four years, seven astronauts would die (an eighth would die in 
an airplane crash in late 1967 when only Life was left holding a contract 
with the astronauts--Field failed to renew at the end of the 1963 four 
year contract for reasons to be discussed later), costing the firms 
$350,000 each. According to insurance agent Robert Dragos, of State 
Farm Insurance, the insurance the firms could have purchased would have 
cost them much less than the $700,000 they had to pay as a result of 
those astronauts' deaths (see Appendix B for a copy of the contracts) (34). 
The terms of the contracts were apparently not well explained to 
other publications or else they were not understood properly. Newsweek 
reported, "sixteen astronauts last week sold their personal stories for 
$1,040,000 to Field Enterprises Educational Corporation covering 
newspaper and book rights and to Life magazine." The figure is correct 
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for a two year contract but Newsweek did not spell out exactly what the 
astronauts were to receive--a maximum of $16,250 per year with less as the 
number of astronauts rose above 32 in number nor did the magazine state 
that the contract was to last only four years and the million dollar 
figure was not a total sum. Months later, in the May 11, 1964 issue, 
Newsweek corrected itself somewhat in an article about the Field 
Corporation with the statement that Field was paying the astronauts 
$10,000 for four years. Interesting enough, Newsweek did not editorialize 
about the contracts. Ed Diamond, Newsweek's science editor, was not in 
favor of the contracts and he still maintained that feeling in early 1977 
(31; 122: September 30, 1963). 
Time, life's new-brother, did not report the contracts precisely 
either. Whoever wrote the article in Time also explained that the 
astronauts would be receiving $1,040,000 from life and Fie1d--without 
specifying the amount of time over which the money would be paid to the 
astronauts. The reporter did note that the men would be paid $16,250 
per year. This leads this author to believe that there was a reason for 
publications reporting the $1,040,000 figure as reported in Time and 
Newsweek; $16,250 times sixteen men for four years comes out with a total 
of $1,040,000. This is possibly where the misconception arose (159: 
September 27, 1963). 
Other members of the media were not exactly impressed with the new 
contracts. The New York Times, perhaps the most vocal of the critics, 
blasted NASA for allowing the astronauts to repeat what the Times thought 
was a mistake in the first place. If the astronauts needed more money, 
stormed the Times, then the government should pay them more. Part of 
the Times editorial reads: 
The sale represents a stain of commercialism on the record 
of the space program •••• The motive of private profit has an 
honorable and legitimate place in the world_of_commercia1 endeavor 
but that world does not embrace the tasks L of-' the astronauts ..•• 
They should not be allowed to reap enormous private profits from 
outside sources (120: September 19, 1963). 
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In what appears to be the only publication to present a reasonable 
explanation of the contracts, U.S. News and World Report offered its 
version in its September 30, 1963 issue. The numbers were wrong there, to 
too, as that reporter wrote that the astronauts would receive $16,250 
each a year for four years (without specifying that the amount each 
astronaut earned would drop if there were more than 32 astronauts) but 
this was much closer than most other ,publications had written. Still, 
it would be interesting to find out who supplied this information to the 
media (163: September 30, 1963). 
The editors of U.S. News and World Report stated that there was 
opposition to the sale of the personal stories by many people in the 
media and that the criticism was based upon three points (as the opposition 
saw it): 1. the sale of the personal stories introduced an "unfortunate 
element of commercialism" in the scientific endeavors in the government; 
2. it was inappropiate for government employees to sell their personal 
stories for a profit--something which was denied to test pilots in the 
military services; and 3. the sale of the stories was tarnishing the image 
of the U.S. space program at home and abroad (though exactly in what manner 
this was happening was not discussed). In the same pages, a NASA official 
told the reporter from U.S. News and World Report th~t "there would be no 
contracts if the astronauts had not insisted upon them." In a letter 
years later to this author, Colonel Shorty Powers vigorously denies this 
accusation, writing that "the report that they had insisted upon the 
contracts is pure hogwash" (126; 163: September 30, 1963). 
In U.S. News and World Report, John Glenn told a reporter what the 
astronauts' vi ews about the contracts were.' Gl enn sai d that he 
looked at the money from Life and Field as a means to guarantee his 
children's education. He thought of the criticism towards the contracts 
as being from members of the media who were upset at not being part of 
"the family," but he added, "most of the press has been extremely kind" 
to the astronauts. Towards the end of the interview, Glenn claimed that 
astronauts could have taken advantage of more situations but they had not. 
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The only ones that the men had invested in were the Cape Coloney (which 
had to be given up because of pressure exerted by the media and the 
public) and an apartment project in Washington, D.C. (this is the only 
mention anywhere of such an investment by the astronauts); they had turned 
down another investment, said Glenn, in Bermuda because they had thought 
it would not be good for them. Glenn also said that the astronauts 
had turned down about $2,000,000 in offers which included free cars, 
lifetime jobs with companies, lecture fees, addtional contracts for 
writing stories and books and performing on film,and television. This did 
not include endorsing products for advertisements, where the astronauts 
could have received large sums had they chosen to do so {163: September 
30, 1963}. 
Glenn obviously knows well how much the astronauts could have taken 
in if they had wanted to. He was the man who had received thousands of 
dollars from fans and well-wishers following his space flight but he had 
turned over the money to charity. keeping not a cent for himself as he 
considered that he had only been doing his job. 
Life's manner of celebrating the new contracts was to immediately 
print personal stories written by the new astronauts in its September 
27, 1963 issue. Although this was one year after the men had been 
selected, it was the first opportunity for the magazine to use articles 
written by these men who were now under contract for their personal 
stories for the next four years--something which the editors of Life 
proudly pointed out in an announcement in that issue. In retrospect, 
it was possibly wise that Life waited a year for another reason--if the 
men had tried to write anything for Life when they had been selected, 
with the problems of the contracts aside here, they possibly would have 
not had much to write about. But, one year later, they were working 
busily on future missions which provided new material for Life's columns. 
Tom Stafford wrote about his special area, which was communications, 
including the use of television to send back images of what the spacemen 
would see on the surface of the moon when they arrived there. Ed White 
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became a bit philosophical: " .•• you'll never satisfy man's curiosity 
unless a man goes himself." And Neil Armstrong was unknowingly prophetic 
liThe other day I was simulating a landing on the moon in a device that 
shows a wide-screen picture of the moon's surface coming closer and 
closer to you •••• I could almost touch down on the moon. Then I realized 
it was only an illusion" (98: September 27, 1963). 
During the fall of 1963, an Italian journalist, Oriana Fallaci, 
arrived in Houston to gather material for a book she wanted to write about 
the U.S. space program, which would include views upon the astronauts~ The 
book, If the Sun Dies, is virtually the only candid account of the 
astronauts during those years and it shows a good deal more than did the 
plastic Life articles. In the year that she hung around the NASA 
installations and the astronauts, Fallaci compiled an arsenal of 
information and she did not pull any punches in what she wrote. She 
derided Glenn for not wanting to tell her what books he would take with 
him into space (other than his technical manuals); she tQld him that his 
knowledge of technology would not be sufficient to sustain him for long. 
At the end of the interview with her, Glenn was gritting his teeth while 
trying to m~intain a smile as he left the interview room, leaving Fa11aci 
with only an accompanying PIa to whom to talk (Interestingly enough, Glenn 
had written of the works of Faraday, Franklin and Disraeli in the March 
8, 1962 issue of Life; so maybe Fallaci overshot her point a bit) 
(41). 
The Italian also chastised NASA's PIOs for paying too much 
attention to her. During one interview with an astronaut, she was 
given only ten minutes to talk to him. To the amazement of the astronaut 
and Fallaci, the PIa who had come with her kept reminding them of how 
many minutes were left in the interview period. The astronaut finally 
ignored the PIO's reminders and kept talking past the ten minute limit, 
as did Fa11aci. Frustrated, the PIO had to haul Fallaci out of the 
room. According to Jack Riley and John McLeaish, who headed the PIO at 
Houston in 1976, the man who timed Fal1aci's conversation so accurately 
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eventually found himself transferred to another post within NASA (104; 
129; 41). 
Because If the Sun Dies contains many personal anecdotes about the 
astronauts as well as some which were related to Fallaci by the astronauts, 
the book would seem to be in clear violation of the Field-Life contracts, 
section 8b. Fallaci was not given permission by Life or Field to talk to 
the astronauts and she did not need the permission--she had arranged to 
talk to them while they were on duty, ultimately becoming a member of their 
inner circle to which very few journalists had the privilege of belonging. 
Professor Louis Alexander, of the University of Houston Communications 
Department, says that he knew most of the astronauts were open with her 
and believes that neither she nor they feared that the contracts would stop 
the interviews. Another reason, given by a source who wishes to remain 
anonymous, is that some of the astronauts were impressed with this well 
known journalist who had come from so far to talk with them--just as 
other people were impressed by talking to the astronauts. Deke Slayton, 
in one conversation with Fallaci, realized that he might have been one 
of the 8-25 bomber pilots who attacked her village in World War lIon 
a particular day--the day when a bomb blast knocked the then 14-year-old 
partisan fighter off her bicycle as she approached a bridge (5; 41). 
There has been some talk among male members of the media that 
Fallaci obtained her information from the astronauts by using sex. 
Professor Alexander tends to doubt this, although others insist that 
they have heard this rumor. Practically all of the people who told this 
author that Fallaci had sex with some of the astronauts have always 
started their comnents with "From what I've heard ... " or "I have 
heard .... " There seems to be nothing definitive, only rumors that cannot 
be proven and some of this might be jealousy on the part of some of the 
male reporters. "She had a piece of equipment that the rest of us L-male 
L-male--/ reporters didn't have and she used it," said one journalist, who 
best not be identified. Another man, when asked how he thought Fallaci 
avoided any hassles with the contracts of Life and Field, replied, "How 
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do you think she got her information?1I 
Magazine articles, written about Fallaci years later, tend to 
defend her. Time wrote that she had a habit of dressing in an unsexy 
manner without using lipstick lor combing her hair when she conducted 
interview. Newsweek once mentioned that Fallaci admitted that being 
female was an advantage in the field of journalism as long as a woman 
did not use her sex or behave like a little girl. In Esguire, Fallaci was 
quoted as saying that men told her more information than they would have 
spilled to male reporters but that was ,because the interviewees were 
impressed by being asked questions by a woman (39: January, 1973; 122: 
January 22, 1973; 159: October 20, 1975). 
There were also stories of sexual relations between some of the 
astronauts and other women reporters. Again, Louis Alexander: 
There was frequent talk among the press about women using 
their femaleness and some resentment--but it is hard to know how 
to characterize that resentment, since I have no way of knowing 
whether they felt they had anything to resent. 
I know of at least one generally-circulated story about a 
women reporter who tried, and possibly succeeded in using her 
femaleness to get stories; and upon whom the effect backfired. 
For a reason males would enjoy, whether true or not: She wasn't much 
fun when she was alone with a man, inept, according to the circulated 
stories ..•. To decide how much of this happened, how much was 
talked about and how much was fended off, plus how much never 
happened at all is a major task of research (5). 
In the early and mid-sixties, few articles which were written by 
women about the astronauts appeared in publications. Therefore, maybe not 
many female journalists actually came into contact with the astronauts. 
Of course, there were other females such as those who were associated with 
the electronic media and newspapers as well as'those who might be 
classified under the heading, IIspace-groupiesll--young women who were 
attracted to the astronauts because they were news. What the male 
reporters may have been complaining about may have been a result of their 
imagination. No doubt, some reporters were not too competent in 
interviewing the astronauts and used the excuse of women using their sex 
as a means to soothe their own wounded egos, in addition to the egos of 
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their editors, who were paying the bills and demanding copy. 
There have been stories about the womanizing done by the astronauts. 
In his book, Return to Earth, astronaut Edwin Aldrin admitted to having 
an affair with a woman while he was still married. His Apollo 11 partner, 
Michael Collins, described the feelings of a friend of his when he learned 
that Colli ns was app lyi ng for the astronaut corps: "Now don't forget, 
Mike," said the friend. "When they ask you why you want to be an 
astronaut, tell them it's because of all the money and ass you can 
get" (2; 24: p180). 
Henry Still, coauthor of the book Starfall, writes in that book: 
It was not surprising that the accumulative pressure of the 
space program, which took men away from their homes repeatedly 
and for long periods of time, began to strain some of the 
astronauts' marriages. From the beginning, NASA administrators had 
been grateful for the psychological wisdom that had gone into 
selection of the space pilots in the first place ....... the behavior 
of these men was watched as closely as a stallion training for the 
Kentucky Derby. An astronaut could not be calm if he did not get 
along with his wife or if he were in love with another woman. At 
most he might allow himself a casual encounter, a short fleeting 
adventure, but the fates forbid that he should give in to 
passion .... It would have been nothing short of miraculous if none 
of the men had slipped by the wayside. 
Betty Grissom tried not to be disturbed by the tender traps 
waiting out there while her husband was gone .... 
One temptation had been relieved when the astronauts were 
given their own airplanes. Before that there had always been the 
haunting vision of a stewardess ripe for diversion during a few 
hours' layover in a strange city (59: ppI35.136).1 
In the same book, Mrs. Grissom writes: 
I can understand what happened to some of the marriages. It 
was mostly being apart, you know he's gone most of the time and 
wherever an astronaut goes, there are secretaries and other girls 
to crawl allover them. It seems like the girls were all thrilled 
at meeting an astronaut, and of course the wives weren't thrilled 
because we had known them all our lives .... 
lIn the early sixties, the astronauts were assigned a fleet of 
jet trainers for two purposes: one, so they would not have to rely upon 
commercial transportation to fly to various points across the country; and 
two, so they could remain proficient at flying. 
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We kind of laughed at a few women. To me they just made fools 
of themselves. I think Gus laughed at them too, but I can't say 
that he didn't enjoy it. It was flattering. It's hard to resist 
something like that. I can understand the man. He's out there 
being treated like a celebrity and then when he carnes home all he 
hears is bitch, bitch, bitch. After a while, he doesn't want to come 
home anymore. 
Women are getting more outspoken, too, and aren't going to just 
sit home and take everything. It's hard to stay home and think 
you're trying to keep the kids ,going, the house going, the cars and 
the lawn, while these fellows are out at this party, that party and 
another party. 
I went through a hard few months and finally made up my mind 
there wasn't anything I could do about it and I wasn't going to sit 
around and worry. Worry didn't help me a bit. I'm not saying 
that Gus didn't have girlfriends, but whenever I thought of things 
like that, I went back to the time when he said: "I expect 
secretaries to act like secretaries and I expect them to do their 
duties. I'm doing my work and I expect them to do theirs.1I 
I wasn't feeling sorry for myself. I just tried not to think 
about those possibilities (59: pp135-136). 
To Mrs. Grissom's account, Still adds another paragraph: 
There were fewer of these "possibilities ll than Betty or the 
other astronaut wives might have imagined. As a practical matter, 
these men had no wish to rock the marital boat, jeopardize 
prestigious pOSitions or tarnish the gleaming facade which had 
been carefully fashioned around NASA and the space program. 
"Customer relations ll men and executives from the large corpor.ations 
wined and dined the astronauts when they came to town, but most 
of the parties were staid affairs. While appearing glamorous and 
exciting to the wives at home, these often were dutiful IImust ll 
appearances for political, public relations or morale-building 
purposes (59: p136). 
Reporters knew about some of the astronauts' relations with the 
opposite sex but none chose to write anything about their exploits. Leo 
Janos, once Houston bureau chief for Time, said, liThe astronauts aren't 
saints .••• The carousing they did before launch and in between missions 
was nothing compared to the other stuff that made up the missions. What 
happened in space was far more important than what they did on the ground 
with the women. Now, if one of them got caught with a woman the night 
before a launch, that would have been news and I'm sure that we would 
have written about that" (79). 
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Dora Jane Hamblin. of Time and Life. writes in a letter to the 
author: 
I knew. of course. about some shaky marriages. some womanizing 
some drinking and never reported it. The guys wouldn't have let me. 
and neither would NASA. It was common knowledge that several 
marriages hung together only because the men were afraid NASA would 
disapprove of divorce and take them off flights. I do not think 
they were a wild bunch or any different from any other cross-section 
of well educated. well trained middle class Americans. I think 
in general the press treated them more than fairly out of a 
complicated interaction of desires--on the part of the men. on 
the part of NASA, on the part of the press--to find and keep valid 
heroes in an era of high technical achievement and very exciting 
adventure (64). 
Paul Haney states, "Sure , we I-the members of the PAD I knew that 
some of the astronauts had been with some women ... and I could tell you 
some stories about them ... but what good would that accomplish if those 
stories had appeared in print?" (66). 
The answer is nothing. There might have been trouble if such news 
had become public, just as trouble might have arisen if it was knO\'/n in 
1962 and 1963 that President Kennedy had been having an affair. If 
there had been trouble, NASA probably would have had to rearrange the 
crew selections in addition to the schedules in addition to the delays that 
would have resulted from using new men in the missions. There would have 
been no use for such stories and it was just as good that none of them 
ever appeared. 
What the press seemed most interested in were the launches. No 
manned missions were occurring in the fall of 1963 yet NASA was busy. 
On October 18, 1963, NASA announced that 14 new astronauts had joined the 
organization, bringing the total number to thirty. From the Air Force 
came Major Edwin E. "Buzz" Aldrin; Captains William Anders, Donn F. Eisele, 
Charles A. Bassett II, Theodore C. Freeman, David R. Scott and Michael 
Collins. The Navy supplied Lieutenant Commander Richard F. Gordon, Jr .• 
Lieutenants Eugene A. Cernan, Alan L. Bean and Roger B. Chaffee. Clifton 
C. Williams arrived from the Marine Corps. Rounding out the group were 
two more civilians: Russell L. "Rusty" Schweikart and R. Walter 
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Cunningham. 
Throughout the rest of 1963, the first 16 astronauts would continue 
working on the Gemini programs until they were joined by the third set of 
astronauts. who were due to begin work in February, 1964. With not much 
happening at NASA in which the public would be interested, Paul Haney, 
the new director of the PAO at MSC, decided to implement monthly briefings 
for the media at the MSC press headquarters. These briefings would consist 
of talks to the reporters by various members of MSC, designed to help the 
reporters understand what was happening at that time and also to give the 
media a working knowledge of the Gemini program so that when the missions 
started flying, the reporters would not have to frantically hunt down 
NASA officials for information (66). 
Haney maintains that the purpose of the briefings was not to usurp 
authority from his boss in Washington, Julian Scheer, but the members of 
the media decided that Houston was "the place" to be. They favored the 
briefings so much that, in April, 1964, Haney changed his format to 
one briefing a week to accommodate everyone. Soon, publications began 
setting up Houston offices for their staffs. Time and Newsweek opened up 
Houston bureaus not to report about Texas but about NASA. AP and UPI 
tried the city for a while but, wanting to be closer to MSC, they moved 
their offices to Clear Lake, just outside of NASA's gates (66; 79). 
According to Haney, Scheer was "pleased and pissed off at the same 
time" about the weekly briefings. Haney says that Scheer preferred for 
most of NASA's information to originate in Washington, not from the 
centers. This started a small private war between the two men that 
ultimately became rather vicious and tiresome. Even though both men 
respected the credentials of the other, they had different opinions of how 
things should be run. Haney was now out in front of the media--where 
Powers had been--and this ran counter to Scheer's belief that his staff 
should be behind the scenes. If the news had been released in Washington 
as Scheer so desired, then Scheer would have been at a disadvantage 
because NASA really would not have been able to release much news at all; 
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protocol determines that no government agency can scoop the White House. 
Yet, when the media reported news that had been released in Houston, 
says Haney, IIJulian lifted off in Washington" (66). 
Scheer vigorously denies this. He said in an interview that the 
situation was quite the opposite. He wanted all of the astronaut news 
handled by the PAO of the MSC since the members of that office had more 
contact with the astronauts than did the main office in Washington. The 
same rule applied to all centers: each center was to report on what was 
its special area in relation to NASAls overall operations. Scheer also 
said that a look at the news releases produced by the PAO Headquarters in 
Washington will verify that the NASA administration never tried to run the 
entire public affairs show from there (137). 
Perhaps the NASA Headquarters did not release all that much 
information but, as mentioned, protocol may have had a role in determining 
what was released by the centers. Gordon Harris, the head PAO of the 
Kennedy Space Center, illustrates a point in his book, Selling Uncle Sam: 
A long-standing arrangement of political significance in this 
special area creates problems for information officers and will 
undoubtedly continue to plague them in the future. The rule is 
that once an agency has completed the procurement process and 
selected a contractor, either through competition or otherwise, 
it must notify the Congress before any public announcement. 
Senators and congressmen representing the state and district where 
the award will take place are advised, usually after similar notice 
to the White House. Inevitably this provokes gamesmanship. The 
first congressional office receiving the call is apt to phone the 
press and break the story immediately. Because the announcement is 
coupled with the name of Senator X or Congressman V, their 
constituents are supposed to conclude that he or they engineered 
the contract. The fact is that Congress had nothing to do with it. 
No harm is done if the story is told correctly. Unfortunately, 
the congressional office knows only as much as the agency relayed 
and, naturally, attempts to make the story as exciting as possible. 
Word that a company ..• won a $1,000,000 contract would ring few bells, 
but when that award means 500 new jobs, even hard-boiled editors 
find it interesting. The trouble is that in many cases the award 
is an add-on (to use bureaucratic jargon) and simply means the same 
company will continue to produce the same item with the same number 
of employees. That deflates the news, and somehow the congressional 
office fails often to add that all-important detail. Back at the 
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store the government P.R. operator sitting with his news release 
telling the complete story must suffer in silence until the magic 
hour when he is free to call the press. Usually he has missed the 
edition that carries the congressional news beat (69: pp12-13). 
Not only did the NASA PAO had to contend with protocol but also 
with Life still and its new partner, Field. At the end of 1963, it became 
visible to some members of the Field organization how much President 
Bailey K. Howard viewed the contracts with the astronauts. At a year-end 
meeting with his board of directors at the "21" Club in New York, Howard, 
as the story goes, stood at the head of the table and went over the events of 
the year in a speech to the officials gathered before him. And then he 
said, "This year will be remembered as the year we bought the astronauts" 
(144) • 
He continued to brag about how the astronauts had been purchased 
as if they were some sort of commodity until Scotty Reston, a member 
of the board, became upset. Reston launched a counter-attack, telling 
Howard that the President of Field was wrong, egotistical and not being 
realistic. The astronauts, said Reston, had bought Field, not the other 
way around. Howard, intimidated by the attack, sat down as Reston 
continued to blast away. When Reston finished, an uneasy air lingered 
over the conference table until Alistair Cooke cracked a few mild 
jokes to clear the atmosphere (144). 
Howard's words give an indication of how he felt about the 
astronauts. Writer William Shelton, who worked for Field for 18 months, 
was of the opinion that Field tried to use the astronauts in an exploitive 
manner. To impress their salesmen, Shelton says that Field would have 
them meet the astronauts and send them packing to sell their products. 
At one time, Trudy Cooper, wife of the astronaut, went on a trip to 
Omaha against Shelton's advice to meet some of the Field representatives 
in order to encourage them to sell more and better. Others have mentioned 
Field's exploitation of the astronauts too. It seems as though Field 
entered into the contracts only to make money while Life signed the 
contracts with the intentions of helping NASA and the nation by 
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disseminating information about the astronauts to the public (144; 
26: May/June, 1973). 
When the spring of 1964 rolled around, John Glenn became the first 
astronaut to leave NASA. He chose to enter into politics. Both parties 
had been trying to claim Glenn because of the magnetism of his name. When 
he chose the Democrats, it caused one politician to remark, lilt was as if 
Santa Claus said he was a Democrat" (161: January, 1971). 
Glenn had hopes to run for the U.S. Senate, representing his home 
state of Ohio but his dreams fell with him on a bathroom floor during the 
spring of 1964. A door on the medicine cabinet in the bathroom had stuck 
and Glenn yanked on it to open it. It sprang loose, Glenn lost his balance 
and hit his head as he fell. From that point on, for several weeks, the 
first American to orbit the earth could not even walk around his hospital 
room. The slightest turn of his head would produce nausea. To add to his 
troubles, his wife had to enter the hospital for an operation, his father 
fell ill and his father-in-law underwent two brain operations. Glenn's 
resources were drying up for other reasons too. He had incurred several 
bills during the primaries and he insisted upon paying them off. Glenn's 
name remained on the ballots until seven weeks before the election in 
November when his name was finally struck. Despite the absence of his 
name, 200,000 people voted for him anyway, which delivered a message to 
the other men who were running for election. As time slipped by, Glenn 
decided to retire from the military (which is something that is not 
automatic for an astronaut upon leaving NASA, contrary to what some 
people may think). Glenn's reason for leaving was that he did not want to 
be the world's oldest, permanent astronaut. President Johnson offered to 
promote Glenn to the rank of full colonel so he could benefit from higher 
retirement payments but Glenn refused to accept this. The President would 
have none of that and promoted Glenn despite his protests. On January 4, 
1965, Glenn retired into private life. Eventually he would become the 
President of Royal Crown Cola and run for Congress another time, which was 
unsuccessful. It would not be until 1974 that Glenn would win a seat in the 
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Senate by a two-to-one margin over his Republican opponent. In early 
1975, Glenn returned to the hill where, twelve years before, he had 
entered as a national hero to the standing ovation of the Congress (8: 
pp77-BO) . 
While Glenn was having his share of troubles in the first half of 1964, 
1964, NASA also began to encounter some problems during that summer. It 
was then that Paul Haney had a IInasty set ll with the Houston Post. It had 
I • 
started when Gus Grissom wrote an article for Life about the upcoming 
Gemini missions. The beginning of the story seems personal enough but, 
after a few paragraphs, Grissom was describing the Gemini spacecraft in 
a technical manner: 
Now in the Gemini capsule, there's very little equipment in 
the pressurized cabin and nothing is buried. Most of the systems 
are installed in separate packages on the outside of the cabin or 
in the adapter section behind us. All you have to do to ~et ~t one 
of those "black boxes" is open up a panel. If one goes L badJ ... 
take it out and plug in a new one. Another Mercury alumni, Chuck 
Mathews, now Gemini program manager, has wisely insisted on this 
quick-fix method (9B: June 5, 1964). 
On June B, 1964, Houston Post writer Jim Maloney sent Paul Haney 
a note with a copy of the Life article attached to it. In the note, 
Maloney asked several questions: 
.•.. Is this considered to be a IIpersona111 story? 
.... 1 use the word personal because I am told that is what the 
Life contract is for-- f1 personal stories. 1I I was not pennitted to 
see the contract, so I must accept what I was told • 
.••• Are those stories read by anyone to determine if they fit 
the terms of the contracts? 
If so, by whom? 
Who read this one? 
•... There is a date--December--given by Grissom as the date of 
the first manned Gemini.... I want an official comment on this date. 
I want an official's name with the comment (lOB). 
Maloney was correct in some regards: Grissom had indeed written 
"By December, when we hope to launch our mission .... John and I will 
know each other pretty well," but NASA had not officially given any date 
for the Grissom-Young mission. Hence, Grissom was giving Life exclusive 
information--something the magazine had been trying to obtain for years. 
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Haney apparently missed the mention of the date when he had reviewed the 
article before it went to the presses. Maloney, who had been trying to 
interview Grissom for four months, also complained to his editor about the 
Life article. The Post editor, William P. Hobby, Jr., wrote his 
Congressman, Albert Thomas, who had opposed the contracts from the 
beginning. Thomas, head of the subcommittee that handled NASAls 
appropiations, took up the issue with.NASAls administrator, writing, 
lilt is not too late for Jim Webb to act now and the sooner he acts, the 
fewer headaches hels going to have. 1I 'Thomas also wanted the government 
to increase the pay of the astronauts and supply them with up to $200,000 
worth of life insurance (98: June 5, 1963; 26: May/June, 1973). 
Webb did not answer Thomas immediately but Scheer did, saying that 
NASA had made a mistake in approving Grissomls Life article. This did 
not placate Maloney. He describes his feeling in a letter: 
As soon as we at the Post realized what the contract would mean 
in restricting our coverage, we complained to everyone who would 
listen .... When the contract first came into being, the Post or 
very few other news organizations were aware of it, and not aware at 
all of what it would mean down the road. Then, as the move of the 
the ... Manned Spacecraft Center was begun in 1962 very slowly to 
Houston from Langley Field, Virginia, we began to catch on. MSC 
folks began drifting in, including the astronauts, slowly and in 
small groups, then in growing numbers. It took a while for us to 
realize what their move meant to us newswise. And it took a while 
for us to realize what the coverage rules were going to be. In 
fact, NASA, which was itself a brand new organization, was still 
formulating the rule. We had a tough learning period, at least I 
sure did. Haybe I was slow. But the meaning of the contract, 
and NASAls then news coverage rules crashed through to me--and I 
transmitted this info to our management--we reacted as we thought 
best (106). 
Haney looked upon the Postls anger as being just another round in 
the press versus NASA-and-the-contracts skirmishes that had been going on 
for years. It had started with the Washington Post, followed by the New 
York Times and finally the Houston Post, said Haney, decided it was its 
turn to IILetls goose NASA •... It was as if we had to be opposed by the 
press like the Republican-Democrat kind of thingll (66). 
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Haney met with the hierarchy of the Post and explained NASA's 
position on the contracts. He told Hobby and Hobby's mother, the publisher 
of the paper, about the safeguards that NASA had worked out plus the 
advantages that the astronauts enjoyed with the contracts, such as having 
a more private life and having life insurance. Haney also mentioned that 
the official aspects of the astronauts' work was available for all the 
media to see. When Haney left that meeting, the brass of the Post told him 
that they understood the situation (66). 
Obviously they did not or, if they did, they chose not to pass along 
their understanding to their editorial writers. On the Sunday morning 
following the meeting with Haney, August 2, 1964, the Post opened its 
attack on the editorial page: 
The idea that the astronauts can sell stories of their work to 
one medium while denying similar stories to other media is 
unthinkable. 
The fact that such a situation exists is deplorable •... 
When the crew and the backup crew for the first manned Gemini 
flight was named L-April 13, 1964-/ requests for interviews with 
these crewmen were not acknowledged. 
Still the reporters were patient. They realized that the men 
of these crews are busy with their training. 
Then a magazine that pays the astronauts for their "personal" 
stories ran a story signed by the men of this first Gemini crew. 
First of all, the story ran two months after requests were 
made by reporters for similar stories. 
Secondly, the story by the command pilot of the first Gemini 
spacecraft was not a personal story. He was discussing his duties 
as a public employee and the use of public equipment paid for by 
every taxpayer in this country. 
Stories of this type are public property if anything is and 
should be available to all representatives of all news media on an 
equal basis .....•• the image of the astronauts with news stories for 
sale is one that cheapens us all" (75: August 2, 1964). 
The next day, Haney was back in the offices of the Houston Post. 
Again, it seemed like the Hobbys understood and Haney went back to his 
post at MSC. If the Post understood Haney, the writers did not show it. 
Another blast was delievered eight days later: 
It is not particularly surprising that the nation's space 
program is under attack from time to time from some quarters .•.• 
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/-But-/ what is surprising, though, is that the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration would permit its necessary public relations 
effort to be hurt by allowing Time, In. and Field ... to monopolize 
the "personal" stories of the astronauts through lucrative contracts 
with them. 
And as the space program gets more and more adventurous and 
dramatic and challenging, the public relations effort is sure to be 
hurt more and more. 
In a recent Life magazine article said to have been written by 
the command pilot of the first manned Gemini flight, we are given 
a sample of "personal" stories. . .. the writer discusses the merits 
of the Gemini spacecraft as compared to the Mercury spacecraft and 
announces, for the first time, the month in which the manned Gemini 
flight is scheduled. 
This is not a personal story! 
And yet, what can you expect? Would Field and Life pay $520,000 
a year for an astronaut's recipe for barbecue sauce?--or for his 
wife's advice on how to grow camelias? 
The exploration of space is, and should be a national goal. a 
national effort. It isn't, and shouldn't be, commercialism in any 
form or anything that would even resemble commercialism. 
The mere existence of the Field-Time contracts suggests that an 
astronaut's space voyage is a great feat of personal achievement, 
when in fact thoughtful people know that any manned space flight is 
a gigantic team effort involving the hard work and close cooperation 
of hundreds of scientists, engineers and technicians. 
We would like to believe that the astronauts got into the 
space program for reasons other than $520,000 a year ..... 
The salaries for public service are, unfortunately, low. The 
astronauts must have known this before they entered the space 
program. And there are very real dangers to space flight. They 
must have known this. And there are certain pitfalls, notably 
invasion of privacy, that come with fame such as theirs. They must 
have known this. 
And they must have known that the Field-Time contracts could 
only lead to many very earthly problems (75: August 11, 1964). 
Haney trudged back to the Houston Post's offices for another 
visit, this time taking Alan Shepard with him to help explain the 
contracts once more. Haney wondered what had gone wrong with the previous 
meeting. "Maybe I couldn't speak Texan," mused Haney years later. III 
don't know why they didn't understand me. 1I Maybe speaking Texan would not 
have helped. Again, the Houston Post levelled the shotgun barrels at 
everyone who was tied into the contracts, with an article running under 
the headline, II Contracts , Bad Public Policy" U5: August 18, 1964; 66). 
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The story read: 
•.. The Post finds repugnant any commercialism of the esteem 
in which the public holds ,-the astronauts-'. This is the effect 
of permitting them to contract with two private publishing firms 
for their "personal" stories . 
... The Post believes most firmly that the policy of permitting 
the rather lucrative contracts is wrong in principle and is 
therefore a bad public and governmental policy. It has said so on 
several occasions . 
... Aside from putting the astronauts in the position of 
peddling information which should be equally available to the 
public and all news media in a nondiscriminatory basis, there is this 
very pertinent pOint made by Editor and Publisher when it said: 
"How do you like that, Mr. Editor? Here are some real national 
figures, and some about-to-be national heroes, and your reporters 
can't interview them unless two of your competitors say it's okay." 
The net effect is to cheapen the space program in which the 
astronauts are participating but it also opens the door to 
favoritism, the sale of public property for private benefit and 
government by crony (75: August 18, 1964). 
Haney had had enough. He decided to let the Houston Post run its 
course and not bother to fight back anymore. Nevertheless, he had a 
researcher in Washington, D.C. make a list of all the people who had been 
on government payrolls while writing for a profit---the number came to 
nearly 130 people, including Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas 
who had written more than a score of books concerning the business of the 
nation's top court while he sat on its bench. Also on the list was the 
skipper of the submarine Nautilus who wrote his version of the first 
underwater voyage under the North Pole for the Saturday Evening Post. 
Haney believes that the father of the Post's editor, William Hobby, 
Senior, had also written a book while he was the governor of Texas (this 
author cannot find evidence to support or refute this) (66).1 
It would seem that, initially, the Houston Post had raised a valid 
point in bringing up the matter of Grissom's article for Life but it was 
apparent that the Post was not gaining any ground. For all of the Post's 
work, Editor Hobby did not succeed in dissolving the Life-Field contracts, 
and his newspaper soon joined the ranks of the Washington Post and the 
New York Times in failing to bring the contracts to an end. However, 
1However, in 1977, Bill Hobby, Jr., now Lt. Governor of Texas, wrote 
this author that he still holds financial interests in various media although 
he is now a government employee. This seems to be a conflict of interest. 
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Hobby does have the distinction of editing the last newspaper that made 
a major attack upon the contracts, if that is any consolation to his ego. 
Despite the brushfires the PAO of MSC was having with the Houston 
Post, the MSC kept working on Gemini. In April, 1964, the first Titan 
II missile, which had been mated to a Gemini spacecraft, was successfully 
launched from Cape Kennedy. Other projects associated with Gemini were 
also proceeding well. The astronauts were travelling to the McDonnell 
aircraft plant in St. Louis quite often, training in the simulators there. 
They also visited other contractors to stimulate the employees to maintain 
good performance in their work for NASA. Astronaut Rusty Schweikart spent 
eight days in a Gemini space suit (which was quite different from those 
used for the Mercury missions) performing a variety of tasks, including 
flying at zero-G, riding in the centrifuge and simulating a four-day 
Gemini mission. At the Cape, tests were being run on the second Gemini 
launching, which would also be unmanned (55: pp73-103). 
On October 31, astronaut Theodore "Ted" Freeman was approaching the 
runway at Ellington AFB (the military installation near the MSC which 
NASA also used for its planes) when a large snow goose hit his plane. The 
astronaut stayed with the plane in spite of having lost power and possibly 
being blinded by the impact with the bird. Freeman held the plane in 
good attitude for a few moments until it suddenly rolled onto its back. 
The astronaut delayed squeezing the trigger handles on his ejection seat 
a moment too long. When he finally ejected, he was killed upon impact 
with the ground. Freeman was the first fatality within the ranks of the 
astronauts. He would not be the last (24: pp50-51). 
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FLYING, WALKING AND TRAFFIC COPS 
During the two years that the Americans were working on Gemini, 
the Russians had been busy at their own spaceport. Following Gordon 
Cooper's flight, on June 16, 1963, the Soviets had launched another 
two-ship mission. One of those Vostoks contained cosmonaut Valentina 
Tereshkova--another first for the Russians as she became the first woman 
to fly in space. The following November 3, she married fellow cosmonaut 
Andrian Nikolayev after a romance that was "long suspected" by the 
Russian media. The next June, the first "space baby" was born to the 
couple. The child, Yelena, underwent several studies by Russian medical 
experts to determine if she contained any abnormalities caused by her 
parents having flown in space; she was perfectly healthy (153: ppI21-125). 
The Russians also launched the world's first multi-man mission, 
surpriSing the Americans with not just two men but three, including a 
doctor, who found themselves in space on October 12, 1964. As usual, the 
Russians landed on their own territory, preferring to settle on land 
rather than on water; but this flight marked the first time that any 
cosmonauts remained in their spacecraft. Previous flights had ended with 
the cosmonauts ejecting from their spacecraft at a certain altitude and 
descending to earth via the conventional parachute while the spacecraft 
continued to plunge towards the ground, several thousand feet below. Nine 
days after the flight, the Soviets held a press conference with the 
cosmonauts and 2000 reporters attended. When the reporters asked about 
the landing, the answer was, liThe landing of the spaceship was softer 
than the stopping of a modern lift" (153: pI32). 
The Russians preferred not to show their spaceship, however, nor to 
talk about their heatshield. One of the experts at the press conference 
remarked that the composition of the heatshield was "one of the secrets 
of the Soviet experts." The majority of the information supplied by the 
Russians at that press conference was about the future plans to build a 
space station in orbit around the earth--which they said would be of more 
importance than a mission to the moon (153: pI33). 
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On March 18, 1965, the Soviets launched the second Voskhod but 
this one contained only two men, unlike the previous one. 1 During this 
flight, Alexei Leonov became the first human to IIwalk ll in outer space 
while his pilot, Pavel Belyayev remained inside the still-pressurized 
compartment (this may seem strange to Americans who remember that the 
U.S. Gemini spacecraft had to be completely depressurized for the 
astronauts to leave the spaceships but .. the Soviets had included an 
inflatable airlock on the side of the Voskhod for their cosmonauts 
to enter before exiting into space). IIWalkingll is not really the word to 
use for Leonov's ten-minute float; other than pulling on his tether, 
the cosmonaut had no way to control his movements (153: pp134-146). 
Some hours after Leonov re-entered his spacecraft, it came time to 
return to earth and the cosmonauts suffered the same fate as had Scott 
Carpenter. They overshot their intended landing zone. While Western 
intelligence sources knew of the cosmonauts' plight, the Russian media 
kept quiet about the mistake for more than five hours after the spacemen 
had landed. The cosmonauts found themselves in a dense forest about 15 
miles from the nearest sign of civilization, which was a forest firebreak. 
They slept where they landed that night and the next morning some 
rescuemen, who had been dropped from a helicopter, skiied to where the 
astronauts were encamped. It was not until March 21 that the cosmonauts 
were able to be picked up by helicopter and that was only after they had 
skiied to the firebreak (153: pp134-146; 175b). 
In the United States, things were busy as the first manned Gemini 
mission was being prepared. On the morning of March 23, 1965, Gus 
Grissom and John Young, the first astronaut of the second group to fly 
in space, left their quarters at the Cape and were suiting up when Wally 
Schirra walked into the room where they were being outfitted. The 
astronaut of MA-8, wearing an old Aercury spacesuit which was tattered 
and patched here and there, told Young and Grissom, "I have suited up just 
in case you two chicken out and turn the mission over to the backup 
teams .... 11 Schirra had also something else which, unknown to others, he 
1The Soviets were no longer using the one-man Vostok spacecraft. 
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gave to Young--a corned beef sandwich that he had acquired at a Cocoa 
Beach restaurant. Later, Young and Grissom rode the elevator up the 
gantry and entered their spacecraft, liThe Unsinkable Molly Brown" (61: 
p104) 
At 9:24 a.m., the third Gemini-Titan (GT-3) was launched for a 
three-orbit flight. Although no spectaculars such as a space walk were 
planned, the astronauts were able to change their orbital planes a few 
times, becoming the first spacemen to do so. They also checked out the 
possibility of using their maneuvering unit's thrusters to position them 
for re-entry procedures in case the retro-rockets failed. It was a 
cautious first test of the Gemini spacecraft (57: p189). 
During the mission, the sandwich that Young had smuggled aboard with 
Schirra's assistance appeared. Much to Grissom's surprise, Young yanked 
the delicacy out into the open and offered it to his command pilot. 
Grissom took a bite, noticed the crumbs floating around the cabin and 
decided that the sandwich had better be stowed before any more bites were 
taken because the loose particles could impair the filters of the air 
systems. For his fun, Young received NASAls first official reprimand that 
was ever given to an astronaut (98: April 2, 1965).1 
Michael Collins writes about the trouble that the sandwich caused: 
NASA ... reacted hysterically. The medics claimed that somehow 
that sandwich had negated the flight's medical protocol, while the 
engineers claimed that crumbs from it could easily have invaded the 
guts of the machinery with catastrophic effect. Some members of 
Congress became apoplectic, charging NASA with having lost control 
of the astronaut group. I think most of us could have strangled 
Wally for bringing on a tornado of upper-echelon down on us for 
something as trivial as a corned-beef sandwich (24: p138). 
Henry Still wrote of the incident later in a book about the 
Gri ssom fami ly: 
The press, which already viewed Gus Grissom as Peck's bad 
IGrissom's son, Mark, told his mother later that his father had 
confided in him that there had actually been two sandwiches and Grissom 
ate half of one while Young finished off the rest (59: p153). 
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boy, jumped gleefully upon this episode which interrupted the 
crisp rigidity of the official flight plan. Gus was mildly 
rebuked when he got home, though not as sharply as the press 
indicated. Betty worried about the sandwich more than any other 
episode in the Gemini 3 flight. Always fiercely defensive of her 
husband and his work, she was concerned that this would open him up 
to a new wave of criticism. 
"It was my fault that the sandwich got on board," Gus told her 
later. "I should have known because I was in charge of the flight" 
(59: p153). 
The sandwich did not affect the flight in the slightest manner. But, 
for all of the maneuverability that the spacecraft was supposed to possess, 
it performed badly when landing, undershooting the mark by 60 miles. 
However, this time the astronauts were found quickly and did not have to 
wallow in the ocean as did Scott Carpenter. When they first hit the water, 
the side Grissom was on plunged underneath the waves and he thought, "Here 
we go again ...• " but the spacecraft righted itself and floated as it was 
designed to do. When the astronauts were picked up by the helicopters, 
they had shucked their spacesuits and made the ascent into the Navy 
helicopter wearing only their long underwear. By the time they arrived 
on the deck of the aircraft carrier Intrepid, they had been issued 
standard blue Navy robes for some modesty, maybe not for their sake, but so 
none of the public viewing the televised pictures of the recovery 
would be upset (98: April 2, 1965; 61: pl13; 57: pp189-191). 
A few hours after the astronauts arrived on the ship, the Molly 
Brown came on deck as well. The Molly Brown's name still bothered NASA 
officials. Grissom writes in his book Gemini, which was published after 
his death: 
She was the first and last Gemini spacecraft to have her own 
name. Thereafter, the practice ceased .... Nevertheless, there is 
a significance in the ending of this hand-me-down tradition from 
the services. NASA was letting us and the world know that Gemini 
wasn't a "Peanuts" cartoon episode and we weren't bunch of "Red 
Barons" flying around out there (61: p94). 
When the flight was over, there was a fair amount of publicity 
surrounding the mission. The fact that the Russians had a cosmonaut who 
had walked in space did not seem to bother the Americans. One editorial 
186 
cartoonist thumbed his nose at the Soviets by drawing a picture of a proud 
President Johnson pushing his twin astronauts (one of them was holding a 
steering wheel) in a baby carriage down a sidewalk past a Russian space 
walker, saying, "SO what? My boys can drive before they walk. 1I 
Grissom offered his thoughts on the post-flight publicity that 
greeted him and Young: III think I can understand the reason behind the 
gigantic outpouring of goodwill John aod I received for our relatively 
easy flight. After all the Russian space spectaculars, the United States 
was back in the manned-space flight business" (61: p115). 
Life, as can be expected by now, brought out the astronauts' 
personal stories of their mission in its April 2, 1965 issue. The 
articles were more personal than what Grissom had written the previous 
summer; NASA was probably making sure of that this time. 
Life also did not pass up a chance to let its readers to know what 
the Russians were up to. When Novosti, the Soviet press agency, offered 
the personal stories of Leonov and Belyayev for publishers to print, Life 
snatched up the offer. The article was no better nor worse than those 
which had been written by the American astronauts. The language may seem 
stilted but that might be due to the translation which sometimes disrupts 
the flow of a language; likewise, Russians might think the same of the 
articles in Life (98: May 14, 1965). 
Leonov wrote in flowery terms: 
When I stepped out of the ship above the Black Sea, I looked 
around--how beautiful. I love the Black Sea. I love it in any 
weather. How long have I sat by its shores and admired its 
variegated colors. But from our altitude, the water looked 
different. It was a monotonous dark blue, changing into a gun-metal 
gray. It as if the sunlight had discolored the water. Out in the 
open, I observed a ship .... The ship was lighted from all sides, as 
if bathed in a flow of light •... There is dead silence in the 
cosmos. Pavel talked to me. I reported to him on everything I saw 
in space •... Nor did I feel the enormous velocity of the ship. 
It seemed to be motionless" (98: May 14, 1965). 
Less than two weeks after Leonov's account appeared in Life, NASA 
released some news of its own. The flight of Gemini 4, which was to study 
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the effects of a four-day flight upon the men and the machines, would now 
have another purpose: one of the astronauts would exit from the spacecraft 
and do more than just float in space, he would carry a "gun" which was 
filled with compressed oxygen, allowing him to propel himself around the 
spacecraft for what was called IIExtravehicular Activity (EVA)". The media 
were caught flat by the announcement. A headline for a story in the 
Washington Evening Star, on March 18, 1965, had read, II 'Space Walk' is 
still a year away for U.S." but it obviously had been proven untrue 
six days later when NASA made the announcement. 
Shortly after the announcement that one of the Gemini 4 crew would 
leave his spacecraft, Julian Scheer sent a memo to the White House, on 
May 24, 1965, to explain his view upon the post-flight activites of the 
Gemini crews. 
During the Mercury program and on into the first manned Gemini 
flight, space flight was new to this nation and we found a new 
group of heroes created by the American people. Each flight was a 
IIfirst" of some kind, we were behind the Russians and our flight 
program was smaller and more understandable. Both u.S. and Russian 
space flyers' names became well known. 
As a result, New York City always wanted a ticker tape parade 
and the White House showed, on behalf of the American people, its 
appreciation of the work the astronauts had done. 
We are now entering a new phase of our program .... 
The image that is, perhaps, best for this nation is one of a 
nation ... that goes about its work in an orderly and well-planned 
manner. We will fly these flights as best we can and put these 
flyers right back into the flight schedule for a future missions 
We feel that any build-up of personalities resulting from these 
flights should be spontaneous, based not on the fact that the 
astronauts flew, but what they accomplished in flight or difficulties 
they overcame or obvious skills they demonstrated .... 
Therefore, we prefer to have a mechanism built into our Public 
Affairs program which will enable us to react quickly to given 
situations and to allow us the flexibility to choose the course that 
appears best at the time of the completion of a successful mission. 
On the upcoming flight, Gemini 4, we must consider that 
astronauts Grissom and Young were received at_the White House less 
than ten weeks from this launch date / June 3 / and participated 
in New York and Chicago parades. Similar events 90 days later, 
unless the flight departs radically from the flight plan, may be 
too much saturation and repetition. 
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Therefore, in summary, it is our recommendation that we plan no 
events in advance of the Gemini 4 flight but be prepared to move 
rapidly in case there is interest there. We will ... discourage 
other activity, such as ticker-tape parades, and will have 
consideration ,a visit by the astronauts to the University of Michigan 
campus in late June or early July. Both graduated from the 
University. 
Julian Scheer (139). 
On the next day, when the above memo was laid before the President, 
his aide, Marvin Watson, had attached a sheet of paper with some 
suggestions written on it. Those suggestions read: 
NASA suggest that since there will now be frequent space flights 
flights, you should reconsider the policy of White House receptions 
and ceremonies for the astronauts. 
The next flight is scheduled for June 3 and will last for four 
days. There will be some six days debriefing in Houston, Texas 
which will mean approximately ten days from blast-off until they 
would be at the White House. 
Since both of these astronauts are graduates of the University 
of Michigan and in that the University has asked that both come to 
the University, Director Webb suggests that you consider not having 
the White House or Capitol ceremonies and allow it to be handled in 
this manner. 
Do you want a White House ceremony? Yes No 
... If ypu said no, Director Webb suggests that s~in-c-e-the 
astronauts will be in Houston for debriefing, and if you are in 
Texas, you might want to have them come to the ranch. Yes __ 
No 
-- Marvin (l39). 
At the bottom of the memo, when it was returned to Watson's desk, 
was President Johnson's handwriting, spelling out his thoughts: II I agree 
with the last paragraph •.• let's play it by ear. LII 1 
This may not seem important but, in the future, it would be President 
Johnson who would take the criticism for Webb's final suggestion as 
reported to the President by Watson. 
The PAO of NASA was realizing that things had changed since the 
previous flights and the PAO in Houston was finally allowed to take 
control over the news coverage of the flight once the missile had left the 
pad at Cape Kennedy. This decision caused some anxiety among the MSC 
officials. The original press building at MSC had been IIdesigned to house 
Ipresident Johnson did not bother to check any of the answer blanks 
provided for him by Mr. Watson. 
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all large events covered by the news and television services: but it could 
not hold all those members of the media who had told NASA that they were 
heading to Houston. In a panic, MSC officials went about the Houston area 
and finally acquired a 25,000 square foot facility that belonged to 
McDonnell's Houston representative, Frank G. Morgan, Jr., just across the 
street from MSC. 1 On May 25, the registration process began and all 
members of the media who wanted to coy~r the flight began to sign their 
names to the lists and pick up their passes. The list of correspondents 
would end up with 1128 names; 1068 of those were from the news media and 
the other 60 were public relations and engineering personnel from the 
industrial firms working with NASA (55: p421). 
These reporters gathered at the new building for the public affairs 
activites of MSC, now called Building 6. It was there they would interview 
officials who understood the technology of the upcoming flight and would 
hear briefings about the major components of the spacecraft and missile. 
Building 6 was to be the newsmen's center of operations. From there they 
could be taken on tours of the facilities within the MSC grounds and 
orient themselves with the astronaut training and flight control 
facilities. During the mission, the reporters would gather there three 
times a day for press conferences and briefings given by Chris Kraft's 
flight control teams as they came off-duty. This would occur throughout 
the remaining flights as well but not with the intensity of Gemini 4. 
This intensity would be evident by the amount of stories that the media 
would produce about the second manned Gemini flight, which were more than 
any other flight during the Gemini program (55: p422). 
On June 3, 1965, Gemini 4 was launched, carrying astronauts Ed White 
and Jim McDivitt into space. Witnessing the event at Cape Kennedy were 
671 members of the media. Soon after the launch, 81 of those people 
ILocal reporters did not care for NASA to lease the building, 
spelling out that the rent was costing the U.S. $92,165 per year. In 
addition to that, $166,000 were needed for modifications, $8000 for 
television moniters and another $6600 for just more than 600 chairs. 
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jumped on planes and headed across the Gulf of Mexico for Houston (where 
MSC controlled a mission for the first time) to join the reporters 
already there in Building 6 (88: Winter, 1966, pp722-728). 
A few hours after they were placed in orbit, White prepared to step 
outside of the spacecraft. He opened his hatch and cautiously stood up in 
place, the gold-foil covered umbilical cord floating inside of the space 
cabin. 1 With a small burst of the compressed oxygen from his gun, White 
left the spacecraft and soared in front of McDivitt, who was busy shooting 
pictures of the floating astronaut. As the minutes went by, so did the 
oxygen supply in the gun. When that happened, White simply did what Leonov 
had done, use the tether line. At one time, White did walk--on top of the 
spacecraft. He placed himself on it by pulling tightly on the tether, 
which gave him some friction against the surface of the spacecraft. When 
his shoulder brushed against McDivitt's window, the astronaut inside 
complained, "You smeared up my windshield, you dirty dog!" Miles below, 
the world listened in amusement to the astronauts chattering back and 
forth. 2 When it came time for White to return, he said he did not want 
to do that although he realized that he had better follow the flight plan. 
By the time the hatch was closed, White had been outside for nearly 20 
minutes, twice as long as Leonov had been outside of his Voskhod (98: 
June 18, 1965; 118: September, 1965). 
Although the walk of White's was the most impressive part of Gemini 
4's mission to the public, it was considered as a secondary task by NASA. 
The main project was to evaluate the long-term effects of four days in 
space. For the two-and-a-half days after the walk, Gemini 4 was allowed 
to drift so as to conserve attitude control fuel. Other tests were 
performing a rendezvous with the second stage booster (this phase was 
IThe cord supplied communications and oxygen to White, who also 
had a chest pack carrying 20 minutes' worth of oxygen in case the cord 
broke. 
2John Young, who was listening to them, called up and told them to 
save their voices, explaining, "The toughest part comes after you get back 
to the United States." Another interesting point is that although McDivitt 
was obviously the only person up there shooting pictures of White, Field 
gave itself credit for the pictures when they were published in one of its 
publications, as if McDivitt was working exclusively for World Book. 
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cancelled) and, like Grissom and Young, White and McDivitt were to change 
their orbits occasionally. On June 7, the crew returned to earth and were 
hauled aboard the aircraft carrier Wasp after being picked up by a 
helicopter (57: pp201-202). 
It was either sometime during the mission or immediately after the 
splashdown that the White House announced that the President would 
receive the astronauts at his Texas ranch near Austin. Some Americans did 
not care for this act and they let the President know their thoughts. 
Three telegrams, supplied to the author by Historian John Fawcett of the 
Lyndon Baines Presidential Library in Austin, illustrate some of the 
feelings of the public. 
Mr. President, in all due respect, I, like many Americans, feel 
that the place of honor and dignity in which to receive our Gemini 
twins is in fact the Capitol of this country. Not Texas. It would 
be much more diplomatic and regarded abroad with much more favor if 
you would adhere to the people's wishes. We want our astronauts 
acclaimed in our Capitol. 
Elizabeth Tracy (New Haven, Connecticut) 
It is apparent that by personally lionizing our space heroes, 
you have bypassed we citizens who are taxpayers. As one, I would 
prefer having them received in the White House other than some 
remote place on some remote river presenting only one person. 
Bob Stenzhorn (Tampa, Florida) 
Texas spirit is no bigger than Nevada's. Would it be possible 
to welcome the astronauts in our Capitol? Washington, D.C. II 
Betty Horton (Reno, Nevada) 
President Johnson abandoned Administrator Webb's suggestion about 
meeting the astronauts at the ranch, maybe because of the protests, and 
the reception was held at the White House on June 17, 1965. The Gemini 4 
astronauts arrived that morning with their families and almost as soon 
as the helicopter bringing them from Andrews AFB settled on the ground, 
Mrs. Lady Bird Johnson asked the families to spend the night in the 
Presidential Mansion. At a Rose Garden ceremony, the President called 
White and McDivitt the "Christopher Columbuses of the 20th Century," and 
added that while the United States had not yet passed the Soviets, the 
Americans were at least even with them now. Next came a parade and then 
a lunch with Vice-President Humphrey which was also attended by several 
Congressional leaders. Off the astronauts went to talk to the House and 
the Senate and then back to the White House. There, the men and their 
families swam in the White House swimming pool and later in the evening 
they went to the State Department for a reception. To the people 
gathered there, the astronauts showed a 20-minute movie of White's walk 
in space. In the blackened room, the image of a white-suited astronauts 
floated across the screen just as White had in space; the red, white and 
blue of the tiny U.S. flag sewn on White's left shoulder showed clearly on 
the film (117: SP-350, pI43; 85: p288). 
Mrs. Johnson describes what happened when the lights came on after 
the last frames of the movie disappeared from the projection screen: 
_ ... then Lyndon delivered the shocker of the evening. He said 
L to the Gemini 4 astronauts~, "This may not make me too popular 
with you families. But I'm going to ask you tonight, in the very 
next few hours, to take the /-Presidential-/ plane and travel 
outside the country again ..• ~ I want you to join our delegation 
in Paris" (117: SP-350, pI43; 85: p291). 
What Johnson wanted the astronauts to do was to fly to the Paris 
airshow because the Russians had humbled the Americans there. Yuri 
Gagarin was standing next to a copy of his spaceship (seen for the first 
time by the western world) and was shaking hands with the visitors, 
scoring an impressive hit. The French press had noted that most of the 
crowds were ignoring the lackluster American pavilion. At the President's 
announcement, the wives of the astronauts were visibly stunned. They had 
arrived in Washington for, at most, an overnight stay; they had brought 
nothing for a trip to Paris. Never mind, said the President and the First 
Lady. They whisked the astronauts' ladies to the White House and 
plunged into the wardrobes of Mrs. Johnson and her daughters to find 
clothes for them. At 4 a.m. the next morning, the plane left Andrews with 
the astronauts, their wives, Humphrey, Webb and Charles Mathews, the 
Gemini program manager (117: SP-350; p143; 85: P291).1 
IJohnso~ also had Dr. Mathilde Krim of the Sloan-Kettering Institute 
for Cancer Research join the astronauts in Paris, although how she related 
to an airshow is a bit incomprehensible. 
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Although the astronauts made it to Paris for only the last day and 
a half of activities, they gave the Soviets some competition. Wherever 
the astronauts went, so did hordes of Frenchmen, causing one Paris 
newspaper to remark, "A partial recovery for the United States" (117: 
SP-350, p143). 
By the time the astronauts returned to the U.S., they were greeted 
by the issue of Life containing their personal stories. Compare the 
following account, written by White, to what Leonov had wtttten for Life 
only a month before. 
There were the vivid colors of the sky, followed by the clouds, 
the ocean and the earth. I had seen Texas and the Gulf States, and 
then I saw Florida coming into view. At about that time, I rolled 
over, facing right down, and I could see all the islands of the 
Carribean stretching down beneath Florida--the Keys, the Dominican 
Republic, Cuba, Puerto Rico and many of-the others. The richness 
of those colors! The blues of the ocean were so deep and the greens 
of the shoals and shallow water so beautiful! Of all the colors, 
I myself felt red, white and blue allover .... I knew it was not 
going to be too easy to get back in .... We had quite a struggle 
with the hatch again ....... the lever was not catching; it was 
turning free and not ratcheting the hatch down at all ..•. Between 
the two of us, with a lot of pulling and tugging, we finally got the 
hatch closed. It was a perfect example of teamwork and epitomized 
to me the vital necessity of having two men in a soacecraft who 
can work literally as one •.. " (98: June 18, 1965). 
Life was not the only magazine that could claim it moved fast to 
produce the news for the public to read. Newsweek had planned to have 
golfer Jack Nicklaus on its cover for the June 21, 1965 issue but that 
was changed to a picture of White. Because of this capability for fast 
change, Newsweek's editors patted themselves on the back in the editorial 
column. It would not be the last time that Newsweek or a few other 
magazines made fast changes concerning U.S. space efforts. 
Shortly after the return from France, White wrote President Johnson 
a letter expressing his thanks for all that the President had done and 
White added something that he had not told Johnson while he had been in 
Washington. During the mission, White wrote, he carried a 1950 United 
Nations flag, which had belonged to White's father (an Air Force general 
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who had been with the U.N. peacekeeping forces) and had had it tucked 
into a leg pouch while he performed his EVA. "If you feel this flag might 
serve in some way to promote better world relations," suggested White. "I 
would be proud to have it used in this manner" (174). 
Johnson agreed and contacted the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Arthur 
Goldberg. Goldberg, in turn, made contact with White and the astronaut 
soon presented the flag to the United,Nations (83). 
This gesture was also a boon to the U.S. public image in front of 
the world. This would not the first time an astronaut had come forth with 
a suggestion that would help the public image of NASA and the United 
States. It may have seemed that the astronauts, taken as a group, did not 
care for the public relations activities, but there were some who had the 
their own ideas for helping and they took matters into their own hands at 
times, as did White on this occasion. 
Gemini was now running at near full speed. Two months after White 
and McDivitt had returned, Gemini 5 sat on the launching pad at Cape 
Kennedy. The flight, manned by Pete Conrad and Gordon Cooper, would last 
eight days, again, to study the effects of long flights upon the men 
and the machines with secondary objectives of testing the rendezvous radar 
(although there was no target vehicle with which to rendezvous, only a 
transponder) and checking the performance of new fuel cells in addition 
to 17 other experiments. But there was none of the grandeur of Gemini 4, 
just a long space flight. Later, Mike Collins would refer to Gemini 5 as 
a "ho-hum dull kind of flight and even Conrad's customary ebullience was 
muted" (24: p149; 57: p210). 
In June, 1965, an article appeared in that month's issue of Ebony, 
a publication which aims primarily at the black population of the United 
States. The writer discusses the fate of USAF Captain Edward J. Dwight, 
a black test pilot who had not been selected by NASA to be an astronaut. 
Dwight had been among a group of eight Air Force officers who had been 
recofl1llended to NASA "without qualification" for duty in the astronaut 
corps. Of the eight men, only Dave Scott and Ted Freeman had made the 
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entry into NASA's Houston complex for work (Freeman, of course, died a 
year after the selection had been made). Ebony called NASA to obtain more 
information about Dwight's rejection. But the NASA PIa could tell the 
writer only that the PIa was not at liberty to discuss the details of 
individuals who had not been accepted by NASA as astronauts. The final 
comment in Ebony's article was that NASA and the Air Force were 
discriminating against Captain Dwight. (.36: June, 1965). 
This mayor may not have been true. Ebony did point out that only 
two of the eight men who had been recommended "without qua1ification" had 
been accepted by NASA, which does not have to take every pilot recommended 
by military or civilian sources. NASA has its own procedures for picking 
astronauts. NASA did not say that Captain Dwight was not a good pilot; no 
doubt he was because he belonged to the Air Force flight test school, a 
unit that no simple pilot can just wander into and join. Another point of 
contention with Ebony by this author is why did the writer decide to wait 
until more than one and a half years after the official announcement of 
the group of astronauts for which Dwight had been considered before griping 
about the selection process? This article would have been better if it had 
been run shortly after the announcement of this group of astronauts (the 
third group) which was made in October, 1963. 
It is true that NASA was and still is a very image-conscious 
organization and Dwight's rejection might have been based upon the color 
of his skin. Yet at the same time, one must look at what happened between 
NASA and the town of Huntsville, Alabama. When NASA started building its 
facilities there to test and construct its large rockets, it laid down 
very clear terms that it would not consider even beginning to move into the 
area unless the surrounding region agreed to abandon its discrimination 
against blacks. Huntsville residents agreed and NASA finished its 
rocket-building base, establishing one of the first fully integrated 
communities in Alabama, a state known for its reluctance to drop 
segregation as was its governor, George C. Wallace. 
The case about Captain Dwight was never brought up again in the 
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press as far as this author has determined. It is reasonable to believe 
that there was no discrimination against the Captain unless further facts 
are found and brought into the public light. 1 
About ten days before the launch of Gemini 5 was to take place, the 
press reported that there was disharmony at the Cape surrounding the 
mission. The rumors included statements that Cooper and Conrad were 
fighting about various things. Even~u~lly Cooper set things straight in 
Life but not until after the mission was complete. Cooper wrote in that 
article, 
... some imaginative reporter had put out the story that Pete 
Conrad and I were feuding. One of us •.• supposed1y had taken a poke 
at the other and the story was that bad blood was flowing allover 
Cape Kennedy.... Possibly some guy was hard up for a story and 
started thinking about our different backgrounds. Pete's an Ivy 
Leaguer from the East, I'm from Shawnee, Oklahoma .... He's Navy, 
I'm Air Force •..• Some guy must have thought all this out and 
figured a punch in the nose was bound to happen and gone ahead to 
writing about it without checking to see if it really had. I'm here 
to state flat out that it had not (98: September 24, 1965). 
In the meantime, Julian Scheer seems to have had a change of mind 
about handling some of the publicity that would occur after the astronauts 
were to return from space. On August 13, 1965, he sent another memo to 
the White House, spelling out his thoughts. In it he mentioned that there 
was no way that any activities could happen until 11 days had passed from 
the recovery, as the astronauts would be in debriefings all of that time 
and would not have time to see even their wives. But Scheer now has 
different thoughts about limiting the appearances of the astronauts. In 
the memo he wrote: 
It appears that post-flight interest in astronaut appearances 
will continue to be high and we plan to continue to touch base on 
the major engagements, i.e., requests from large cities (139) 
When the personnel at the Cape first attempted to launch Gemini 5, 
CBS covered the event live for seven hours, only to watch the mission end 
ISee p219 for Mike Collins' comments upon the selection process. 
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in a cancellation. No doubt this cost CBS heavily as it not only lost 
money on this type of long coverage but it would also have to cover the 
next try as well, with no idea of how many attempts would be made. But the 
next attempt was successful and, on August 21, 1965, Cooper and Conrad 
were launched into orbit atop their Gemini-Titan vehicle. For more than a 
week they would remain in space. Conrad carried with him a momento from 
another astronaut--Ted Freeman's wedding ring. He had taken it with him 
to give back to Freeman's widow, Faith, upon his return since Freeman had 
never had the chance to fly above the earth's atmosphere. In the future, 
other astronauts would also carry items into space for their comrades who 
had fallen in the line of their explorations (8: p90; 98: September 24, 
1965). 
The flight encountered some minor difficulties in the power systems 
but, other than that, it went smoothly. When the astronauts came down on 
August 29, they were brought aboard the aircraft carrier Lake Champlain. 
Among those who received them was a representative from the International 
Aeronautical Federation (IAF) who asked to see certain dollar bills which 
had been carried aboard Gemini 5 during the flight. His purpose in 
asking was to verify, by checking the serial numbers, that they were the 
same ones which had been placed in the spacecraft before launch, i.e., 
in reality, to insure that Gemini 5 was indeed the same spacecraft that 
had left Cape Kennedy eight days before. The checking seems superfluous 
because the flight had been watched by the world but the IAF considered 
this to be standard procedure for recording any attempts at setting records, 
whether watched by all of humanity or ~ot. Conrad wondered what would have 
happened if he and Cooper had substituted "a couple of Confederate bucks 
for the others." Conrad possibly did not know, but the answer would have 
been that nothing would have happened--Confederate dollars were just what 
Shepard had carried with him on his flight years before for his proof to 
the IAF (61: p139). 
The flight of Gemini 5, like Gemini 4, was just the beginning of the 
travels of its crew. Whereas White and McDivitt went to France, Cooper and 
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Conrad were going to more countries and the plans being laid for that 
trip were beyond the control of the astronauts. It was during their 
flight that the Chief of Protocol for the State Department, Lloyd N. 
Hand, visited with President Johnson and talked about sending the 
astronauts to various countries on a goodwill tour, which would be the 
first such tour made by any of the astronauts. On September 1, 1965, 
Hand sent Johnson a reminder. 
You will recall that I spoke to you last week about the 
possibility of some of the astronauts travelling to certain selected 
countries around the world. The purpose of this trip is to 
demonstrate the United States' willingness to share its knowledge 
about space technology and to allow our astronauts to demonstrate 
our peaceful intentions in the exploration of space. This 
conversation was prior to your announcement Sunday as to the 
possibility of some of the astronauts being available for foreign 
travel .... 
Selected embassies around the world have given overwhelming 
support to the proposal (65). 
With Hand's memo were statements made by several ambassadors of the 
United States stationed in various countries. They included remarks 
such as: 
Believe visit would not only be valuable and highly successful 
public relations venture but would provide unparalleled means 
allow government of Nigeria gain credit their participation space 
scientific program I-sic /. 
Interest hi~h and ~eneral attitude admiration for outstanding 
accomplishment L Mexico-1. 
Embassy believes Her Majesty would welcome visit to London by 
astronauts Cooper and Conrad. 
Japanese people are demonstrably space conscious, and media has 
given heavy play to Gemini V feat. Visit might also take some edge 
off scheduled visitation to Japan of Soviet cosmonauts Nikolayev and 
Tereshkova who scheduled arrive in October as guests of Japanese 
Socialist Party on occasion latter's 20th anniversary I-sic /. 
Believe that in view major NASA interests in Spain visit would 
be most beneficial in creating atmosphere favorable both to 
resolution current technical metters relating NASA activities here 
and to long range Spanish-US relationship /-sic-;. 
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Johnson agreed to the visits, writing that the astronauts should 
not be accompanied by high-government officials, only their wives and 
necessary aides. He also wanted the astronauts to be prepared to help 
with scientific lectures and to "provide public demonstrations of space 
equipment~ techniques, etc., in countries approved by the State 
Department and NASA" (65). 
When the astronauts of Gemini 5 finished their debriefings on 
September 11, they received a phone call from President Johnson. It was 
not a totally spontaneous thought on the part of the President. Julian 
Scheer had been at work again and had made suggestions to the President as 
to what he could say to the astronauts. Scheerls script follows: 
This is President Johnson speaking. 11m glad to learn that 
your eleven days of intensive debriefing are over, and that so much 
valuable scientific information is being gained from the study of 
your record breaking flight, and I am happy you are back home with 
your families today ...• 
I have stated ... that those who venture into space go as envoys 
of the entire human race. 
r therefore believe that, perhaps, the most important mission 
you can perform now is that of sharing your findings in space with 
the people of the world. 
Accordingly, I am making arrangements now for you to visit a 
number of countries--many of which have cooperated with us in the 
Gemini tracking and data acquisition networks that monitored your 
mission--to give them a firsthand account of our manned space flight 
program. You have been invited to the International Aeronautical 
Federation meeting in Athens and the nations of Turkey, Ethiopia, 
Malagasy, Kenya and Nigeria have invited you to visit them. 
We are looking forward to having a chat with all of you, and 
weIll be giving you further details of your itinerary at that 
time (139). 
No one recorded the impressions of astronauts Cooper and Conrad as 
to what they thought of this. By now, all of the astronauts may have 
had the impression that whatever they did in space would be followed by a 
visit to other countries, and they were not far from being right. 
Although some people may have been enthusiastic about sending the 
nationls astronauts across the world to spread the knowledge about the 
U.S. space program, the man who headed NASA was not impressed with doing 
this. Jim Webb did not care for the tours because there were people in 
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the government who were attempting to stick his administration with the 
bills for these trips. He said in an interview in late 1976 that if the 
State Department and the U.S. Information Agency had wanted to send the 
astronauts to various places, then those two agencies should have footed 
the costs for such trips. IINASA needed its money for missions and 
rockets," said Webb. IINot for sending out astronauts to other nations. 
I paid but I was reluctant when I did .• NASA didn1t depend upon those 
tours, or any others, to sell NASA. We depended upon the success of our 
mi ss ions to support our cause" (170). ' 
This author, while agreeing with Webb that if the other governmental 
agencies wanted to send the astronauts abroad, then they should have paid 
the bills for such trips, questions Webb1s statement on the value of any 
tours, expecially those within the confines of the U.S. The success of 
the missions was definitely a selling point but so was the exposure of 
the astronauts to the public because of the heroes into which they had been 
made. Keeping the astronauts under wraps forever would more than likely 
have hurt the popularity of NASA, especially during those early years when 
space travel was still a novelty that only a small number of individuals 
could enjoy. 
The funding for the trip of the Gemini 5 astronauts was worked out 
and they flew to Athens, their first stop, where they also flew into a 
peck of trouble which gave the PAO a black eye, according to the editor 
of t1issiles and Rockets (112, October 4, 1965). 
It had started innocently enough. At the same meeting of the IAF 
were two Russian cosmonauts, Leonov and Belyayev. Jules Bergman of ABC 
decided it would be nice for the cosmonauts and the astronauts to meet. 
After all, it seemed natural. ABC checked with the Russian delegation 
about arranging such a meeting and the American journalists received a 
IIda. 1I Then ABC hauled in its equipment from across the Atlantic after 
receiving what it thought was a go-ahead from NASA in Washington. Bergman 
arranged to have most of the Russians, including the cosmonauts and the 
Soviet scientist who headed the delegation, Leonid Sedov {who had once 
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been hustled by a Time reporter in a blue Cadillac from Providence, Rhode 
Island to New York City) at the Galaxy Bar high atop the Athens Hilton. 
It was there they were supposed to meet the astronauts. In addition to the 
Russians were other scientists, camera operators and the Chairman of the 
U.S. House Space Committee, Congressman George Miller. But the astronauts 
never showed up. Everyone waited and waited. Finally Bergman called 
Julian Scheer, the PIO for the trip, to find out what was happening 
(112: October 4, 1965; 98: October 1, 1965). 
Scheer replied that the astronauts were not coming since no one had 
cleared the meeting with him. It turned out that the astronauts were 
actually doing nothing at the time of the meeting. They could have 
attended but Scheer had kept them from it. Later that day, the head 
PAD told the media, "Today we learned for the first time an American 
network was seeking to arrange an exclusive interview. We do not grant 
exclusive interviews but we conduct our business openly and before all 
news media" (112: October 4, 1965; 98: October 1, 1965). 
Bergman protested and told Scheer that he had talked to Brian Duff 
of the PAD at NASA Headquarters in Washington, from whom Bergman had 
received permission. Scheer pointed to a man nearby and asked Bergman, 
"00 you know who that man is?" Bergman said he did not. Then Scheer 
introduced the ABC reporter to Brian Duff. According to Scheer, Bergman's 
face fell upon hearing the introduction (137). 
Scheer also stated that Bergman had made his move without any 
consideration to the U.S. State Department or to the United States. This 
was possibly another reason for Scheer deciding to keep the astronauts 
away from the Galaxy Bar. (137). 
The incident atop the Hilton (or the lack of an incident) was the 
first of three episodes that occurred between the media and the PAD in 
Greece. Concerning the Galaxy Bar incident, Scheer's actions seem~ 
justified. ABC was the only news organization at the bar that day and, 
from what all reports have shown, it must have looked like an exclusive 
interview; moreso because Bergman had arranged it all. In fact, he might 
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have been calling for Scheer to play his hand, hoping for a bluff and 
it backfired on Bergman, with residual fallout on Scheer who had the 
courage to stand up to such tactics. 
The second incident, which seemed to be a mistake on the part of 
NASA, occurred when the Russians were presenting their papers to the 
conference. At the same time, the astronauts were holding a press 
conference, thus splitting the attention of the media. Later, when the 
Russians realized that their press conference would conflict with the 
presentation of the astronauts· papers~ they cut their conference short 
so as not to interfere. If the timing of the astronauts· press conference 
was Scheer·s fault is not known but it seems that it might have been 
the responsibility of the people who had arranged the entire schedule 
for that meeting of the IAF. Since the Russian press conference was 
scheduled in a manner similar to the astronauts· press conference, it 
would seem that this is a good possibility. 
In order to help rectify the first mishap which occurred at the 
Galaxy Bar, Scheer found himself thrust into the position of trying to 
get the astronauts and the cosmonauts together. He called the President 
of the IAF, Dr. William Pickering, but Pickering could offer no help. 
It was now up to the spacemen to patch things together. 
Cooper made the first move. At the session that was held especially 
for the royal families of Greece and Denmark, Cooper virtually committed 
diplomatic murder by directing his opening comments not at the royalty 
in front of him but at the entire audience, asking everyone to give 
cosmononaut Belyayev (who was present without Leonov) a round of applause. 
After he finished his speech, Cooper, followed by Conrad, vaulted from 
the stage and waded through the crowds straight for Belyayev. While the 
royal families retreated to an outer area to greet the spacemen, the 
reporters and tourists crushed around the Russians and the Americans, 
causing absolute pandemonium. The spacemen, pressed together because of 
the crowd, traded flight pins that had been given to them by their 
flight agencies. Then they tried to move into the outer area to meet the 
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royalty but the closeness of the crowd knocked over the people, tables 
and lamps as the queen bees and their attendants moved en masse through 
the Hilton. Speaking of Queens, Queen Mother Frederika was nearly knocked 
on her back by the crowd. The meeting with the royalty was short, but 
for the first time at the IAF meeting, the Russians and the Americans 
had met (98: October 1, 1965). 
That night at the dinner, Cooper,invited Belyayev and Leonov to 
have breakfast with the Americans the next morning, which they accepted. 
When morning came, the Russians, who were supposed to appear at 9:00, did 
not. Anxiety gripped the Americans as they paced the floor: were the 
Russians making a repayment for the Galaxy Bar incident? No. Leonov and 
Belyayev arrived a few minutes late and sat down with the astronauts for 
breakfast on a balcony overlooking the Acropolis. All of this was nice 
except for one thing--they were not alone. In stepped Jim Hicks, who was 
a reporter. That would have been innocent enough if he had been a pool 
representative since he was the only reporter there, i.e., in a 
very exclusive position. But Hicks belonged to the archnemesis of the 
press--Life magazine. Life carried details of the breakfast whereas no 
other magazine had such a story available to them. Missiles and Rockets' 
editor, William J. Coughlin, accused Scheer of giving Life an exclusive 
only two days after saying that NASA did not grant anyone exclusive 
interviews (98: October 1, 1965; 112: October 4, 1965). 
Scheer spoke to this author years later about why he allowed the 
reporter from Life inside the hotel room that morning. 
Life demanded an interview and I said that an interview would 
be done for the entire press. This was not to be a personal 
story. I met the astronauts and the cosmonauts who were also 
joine~ by Chuck Berry L-the NASA physician assigned to the astronaut 
corps~, Deke Slayton and an interpreter. Later I briefed the 
press about the breakfast and Life got nasty about it (137). 
Maybe Hicks used the material obtained from Scheer's briefing for 
his story about the breakfast but according to William Coughlin, Hicks was 
in the hotel room with the spacemen when they ate their breakfast that 
morning. If Hicks was in there, it was a serious mistake on the part of 
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the NASA PAD. If the Life reporter was not in the room, then William 
Coughlin erred in writing his editorial entitled, liThe Ugly American. 1l1 
The third event of the Athens affair came after the astronauts had 
actually left Athens and were on their way to the city of Thessoloniki for 
a meeting there. During the short flight, Pete Conrad beckoned Jules 
Bergman, who was accompanying the men, to come to the compartment in which 
he and Cooper were sitting (13). 
Bergman writes about what happened then in a letter to the author: 
What happened is that I bent over to chat with Conrad who was 
at a window seat. As I did so, Scheer, at the opposite aisle seat, 
declared nastily, lIyou can't come back here ... 11 and, before Conrad 
or I could explain, he got up and lunged at me. He missed, I 
retreated a foot or so in surprise and Bill Coughlin and a few others 
grabbed him to restrain him. It was certainly embarrassing to all 
there (13). 
In an interview with the author, Scheer gave his impression about 
what had happened during that flight. 
On the flight to Thessoloniki, Jules was abrasive and loud when 
he was in the compartment with us. We were trying to write our 
speeches and he was making it hard to concentrate. There was 
sort of a swinging door at the front of the compartment and he was 
standing near it. Jules kept talking, making things difficult for 
us and I said something to him like, IIJesus Christ, Jules, leave us 
alone,1I and I explained to him about the speeches we were working on. 
He persisted in talking loud so I got up and shoved him through 
the door. I guess that was something I should have thought about 
and maybe shouldn't have done. William Coughlin later wrote an 
editorial about it ... with some nasty comments (137). 
As Coughlin described it to the readers of Missiles and Rockets, 
Scheer had IIslammed him '-Bergman' bodily out of the compartment to 
the embarrassment of all present II which included newsmen of both Greece 
and the United States (112: October 4, 1965). 
After leaving Greece, the rest of the tour proceeded without 
incident. However, when the entourage returned to the United States, 
not much news was made of the troubles between the media and the PAD 
in Greece. Greg Robinson, the Army Assistant to the President's Armed 
Forces Aide, sent a report to the White House upon the trip. 
1However, Bergman also writes that IILife was indeed invited ll to the 
breakfast and that II none of the other media were there ll (13). 
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The visit of the astronauts to Greece, Turkey, the four African 
countries and the Canary Islands was highly successful from a public 
relations viewpoint. The astronauts were well received by the 
public and official governments in all places with the exception of 
Turkey where the public response was lukewarm. The enthusiasm of the 
African countries was particularly noteworthy. 
The highlights of the trip were: 
1. The enthusiastic reception by the people of Thessoloniki, 
Greece which exceeded the enthusiastic welcomes received in Africa. 
2. The audience with His RQya1 Majesty, Emperor Haile Se1assie 
of Ethiopia. The Emperor was mo~t cordial and chatted with the 
astronauts for better than one hour. 
3. The visit with President Kenyetta at Keekorok Lodge, Kenya. 
The President was kind enough to take us on a guided tour of the 
game preserve and show us IIhisll lions. 
4. The visit with the Emir in Kano, Nigeria. The Emir 
presented a spectacular show of approximately 300 regally-attired 
guards mounted on horses and camels. 
5. The warm and friendly crowds thoughout Africa. 
During the trip we learned some lessons which will apply to any 
succeeding trip. Sufficient time should be allotted prior to 
commencing the trip to allow receipt of and approval of planned 
programs at each location, the respective roles of NASA and the State 
Department should be clearly defined and clear instructions should 
be issued to all countries to be visited reference participation 
of party members. This will prevent friction between NASA and State, 
will assure that the astronauts have at least one rest period each 
day, and will result in programmed participation of all party 
members •... 
Hugh Robinson (130) 
When Scheer returned, the news of the Greek incidents had preceded 
him and Haney sent his boss a note, asking, IIHow were things in Greece?" 
Scheer did not have to wait long for a reason to fire back a joke 
in Haney's direction. The next day, Haney and Chris Kraft found themselves 
on the first plane that was ever hijacked from the U.S. to Cuba. When 
Haney finally arrived at his intended destination, a few hours later than 
he had planned, he found a message waiting for him: IIGreece was fun. Had 
any interesting flights lately?" (66). 
Scheer had more important things to worry about though; Gemini 6 
was just over the horizon. On October 19, he sent Presidential Press 
Aide Bill Moyers a note that may have been typical for all missions. 
Just a reminder that we launch Schirra-Stafford on October 25 
and recovery is October 27. We will open a line with you on launch 
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day, as usual, and Bill Lloyd will keep you informed. You might 
want to consider now if the President will want to talk to the 
astronauts on the ship, as usual, or to break the pattern this 
time. 
Scheer (139) 
On the launch day, the Gemini program suffered its first major 
setback. At Cape Kennedy, two missiles were set for launch: the Gemini 6 
was on top of its Titan II missile and a Gemini-Agena Target Vehicle (GATV) 
rested on the tip of an Atlas. The Agena was to be fired first and shortly 
thereafter the Gemini astronauts would be launched to rendezvous and dock 
with the Agena. However, a little more than six minutes after the Agena 
was blasted off the pad, all telemetry from it ceased, indicating that 
the spacecraft had failed. The countdown for the Gemini 6 crew continued 
until it was evident that the Agena spacecraft had disintegrated 540 
miles out from the Cape. With no target for Schirra and Stafford to 
chase, the NASA officials cancelled the second launch of the day (57: p216; 
98: November 5, 1965). 
Sadly, the two astronauts left their spacecraft and walked away from 
the gantry. Schirra called home and told his daughters to go to school 
while Stafford telephoned the editor of his hometown paper in Weatherford, 
Oklahoma, and thanked him for arranging a parade that was to have been 
held after the mission was completed. Schirra commented later, "Itls a 
little like show-biz with all those people watching. But welre not in 
show-biz and we couldnlt come out of that elevator with big, fake smiles 
on our faces .... They would be looking to see how we took it" (98: 
November 5, 1965). 
At NASA and McDonnell, some people were putting their brains to use 
and came up with a target for Gemini 6 after all--Gemini 7. On October 
28, 1965, Bill Moyers announced that Gemini 6 would be removed from the 
launch pad and Gemini 7 would be erected in its place to be launched 
first. If there was no more than the usual damage to the pad after 
Gemini 7 left earth, then Gemini 6 could be launched in a matter of days 
without having to go through the elaborate check-out procedures since 
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they had already been accomplished (57: p217). 
A month and a half passed and Gemini 7 was ready. On December 4, 
1965, astronauts Frank Borman and Jim Lovell boarded their spacecraft in 
the morning and were launched that afternoon. Their mission was to fly in 
space for fourteen days during which to study the long term effects upon the 
men and the equipment which put them there. They wore lightweight suits 
which they could remove to be in thei~ ,long underwear but for most of 
the mission NASA ordered the crew to have at least one of them wear his 
spacesuit in case of an emergency. By the twelfth day, NASA finally 
allowed both men to remove their suits simultaneously. NASA also changed 
the sleeping habits of the astronauts. On previous missions, one astronaut 
had to remain awake while the other slept, which was unsettling for those 
who tried to sleep. Even if the "sleepers" turned down their volume 
switches, they could still hear the conversations between the one astronaut 
who was awake and the ground controllers (during another mission, an 
astronaut had been asked by ground controllers to check some switches on 
his buddy's instrument panel and he was surprised to see his "sleeping" 
partner reaching forward to check the switches himself). On Gemini 7, 
all of this changed. Borman and Lovell were allowed to sleep at the same 
time. Mike Collins said that NASA informed the public that the astronauts 
were going through "simultaneous sleep periods" because the officials did 
not want to tell the public that "the astronauts are sleeping together" 
(57: p224; 24: p 
On December 12, Gemini 6 (technically labelled as Gemini 6A by 
NASA) sat on the pad with Schirra and Stafford in the spacecraft once 
more. 1 The engines ignited at 9:54 a.m. and shut off a few seconds later 
with clouds of exhaust boiling around the launch area. The Titan had not 
moved off the pad and Schirra made a wise decision. Not knowing exactly 
what had happened, he held onto the ejection ring between his knees'and 
elected not to pull it (if he had, he and Stafford would have been ejected 
lAs the astronauts rested in the spacecraft, NASA was being blasted 
by fundamentalist radio preachers for attempting a launch on a Sunday. 
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from the spacecraft and the mission probably would have ended then and 
there).l As it was, the Titan was undamaged by the premature shutdown of 
its engines; an electrical plug had dropped out of the tail of the missile 
earlier than planned. But even if the plug had held, the engines would 
have quit anyway because NASA announced on December 13 that a plastic dust 
cover, installed in the factory, had not been removed due to human error 
and it would have blocked a fuel line (57: p226; 24: p164). 
Finally~ the third attempt to place Gemini 6 in space worked and, 
on December 15, the Schirra-Stafford team left Cape Kennedy in a manner 
that most astronauts would prefer to leave. Gemini 6 was not going into 
orbit for any long distance or time records. Schirra wanted to get into 
space, rendezvous with Borman and Lovell and get back down as soon as 
possible. Scientists were not pleased by this. They wanted the astronauts 
of Gemini 6 to perform some experiments and Stafford wished to take a walk 
outside of the spacecraft, "but Wally just laughed," writes Michael 
Collins. "He wanted simplicity, brevity and success. He had the world's 
greatest human computer, Tom Stafford, to analyze the rendezvous problem 
and once that was over, Wally was going to ... come home and have a 
cigarette" (57: p227; 24: p161). 
Only a few hours after launch, Schirra and Stafford caught up with 
Borman and Lovell, who were flying as a passive target in Gemini 7 as 
they needed to conserve their fuel for their longer flight. With 
Gemini 7 "stationary" in relation to the maneuvers of Gemini 6 (even 
though both spacecraft were flying in excess of 17,000 mph), Schirra and 
Stafford brought their spacecraft to as close as one foot and as far away 
as 300 feet from Gemini 7 while taking pictures and having pictures taken 
of them. There was a lot of chit-chat, as a person might expect with 
the gregarious Schirra amongst the company up there. "There seems to be 
a lot of traffic up here!" Schirra told the ground controllers in Hawaii 
(118: April, 1966). 
Borman replied, "Call a policeman." Schirra remarked that he could 
see the 11-day-old beards of Lovell and Borman through the windows. Then 
lOuring a test of the ejection seats, Grissom and Young had watched 
a seat fired from the spacecraft sitting on the test stand but the hatch 
did not open. Nevertheless, the seat shot through it. As Young commented 
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Schirra held up his own little message to Borman from the all-Navy crew 
of Gemini 6--in the window of his spacecraft Schirra placed a sign 
referring to Borman's alma mater: "BEAT ARMY." While Schirra had flown 
the spacecraft into position for the rendezvous, his partner, Stafford, 
had been so busy working with the spacecraft's brain as well as his own 
that he had managed to look out the windows for no more than 15 minutes 
during the first six hours of flight. ,. But, during the rendezvous, it was 
Stafford who did most of the sightseeing as he photographed Gemini 61 s 
viewpoint while Schirra piloted the four-ton spacecraft around Gemini 7 
(118: April, 1966). 
For three and a half orbits, the spacecraft flew together, while on 
the ground, tiny U.S. flags popped up on the consoles of the controllers 
at MSC and cigars were lit by the people gathered in the control room--a 
typical procedure for any success in NASA. When the two teams of 
astronauts separated, Schirra went into an orbital flight that differed 
from that of Gemini 7 and he and Stafford stayed in space for another day 
(57: p229; 118: April, 1966). 
Schirra and Stafford slept after they had left Borman and 
Lovell and, when they woke the n~xt morning, they startled the ground 
controllers with the statement that they were watching a UFO which was 
also orbiting the earth. "This is Gemini 6," called Schirra over the 
radio. "We have an object, looks like a satellite going from north to 
south, up in a polar orbit. He's in a very low trajectory, looks like he 
may be going to reentry pretty soon. Standby ... looks as if he's trying 
to signal us." The controllers had no idea of what was happening until 
they heard the sounds of bells and a harmonica playing "Jingle Bells." 
The affable Schirra had struck again (61: p152). 
Gemini 6 landed on December 16, seven miles from the assigned 
landing point, which was not as accurate as Schirra's previous landing 
during the Mercury program. While Schirra and Stafford were brought 
aboard the aircraft carrier Wasp in the West Atlantic, Borman and Lovell 
were encountering t~oubles with their fuel cells. The crew of Gemini 7 
later, such a mistake on the launch pad could cause "a helluva headache" 
for an astronaut but he added that the headache would not last long, though. 
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asked the controllers for a private conversation and instead of releasing 
an exact transcript of what had been said, Paul Haney and Kraft later 
paraphrased the conversation for the media's benefit. Kraft was also 
busy talking to the crew, trying to get them to stay in space for another 
two days as Borman and Lovell were thinking about coming down early 
because of the hassles with the power systems (57: p226; 93). 
When Borman and Lovell finally arrived on the deck of the Wasp to 
join Schirra and Stafford on December 18, they had flown in space for more 
than 280 hours and they were none the worse for it. In fact, when they 
left the helicopter, they walked across the flight deck of the ship without 
any ill effect and appeared to be in better shape than had been Cooper and 
Conrad whose flight had gone for only eight days (24: pp164-165).1 
The missions of Geminis 6 and 7, dubbed liThe Flight of 176" by NASA 
employees, marked the awareness of a NASA procedure by the media. Ground 
controllers, when knowing that the media wanted to listen in on the 
air-to-ground transmissions "1ive," would inform the astronauts via a 
code so the astronauts could say pleasantries during that particular 
pass over the United States. The code, referred to as IHF-6" by 
controllers, was thrown in with a bunch of other data transmitted to the 
astronauts when they were approaching the American continent. Usually the 
reporters who scanned the transcripts would be none the wiser, thinking 
that IHF-6" was some technical information being used by the crew and 
the controllers. Thus, upon hearing IHF-6," the astronauts, said Paul 
Haney, "would say Bicentennial kinds of things, like, IGee, those 
orange trees in California sure look fine today, 1 and other things like 
that" (66; 93; 104; 129). 
The press had found out about the code during one of the flight 
controllers 1 shift press conferences of the 11176" mission when Gene 
Kranz, who was in charge of one of the teams of flight controllers, told 
a reporter, who had asked him about the meaning of HF-6, what the code 
lA person must keep in mind that either eight or twelve days in 
space, which may not sound like much, is not all that comfortable 
in a spacecraft that has about the same volume as a telephone booth. 
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meant. NASA had not used the code in a sinister manner, according to 
John McLeaish (head of the Houston PIO in 1976), but only as a way to tip 
off the astronauts that they were "live" at certain times. The knowledge 
of the use of IHF-6" did not arouse the media much nor did it cause the 
code to never be used again (104). 
Whereas all of the flights of Gemini and Mercury had gone well 
without any real difficulties in space.(barring the loose heatshield of 
Glenn's Friendship 7), Gemini 8 would change all of that as well as the 
method by which NASA reported the progress of the flights to the media. 
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GEMINI 8: A LESSON IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
Before Gemini 8 was launched, disaster struck NASA again. On 
February 28, 1966, in fog and rain, Gemini 9's prime crew, Elliott See 
and Charles Bassett, and their backup crew, Tom Stafford and Eugene 
Cernan, were enroute to St. Louis for two week's training in the simulators 
at the McDonnell complex. Because of the weather, the crews, each in 
their two-place T-38 trainers, were for.ced to make instrument landings. 
Bassett and See were the first to make the approach and they dropped 
towards the runway. On the way in, they hit the roof of the McDonnell 
plant 1000 feet from the runway, bounced into a courtyard of the 
complex and the T-38 exploded, injuring several McDonnell employees and 
killing the astronauts. Minutes after the accident, Stafford and Cernan 
landed safely. NASA later announced that the backup crew would then 
assume command of the mission and fly it on schedule. Alan Shepard was 
apPointed to head an investigating team to look into the cause of the 
crash (57: p234). 
Sixteen days after See and Bassett died, Gemini 8 blasted off from 
Cape Kennedy following a GATV. The primary objectives for the mission 
were for the astronauts, Neil Armstrong and Dave Scott, to dock with 
the Agena and to perform some extravehicular activities. About six and a 
half hours after Armstrong and Scott were launched, they successfully 
docked with the GATV. Twenty-seven minutes after docking, a thruster 
at the rear end of the Gemini spacecraft malfunctioned, causing the two 
mated vehicles to tumble wildly out of control. Armstrong backed off 
from the Agena. He thought the target vehicle was at fault but the 
Gemini continued to tumble, its thruster stuck in an open position (57: 
p235). 
With the spacecraft revolving 300 degrees per second, Armstrong 
elected to shut off the Gemini's Orbit Attitude and Maneuver 
Systems (DAMS). Turning off the DAMS did not stop the movement though; 
Newton's Second Law of Motion states that once a body is in motion, it 
will continue to be in motion unless acted upon and since Gemini 8 was 
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already in motion in a frictionless environment, it continued to spin. 
Armstrong finally decided to use the attitude controls which were to be 
used only for positioning the spacecraft for reentry just before entering 
the earth's atmosphere. When he activated this system to stop the 
tumbling, he was also forced to end the mission for NASA rules dictated 
that once the reentry control system was put into operation, a mission 
would have to be terminated as quickly, as possible (57: p235). 
Armstrong stabilized the Gemini and assumed the correct reentry 
attitude. Gemini 8 landed after only seven orbits in the western 
Pacific. The astronauts had to wait for three hours before the U.S. 
destroyer Leonard Mason arrived to retrieve them and their spacecraft 
(57: p235). 
When they arrived at Okinawa, Armstrong and Scott were met by 
Wally Schirra and Dr. Duane Catterson, of NASA, who had flown there from 
Hawaii (Schirra had been at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel at Waikiki with 
Frank Borman and their wives. They had been on a goodwill trip throughout 
the Orient for President Johnson. During that time, about 30 days, 
Borman and Schirra were giving up to three speeches a day at different 
locations. After being in Hawaii for a short time on their way back 
to the U.S., Schirra and Borman had been informed about the situation 
involving Gemini 8 and, while Schirra headed to Okinawa, Borman took the 
wives home by commercial airplane). Later, they went to Oahu, Hawaii 
where Armstrong and Scott were checked by phsycians at Tripler Hospital 
and found to be in good shape (141). 
As if the trouble with the stuck thruster (which was not analyzed 
for days afterwards) was not enough for NASA to be concerned about, the 
PAO came under heavy fire from the media. Paul Haney had been ready to 
leave Mission Control that evening when the Agena-Gemini combination 
began to tumble. According to Louis Alexander, Haney broadcast a 
"cryptic announcement" to the media and continued to do so for the next 
30 minutes when the astronauts finally attained control of their 
spacecraft. The reporters demanded to hear the tapes of the air-to-ground 
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conversations. Julian Scheer, who had been at his home at the time of 
the thruster malfunction, received a call that lithe astronauts are 
dying, screaming in space. 1I With Scheer was George Miller, the Chairman 
of the House Space Committee, and Howard Simon, later to become the 
managing editor of the Washington Post but then a reporter closely tied 
to space. With Miller and Simon as witnesses, Scheer decided that the 
tapes should not be released to the media because he thought that the 
families of the astronauts might be listening to the radio or television 
and they should be spared from having to hear the voices of their 
husbands and fathers (66; 137; 88: Winter, 1966~.p727).1 
The initial response from Haney to the media was that the voices 
of the astronauts would, according to Alexander, "give the impression 
of an alann that was not justified by the events II (88: Winter, 1966, p727). 
While the media could not obtain the information they wanted out of 
NASA, i.e., the tapes, they went to another place for a "human" story--
the astronauts' wives. Mike Collins had just arrived at his home when 
his wife received a phone call asking for the Collins to look after 
Dave Scott's children until the astronaut5 were brought down. Collins 
called Mission Control to find out exactly what was happening (he had left 
MSC before the accident had occurred) and Mrs. Scott's father, General 
Ott, arrived with the children. Mrs. Collins and General Ott stayed with 
the children while Collins drove to the space complex to see what he could 
do. When the astronaut understood that everything was going to be okay, 
he returned home and he, his wife and General Ott decided that the 
Scott children should be returned to their home. Word arrived that Mrs. 
Armstrong was on her way to the Scott house too and so was the press. 
By the time the entourage from the Collins' house arrived, the front yard 
was lit with television lights and excited reporters stood on the lawn. 
Realizing that all of the activity was in the front yard, Collins ordered 
IWhY Simon did not file an exclusive story from his observations 
is not known but he might have held back because of the ethics around 
the situation, i.e., he could have made things difficult for Scheer to 
act if Scheer had known that Simon was going to file a story; this is 
only speculation though. 
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his small group in the back door to avoid a scene. Jan Armstrong arrived 
with NASA officials following closely behind. She went for the front 
door, wading through the reporters and the NASA officials kept the press 
at bay by saying that she wanted to talk to Mrs. Scott for a short while 
and would eventually talk to the reporters. Placated, the television 
crews turned off their lights and the correspondents huddled in the 
darkness, waiting for Mrs. Armstrong to reappear (24: pp183-184). 
After learning that their husbands were all right, the wives 
decided to call it a night and Mrs. Armstrong headed home. As soon as she 
reached the front door of the Scott house, the flashbulbs and strobes 
went off and the k1eig lights and tape recorders went on. Leaving her 
questioners behind, Mrs. Armstrong jumped in her car and left the 
confusing scene. She also left some hurt and angry reporters at the 
front of the Scott residence. Collins writes, "She hadn't even gotten in 
the 'thrilled, proud and pleased' which is the astronaut wife's standard" 
(24: pp183-184). 
The next afternoon at a press conference held by Haney and Mission 
Director William Schneider, the tapes were released to the media. Louis 
Alexander writes, "The voices of the two astronauts--carefu11y noted by 
the reporters--were so unusually calm that it excited among them 
admiration for the astronauts' professionalism" (88: Winter, 1966, p727). 
There were no cries for help, no screams of pain, not even a rise 
in Armstrong's tone of voice--he was the only astronaut talking with the 
ground controllers. Part of the transcript follows, showing only 
Amrstrong's words because those of the controllers would only tend to 
elongate and possibly confuse the issue. 
Well, we consider this problem serious, we're toppling end over 
end but we're disengaged from the Agena ••.• It's a roll or nothing, 
we can't turn anything off. Continuing ••. in a left roll •••• OK, 
we are regaining control of the spacecraft slowly in RCS direct •••• 
..• it was when we were in the 0-180-0 spacecraft configuration. 
Spacecraft BEF hooked into the Agena and we were stabilized there. 
We had the attitude power off in the spacecraft, OAMS attitude 
control power off (117: Transcript of the Gemini 8 mission). 
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After the tapes were played, Haney talked for a few minutes, as did 
Schneider, and then the press conference turned into a question and answer 
session. 
Haney: I'd like to say we appreciate your forebearance in release 
of the tapes. As we said last night, we believe that they would be 
released, now they have been released. The additional time is 
accountable in the fact that we included considerably more talk than 
just air-to-ground passes which we thought might be in your best 
interests .... I believe that's everything we have. 
Question: Paul, you indicated last night, I think, that one of the 
reasons for not releasing the tape was a high voice level. Now I 
didn't hear a high voice level on these tapes. What were you 
referring to? 
Haney: If I said high, it was erroneous. I said the voice level 
was, I meant to say, the voice level was important. You compare that 
with the heart rates. 
Question: Just to follow up. I didn't hear any indication in the 
voice level that would suggest that there was any strong emotion 
being displayed in the voice. Was that what you meant last night? 
Hane~: No, that is not what I meant, but if that is what you meant, 
that s perfectly all right with me. 
Schneider: I think we were quite pleased with the way that the crew 
behaved and I think you'll agree with me as that they behave quite 
phenomenally under the very trying situations and should be 
complimented. 
Still, some reporters were not totally sure that the tapes they had 
heard at the press conference had not been censored. 
Question: I have two questions if I may. First of all, could you 
tell us a little more accurately what portions were deleted, I 
think what I'm looking for is some reassurance that no sections 
pertinent to technical information were cut from the tapes that 
we've heard. 
Haney: That's the point I want to make. Absolutely nothing was 
deleted, in fact we went the other route and added the Flight 
Controllers' cross-talk between passes (117: Air-Ground Tape 
Briefing, Houston, Texas, March 17, 1966). 
Even though it had been primarily Haney's idea initially to withhold 
the tapes, it was Scheer who accepted the blame for Haney's actions. 
Ten years later, in an interview, Scheer said, 
We made a mistake in Gemini 8 by withholding those tapes and I 
took the responsibility for doing it. Keep in mind that the same 
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system that created this situation was also creating live television 
throughout all phases of the missions. But I had to be responsible 
for the actions of my people (137). 
A few people in the PAO in late 1976, when asked to recall what they 
thought was the low point in the history of that office, pointed to the 
withholding of the Gemini 8 voice tapes. These people included Jack Riley, 
John McLeaish and Terry White. Others at the space center in Houston, 
in retrospect, agreed with the PIOs .. Chris Kraft, who became the director 
of MSC in 1972, said, "We made a serious mistake in Gemini 8 by withholding 
the tapes." Dr. Gilruth expressed similar sentiments, saying, "Scheer 
withheld the tapes and we shouldn't have done that" (48; 93; 103; 129; 
175) . 
The NASA Public Affairs Office learned a lot from the experiences 
surrounding the tapes of Gemini 8. The people associated with the office 
admitted that they had erred but they also defended themselves in respect 
to some other areas regarding the events that followed the splashdown of 
Gemini 8. In Roundup, the MSC newsletter, PIO Terry White wrote about 
some of the reporters who had been covering the mission. 
While the Gemini VIII spacecraft and its crew were still 
aboard the USS Mason en route to Okinawa after a successful 
landing ... many self-styled space expert reporters had already pinned 
down the cause of Gemini VIII's problems to that convenient 
scapegoat, "pilot error." 
After failing to badger the mission director and Gemini project 
management in speculating on the causes of something that happened 
in space half-way around the world, our typewriter-flying space 
cadets concluded that indeed the Gemini VIII crew had sent the 
wrong command into the Agena's stored program and got thruster 
firing instead of a tape recorder start. As if Armstrong and 
Scott, with their hours of simulations and training, could not 
recite the digital command core numbers in their sleep. 
Tight deadlines and table-pounding editors notwithstanding, 
irresponsible speculation with incomplete information does credit 
to neither the space program or to journalistic integrity. Of 
course. there is always that small minority of reporters whose 
attitude is II Don't confuse me with the facts, my mi nd is made up. II 
As the Gemini VIII onboard recordin~s revealed when returned 
stateside, a short circuit caused a yaw/roll thruster to fire 
continuously. Moreover, commands sent to the Agena through the 
Gemini encoder were correct and in proper sequence. Pilot error 
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was positively ruled out by the findings of the Mission Evaluation 
Team, who within 72 hours after the problem arose, sifted out the 
reason for it. 
The majority of reporters from magazines, newspapers radio and 
television who cover the manned spaceflight program are competent, 
responsible people who do their homework and who understand that 
without sufficient data, it is unfair to expect management or 
operations people to comment prematurely on probably causes of 
mission problems. But then there is always that ten percent whose 
bias gets in the way of their accuracy (132: April 1, 1966). 
Obviously, there were some members of the public who thought that 
the media were unfairly accusing NASA of being wrong. When White wrote 
Haney, asking permission to run the aforementioned article, Haney not only 
approved but suggested that IIwe might also run a few letters we1ve 
received on press treatment of NASA people ll (68). 
In one part of the press, there was a small change in how the 
astronauts were being handled. The personal stories of the Gemini 8 
astronauts were of a different format than stories written by previous 
astronauts. In the April 8, 1966 issue of Life, the stories of Scott and 
Armstrong were not IIwritten ll or dictated by them in the first person sense. 
Nor were their stories separated as being written by Scott and written by 
Armstrong. It was one whole story speaking in the IIwe ll category sometimes 
and other times in the IItheyll aspect--both forms referring to the Gemini 
8 astronauts. Why Life did not use the "1" first person story-telling 
format is not known (98: April 8, 1966). 
Another aspect of Life, including Field, came up in April, 1966. 
That month, 19 new astronauts were selected and that brought the total 
number of astronauts to 54. This number cut the yearly payments from 
$14,857 to $11,555. The insurance still stood at $100,000 though. 
The nineteen were: Vance D. Brand, John S. Bull, Gerald P. Carr, Charles 
M. Duke, Jr., Joe H. Engle, Ronald E. Evans, Edward G. Givens, Fred 
Haise, Jr., James B. Irwin, Don L. Lind, Jack R. Lousma, Thomas Ken 
Mattingly, Bruce McCandless II, Edgar D. Mitchell, William R. Pogue, 
Stuart A. Roosa, John L. Swigert, Jr., Paul J. Weitz and Alfred M. Worden. 
Like the previous groups, the men came from a variety of backgrounds, 
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representing all of the military services and some civilians were also in 
the group. Again, no blacks or women were chosen. Mike Collins, who was 
a member of the selection board, writes in his book Carrying the Fire, 
The absence of blacks was a different matter Ifrom women, who 
would have necessitated a number of changes in suits, systems etc.-I. 
NASA should have had them, our group would have welcomed them and T 
don't know why none showed up. Perhaps there weren't any who had 
the flying-educational backgrounds required or perhaps they were 
more interested in other careers. I only know that no one was 
eliminated because of color (24: pI78). 
The new group of 19 astronauts, dubbed by John Young as the "Original 
Nineteen," in jest, were selected because they were qualified, not because 
they were needed for missions. Slayton had wanted the selection board 
to choose as many as they felt were fit to join the corps; he had set no 
Jimit. The members of the board were Young, Collins, C.C. Williams and 
Warren North, a civilian in NASA, felt that no more than six astronauts 
needed to be added but Slayton needed people to fill the lists of prime 
crews, support crews and backup crews for the many flights coming in the 
future. At that time, the feelings were that there would be many more 
space missions--Apollo moon landings and flights with an emphasis like the 
later Skylab. At that time, no end was in sight (24: ppI80-181). 
lIn June, 1965, NASA had selected six scientists to join the 
astronauts corps. Some say this was done to placate the nation's 
scientists who were complaining that NASA was doing nothing for science. 
The six were: Owen K. Garriott, Edward G. GiHson, Duane E. Graveline, 
Joseph P. Kerwin, Frank C. Michel and Harrison H. "Jack" Schmitt. 
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THE LAST OF GEMINI 
On May 17, 1966, astronauts Gene Cernan and Tom Stafford lay in the 
couches of Gemini 9 and waited for a GATV at another pad to be launched. 
The Agena-Atlas combination roared upwards until a short occurred in a 
servo control ~ircuit in the guidance systems and the space vehicle pitched 
over 216 degrees, pointing towards Cape Kennedy. Seven and a half minutes 
after launch, the Agena hit the Atlantic Ocean 90 miles from its launching 
pad. Stafford may have been wondering if he was having some sort of 
effect upon the Agenas since he had been on the crew of Gemini 6 too (57: 
p243) . 
The minds at NASA came up with another plan. They would not use an 
Agena as a target vehicle for Gemini 9, since one was not readily 
available but they would use a shortened version of one, which did not have 
a fuel tank, i.e., it would only be used for docking exercises and not for 
powering the Gemini to a higher orbit. Called the Augmented Target 
Docking Adapter (ATDA), the satellite was launched from Cape Kennedy on 
June 1, 1965. Gemini 9 was supposed to be launched that day too but there 
was a failure in some ground equipment and the Gemini 9 astronauts once 
more left their spacecraft (57: p243). 
Finally, on June 3, 1966, Cern an and Stafford were launched from 
Cape Kennedy and caught up with the ATDA in the third revolution around 
the earth. But a jinx held with the mission. Although the astronauts 
found the abbreviated Agena, the nose cone shroud had failed to separate 
because a tether had not let loose. The partially open nose cone halves 
prevented the Gemini from docking with the ATDA and the appearance of the 
ATDA caused Stafford to comment that it looked like an "angry alligator" 
(57: p243; 24: pISS). 
With the docking now out of the question, the crew turned to their 
secondary tasks. After two days of flight, Cern an opened his hatch and 
became the second American to step into space. His "walk" was not the 
same as White·s had been. Cernan was to move to the rear of the Gemini·s 
adapter section, where there was an equipment bay, and strap on a portable 
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astronaut maneuvering unit (AMU). The AMU had been placed in the bay 
because there was no room for it in the cabin. In the process of trying 
to put on the AMU, Cernan exerted himself so much that he fogged his 
faceplate. At that point, he and Stafford decided that there was no need 
for him to chance the remainder of the EVA in that condition so they called 
it off. What the second American space-walker had done was to illustrate 
to NASA officials and McDonnell's designers that proper handholds and 
footholds were necessary to move about in space effectively. Two hours 
after he had left the cabin, Cernan rejoined Stafford inside the Gemini. 
The next day, after some more experiments and another sleep period, Stafford 
and Cernan fired their retro-rockets and returned to earth, landing only one 
mile from their intended splashdown point (57:p246~ 24: pI88). 
Life came out with an article on the mission in its June 17, 1966 
issue but, for the first time time, Life did not publish a personal story 
~
by the astronauts. A person might think that by this time, Life was tiring 
of stories of astronauts and space. That may well have been the case. A 
look at the June 24, 1966 issue will show some dramatic news that grabbed 
the nation's attention. Over the skies of California, the experimental 
bomber, the XB-70, had been flying in formation with a number of smaller 
jets. The purpose of the flight was to position a number of planes, 
which had in them engines manufactured by General Electric, together for a 
family portrait for the company. As they flew, an F-I04 interceptor took 
its position near the large, twin tails of the bomber. There, the smaller 
place was caught in the invisible, swirling vortexes of air behind the huge 
bomber. Out of control, the F~104 flipped upside down, tore off one of the 
tails of the bomber and seriously damaged the other. The pilot of the F~104 
was killed outright while those in the X8-70 fought for the control of their 
crippled aircraft. The big plane sank from the skies and the co-pilot 
ejected safely after some initial trouble due to the gravitational forces of 
the wildly spinning airplace. The pilot never made it out and was killed 
when the plane, like an ancient pterodactyl. slammed into the ground miles 
below (98: June 24, 1966), 
With no successful docking in space to its credtt yet, NASA 
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officials were crossing their fingers as only three more missions were 
left in the plans. On July 18, 1966, Gemini 10 left the Cape with 
astronauts John Young and Mike Collins to take up where the other flights 
had fallen short. Presumably, this time Young left his sandwiches home 
on earth. At about five hours into the flight, Young and Collins caught 
the Agena and docked with it. With that accomplished, they could then use 
the big engine of the Agena to boost them where they wanted to go without 
having to use anymore fuel from the Gemini IS tanks, which were low at that 
time because of some excess maneuvering required to approach the Agena. 
By using the power of the Agena, the astronauts pushed themselves to an 
altitude of 475 miles giving them the record lion a platter," as Collins 
wrote later, for having flown the farthest from earth. It was at that 
altitude that Young and Collins found another Agena, the one that had been 
used during Gemini 8 (the Agena of Gemini 8 had not been at that altitude 
when Armstrong and Scott had docked with it. After those astronauts had 
landed, ground controllers had pushed the Agena to that height and "parked" 
it for future use) (57: p251; 24: pp203-2l8). 
On the second day, the astronauts were about to open a hatch so 
Collins could stand and take some pictures when they received a call from 
Houston. It was Deke Slayton, who rarely took over the air-to-ground 
microphone. Collins describes the conversation in his book. 
"John, this is Deke. You guys are doing a corrmendable job of 
maintaining radio silence .... Why don't you do a little more 
talking from here on?" This may not sound like much of a censure, 
but in our world this is a BIG DEAL. Deke, who is extremely 
closemouthed himself, comes on the radio only in extremis and he 
must have caught a huge ration of abuse around Mission Control to 
actually incite us to chatter ....... the reporters at the news 
center are not going to be satisfied with a vague promise of 
scientific results to be published at some future date: they want 
hard news, they want quotes, and they want them right now. The 
American public has a RIGHT TO KNOW! Never mind that we are busier 
that two one-legged men in a kicking contest. Never mind that we 
have been given four days I work to do in three .... Never mind all 
that--we are not talkative enough and we have been commanded to 
speak. John is pissed. "OK. What do you want us to talk about?" 
Deke backs off. "Well anything that seems .appropriate. Like EVA." 
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John rubs it in a little bit. "All right. Mike is talking right 
now, matter of fact." Mike is not only talking, he is singing 
like a canary, prating endlessly about things that are better left ... 
for the ... debriefing after the flight .... Jesus Christ! Here I 
am, asshole deep in a 131 step EVA checklist and they want to talk 
about baseball! One little boo-boo at this state of the game and 
all the oxygen will depart my suit and I will die, and they will be 
talking about the color of the infield grass and I will have to 
interrupt them to describe my last gasp, just in time to make the 
deadline for the city edition {24: p219}. 
The chatter continued and the astronauts opened Collins' hatch. He 
stood on his seat and shot ultraviolet photographs for the scientists back 
on earth to use. After he had been standing for some time, Collins' eyes 
began to water. At first he thought the sunlight was causing the problem 
but then Young's eyes began watering too. Both were nearly blinded by the 
moisture. However, the problem cleared enough for Collins to continue with 
the photography and reenter the spacecraft without further alarm.1 
On the third day of flight, the astronauts closed the gap between 
them and Agena 8 to a distance where Collins could "walk" to it and 
retrieve a package on its side. The package, a.device used to measure 
micrometeorite hits, was taken by Collins after some maneuvering on both 
his and Young's part and was brought back inside the Gemini. There was 
another EVA an hour later consisting of only opening the hatch and throwing 
out a duffel bag of equipment that the astronauts did not need anymore. 
The next day, Gemini 10 splashed down within sight of the television 
cameras (24: pp228-249). 
At the press conference following the flight, a phone call from 
Slayton to some high McDonnell officials averted what might have been a 
public relations disaster. It seems that somebody at the plant had some 
photographs of two bunnies from the St. Louis Playboy Club attached to 
the inside of the spacecraft's window shades so that during the sleep 
periods, when the shades went into position, the pictures were viewable. 
The girls headed for the press conference and Collins writes that he and 
John could imagine the scene--the two girls standing in a crowd of 
reporters and asking the astronauts what it was like "going around the 
lIt was not known at that time what caused the condensation but it 
is thought to be a chemical in the air purification unit. 
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world 45 times with US?" The scene never materialized because of Slayton 
(for an interesting account of Gemini 10, read Collins' book, Carrying the 
Fire, pp200-249). 
The astronauts of Gemini 10 joined Cern an and Stafford in the 
distinction of not having thier personal stories printed in Life. Once more, 
national news wrestled the spotlight from what the astronauts had to write. 
In Austin, Texas, a young man by the name of Charles Whitman ascended the 
steps of the tower on the campus of the University of Texas. Shortly after he 
barricaded himself on the tower's observation deck, he killed a number of 
people and wounded many more on the ground below with a high powered rifle. 
The terror ended only when law officers and civilian volunteers stormed the 
young man's high vantage point and killed him in a fusillade of bullets. The 
August 12, 1966 issue of Life, which might have otherwise contained the words 
of Collins and Young, carried the story and photographs of the Texas slaughter. 
Like clockwork, the Gemini program kept flying along. On September 
12, 1966, Gemini 11 was launched from Florida. The objectives of the crew, 
Pete Conrad and Dick Gordon, were to perform an EVA to an Agena which with they 
were then to dock and to perform some other lesser experiments. Within the 
first revolution around the earth, they docked with the Agena, making it the 
fastest docking ever achieved. The spacecraf.t flew together while Conrad po 
powered up the Agena's rocket and propelled the crew to a new height record--
741 nautical miles. From that altitude, the curvature of the earth is more 
apparent (the photographs of the earth taken by Conrad and Gordon were later 
considered by many people to be very outstanding). 
Then Gordon left the Gemini and, while sitting astride the nose of the 
Gemini like a cowboy sits on a horse, he attached a tether to the Agena from 
the Gemini. Once Gordon was inside the Gemini's cabin again, Conrad undocked 
the two spacecraft. Being tethered allowed them Gemini to maintain position 
without having to use fuel. The astronauts also noticed that the slow 
spinning motion was creating artificial gravity because they found one of 
their cameras constantly placing itself at the rear of the cabin wall; the 
amount of gravity was not that much in comparison to what people know on 
earth, it was only 1.5 thousandsths of the earth's pull. 
On the second day, Gordon performed another EVA although it was 
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one where he only stood on his seat shooting pictures, similar to what 
Collins had done during Gemini 10. Finally, after three days in space, 
Conrad and Gordon returned to the waters of the western Atlantic. Their 
return sparked some controversy in the United States, particularly among 
housewives who had been watching soap operas that afternoon. It was 
during those programs that the networks decided"to show the recovery live. 
Minutes later, the telephone switchboar.ds of the networks lit up with the 
calls of angry soap opera fans. Clearly, the public was not interested 
in Gemini as it had once been. In his book, Gemini, Grissom writes that 
the viewers "were partially right" in their complaining because, to the 
uninformed, the Gemini missions must have seemed repetitive, although to 
the people at NASA, each mission was uniquely different (61: p90; 57: 
p255) . 
Some photographs shot by the Gemini 11 crew were published in Life 
but there were no personal stories. No large news event happened during 
the weeks fo 11 owi ng Gemi ni 11' s fl i ght whi ch mi ght have II bumped" the 
stories of Gordon and Conrad from the pages of Life. Therefore, it would 
seem that Life was not interested, or judged the public to have no 
interest, in what the astronauts "felt" in space anymore. The excitement 
was dying. 
On the ground, the astronauts made a decision in early October 
at the recommendation of Alan Shepard to hire a new lawyer to handle their 
legal problems. C. Leo DeOrsey had died in 1965 and Harry Batten then 
took control of the legal responsibilities for the astronauts. In 1966, 
Batten died. With no one to represent them, the astronauts went shopping 
for lawyers. Shepard, on the advice of his friend Jack Valenti (who had 
been involved in government and later set up the movie rating codes), 
contacted the law firm of Louis Nizer. On October 5, 1966, the PIa at 
MSC released a short statement to the media that read: "Louis Nizer, New 
York City attorney, has been selected by NASA astronauts to be their 
personal adviser, succeeding the late Harry Batten of Philadelphia." But 
Nizer himself did not handle the astronauts. Instead, he passed on that 
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responsibility to Paul Sawyer, one of the members of his firm. As with 
DeOrsey and Batten, the Nizer firm would not receive any fees for its 
work (116: MSC 66-75; 134). 
Gemini 12 appeared on the launch pad shortly after Gemini Ills 
Titan II missile had been launched. A writer for U.S. News and World 
Report wrote that the men working around Pad 19, where Gemini 12 was 
awaiting launch, seemed to have an easy, relaxed air about them as they 
prepared the missile and the spacecraft for the flight. On November 12, 
1966, as Jim Lovell and Buzz Aldrin walked towards the launch pad, they 
each wore a sign on the rear of their spacesuits that, when they stood 
side by side, told the world, liTHE END," When they arrived at the gantry 
the last Gemini crew found a sign waiting for them: "Last chance. No 
reruns. Show will close after this performance." A few hours after they 
took their places in their spacecraft, Lovell and Aldrin were in space 
(163: November 21, 1966).1 
The flight of Aldrin and Lovell, supposed to be the last flight 
of the Gemini series, seemed to be a wrap-up flight. During the first 
day of flight, Aldrin performed several stand-up EVAs in order to shoot 
pictures of stars. It might seem odd that the astronauts had to shoot 
photgraphs of the stars while they were outside of the Gemini but the 
glass windows blocked the ultraviolet light from passing through and the 
scientists wanted to see the type of ultraviolet light being emitted from 
the stars. The next day, Aldrin left his spacecraft, although he was 
tethered to it, and performed a series of experiments using restrainers 
that permitted him to conduct a rather effortless EVA in contrast to 
those of Cern an and Gordon, who had overexerted themselves. During that 
EVA, Aldrin threw a Veterans I Day pennant into space and, as he did that, 
his words were broadcast live around the world. The amount of time that 
IAldrin almost lost his chance to go into space because of a 
well-meant but wrongly placed remark he had made during Gemini 9. When 
Stafford and Cernan could not dock with the shroud covered ATDA, Aldrin 
suggested that Cern an inspect it during an EVA and remove the cover. 
Gilruth, who did not think this was wise because a piece of metal could 
puncture Cernanls suit, heard this and was set to order Aldrin off of 
Gemini 12 but Slayton intervened on Aldrinls behalf and he remained on 
the crew. 
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Aldrin spent outside of the spacecraft--five hours and 38 minutes--gave 
him the record for EVAs and Lovell also earned a record for himself--over 
425 hours in space. That made him the person who had been in space more 
than any other man (2: pp182-184; 57: pp259-261; 24: p262). 
When Aldrin and Lovell returned to earth on November 15, 1966, 
NASA and the media in general had already painted Gemini 12 as being the 
most perfect Gemini mission, succeeding where all others had failed--at 
least it seemed that way in the press. Mike Collins takes exception to 
that line of thought. He mentions in his book that Gemini 12's crew had 
been given four days to accomplish a list of tasks that he and Young 
had to accomplish in the three-day flight of Gemini 10. Aldrin's EVA 
work was portrayed as being not as troublesome as what ~ad been encountered 
by the previous astronauts who had "walked" in space. This also 
irritated Collins, who claims that he and White had not had any trouble 
during their EVAs. Aldrin agrees with Collins on this. In an overall 
aspect, the media did not write that much material about the flight of 
Gemini 12 other than it was the last flight of the series (2: p183; 24: 
p262) . 
The men of Gemini accomplished what they had set out to do: 1. prove 
that men could survive in space for as long as 14 days, which was more 
than enough to go to the moon and back, with no ill effects; 2. prove 
that a rendezvous could be accomplished between space vehicles--one 
astronaut claimed it was just about as easy as parking a car in the 
home garage; and 3. prove that the teams needed for flight control, 
planning and testing required for such a project could be handled 
adequately (57: p261). 
After NASA announced that Gemini was through, the eyes of the nation 
began to focus on the next program--Apollo--designed to take men to the 
moon's surface, but destined to begin with the ashes of tragedy. 
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CONCLUSION OF THE GEMINI YEARS 
In the time of three and a half years, from the end of r~ercury unti 1 
the end of Gemini, a number of occurrences happened in relation to the 
magazines, the PAG and the astronauts. Overall, it was a more relaxed 
feeling between the groups although there were some sore points, most 
notably the withholding of the voice tapes of Gemini 8. 
In an overview, it would appear that the publicity around Gemini 
began well, despite a lapse of almost two years since the last Mercury 
flight. Gemini 3 came after several Soviet launches and the publicity 
surrounding Gemini 4 was tremendous because of the atmosphere created 
around Ed White's space walk. Gemini 5 was a long-term flight that did 
seemingly nothing but fly around the earth for eight days. Then came the 
heartbreak of Gemini 6's Agena blowing up but this was followed a short 
time later by the spectacular rendezvous of two manned spacecraft during 
the "Flight of '76." Gemini 8, of course, was aborted only a few hours 
after its launch because of a stuck thruster. This possibly caused the 
media to be more attentive to that flight. Gemini 9 encountered more 
trouble with a target vehicle that refused to be docked with and an 
abbreviated EVA. Then, Geminis 10, 11 and 12 put together an impressive 
list of good technological accomplishments but, by the time those missions 
were flown, the interest was dying. As Gus Grissom wrote, the flights must 
have seemed repetitive to the general public. But the astronauts may not 
have been concerned about the lack of publicity. In late 1966, Loudon 
Wainwright wrote in Time, "From all I can gather, the diminution of 
public notice and fanfare is of small notice to the astronauts. 'Nobody 
around here is disappointed by it,' Scott Carpenter told me" (159: 
December 12, 1966). 
Perhaps another thing that cut down on the public interest was the 
length of the flights. With the coming of the long flights, primarily 
Geminis 5 and 7, the minute-by-minute reporting, such as had happened 
during Mercury, was hard to maintain and was beginning to fade. Because 
of this, i.e., the removal of Gemini from constantly being in the public 
229 
eye plus the apparent redundancy of the program, public interest in Gemini 
dimmed. This is most noticeable in the articles written about the last 
three Gemini missions. It was as if they were written in an 1I0h yeah, 
forgot to tell you but a couple of astronauts went into space for a 
while again" attitude. The hoop-lah was gone and it would be necessary 
for Apollo to pick up the pieces for that was the program taking men to the 
moon and back. 
Another item that might have cut down on the publicity was the lack 
of a small group of easily identifiable astronauts. Whereas Mercury had 
only seven astronauts, Gemini had many times that number. By the time 
Gemini ended, over 50 men were within the astronaut corps. As time went 
on, it may have been harder and harder for the public to keep up with who 
was who in space. Because of this, the vision of the astronauts as heroes 
might have been diminished somewhat, although as a group they were still 
held in relatively high esteem. It is interesting to note in The Reader's 
Guide to Periodical Literature that the number of articles under 
IIAstronauts" tend to drop as Gemini went on, even though there were more 
astronauts. In the 1963-65 issue, there were 79 articles for under that 
heading (or about 40 per year); this drops to 34 in the 1965-66 issue 
and further to only 24 in the issue for March, 1966-February, 1967 (during 
which time Geminis 8-12 flew). 
Viewed in another way, the number of astronauts helped NASA by 
giving the space administration more astronauts to use for public relations 
pursposes. The public relations activity most utilized was one called 
liThe Week in the Barrel." This was when an astronaut, who was not assigned 
to a prime or backup crew for an upcoming mission, would be assigned to 
public relations duty for a week. There would only be one such week a 
month, thus only 12 astronauts would be used during the year. The purpose 
of this activity was two-fold, according to Gene Marianetti, a protocol 
officer at NASA Headquarters: 1. to give the astronauts experience with 
the media, which could help them at later times, primarily after they had 
returned from missions; and 2. to let the public see some of the 
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astronauts (109}.1 
There was an almost limitless number of requests coming into NASA 
for an appearance by an astronaut here and there. NASA Headquarters 
fielded these and, at the beginning of each year, set up a schedule with 
the astronaut office at MSC to arrange for the astronauts for the next 
year (the astronaut office handled all astronaut appearances related to 
technical matters without any help from headquarters). Marianetti says 
that the trips were arranged geographically so the astronauts who were 
participating in the program could accomplish as much as possible without 
having to fly across the entire nation. Mike Collins assumes that the 
basis of determining who was seen by the astronauts was decided in terms 
of political clout, persistence and prestige of the audiences (24: pp93-97; 
109) . 
A day in the "Week in the Barrel" could sometimes require an 
astronaut to stop in as many as three locations for various purposes. 
Since the astronauts had access to a fleet of supersonic T-38 trainers, 
moving from city to city did not present all that much of a task although 
it could be tiring. According to Marianetti, a NASA protocol officer 
usually met the astronauts at each location and gave them more detailed 
briefings about what they were to do. These meetings were for the benefit 
of the public, not the media. If reporters were at the stops, that was 
fine, but the trips were never meant to be used expressly for having the 
astronauts meet the media. As can be expected, the well-known astronauts 
were desired by the crowds but, more than not in the early sixties, the 
lesser known men went to the various localities. Mike Collins remembers 
one time, before he flew in space, when a Boy Scout asked him, on a 
speakers' platform, if any of the "real" astronauts were coming (for 
more views on Collins' attitude towards "The Week in the Barrel," read 
Carrying the Fire, pp93-97) (109). 
The astronauts were also sent to other nations to engage in public 
INo one to whom this author has spoken remembers exactly when the 
"Week" started but the earliest reference to it was in a NASA press release 
dated February 16, 1965 (116: MSC 65-28). 
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relations not just for NASA for also for the United States. As mentioned, 
earlier in relation to Gemini 5, NASA Administrator Webb did not care to 
use his funds to send the astronauts on these journeys as he believed that 
someone else should carry the burden of the expenses. An illustration 
of what happened to one trip can be seen in an exchange of letters in 
January, 1966 between various people in the White House. On January 21 
Lloyd Hand sent a notice to President. Johnson telling that Webb did not 
have $53,000 to spare for covering the transportation for a trip to eight 
Far Eastern countries by some astronauts. Because Webb said he lacked the 
funds, Hand wanted to know if he could check with the Air Force's Special 
Air Missions branch since the purpose of the trip was a Presidential 
Mission (costs other than the transportation were already being handled 
by the State Department). The President rejected Hand's suggestion 
to make contact with the Air Force and he wrote at the bottom of Hand's 
memo, IIIf space can't do it, lid forget it. 1I Apparently Presidential 
Aide Joseph Califano did not hear of Johnson's rejection and he continued 
to pursue funding for the trip. He approached the Secretary of Defense, 
Cyrus Vance, and Vance said that he could pick up the tab. The President 
was then told of this but he disapproved of the plan on January 26. 
Yet, somehow, the funding for the transportation was arranged, because 
in February and March, astronauts Borman and Schirra went on a President 
Presidential goodwill mission throughout the Orient (65; 18; 141). 
Occasionally the White House became involved in domestic appearances 
too. In June, 1966, a letter arrived at the White House from a Betty 
Weinheimer of Stonewall, Texas, which is virtually the backyard of the 
President's Texas ranch. In that letter, Weinheimer asked for White 
House assistance in obtaining an astronaut or two for Stonewall IS Peach 
Jamboree to be held in late June. The President refused to let anyone 
from the White House contact NASA to help the officials of the Peach 
Jamboree (173). 
Neither were the astronauts free on their own to accept invitations 
for various function. Deke Slayton, the Director of Flight Ooerations, 
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put his thoughts in a memo to the astronauts. 
Nothing engenders hatred more rapidly than having an astronaut 
appear at the Podunk Center Elks Club on his own after having 
officially turned down the local Congressmanls request for a 
Chamber of Commerce or Rotary meeting .... No astronaut has 
authority to accept speaking engagements or public appearances .. . 
without approval from higher authority. When in doubt, call .. . 
(24: p93). 
The only time that the astronauts were not engaged in any public 
activities was from just prior to a launch until the mission was 
finished. During this time, the astr9nauts were called to Houston or the 
Cape and were to stay at those two places. This policy might have 
appeared to be unnecessary but, in case of an accident, an astronaut 
visiting some city could have found himself suddenly thrown into the 
role of an lIexpertll and be asked several questions that were best left 
unanswered except for official NASA statements (2: p249). 
The media tended to find NASAls PAD rather inept when it came to 
handling emergencies. Professor Louis Alexander writes of a survey he 
conducted about the PAD: 
NASAls public affairs staff does unusually well in its 
routine services for the press and when things are going normally. 
By II routine ll or 1I 0rdinary" services, the media representatives 
indicated they mean the press kit and flight plan, the running 
commentary over the public address system and its transcripts and 
the change-of-shift briefings. IIThere is evidence of a lot of 
planning by people who know and understand the particular needs of 
newsmen working on the story,1I said Robert Zimmerman of the 
San Diego Sun. 
It mus-r-be recognized that what is routine for space flight 
coverage may be quite unusual as ordinary press services go: an 
explanation of orbital mechanics, a demonstration of an astronautls 
propulsion pack for maneyvering in space, a digest (detailed enough 
to be useful to a radio newsman) of the flight plan for the entire 
three-day mission. 
The press is not at all satisfied with NASAls press workings 
when things are not going s:noothly aloft. III have found that while 
NASA has more information than a dog has fleas while all is going 
well ,II chided William Hines of the Washington Star, lithe experts' 
tend to pull back for regourping when things go wrong. 1I 
NASAls prompt defense: At such times, not enough is really 
known. It would be all too easy to give sincere, but wrong 
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replies (88: Winter, 1966, p736). 
Alexander's survey found that most of the press had high praise for 
NASA's PR management in some areas, most importantly, the various press 
conferences that were held by NASA. These included pre-launch, 
post-launch, change-of-shift, post-flight and astronaut briefings. Yet 
at the same time, members of the media complained about the caliber of 
the PAO staffers, saying that few were qualified to adequately answer 
technical questions. When a person thinks about it, that is more than 
likely true. The members of the PAO were journalists, not technicians. 
However, it was their responsibility to see that knowledgable NASA 
officials could provide technical information to the media. Another 
complaint that Alexander's respondents supplied was that "officials and 
astronauts do not always volunteer information which the reporters 
consider significant" (88: Winter, 1966, p736).1 
Yet some of the reporters were also considered ignorant. Alvin B. 
Webb, of UPI, writes critically of his fellow reporters in Alexander's 
survey: 
Listening to a typical NASA press conference, a newsman must 
be astounded by the uninformed, useless and often down-right 
asinine questions generated by his colleagues ... news conferences 
often turn out to be useless exercises despite the willingness of 
NASA experts to do their part (88: Winter, 1966, p737). 
The astronauts may have been unwilling to do too much for NASA's 
public relations--they had enough to do otherwise. Note the following 
travel schedule for the month from 1964. 
April 13: all astronauts in Houston 
April 14: Grissom in Burbank dealing with suit molding at Weber 
aircraft 
April 14-16: astronauts Carpenter, Armstrong, Lovell, McDivitt, 
White, See, Stafford, Schirra and Conrad to Alpine, Texas for 
Geology field trip 
1Interestingly enough, NASA has never conducted a poll on its 
PAO among the media, according to William J. O'Donnell, the Director 
of Public Affairs Officers Division, in the spring of 1977. The only 
ones known by this author to be in existence were done by Lydia Dotto 
(now a reporter of the Toronto Globe in Canada), D. Brent Clements of 
Brigham Young University and that done by Alexander at the University of 
Houston (123a; 23). 
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April 15: Borman to Huntsville for Saturn coordination 
April 15-17: Gemini Coordination at St. Louis, Young and Grissom 
April 17: Cooper to Langley for docking simulation 
April 17: Cooper at Flagstaff, Arizona for a scientific meeting 
April 20-24: Four unassigned astronauts to Langley for docking 
simulation 
April 21-24: Gemini Coordination for Schirra and Stafford in St. 
Louis. 
April 27-May 2: Cooper in Washington for public appearance 
April 28-30: ten unassigned astronauts to North American for Apollo 
desi gn revi ew 
April 30: all available astronauts to Tucson for geology field trip 
April 30: Borman at Martin plant for a zero defects visit 
May 2: Grissom at Purdue for a public appearance (61: p82). 
Being an astronaut was (and still is) a very demanding job. The 
beginning course for new astronauts in the early sixties was as follows: 
Astronomy: 15 hours of class 
Aerodynamics: 8 hours 
Rocket propulsion: 12 hours 
Communications: 8 hours 
Medical: 12 hours 
Meteorology: 5 hours 
Physics of the upper atmosphere: 12 hours 
Guidance and Navigation: 34 hours 
~1athemat;cs and physics of space vehicles: 40 hours 
Digital computers: 36 hours 
Geology: 58 hours (24: p72). 
This was the beginning course. Astronauts were assigned to certain 
areas of study that were to be their own specialty. In addition to this, 
they went through hours of simulations, survival treks in remote areas, 
riding the centrifuge, being involved with spacecraft design work and 
countless other tasks. It is no wonder that some of the astronauts may 
not have favored public relations activities. Mike Collins writes in 
his book, "l simply do not enjoy PR work and there is no point in 
pretending I do" (24: p95).1 
There was possibly one source of public information that the 
astronauts did not mind too much--Life magazine. It may seem that this 
IThe irony of this statement~Collins is that after his Apollo 11 
flight, he went to the State Department where he became the Assistant 
Secretary for Public Affairs. He writes that when he left that job for 
another in Washington, D.C., he left the organization more effective than 
when he came; so even if Collins hated PR work, he must have known what 
he was doing (24: p458). 
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author has spent considerable time discussing Life and its relationship 
with the astronauts but that is necessary. It was virtually the only 
magazine which reported them (not just the missions) in depth, mainly 
through the use of the personal articles. This is not to slight the other 
magazines but Life was in a unique position--having the astronauts being 
available to its reporters and photographers in the astronauts I off-duty 
time. Mike Collins offers his views upon the contracts with Life in his 
book. 
Pat /-Collins-/ felt that to take money under any circumstances 
for our participation in the space program was wrong, since the 
taxpayers had financed it and we should not gain personally from 
a public venture .•..... consider for a moment, the possibilities in 
holding Life magazine a virtual captive: certainly after being 
invited into the home and hearing the wife emote and the children 
prate, the stinkers weren't going to turn on their host (even a 
paid one) and write nasty articles. No, the contract almost 
guaranteed peaches and cream, full-color spreads glittering with 
harmless inanities •••. 
Flip the armored beetle over and inspect the soft underbelly. 
What did little Sarah Jean think about Daddy's impending departure, 
temporary or permanent? How did Mom feel when Dad was up? (An 
astronaut wife I know, when asked this by a female reporter, blinked 
a time or two and then deadpanned, "Honey, how do you feel when your 
husband is Up?" End of interview.) But no doubt about it, home was 
where the personal stories were and this is what the contract was 
all about. I feel that it was perfectly proper to extract 
compensation for this invasion of privacy ....... also it served 
as a beautiful excuse for turning off any non-contract interviews. 
In fact, once the word got around, the regulars would quit bugging 
the wife and kids .•.. This was not true during the chaotic times 
when a husband was up .... Of course, the men still had professional, 
or non-personal or whatever interviews and these were scheduled on 
Fridays. If possible, we would schedule ourselves to be away 
from Houston on Fridays but if we weren1t, we grunted, hot under 
TV lights, and we sat walleyed while passing back and forth the same 
cold potatoes.... Sic transit media (24: pp52-55). 
Yet, just as much as Collins (and Shepard too) says that the 
astronauts had Life under control, the Gemini 10 astronaut admits that 
Life had him as well. When this author sent a question to Collins asking 
him if he allowed the Life photographer-reporter teams into his house only 
to fulfill the contract, he replied yes. When asked if he would have done 
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the same had the contract not existed, Collins answered no (25). 
According to writer Robert Sherrod, the contracts were strengthened 
in practice by the astronauts I new attorney, Paul Sawyer, of Louis Nizer's 
law firm in New York. What Sawyer did, writes Sherrod in Columbia 
Journalism Review, was to remind the astronauts, through Shepard (who was 
then grounded due to ear trouble but was in charge of the astronaut corps). 
that the astronauts were to talk to no one but reporters and photographers 
from Life and Field about their personal impressions. In conversation with 
this author, Sawyer said he did not know if he was all that tough in 
comparison to DeOrsey and Batten. However. he said, he did try to make 
it clear to the astronauts that Life and Field might not regard the 
arrangement for the personal stories worthwhile if the astronauts kept 
talking to everybody about their feelings (134; 26: May/June, 1973). 
The sterner measures hit the Los Angeles Times in 1966. The 
newspaper wanted Wally Schirra's byline on a special section entitled, 
IISpace ,1I which already had contributions by Webb and Vice-President 
Humphrey. If we can get Schirra's bosses to write for us, reasoned the 
editors of the Times, why can't we get Schirra? NASA approved but Life 
and Field pointed to section 8b of the contracts and said no. Life editor 
Thompson warned that if an article written by Schirra appeared in the 
Times, then the contracts that the astronauts had with Life and Field 
could be terminated. Schirra, no fool, kept his name out of the 
newspaper (26: May/June, 1973). 
There is another example of how the terms of the contracts were 
met. Buzz Aldrin's wife, Joan, who was very much involved with theater 
work, was asked by a Houston area radio station to host a twice-weekly 
afternoon talk show. She decided to use her maiden name in order to avoid 
any association with NASA and the format of the radio program was to be 
left up to her. At first there did not seem to be any difficulty, 
figured the Aldrins. After all, Renee Carpenter was writing a newspaper 
column. Field torpedoed the radio show idea, saying that, although no 
restrictions were in the contract, IIthey would nevertheless consider it 
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politic of us to drop the show," remembers Aldrin in his book, Return to 
Earth. His fellow astronauts voiced displeasure about the thought that 
one of the astronaut wives might be hosting a radio talk show and they 
added that they did not care for Mrs. Carpenter's column either. 
Eventually Mrs. Aldrin dropped the idea of working for the radio station. 
But weeks later she became bitter when she learned why Field had never 
forced Renee Carpenter to abandon her column--Field was selling what she 
wrote (2: pp161-162). 
Attorney Sawyer says that Life and Field did not always stop the 
astronauts from writing for other publications. He stated in the 
interview, "If the magazine was something like Boys' Life, then 99.9 
percent of the time, Life and Field would say yes, and Bill Anders wrote 
for that magazine once. But if the publication was like Look, then the 
answer was no." Clearly, the matter depended upon for whom the astronauts 
were going to write their personal stories (134). 
It may seem odd that the contracts were being applied more 
stringently by Field and Life when virtually all vocal opposition to the 
contracts had disappeared. However Sherrod offers a possible explanation: 
Field was losing money on the deal (more about this will appear later 
when this author discusses Field's election to not renew the contracts 
in the fall of 1967). Sawyer says that if he cracked down at all on 
the astronauts, it was because of Field's distress. The New York lawyer 
added that Life never presented the astronaut corps with any real legal 
hassles since "it would appear bad if Life was suing the astronauts and 
the astronauts were suing Life." Differences with Life were worked out 
on a practical basis, not a legalistic one. according the Sawyer who 
also said, "We handled the discussions with Life on a basis of what was 
good for everyone involved" (134; 26: May/June, 1973). 
The astronauts and the missions were important to many people, not 
just Life and Field. Following the missions was the business of every 
reporter sent to either the Cape or to MSC. As Gemini progressed, NASA 
Headquarters wanted the focus of the newsmen to change to Houston 24 hours 
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after the rockets had left their launching pads. This may seem logical 
because Houston took control of the missions just seconds after the 
astronauts were launched but Dr. Kurt Debus, the head of the Kennedy 
Space Center, would have none of this idea. He reasoned that many of the 
media wanted to remain at the Cape for the entire missions rather than 
to have to hop in a plane and fly across the Gulf of Mexico. If that 
happened, time would be lost by the reporters or each medium would have 
to have two sets of correspondents--one in Houston, the other in Florida. 
Some publications might have been able to have afforded that luxury but 
not everyone could. The issue was resolved when communications were 
installed at the Cape and the newsmen were allowed to remain there, able 
to hear the complete missions by listening to special "squawkboxes" that 
broadcast the talk between the ground controllers in Houston and the 
astronauts (69: pl19). 
Other anomalies of news coverage between Houston and Florida 
developed as Gemini went along. One was that MSC would handle all news 
about the astronauts regardless of where the men were. That meant if a 
reporter at the Cape wanted information about the astronauts, some who 
might have been at the Cape in training or preparing for a mission, he 
would have to call Houston despite the proximity to the astronauts. 
Gordon Harris, in his book, Selling Uncle Sam, states, "If a catastrophe 
occurred while the rocket was within sight of the newsmen at the launch 
base, they were supposed to rely upon that distant Texas observer for 
information" (69: p208). 
Gemini 4 was the last crew to receive a parade at the Cape. After 
that mission, the control was switched to Houston and the Gemini crews 
were returned there following splashdown. It was a sharp break for the 
residents of Brevard County, Florida, who had been accustomed to giving 
lavish welcome-back parties for the Mercury astronauts who regarded 
Florida as their second home (in Houston there was a substantial lack 
of community participation). There was no small resentment towards NASA 
by the Floridians at the loss of the astronauts (69: p128). 
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But, no matter where the astronauts went, more media than just Life 
and Field were sure to follow, despite the thought that this author has 
dealt primarily with them while dicussing the flights of Gemini. Many 
other publications sent reporters to the Cape and to Houston but the 
magazines that produced the news just as fast and accurately as Life were 
Time, Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report. However, there is one 
magazine that many people at Houston with NASA mentioned more often than 
Life when asked by this author about how the magazines handled the space 
administration--National Geographic. The magazine with the yellow border 
on its covers, although never timely because of its precise production, 
carried brilliant photographs and its articles lent the public a better 
understanding of what NASA was doing in space. From 1955 until 1966, the 
editors of National Geographic wrote 26 stories related to the U.S. space 
efforts: seven of those were about manned space flights and astronaut 
training. Although National Geographic was prohibited by the Life-Field 
contracts from having any of the astronauts write stories for its pages, 
National Geographic's editors did have other personnel within the ranks 
of NASA write stories for them. 1 NASAls Assistant Administrator, Hugh 
Dryden, wrote articles about Ed White's space walk and NASAls plans to put 
men on the moon. MSC Director Gilruth described the training that the 
astronauts went through in preparation for their flights while a NASA 
physician wrote about Shepard's flight in Freedom 7. 
Although there were often members of NASAls hierarchy on the 
magazine's Board of Trustees, they gave no favoritism towards having 
articles written about NASA, as attested to by several people within NASA 
and working with National Geographic. According to sources at NASA, the 
magazine had to proceed through normal channels to gather information. 
Gilruth, in a letter to this author, mentioned that he had been approached 
by Ken Weaver, the magazine's science editor, who asked if the Director of 
IA person should not have the opinion that National Geographic did 
not try to have the astronauts write stories in its pages. Science editor 
Ken Weaver writes that the staff of the magazine tried livery hard" to have 
Glenn write a story for them about his flight but Life stopped them cold (169). -
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MSC would write a story about the training of the astronauts. To do this 
Gilruth received help from the National Geographic people and also from 
his own staff, who put together a text for him after the outline of the 
story had been agreed upon (169; 48; 47; 152; 20). 
Usually several months passed after a flight before National 
Geographic was able to publish anything about it. This may lead some 
people to criticize the magazine for being slow but few people understand 
what goes into printing that magazine. Frequently color runs are sent 
back time and again so the results match the original transparencies. 
This takes time but the editors of National Geographic insist upon high 
quality output. Putting out an issue within three or four months of 
an event is considered fast work by the National Geographic staff. 
Despite this time lag, National Geographic still published some of the 
best material ever made by magazines about the manned spaceflights as well 
as other aspects of NASA (169). 
The media was not the only way that the public affairs office of 
NASA reached the people though. It had its own way of handling the 
public. In late 1963, plans were discussed at Cape Kennedy to allow the 
public into NASA's grounds to see what was there. Eventually tourists 
were allowed to drive through on Sunday mornings for a look but they were 
prohibited from stopping. On September 18, 1965, the motorists, for the 
first time, were allowed to stop to view the Gemini spacecraft that had 
returned from the mission flown by Cooper and Conrad. Given that chance, 
6000 people showed up. Shortly after Christmas of that year, over 33,000 
people journeyed through the complex one day in their automobiles. On 
July 20, 1966, NASA started a touring service using old buses leased from 
the General Services Administration and 1500 people took the tour of the 
Cape facilities that day. Plans were laid for a visitors center at the 
Cape to be completed by the middle of 1967 (69: pp92-94). 
Cape Kennedy was busy doing other things. It was turning down many 
requests to use the spaceport as a backdrop for advertisers and also was 
allowing some to be filmed (such as one for a major oil company which 
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showed large ocean-going tankers gliding by the launch complexes despite 
the fact that rockets do not use oil based products as a fuel). The Cape 
Kennedy PAO also helped actor Don Knotts with his version of astronauts in 
the movie liThe Reluctant Astronaut." At another time, Lassie came to the 
Cape and was filmed for his television show among the launching pads (69: 
p8) . 
Meanwhile, in Houston, a visitor,facility was being built, too, in 
order to accommodate tourists. NASA was beginning to open up although 
there were no doubt some reporters who thought otherwise because of 
the Gemini 8 episode. 
It is this author's opinion that the general public thought well of 
NASA during the Gemini years even though the populace possibly was becoming 
bored with the project after seeing 20 men go into space during a period 
of 20 months. There were faults but NASA operated in a way that was more 
open than did most other government agencies. The hassle with the tapes 
of Gemini 8 was a matter concerning the media only, who appeared to be 
more concerned with getting some news fast rather than wait for accurate 
facts. The public possibly did not care about those tapes, yet it might 
have, had the tapes not been released at all. 
Not only was the public affairs office maturing during Gemini but 
so was the media because of the efforts of the PAO. Reporters found 
themselves more knowledgable about what was happening with the space 
shots and more able to transmit this information to the public. Likewise, 
the astronauts were beginning to accept their public relations roles, even 
though they may have considered that it interfered with what some of the 
astronauts thought to be their only responsibility--flying. The Gemini 
period was not only a time when techniques were being perfected in space 
by the astronauts but also a period when the relations between the PAO, 
the media and the astronauts became better through understanding. The 
result was that the nation was acclimating itself to what was happening 
in the black skies above the earth's atmosphere. The public was so 
confident that the space programs were going so well that all was almost 
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becoming ho-hum and. as fate sometimes plays the game, a shock is needed 
and two months after Aldrin and Lovell returned to earth in Gemini 12, the 
jolt of failure was felt by everyone and the complacency was lost. 
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APOLLO: THE FIRE 
On December 15 and 16, 1966, the PAO at MSC held a two-day seminar 
to give the media more information about the upcoming Apollo mission, 
scheduled for February, 1967 and to let the reporters meet the prime 
crew. The astronauts were Gus Grissom, Ed White and Roger Chaffee. Along 
with them at a press conference were Deke Slayton and the backup crew, 
consisting of Wally Schirra, Donn Eisele and Walter Cunningham. At that 
gathering, much of their talk revolved around how the astronauts felt about 
taking their suits off once they were in space. Grissom replied that 
he was "very bashful" while White commented that he wanted to keep at 
least his helmet and gloves on. While there was humor in the talk at the 
press conference, a message was being given to the newsmen--do not spend 
too much time on this mission because the better ones are yet to come. 
Program Manager Joseph Shea described it this way, "It's almost a bland 
mission to describe because it's not spectacular."l NASA assured the 
media that all would be taken care of since NASA would handle the first 
hand reporting of events leading up to the flight. Perhaps for this 
reason, the media decided to pay little attention to the preparation for 
the first Apollo shot (90: pp42-44).2 
More than a month later, on Sunday, January, 22, 1967, the 
astronauts of the prime crew stopped at their homes in Houston to visit 
their families. They had been in California preparing for their mission 
and were due at the Cape the next day to begin some simulations. The 
stopover in Houston also allowed the men to read their mail which had 
been accumulating for some days. But before Grissom left his house that 
Sunday afternoon, he expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of the 
Apollo mission. Mrs. Grissom and Henry Still wrote in their book, 
Starfall, what the astronaut did on his way out that day. 
When Gus was ready to leave, he packed his bag, then went to 
IAt another press conference during the seminar, Shea told reporters 
that there had been more than 20,000 failures in the six years of the 
Apollo program; of these, 220 were in the environmental controls that 
were necessary to keep the astronauts alive in space (90: p39; 97: p367). 
2This mission was to be known as either Apollo 1 or Apollo/Saturn 
204. The spacecraft itself was known as Apollo 012. 
244 
the kitchen and sliced off a piece from a large slab of cheese a 
friend had given the family for Christmas. 
Then he went out in the courtyard and pulled a lemon off our 
tree. It was a Texas lemon, really as big as a grapefruit. 
"What are you doing with the lemon?" Betty asked. 
"I'm going to hang it on that spacecraft," Gus said grimly and 
kissed her goodbye. 
He left with his hunk of cheese and that lemon and that's the 
last time he was here at the house (59: ppI81-182). 
On Friday, January 27,1967, the members of the prime crew left the 
astronaut quarters at the Cape to head to Launch Pad 34 where their 
Saturn IB with an Apollo spacecraft atop it awaited them. Grissom, White 
and Chaffee were to participate in a "plugs-out" test, the first ever with 
a crew in the spacecraft. The plugs-out test was a simulation of a 
countdown until 15 minutes before the simulated launch when all external 
power was to be disconnected. The astronauts entered the spacecraft at 
2:30 p.m. and Grissom called for an air sampling team; he smelled a 
buttermilk odor in the spacecraft and wanted it checked. The air 
sampling team, called "The Watermelon Gang" because of the shape of their 
mechanical samplers, found nothing, even when they were called in for a 
second time. Finally, the three-part inward opening hatch was closed at 
3:00 and the astronauts were sealed inside. With that done, the air of 
the spacecraft was purged to be replaced by pure oxygen at a pressure of 
16.6 psi. The Apollo command module (as the spacecraft was called in 
order to differentiate it from the lunar module which was designed to 
place men on the moon) became a bomb at that moment (90: p6; 69: p9). 
The media were not particularly interested in what was happening 
at Pad 34 that day. NBC's Jay Barberee was the only network reporter assigned 
to the Cape, was on his way to Bimini to talk with Adam Clayton Powell, 
the controversial Congressman from New York City. Howard Benedict, a veteran 
space reporter was delivering a speech in Alabama. George Alexander, 
from Aviation Week and Space Technology, was with UPI's Al Rossiter, Jr., 
at a Sigma Delta Chi meeting twelve miles away. In the blockhouse was 
Jack King, a PIO of the Kennedy Space complex. From time to time, he 
telephoned wire service reporters as he customarily did on every launch, 
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reporting the progress of the test (90: p9; 69: p37). 
Official Washington was going about its usual day. At the White 
House, space advocate President Johnson signed the Treaty on Outer Space, 
the design of which was to remove all weapons and territorial claims from 
space. Also with him at the signing was NASA Administrator Webb with an 
entourage from the astronaut corps: Neil Armstrong, Scott Carpenter, 
Gordon Cooper, Dick Gordon and Jim Lovell. Ambassadors from many countries 
including the U.S.S.R. were there representing their countries' interest 
in the treaty. At five o'clock, Johnson signed the piece of paper and 
passed out the pens he used in writing his signature (85: p482). 
The checkout of the spacecraft was going badly because of many 
little "glitches," as the space comnunity referred to problems. The 
conmunications were so bad that Grissom once complained, "How do you 
expect us to get to the moon when we can't even talk to the guys three 
hundred yards away?" At one point, Deke Slayton, in the control room, 
almost decided to go the spacecraft and go inside with the crew to observe 
what the problems were but he remained where he was.(91; 98: April 21, 
1967) . 
MSC's Flight Director Chris Kraft, in Houston, and the Cape's flight 
test supervisor, George Page, held a facetious talk about who was more 
responsible for the holds in the test: Houston or the Cape. During 
a hold in the simulated countdown, the Pad Leader of the White Room (the 
sterile compartment at the top of the gantry encompassing the spacecraft) 
dismissed most of his men to go on a coffee break (90: p9). 
At 6:30, the hold was still in effect (there were only ten minutes 
left in the "countdown" once the hold was finished) and everything seemed 
"normal" for the type of day it had been. Twenty seconds later, 
astronaut White's pulse went up with no explanation but the people in the 
control room paid no attention, thinking that it was some normal 
excitement. Then the gyroscopes in the spacecraft indicated that someone 
was moving in the spacecraft's cabin but all the astronauts were supposed 
to be strapped into their couches. At 30 seconds past 6:30, the oxygen 
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being supplied to the astronauts through a common valve was indicated as 
beginning to rise in the amount being used. The electrocardiogram showed 
White was beginning to move in his position. There was a surge of power 
and the electricity to the spacecraft's radar and a communication unit 
went dead. More motion was recorded. The oxygen level went so high 
so quickly that the meters could not follow it anymore. More motion 
occurred and then, at five seconds after 6:31, someone, apparently 
Grissom, yelled "Fire in the spacecraft!" (12: pp17-18; 91). 
The fire in the spacecraft, from a still unknown source, ignited 
over 70 pounds of combustible material and the temperature soared to over 
1200 degrees Fahrenheit. 1 In the fire, the combustible materials produced 
several gases. In eight, maybe ten seconds after the voice had cried out 
the warning, one of the astronaut's suits was penetrated by the fire and 
the gases were sucked into the men's breathing systems. 2 Seven seconds 
after that, the pressure that had built up to 29 psi within the command 
module ruptured a hole in the lower side of the spacecraft and the heat 
and smoke spread to the outside. The launch support crew in the White 
Room was drvien back from the spacecraft by the fiery blast (some members 
of the team thought that the escape rocket above the spacecraft, similar 
to that of the Mercury spacecraft, had ignited). When several members of 
the support team put on gas masks, they had to retreat again because the 
masks were unable to keep the smoke out. Eleven seconds after one or more 
of the astronauts' suits had been entered by the smoke, came the last 
garbled communication from the spacecraft (90: p34). 
At 6:36, four and a half minutes after the last bit of information 
had come from the spacecraft, the launch crew managed to open the three 
hatches. Because of the heat, the men could not enter to touch the 
astronauts. There is still speculation that the astronauts might have 
IThat is, 70 pounds of materials combustible under usual atmospheric 
conditions. But with pure oxygen present as it was, even stainless steel 
can burn so no doubt there was much more than 70 pounds of materials that 
burned that day. 
2 Sucked in because the air pressure in the suits was lower than 
that of the cabin, which had been increased because of the fire. 
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still been alive at that time but this is doubtful. The autopsies showed 
that the astronauts did not die of burns--none would have been fatal--but 
from asphyxiation; soot was found in their noses, nasal cavities, trachea 
and bronchia (90: pp35, 325-327). 
Firemen arrived and fireman Jim Burch approached the open hatch, 
looked around and saw none of the crew. The lights of the spacecraft's 
control panels glowed in the darkness. Then Burch saw the astronauts 
in the spacecraft: Grissom had left his couch and had obviously been trying 
to open the hatch; White, in the center couch had turned and appeared to 
have been trying to assist Grissom; and Chafee, in the right couch, was 
still in his couch, apparently trying to maintain communications with the 
ground as that was his responsibility on the crew. Another fireman, Jim 
Mooney, touched the astronauts for a response but received none. Many 
members of the launch support team still feared the deadly escape rocket 
capable of producing up to 5000 degrees on the ground, more than two 
hundred feet away, if it ignited (98: April 21, 1967). 
The men in the control had heard the cry of "Fire in the 
spacecraft" twice and then saw a belch of smoke appear on the television 
monitors covering the outside of the command module. Jack King stated 
later that there was concern about the men at the top of the gantry and 
the astronauts and the controllers attempted to communicate with the 
astronauts. Deke Slayton left the control room and headed towards the 
pad with a team of doctors. While he was gone, King took a small note 
pad and scawled out a message to be released to the media. Then he 
called Gordon Harris, head of the Capels PAO, at 6:37, informed him 
of the fire and discussed how the media were to be told of the tragedy. 
(91). 
The Pad Leader at the top of the gantry, when asked by the control 
room personnel what had happened to the astronauts, replied that he 
could not describe the scene; in essence, without trying to inform 
everyone who was hooked into the communications loops, the Pad Leader was 
saying that the astronauts had perished (90: p14; 91). 
248 
When Slayton returned to the control room, he told King that the 
astronauts were dead. King then tried to contact Julian Scheer in 
Washington. Harris was also trying to reach Scheer; he could not find the 
head PAD so he called Al Alibrando, who was Scheer's assistant for public 
relations for the manned space flights. Alibrando was not reachable 
either so Harris called Alibrando's home in Maryland to tell Mrs. 
Alibrando to have her husband call the Cape as soon as he could. Then 
Harris left his home and went to the news center of the Cape, arriving 
there about 7:10. Somehow Scheer got the message to call and he phoned 
King. King told him the news and read the prepared press release. Scheer 
agreed with King's message. Then King called Harris for further comments 
about his intended statement to the press. Harris, too, agreed with it 
and it was released at 7:40 (91; 137; 70b). 
It read: 
There has been an accidental fire at Launch Complex 34 during 
the plugs-out test of the Apollo/Saturn 204 involving a fatality. 
More will be announced after next-of-kin have been notified. The 
prime crew was in the spacecraft (69: p38; 91). 
The statement did not say that any astronauts had died, only that 
there was "a fatality." Many reporters criticized NASA later for not 
reporting that the astronauts were dead. But NASA rightly defends itself 
by saying that it was not known at the time if the next-of-kin had been 
told of the accident and the space officials did not want the families 
to find out by listening to the radio or television or from some 
reporter. 1 King, in an interview years later, said that some of the media 
likened the Apollo fire to a Presidential killing, i.e., the media does 
not have to wait for the First Lady to be notified in order to tell the 
public. But NASA stuck to its gun and clearly seems to be in the right 
in this case. Although the astronauts were well-known men, their families 
would seem to be entitled to as much consideration in an accident as the 
families of any other American (91). 
1Many of the NASA officials and astronauts remembered the time 
when Ted Freeman was killed in an airplane crash in October, 1964 and 
his widow found out about his death when a reporter came to the house 
to ask her for some additional information (24: p270). 
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Slayton called his MSC office ten minutes after the fire and found 
his assistant, Don Gregory, and Mike Collins there. After hearing the news, 
news, Collins called astronaut A1 Bean and, together, they managed to find 
some other astronauts who could go to the households of the deceased men 
to inform the families of the fire. Unable to have someone go_to the 
Chaffee home, Collins took it upon himself to go there and break the news 
to the widow. Wally Schirra, who had just returned from a flight, went 
to comfort Mrs. Grissom. As he stood in the house, still in his flying 
suit, he was asked by Mrs. Grissom, "Did Gus get the lemon hung on the 
spacecraft?" 
Schirra assured her that her husband had done that. "Well," she 
said. "I guess now they know what he thought of it" (59: p189; 24: 
pp270-271). 
Shortly after the families were informed of what had happened, 
Slayton was told that they knew. He passed this onto King. With this 
confirmation, King, Haney, Harris and Scheer prepared the second statement. 
this time announcing the names of the astronauts. This statement was 
released at 8:30 that night (91; 69: p40). 
Earlier, at the White House, the scene was different. After the Treaty on 
Outer Space had been signed, President Johnson held a farewell dinner for 
the outgoing Secretary of Commerce, John Conners. Unknown to the 
President, Scheer and Webb were figuring out a way to inform him. Lady 
Bird Johnson recalls: 
During John Conners' 'toast, someone handed Lyndon a folded 
note •••• His face sagged ••. the news was bad and something close. 
When the applause died down, he said,I'''I have to make a sad 
announcement. We have lost three astronauts. Ed White and Virgil 
Grissom and Roger Chaffee at Cape Kennedy. There was a fire in the 
spaceship." He said a brief farewell to the Conners and left for 
the situation room •••• Lyndon did not come home for a long time 
(85: p482). 
Until 8:30 that night, the people at the White House dinner were the 
only other ones besides those connected with NASA who knew that the 
astronauts had died. But the media was trying to get information in any 
manner that it could. Mary Bubb, who worked for Fairchild publications 
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and was a stringer for Reuters News Agency, had been in her home at the 
time of the fire when there was a phone call. A voice said that there 
had been a fire on the pad. She told the caller, "You1re putting me on,1I 
and then the person reiterated his statement. She ran down to the AP 
Bureau, only two doors from her home, and found Jim Strothman, who had also 
just been called. Bubb then called Fairchild and talked them into holding 
their presses for the distribution of news to the electronic media for 
another hour. Without any confirmation from NASA other than the voice on 
the phone, Bubb went ahead and announced to Fairchild that all three 
astronauts were dead. By 8:30, she knew she was right (17). 
In Alabama, UPI reporter Howard Benedict had heard the news and 
tried to get a plane to Florida. There were none available so Benedict 
took a plane to New Orleans, made connections there with a Florida-bound 
plane and arrived in Tampa shortly thereafter (11). 
George Alexander, of Aviation Week, had been with many other 
journalists at a meeting of Sigma Delta Chi, the honor society of 
journalists, when a call came for an Air Force PIO who was at the meeting. 
All the news said was that there had been an accident at the Cape and none 
of the newsmen bothered to take action. Another telephone call came and 
the location of the accident became known--Pad 34. A third phone call 
came and it was announced that the crew of the Apollo spacecraft was 
involved. The meeting quickly ceased as the reporters left the room 
(4) . 
NASA was moving fast. Author Eric Bergaust (who wrote Murder on 
Pad 34) claims that Dr. Gilruth, who was in Washington, ordered a news 
blackout at the Cape and all telephone lines cut off. However, Jack 
King says that he was able to keep his line open and therefore was able 
to continue feeding reports to Harris and others in the PAD. What is 
odd about the stories that Gilruth ordered the Cape sealed is that he 
was the Director of MSC, not the Cape and therefore had no authority 
over the personnel of the Cape. In an interview, Gilruth said he knew 
that the reporters would be trying to get the "biggest story of their 
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lives. 1I If Gilruth did order a news blackout is not known but it is known 
that it was very hard for the reporters to pry much information out of the 
PIOs that night. It was possibly the wisest thing for the PAO to keep a 
closed mouth on the affair since not all the facts were known that evening. 
(91; 12: pp20-22; 48). 
Major General Samuel C. Phillips, head of the Apollo moon program, 
left NASA Headquarters and flew to the.,Cape, ordering an impoundment of 
all equipment and records related to the mission. Administrator Webb 
was busy with several of his headquarters personnel attempting to piece 
together an investigation board. At the homes of the Apollo 204 
astronauts, NASA guards and local police arrived to keep the curious away. 
The parents of Ed White, living in St. Petersburg, Florida, turned off 
their lights and drew the blinds that night. At the home of the elder 
Grissoms in Mitchell, Indiana, the city mayor set up a police guard 
around the house and asked the State Patrol to assist (12: pp20-22). 
At the Cape, the reporters were arriving at the news center seeking 
information about the fire. No members of the media were allowed into the 
Cape proper (because of the demands of the media some years before, the 
news center for Cape Kennedy had been built at the Cape Royal Hotel, 12 
miles from the launch facilities; this had been done because many of the 
reporters did not like to travel to the Cape, far from their hotels, to 
get their news). After the 8:30 announcement containing the names of the 
astronauts, the media learned from the PAO at Cape Royal that: 
--there was no fuel in the rocket nor in the spacecraft 
--some pyrotechnics were aboard but not armed 
--the countdown had not been underway; it had been stopped at 6:28 
--there had been communications problems consistently in the test 
--engineers in the blockhouse had seen the fire via the television 
monitors 
--there were some members of the support team near the spacecraft 
at the time of the fire 
--it took five or more minutes to remove the three hatches of the 
command module under normal circumstances; they were the boost 
protective hatch, the inner and outer hatches 
--the bodies of the astronauts were still in the spacecraft 
--the astronauts entered the command module at 2:00 and the hatch 
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was closed at 2:30. Slayton later changed these times to 2:30 
and 3;00 respectively (69: pp40-41). 
At 10:00 that night, the PAO at the Cape informed the media of the 
names of 27 men who had been on the gantry during the fire and were being 
treated for smoke inhalation. By 10:50, the PAO was able to state that 
25 of these men had been released but two required further treatment. 
At 11:05 (CST), Paul Haney, at MSC, made a small error in stating that 
the spacecraft had been on "internal" power at the time of the fire. 1 
However, the Cape was correctly reporting that the spacecraft had been on 
external power. This was pointed out as a discrepancy by several newsmen 
and Julian Scheer became angry that not only were his PIOs not relating 
their stories to each other's but that some members of the media were 
apparently trying to drive a wedge between the PIOs. 
At the top of the gantry, various NASA officials and workmen 
gathered around the open hatch. Black soot covered everything inside 
the spacecraft. NASA photographers shot pictures and moved away. It was 
not until seven-and-a-half hours after the fire that the bodies were 
removed, a process hampered by the fusion of the spacesuits to the 
couches. Jack King does not remember any of the media requesting copies 
of the photographs of the interior while the bodies were still there (91). 
In Chicago, NASA received help from an old friend but the media 
turned it down. Colonel Shorty Powers was snow-bound at O'Hare airport 
and, after placing several calls, a friend of his at MSC finally reached 
him at a hotel near the airport. At the time, the media could only say 
that there had been an accident at the Cape'with not much else in the 
way of details. Powers' friend told him that he had come from the homes 
of the astronauts and mentioned that NASA officials, other astronauts 
and, in one home, a minister, were with the families. Powers writes 
ISome things are still unclear about this though. NASA has said 
that the spaceship was on external power at the time of the fire. But 
the test schedule that day called for the command module to go on 
internal power at T-15 minutes (15 minutes before the simulated launch). 
At the time of the fire, it was T-I0 minutes and holding so therefore 
the spacecraft should have been on internal power if all was in accordance 
with the procedure called for at the time. However, it stands that the 
command module ~a8 using external power at the time of the accident. 
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in a letter that he knew the media would be informed shortly thereafter 
since the next-of-kin had been told. 
I felt no compunction therefore about trying to move the 
information. More than that, I felt an obligation to try to get the 
information out because it was clear to me that to get it 
piece-meal and probably with great speculation in the absence of 
official information would only make the whole thing more damaging 
to the overall program 
I called one of the network. affiliates in Chicago, identified 
myself and told the news director what I had and that I was willing 
to go on the air either live or taped with the story. First of all, 
he wouldn't believe it was me--and then, much to my chagrin, told 
me that he was getting all the straight information from his sources 
at the Cape--even though he admitted that I had more than he did. 
He would not move the story and after one more call with much the 
same result, I gave up (126). 
At 8:00 a.m. the next day, Saturday, the Cape Kennedy newscenter 
made available more facts for the media, primarily clarification about the 
times of the events of the previous evening. At 9:00 a.m., NASA announced 
that a panel of inquiry had been appointed to study the accident and it 
was to be headed by Dr. Floyd Thompson of the Langley Research Center. 
At 9:45 a.m., General Phillips met the newsmen to brief them on the 
status of the situation and he then answered their questions for 30 
minutes (69: pp41-42). 
That same morning, a piece of paper was laid on the desk of President 
Johnson. It was from a White House staffer, Bob Fleming, who wrote: 
Newsweek is planning its cover story on the astronauts' 
accident, so Normal /-sic-' Milligan is asking about your receipt 
of the news and actions thereafter. 
George '-1-1 agrees that a few facts would show how you keep in 
touch with important activities. 
May we provide this information--if it is correct: 
You were in the Mansion, that Secretary and Mrs. Connors 
and a few friends were there for supper, when the word came by 
telephone. 
You advised the others of the accident, and then left the 
group to dictate telegrams to the families and your public 
statement. 
You then received additional calls and talked with other 
officials throughout the evening as supplemental information 
was received. 
(45). 
I do not suggest we go into details beyond these brief facts 
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President Johnson obviously did not want Newsweek to print such 
items. The next issue of that magazine~ dated February 6~ 1967~ contained 
no reference as to how the President received the information about the 
fire. 
At 3:00 that Saturday afternoon, Dr. Thompson convened the 
investigation board. Jack King sat in on the board's closed hearings as 
an observer who would relate the events twice daily to the media. King 
was not to discuss the findings of the board's members but rather to reveal 
who spoke to the board~ how long the meetings lasted and other peripheral 
information (91; 69: pp41-42). 
On January 29~ at 11:30 a.m.~ the funeral plans for the astronauts 
were given to the media: White was to be buried at West Point~ his alma 
mater; Grissom and Chaffee were to be laid to rest in Arlington National 
Cemetery in two separate services. 
At noon on the same day~ the PAO staff arranged for a media pool to 
be escorted to the launch complex and for a writer and a photographer to 
visit the top of the gantry to see the command module. George Alexander 
said in an interview that there was debate amongst the reporters as to 
who would ascend the gantry and finally it was decided that a . 
representative from a trade magazine would go. It turned out to be 
Alexander. Mary Bubb says that she and Alexander discussed the situation 
between themselves and decided that Alexander would go since he had more 
experience with the manufacturer of the spacecraft. However it was 
decided~ Alexander went to the White Room and saw what had been the 
pressurized tomb of the three astronauts. He was allowed to stick his 
head in the open hatch and look around but not touch anything. He could 
see that the interior had been burned more intensely in some areas than 
in others. When he returned to the ground~ he was taken to the Cape 
Royal Hotel where~ at the newscenter on the tenth floor~ he typed his 
report for the media and NASA then made copies of it available for all the 
members of the media who requested them. A copy of his report appeared 
in Aviation Week. The cockpit~ wrote Alexander~ looked like the cockpit 
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of an airplane which had suffered a direct hit by an artillery shell (69: 
pp41-42; 4; 17). 
The media were taken out to the Capels airstrip the next day to 
view the caskets being loaded in an airplane to fly them to Washington, 
D.C. and New York. At the White House, suggestions were being made to the 
President for him to attend the funeral services of at least one of the 
astronauts (69: p42; 86). 
On that same day, January 30, Julian Scheer decided he had had 
enough with the media trying to drive wedges into the statements of his 
PIOs. He sent Paul Haney a memo that day which was accompanying a story 
written by a UPI reporter. 
The attached from UPI is the first of a number of attempts to 
split our statements on the 204 accident. 
Your comment from here on out is simply: "No comment." 
The Review Board will release all information through Jack 
King. He will confer with proper people and there will be no 
statements from anyone in NASA on this subject. 
The next day, Tuesday, January, 31, the bodies of Grissom, White 
and Chaffee were buried while the rest of the astronaut corps attended. 
Grissom was buried first, with the President standing nearby. His widow 
wore a blue dress and was closely attended to by Wally Schirra. The other 
Original 7 astronauts were also there. 1 A Life photographer caught the 
expression of Mrs. Grissom while she watched the flag that had covered 
her husband's coffin being folded--her countenance was not one of sorrow 
but one of anger in the photograph that appeared in the next issue of 
Life (98: February 6, 1967). 
later that day, Chaffee was buried not far away. His funeral was 
also attended by the President and the men of the third group of 
astronauts to be selected for duty with NASA. As a sidenote, Grissom and 
Chaffee were buried relatively close to the grave of First Lieutenant 
lIn the issue of Life which showed the funerals, astronaut Slayton 
is not pictured at the funeral of Grissom even though he was there. He 
was dressed in civilian clothing and perhaps a picture editor of Life did 
not recognize him. In one situation, he was in line with the other--
Mercury astronauts and the photograph used in Life was cropped so he was 
not visible even though there was space on the page for a larger picture. 
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Thomas E. Selfridge, the first aircraft fatality (98: February 6, 1967). 
At West Point, Ed White was laid in the earth on the grounds of the 
U.S. Military Academy. In attendance were the First Lady, Vice-President 
Humphrey, Mrs. Webb, Air Force Chief of Staff John McConnell and White's 
minister from Seabrook, Texas (98: February 6, 1967; 58: p483). 
The magazines reporting the events of that long weekend obtained 
information in the best way they coul.d. Time erroneously reported: 
The flames were apparently sucked into the astron~utsl space 
suits, kilZing them as soon as they noticed the fire I italics by 
the author for emphasis-I. The three charred bodies were left 
strapped to their couches for more than seven hours ... (159: 
February 3, 1967). 
Newsweek prided itself on being able to change its cover photograph 
in the middle of a press run; the original cover was replaced by a 
photograph of the three astronauts which had been taken a few days before 
the accident by an AP photographer. The writer of that magazine's article 
on the fire was more accurate than most writers when he or she described 
that the astronauts had died from either "incineration or asphyxiation" 
but was inaccurate in the statement that the deaths were instantaneous 
(122: February 6, 1967). 
This brings up two points. One, the deaths of the astronauts were 
not instantaneous but that fact was apparently not known by even the PAO 
for several days, which was past the deadline of many publications. 
Second, eyewitness accounts of the spacecraft with the bodies still in it 
may have led to the assumption that the three men had been burned to 
death. Jack King remarked in an interview in 1977 that the interior of 
the spacecraft had been covered with the soot of the fire, blackening 
everything, including the astronauts I suits and skin, which may have 
given the appearance that the crew had been burned in their suits (91). 
Meanwhile the magazines also concentrated upon another area of the 
fire--the investigation. Some of the press (and later authors of books) 
thought that the idea of NASA appointing its own inquiry board was 
ridiculous--an attempt to whitewash the findings. However, the military 
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investigates its own accidents and so does practically every airline along 
with the Federal Aviation Authority. Likewise companies which have 
industrial accidents tend to conduct their own investigations simply 
because they know more than anyone else about their occupations and 
hardware. Thus, it makes sense that NASA conducted its own investigation; 
who knows more about manned spacecraft than NASA? 
In the same issue that carried ,photographs of the funerals, Life's 
Robert Holz came out on the side of NASA, saying that the investigation 
of the fire was in capable hands. He editorialized that the astronauts 
were not the only test pilots--which is what the astronauts are and were--
who have died in the line of duty; only the week before, wrote Holz, two 
Air Force test pilots had died in accidents (98: February 6, 1967). 
Much of the media attributed their lack of information to NASA and 
they are right. No one knew what had caused the fire and NASA management 
told everyone in the space administration to be quiet to stop any errant 
speculations. The rumors were plenty as it was. One of the rumors was 
that there had been tapes of the last moments of the astronauts, 
indicating that the astronauts had not died quickly and had cried out in 
pain shortly after the one astronaut had announced "Fire in the 
spacecraft!" John Wilford printed this in the New York Times. When 
NASA officials were questioned about this later, the answer was only, "No 
comment." The rumor was correct. Jack King, who had been in the 
blockhouse during the test, did not remember hearing any screams during 
the incident but, three days later, he heard the tapes and the screams 
1 
were there. Paul Haney had told newsmen in Houston only a few hours 
after the fire that it was a "fair assumption" that the astronauts had 
died quickly. The management of NASA might have known about the cries 
on the tapes, as did Wilford's source(s), but when the PAOs were 
confronted with questi·ons about those cries, what else could they say 
IThese tapes would later prove to be very valuable to Mrs. Grissom 
in 1971 when she sued North American Rockwell,-the manufacturer of the 
command module, for $10 million for negligence in the construction of the 
spacecraft. 
258 
except "no cOfll11ent" if they had not been informed by NASA's hierarchy? 
Likewise about the "instant deaths." If the PIOs knew, then the PAO was 
at fault for covering up information but if they did not know, then the 
blame lies with the management of NASA. Finger pointing goes every which 
way on this account: Webb talked to some of the PIOs the day of the 
funerals and said he had not been told of any tapes containing the 
cries of pain. Scheer said Haney had not told him but Haney claims that he 
did inform Scheer about the cries (17; 66; 137). 
Some NASA personnel knew a great deal about the fire soon after it 
had happened and Scheer's "No comment" rule applying to all the centers 
was a wise one. This was meant to cut down on speculation yet at the 
same time it may have increased it since the official lines of 
communication with the media were cut. This forced reporters to rely 
upon their backup means of finding information from NASA. These backup 
means might have been accurate or not; it depends upon how close they 
were tied into the investigation. Howard Benedict, of AP, said in an 
interview that he had his network of "spies" working for him around 
NASA and quite often had to hold clandestine meetings with them so they 
would not be fired by NASA or receive reprimands. Mary Bubb, of 
Fairchild publications and Reuters, indicated a similar use of sources 
within NASA. 1 
Obviously NASA was not the only source from which reporters could 
garner information. There were the contractors for Apollo. John C. 
McClintock, Chief of the Program Control Division at MSC, issued the 
following upon the contractors as well as NASA personnel on January 
31, 1967: 
Subject: Speeches and news releases on the Apollo program. As 
a subject of the recent accident involving spacecraft 012 and in the 
interest of the Apollo program, contractors are asked to have their 
~ordon Harris, in his book, Selling Uncle Sam, writes that some 
newsmen occasionally monitored the shortwave radio communications used by 
the personnel at the Cape, including guards, truck drivers, firemen and 
"others who talked too freely on the air." Therefore, a reporter did not 
(need just a system of willing informants to provide information for,stories 69: p201). 
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personnel refrain from participating in any of the following 
activities pertaining to the Apollo program until such time as the 
investigation has been concluded: 
Speeches (except currently scheduled courses of instruction or 
familiarization) 
Presentation of technical papers 
Publication of articles in periodicals or technical journals 
Holdings of news releases 
New releases 
The above policy also applies to coverage on all systems, 
subsystems and operational methods ..•. 
Public information activities of the contractors in response to 
pressure from news media must be closely coordinated with MSC 
Public Information Office. Information release should only be in 
response to query and must not be or lead towards speculative 
conclusions concerning the accident. Responses by public information 
employees should follow specifically documents already in the public 
domain (90: p328). 
When the PAO of the MSC received the memo, a staff member called 
NASA Headquarters, which issued a new set of rules on February 2, 1967 to 
supersede those of McClintock's: 
1. During this period of time we realize that all Apollo 
associated personnel will be questioned about the 204 accident. 
This matter is in the hands of the Review Board and no speculation on 
causes or probable cause is proper. However, we feel that speeches 
per se should not be forbidden. The speaker must stay away from 
those areas about the accident which speculate on causes ... but 
dissertations about the program in general and specifically about 
the role of the individual contractors is all right. Discretion must 
always be exercised but there is not a blanket embargo. 
2. There should be no embargo on technical papers now 
scheduled .... Presentations ... which could tend to have contractors 
or NASA defending a position should be looked at carefully and 
coordinated with Apollo office. 
3. All of these papers ,-articles in journals and 
periodicals-/ come to NASA for clearance for technical accuracy and 
will continue to be examined in that context. Contractors should 
not stop present commitments and should continue to prepare ~uch_ 
articles for publications in the normal_course of its wor~L sic-1. 
4. None are presently scheduled L press conferences-1. If 
there is a desire to hold news conferences, contractors should 
discuss it with the center's public affairs office. 
5. All news releases are presently cleared for technical 
accuracy /-by~ the Center Public Affairs Office. This continues 
and contracts-'-sic-/ should continue to submit news releases 
considered of public interest. There is no desire to stop the flow 
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of public information in NASA or the Apollo program. 
6. Contractors understand the responsibility of the Review 
Board. The desire is not to hamper the Board in its work, and to 
refrain from speculation. We are keeping the doors of our 
contractors open to the press, responding to queries and 
demonstrating to media the equipment presently used and under 
development. This material is presently in public domain. Press 
relations should continue to be carefully coordinated with the center 
public affairs offices. 
Signed, George Mueller, Associate Administrator for MSF I-Manned 
Space Flight-I; Julian Scheer, Assistant Administrator for Public 
Affairs (90:-pp328-329). 
NASA was not creating a total news blackout as some people have 
claimed but it was attempting to hold down the loose talk and rumors. 
The messages were clear: there would only be one part of NASA whose staff 
would comment upon the accident and that was the Review Board under Dr. 
Thompson. Until the Board made its findings public, everyone else in NASA 
was to remain silent. This irritated the media. Some reporters claimed 
that they had a right to know what killed the astronauts. At the time, 
the public possibly wanted to know also but until things were completely 
cleared up and understood by the Review Board, not much could be said. 
In a letter, Paul Haney describes the months following the fire and 
the effects upon the NASA community. 
I-King-I sat.in on most of the 204 Board hearings but, 
characteristically, they kicked him out when they took critical 
actions. 
Immediately after the fire--like about a week after it--Joe 
Shea and I went to New York and had long, off-the-record but 
informative chats with various news people. We spent two hours in 
Whyte's Bar on 57th St. with Cronkite. Had a long lunch with Dick 
Witkin of the Times at the Harvard Club. And Jim Kitchell assembled 
the NBC crew for long evening confab. We told them all we knew 
about the fire, probable cause, etc. 
Then the whole information effort halted for about five or 
six months. The engineer types loved it. They'd say, "We can't 
say a thing until the board makes its report. 1I As a result, we 
were never able to get out info on the tremendous amount of work 
that was going on inhouse during the spring and summer of 1967 ... 
like capsule fires under controlled causes ... development of new 
materials for space suits and capsule interior, etc. 
We suggested and held an anniversary dinner for Shepard on 
May 5, 1967, to try to get people to come out of themselves a little 
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again. About 400 attended. It was in the hotel across from MSC. 
Sort of roasted Shepard (we put together a special gag film called, 
How to Succeed in Business Without Really Flying Much." Shepard 
had his ear problem then and wasn't flying at all). Gave him a 
barbecue. Al made a good inspiring speech about all the work that 
had to be done. Von Braun came over for the dinner, in one of his 
rare public Houston visits. He made a good talk too .•• something 
about the work we were involved in was a bit more complicated than 
making shoes .•. all told in that wonderbar /sic~ apP'le stcudel /sic-/ 
accent of his. No one from Washington was~invlted (67). --
The manner in which the PAO handled the news about the fire provided 
a the~is subject for D. Brent Clement, of Brigham Young University, who 
was working on a master's degree. In 1968, Clement published his thesis: 
the conclusions of which follow: 
1. Considering its purpose as outlined by management, the 
Public Information Branch is being operated on an overage or above 
average manner. 
2. The space agency does a better than average job of 
recognizing the interest of newsmen. Elaborate facilities are 
provided. 
3. NASAls information program has definite goals and 
objectives, although they could be more specific. 
Inherent problems revealed are: 
1. The personal integrity of program personnel is questionable. 
However, much of the blame is shifted from the PAO to NASA 
management. 
2. In emergencies, NASA personnel lack the personal courage 
required of good public relations practitioners. 
3. NASA Information programs could more effectively explain 
and justify the actions of management. At present, this is not 
considered an important function. 
4. The agency should be more concerned with two-way 
communication. Little is done to analyze what the public would like 
to know. 
5. NASA needs more specific short-term, intermediate and 
long-term goals and objectives. Present goals and objectives are 
too general to be effective. 
6. The space agency has been ineffective in anticipating 
public reaction. Little is done to anticipate trouble before it 
begins. 
7. NASA could improve its public image by utilizing a more 
extensive research program. Presently, little or nothing is 
done (23). 
As is known by anyone who studies the events of that spring of 1967, 
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NASA took a beating on Capttol Hill in Washington, D.C. when several 
disclosures showed the laxity of NASAls management and how it attempted to 
cover up many aspects related to the fire, most notably, the Phillips 
Report. This report, written by General Samuel Phillips in late 1965, 
describes how loose the entire operation around Apollo was yet practically 
everyone who appeared before the Senate hearings committee denied ever 
hearing of such a report, or ever of hearing previous warnings about North 
Americanls progress with the project (90: ppl13-114). 
The image of the astronauts remained intact for the most part, but 
the fire shocked the nation into realizing that the men could really die. 
It might sound crude to read it in such terms but the public seemed to 
have the image of the astronauts as being almost gods, that they could not 
do anything wrong nor perish. The thought almost seemed to be that if 
astronauts died, it would be in their airplanes or in space but not on the 
pad. Astronauts do not die on earth, they fade away in the skies. 
Mrs. Grissom wrote in her book, Starfall: "They tried to make them 
look like perfect American boys. Well, in most respects they were, but 
they were human, too, just like the rest of us" (59: p114). 
As an ironic footnote to all of this, the hatch that was on the 
Apollo 204 command module came about as a result of Liberty Bell 7. The 
designers of the Apollo spacecraft preferred a hatch that did not open 
quickly. They feared an easily opened hatch might cause a repeat of 
Grissom's first flight; hence a more secure hatch that could not be 
removed with just a flick of the wrist was installed. As time went on, 
even before the fire, the designers had second thoughts about the triple 
hatch, along with a number of elements in the command module. Forty-five 
changes were planned for the spacecraft; 36 of them had been taken care 
of by January 27,1967. Of the six remaining changes, one was a new hatch. 
(98: April 24, 1967). 
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THE SECOND INTERIM 
The mission which Grissom, White and Chaffee were to fly was 
scheduled for February 21, 1967 but the first Apollo flight took place 
in October, 1968. Some people regard the fire as being the cause for 
delaying Apollo for a year and a half but Mike Collins writes that the 
fire had no effect upon the timetable of the moon landings. He states 
that the first lunar landing would have occurred in the middle of 1969 
even if the fire had not happened. That is how things in the space agency 
were during that time. The fire caused many changes in the Apollo command 
module but the lunar module, not affected by the fire, was not ready for 
a checkout flight until the spring of 1966 (24: p275). 
Things were not going well for the Russians either. While the 
Americans were not launching any manned flights during 1967, the Russians, 
who had not launched any cosmonauts into space for a couple of years, 
launched a new type of spacecraft, called Soyuz, on April 24, 1967 with 
only one man aboard (the Soyuz is capable of holding up to three 
cosmonauts). Tass was remarkably reticent about the progress of the 
flight, indicating that not all was going correctly. The cosmonaut, 
Vladimir Komarov, who had flown in Vokhod-1, was having trouble controlling 
the spacecraft and, after 18 orbits, elected to reenter the atmosphere. 
At an altitude of about four miles, Komarov's Soyuz unfurled its 
parachutes but they failed to deploy properly. At a speed of nearly 
300 mph, Komarov impacted upon the soil of his country and was killed 
(153: ppI49-150). 
In the U.S., Joe Califano sent a confidential message to President 
Johnson on April 24 concerning the cosmonaut's death. 
Webb and Katzenbach both believe it would be a good idea to 
send an astronaut and his wife to the Soviet funeral for their 
cosmonaut. Webb recommends Frank Borman ..•. Katzenbach said that, 
before any announcement is made, there should be a check made 
quietly with the Russians to avoid embarrassment. He needs prompt 
authority to send a cable to L-U.S. Ambassador / Thompson in 
Moscow so the check can be made. If you approve, I will tell Nick 
to send the cable (18). 
President Johnson approved the attempt but the Russians did not, 
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saying that the funeral was purely an internal affair. The Russians, who 
had feared "counter-propaganda" from the West, found none, but only 
sympathetic messages from allover the world. 1 Jim Webb sent a message 
urging closer cooperation between the Soviets and the Americans, 
suggesting that such efforts might have prevented the deaths of Komarov 
and the Apollo 204 astronauts. Similar to Apollo 204, a State Commission 
was appointed by the Soviet government to study the Soyuz accident (153: 
pp159-160) • 
Despite the apparent setback given to the Russians, they still had 
some thoughts about going to the moon. In May, 1967, astronaut Mike 
Collins and Dave Scott went to the Paris airshow and met cosmonauts 
Belyayev and Konstantin Feoktistov. A crowd gathered as the men met and 
soon the Russians proposed a way to get away from the autograph seekers; 
nearby was a Russian plane which the men hopped aboard and sat in, 
surrounded by Soviet security men as they talked with vodka in their 
hands. It was then that Belyayev remarked that he and other cosmonauts 
had been practicing helicopter flights--something required for lunar 
touchdown--although the Russians would not admit that. What he did 
admit was that he soon expected to make a circum-lunar flight (24: 
PP279-280).2 
Meanwhile, in the United States, the astronauts received a setback 
of sorts. On May 2, 1967, Field Enterprises Educational Incorporated 
announced that it would not renew its four-year contract with the 
astronauts for their personal stories. The Washington Post reported the 
news that day and added the fact that when Field pulled out~-on August 
31, 1967--the astronauts' incomes would be reduced by $10,000 per family. 
This shows how misinformed some of the media still were. There were 54 
astronauts and six widows (who were still being paid under terms of the 
IThe Russians had good reason to fear what the American press might 
have to say. Before Komarov crashed. he used his flight for propaganda 
purposes, praising "the courageous Vietnamese peoDle for fighting aqainst 
the bandit aggression of American imperialism" (8: pl35). 
2Be1yayev never had the chance. In January, 1970, he died of 
complications following surgery for stomach ulcers. 
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contracts) at that time and that number was to be divided into Field's 
maximum payment of $320,000 per year for the group. Thus, each family 
was receiving approximately $5333 per year from Field (168: May 2, 1967). 
Another aspect of the story was Field's reason for quitting. The 
official excuse was that there were too many astronauts for the contract 
to be practical anymore, i.e., the amount that each astronaut was 
receiving might not make it worthwhile in his eyes to pay allegiance to 
Field. Writer William Sherrod claims there was another reason: Field was 
suffering financially from the contracts. 
Partly this was due to hard luck ... the first manned Gemini 
flight was scheduled for November, 1963 but as the program fell 
further and further behind, Field found itself paying out over 1 
$1 million (including expenses) during the flightless doldrums. 
Newspaper syndication never caught on as expected, and the sale of 
books about the Gemini program and the astronauts' families were 
even more disappointing. Foreign syndication ... was bette~ but 
after four years, Marshall Field 4th / the owner of Field / 
found that he had spent about $3 million--which exceeded receipts 
by a substantial margin (26: May/June, 1973). 
Jim Godbold, who had helped to negotiate the original contracts for 
Field in 1963, says that Sherrod is wrong. Godbold said in an interview 
that while Field had published only one book by the astronauts during the 
time from 1963-1967 (the book by Grissom--Gemini), the official reason 
was the correct version of why Field decided not to renew the contract 
with the astronauts (52). 
At the time of the announcement, Bailey K. Howard, President of 
Field, was reported in U.S. News and World Report as saying, 
To cover the personal stories of the astronauts who are not 
in the program, together with their families, has become extremely 
difficult and quite unlike the undertaking originally assumed, 
which involved only the seven original astronauts and the second 
group of nine (163: May 15, 1967). 
If Howard really believed this, then he had to have been naive not 
IHowever, it would seem ,that Field had to have known that the first 
Gemini flight would not occur until late 1964--this was public knowledge 
in the summer of 1963 when Field was negotiating the contracts with the 
astronauts and NASA (the Original 7 astronauts had argued with President 
Kennedy for another Mercury flight then to kill the l8-month gap). If 
Field knew, then maybe Sherrod made a typographical error and meant 
November, 1964. 
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to think that more astronauts would be added to NASA for future flights. 
This author tends to think that both Sherrod and Godbold are correct to 
a degree: the astronaut corps had grown too big for Field's money to have 
that much of an impact, especially with the earlier astronauts who 
remembered receiving $10,000 per year from Field, but with only one 
book having been produced for Field in four years, Field was possibly 
hurting from financial losses as well. 
While the U.S. astronauts were losing money, the Russian government 
was earning money because of its cosmonauts. The Saturday Evening Review 
carried an article in its May 13, 1967 issue describing how the Russians 
finally learned from Life the technique of selling stories. Writer 
William Shelton reported that for $100 a reporter could talk to a pair of 
Soviet space pilots while for $25,000 a news medium could arrange to 
interview a crew that had just returned from an epic flight, such as 
would have been the case for talking to Leonov following his space "walk.1I 
The only people who could do this were bonafide journalists and the 
payment had to be in U.S. dollars, not to the cosmonauts, but to the 
Novosti Press Agency. It was obvious that the Russians knew how to 
exchange public interest in their space programs for cold cash; they had 
been watching the American astronauts do it for eight years (133: May 13, 
1967) . 
On May 22, 1967, Betty Grissom wrote President Johnson a letter, 
suggesting that MSC should be renamed for her husband. The thought was 
not entirely her own as she states in that letter, "This idea has been 
brought to our attention L-the family's:! from people allover the world. 
It is our hope and prayer that you will also feel that Gus deserves this 
honor. II The President directed NASA Administrator Webb to handle the 
reply, which was to carry Johnson's signature (60). 
MSC was never renamed as the Grissom Manned Spacecraft Center, 
as Mrs. Grissom desired. Instead, Bunker Hill Air Force Base in Indiana, 
Grissom's home state, was named for him in May, 1968. In the early 
1970s, MSC would be renamed for President Johnson, who died in February, 
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1973. 
On June 6, 1967. another astronaut died. Major Edward G. Givens, 
one of the 1966 group of pilot-astronauts, was returning to his home from 
a party of the Birdman's club (the fraternal organization of Air Force 
pilots) when he was killed in a car accident. Again. the old 
military uniforms that the astronauts rarely wore any more were taken out 
of the closets as the men gathered to qury another of their kind (24: pSI; 
123b: pI60). 
For some years. the Air Force had a project underway involving its 
own astronauts. to be used in conjunction with NASA but for Air Force 
purposes. The Air Force wanted to put a large space station into orbit 
and from there monitor the earth with its astronauts. The astronauts of 
the Air Force belonged to what was called the Manned Orbiting Laboratory 
(MOL) and they were separate from NASA yet in some regards they were 
treated in a manner like their NASA cousins. One of the MOL astronauts, 
Major Robert Lawrence. was asked to participate in a Chicago parade. to be 
held on August 12. 1967 but the Air Force said no. The explanation to 
the Undersecretary of the Air Force from the Director of U.S.A.F. 
Information. Brigadier General William C. Garland, is as follows and 
illustrates the difference between NASA's astronauts and those of the 
mi 1 i tary. 
The parade is an annual affair, sponsored by the Chicago 
Defender, a Negro newspaper, and the parade takes place in general 
in the Negro area. Colonel Springer, our Chicago representative, 
advises that there is normally a large turn out by the Negro 
populuation, that the parade has sort of a folklore and Christmas 
Santa Claus approach. In past years there has been some difficulty 
by military participants. i.e., comments from spectators and 
objects thrown at the military by spectators .... Colonel Springer 
is less than enthusiastic over Major Lawrence's possible 
participation, although he does not anticipate any difficulties .... 
In the past, our MOL astronauts, after their initial press 
conference on selection, have been "under wraps" with no public 
visibility. A precedence would be established by permitting Major 
Lawrence to attend this function and could result in many demands 
for our MOL astronauts which could have an impact upon this 
sensitive program. In the past we have turned down requests, as 
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has NASA with their astronauts, based on the fact that the heavy 
training schedule would not permit public appearances. 
If political or other considerations are not overriding, I 
recommend we turn down this request on the same basis that we have 
used in the past (46). 
Major Lawrence did not participate in the parade on the basis that 
he was too busy. But the main point in using this letter is to show that 
whereas NASA conducted an open operation in fron of the entire world 
along with putting its astronauts into the open, the Air Force kept its 
men lIunder wraps" for whatever purposes were needed. The author does not 
know anything about MOL other than what has already been stated but a 
reason to keep the MOL astronauts out of public circulation was to keep 
them from talking or having to say IINo comment ll in reply to reporters I 
questions. Space was to be used for peaceful purposes and the military 
was not to enter into it, as stipulated in the treaty signed by the U.S. 
and other countries on the day of the Apollo fire. It was for this reason 
that the Air Forcels astronauts were kept out of sight, in the opinion 
of this author. 
On October 5, 1967, an astronaut left Florida to return to Houston 
when he lost control of his plane. At supersonic speed, the white, 
needle-like T-38 dove into the ground killing the pilot. Note NASAls 
manner of handling the following press releases, much in the same way as 
the Apollo fire. 
October 5, 1967 
HOUSTON, TEXAS -- An astronaut was reported killed about 
1:30 p.m. EDT today in a crash of a T-38 near Tallahassee, Florida. 
The plane was returning to Houston from Cape Kennedy. Details of 
the crash were lacking. Identification of the pilot was withheld 
pending notification of next of kin (116: MSC 67-57). 
October 5, 1967 
HOUSTON, TEXAS -- Astronaut C.C. Williams, Jr., 35, was killed 
about 1:30 p.m. EDT today in a T-38 crash near Tallahassee, Florida. 
There were no details immediately available on circumstances 
surrounding the crash. 
Williams, a Marine major was flying by himself in one of 23 
T-38 jet aircraft used by the astronauts. He had left Patrick AFB, 
Florida at about 1 p.m. bound for Ellington AFB adjacent to the 
Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston. He planned to make a gas stop 
at Brookley AFB at Mobile, Alabama (116: MSC 67-58). 
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The second announcement listed the members of the Board of Inquiry 
who had already been appointed to study the reasons for the crash. Within 
two hours of the first announcement, all signs of Major Clifton C. 
Williams, Jr., were removed from the astronaut office. His name plate was 
removed from his office door and his mail box. A file full of photographs 
of Williams for autograph seekers was emptied. Other astronauts called 
home to let their wives know that theY,were safe (123b: pI58). 
The next day, another announcement was released to the media, giving 
details of the upcoming funeral. Later that day, a fourth announcement 
about Williams was produced at the PIO, stating that there would be a 
memorial service for the astronaut at a Catholic church near MSC. In 
Washington, D.C., Julian Scheer sent an outline of the funeral plans to 
George Christian at the White House, lIin case you want to pass it to the 
appropiate people ll (139; 116: MSC: 67-59, 67-60). 
The following Monday, six astronauts went to Washington, D.C., to 
act as pallbearers for Williams' body when he was buried at Arlington. In 
Dickinson, Texas, the remainder of the astronaut corps attended the 
memorial mass for him; the men sat at the rear of the church and they 
were the first people out. Overhead thundered four T-38s, saluting 
the fallen astronaut (123b: pI60). 
On November 9, 1967, a number of NASA personnel gathered in the 
morning hours at the Cape to watch another missile being launched. This 
was not just another missile but the missile, the one destined to take 
men to the moon; it was the Saturn 5. The Cape officials had tried to 
launch the unmanned space booster the previous month but had encountered 
various delays. Now, on that Thursday morning, the towering gantry 
rolled back from the rocket that stood taller than the Statue of Liberty. 
If things went wrong, there would be a fireball 3000 feet in diameter. 
The force of the explosion would throw heavy objects as far as three miles 
away; this is what made NASA officials decide to put spectators about 
three and a half miles away from the gantry. At 7 o'clock that morning, 
the five engines of the Saturn were ignited and 15 tons of fuel per second 
spouted into flame. Richard Lewis describes the event: 
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Up went the rocket, clearing the launch tower, piercing the 
sky. Fires burned allover the launch tower and dense smoke rose 
from the pedestal. The ground began to shake as though an 
earthquake had started ..•• The shock wave smote observers three and 
a half miles away like a giant fist .••. Telephone receivers danced 
in their cradles .... In the concrete and steel control center, 
plaster dust began falling on the consoles. Werner von Braun was 
bell owi ng, "Go Baby, GO! II Part of the roof and a window in the CBS 
trailer began to fall in on commentator Walter Cronkite as he was 
describing this stupendous scene. He kept on talking while others 
in the trailer held the roof and window (97: pp401-410). 
Columbia University's Lamont Geological Obervatory at Palisades, 
N.Y. reported that the Saturn 5 launch produced such shock waves there, 
75 minutes after launch, that they were ~xceeded only by the nuclear 
testing of the Russians and the Americans, the Krakatoa volcano explosion 
in 1883 and the fall of the Siberian meteorite in 1908 (97: p410). 
On January 29, 1968, a Florida newspaper, Today, which bills itself 
as being "Space-Age," printed a front page editorial as a memorial tribute 
which said, "One year ago, the men, their faith, their hopes turned to 
charred embers in seconds." On the second page, a Today reporter wrote 
that the astronauts had burned to death. Although it was known by then, 
the media kept using the phrases that referred to the Apollo 204 
astronauts as having been burned to death. Not only were newspapers and 
magazines using the phrase but so were those who should have known better. 
McGraw-Hill's Encyclopedia of Space, published in 1968, mentioned the 
astronauts were "burned to death." Former astronaut Brian T. O'Leary 
(a scientist-astronaut selected in August, 1967 with ten others) stated 
the same in his book, The Making of an Ex-Astronaut. So did other 
astronauts. Wally Schirra wrote an article for Life in December, 1968, 
saying "Ever since Gus Grissom, Ed White and Roger Chaffee ..• were 
incinerated during a routine test." Maybe it was simply easier to say 
that the men had died as a result of their burns, which was not the 
case. They had died of asphyxiation. Period (90: p49; 123b: p160). 
It was close to a year after the accident that another astronaut, 
:~1ajor Lawrence of the MOL program, died in an airplane crash. Three 
other MOL astronauts had died in early 1966. 1 The widows of these pilots 
INone of the MOL astronauts died in space, 
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were not paid $100,000 (split equally by life and Field) as were the widows of 
dead NASA astronauts. The black magazine Ebony printed pictures and a 
short story concerning the funeral of America's only black astronaut. No 
other publications mentioned his passing (36: February, 1968). 
On March 27, 1968, the first man in space, Yuri Gagarin, died in the 
crash of a jet trainer in the Soviet Union. The mid-sixties seem to have 
been a deadly time for anyone to have been an astronaut or cosmonaut. It 
appeared that the odds were finally catching up with everyone (153: p25).1 
On April 23, 1968, the PAO at MSC released a bulletin announcing 
that, for the fourth time in NASA's history, an astronaut was leaving the 
ranks. Bri an T. 0' Lea ry, who had been wi th NASA since the previ,ous 
suntner, claimed that "flying just isn't my cup of tea." This seems to be 
O'Leary's real and main point although there was dissatisfaction on his 
part towards NASA's attitude towards the scientist-astronauts. He 
claimed that NASA preferred to use the pilot-astronauts for the missions 
and it would be up to ten years before any of the scientists would fly in 
space. O'leary was close. The first group of six scientist-astronauts 
had been selected in the summer of 1965 and one of those six, Harrison 
Schmitt, flew in December, 1972 on Apollo 17 and several more of the men 
flew in the Skylab missions in 1973-74). There has been talk by others 
that the scientist-astronauts were ridiculed at times by the pilots, 
saying that the scientists had no reason to be in the astronaut corps. 
Loudon Wainwright wrote in life in 1970 that Shepard was accused as being 
unsympathetic towards the scientist-astronauts when it came time to tell 
them that they were disqualified from a flight and that he also told 
jokes about them. A confidential source said in an interview that some 
of the pilot-astronauts with NASA at that time did not care for O'Leary 
and they care less for him today because of his book, which is rather 
lThis is not meant to be a reflection upon space flight. It does 
illustrate, however, that military flying is a high risk occupation. 
The astronauts flew aircraft much more than they flew spacecraft so it 
might be said that the chances for them being hurt or killed while in 
aircraft were greater than while being in spacecraft. 
272 
critical of NASA in places. 1 The source also said that the 
pilot-astronauts like to take O'Leary flying at times just to get him air 
sick (116: MSC 68-32; 123b: p200; 98: July 31, 1970). 
In May, 1968, one of the astronauts checked into a Los Angeles 
hospital using an assumed name. He did not want anyone to know he was 
there because of the mail he might receive. Another possible reason is 
that he was of the Christian Science religion, a sect that does not believe 
in the use of medicine to cure any ailments. The operation he underwent 
was to relieve an old problem with his inner ear, which had been keeping 
him off balance just enough to keep him off flying status. The astronaut 
realized that the moon flights were approaching and he wanted to be on one 
of them. In a .television interview sometime later, the astronaut said 
that he had not given up his religion by having the operation; if members 
of other religions can do things that they do not believe whole-heartedly, 
then he could have an operation and still retain his faith. The man was 
Alan Shepard and, after years of being grounded, he was back in the 
running (161: January, 1971). 
During the interim between Apollo 204 and Apollo 7 (the first 
manned mission of the series) there appeared to be not much happening 
in the way of publicity about the astronauts. Toward the latter portion 
of the interim, the publicity that existed was geared toward the flight 
of Apollo 7. This was the flight where the Apollo project, NASA and 
North American Rockwell would finally clear themselves of the fallout 
that had covered them since the Apollo fire a year and a half before. 
1The Making of an Ex-Astronaut. Boston, Houghton, Miffling, 1970. 
273 
THE FIRST OF THE SUN 
The publicity that surrounded the astronauts of Apollo 7 and their 
mission began when the Apollo 204 astronauts died. Wally Schirra, Donn 
Eisele and Walter Cunningham made up the backup crew for Apollo 204 and, 
upon the deaths of the others, moved into the prime crew position. Their 
appointments were duly noted in Time and Newsweek in the issues that 
carried the news of the Apollo fire tn,early February, 1967. After the 
fire, the first manned mission to Apollo was constantly in the news as its 
launch date kept slipping back and back. 
On May 9, 1967, Life came out with photographs of the Apollo 7 
astronauts and their families. Once again, Ralph Morse photographed the 
pictures. The stories in that issue were not written by the astronauts 
but were only about them. Walt Cunningham was described as having 
callouses on his hands from pulling himself by the bootstraps so much. 
Donn Eisele, however, was lithe most relaxed character around." Schirra, 
the veteran of two flights in space and soon to be the only astronaut to 
fly in all three series, was written up as being the astronaut who loved 
to play "gotcha" jokes on everyone and would "most likely ... have to go 
on a diet to squeeze himself into the ship." Why Life chose that early 
of a time to write the stories about the crew is not known. Perhaps 
Life wanted to fill up some empty time in the U.S. space program or 
perhaps Life thought the crew was going to be launched sooner than they 
were (98: May 9, 1967). 
Meanwhile, NASA was at work too in relation to the publicity around 
the flight. Paul Haney describes some of the efforts of the PAO in a 
letter: 
A few months before Apollo 7, we scheduled several major 
press activities involving the crew. 
One was in Sacramento at an Aeroject plan! where they made the 
S-IVB L-the third stage of the Saturn 5 rocket-1 •... 
We had another press conference with the Apollo 7 crew at 
Downey in the same room, etc., where weld held a similar one with 
Grissom's crew two years before. We also did a safety press 
show at the Cape, showing the new egress safety lines from the 
spacecraft. And we did something up in Dover, Delaware, at 
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International Latex, with Walt Cunningham to show off the new 
suit L-that was more fire-resistant than previous suits I. In 
short, we did more with the 7 crew than with most other Apollo crews 
because we were looking for the reassurance factor and the Schirra 
crew was more agreeable to do press things than most of the crews 
to follow (67}.1 
Before Apollo 7 was launched, there were a couple of occurrences 
that attracted the attention of space watchers. One was on the ground. 
On September 16, 1968, NASA Administrator Webb announced that he was going 
to step down from his post effective October 7, 1968, his 62nd birthday. 
It may have been expected that he would retire if the Republicans won 
the upcoming Presidential elections but the early retirement caught some 
of the press off-guard. In an interview, Webb said that he had known since 
the previous December that President Johnson would not run in the elections 
and it was then that Webb decided to leave NASA (Webb claims that the 
President told him of his decision not to seek re-election). In Webb's 
place would step Dr. Thomas O. Paine, who would act as the administrator 
until a person could be found to assume the post permanently (97: p432; 
170). 
The second bit of news came from Russia. On September 21, a 
satellite, Zond-5, landed in the Indian Ocean. That may not seem like 
anything important but it was the first man-made object to go around the 
moon shooting photographs and return safely to earth, having been launched 
on September 16 (153: p21S). 
Shortly before noon on October 11, 1968, a Saturn IB missile 
launched the Apollo 7 astronauts into orbit around the earth. Mike 
Collins describes it in a variety of ways: 
L-Wally's-j Apollo flight was especially gutsy, com~ng after 
a fatal fire but that spacecraft wouldn't dare blow up wlth Wally 
on board.... It marked the end of the slippage in the program, 
the end of a series of target dates which were discussed but never 
tIn the letter, Haney also wrote the author, " ... we had an 
explosion of the S-IVB in a captive run on Friday, January 20, 1967 ... one 
week to the day before the 204 fire ... almost one week to the day down to 
the minute. It wrecked the test stand and took about a year to get back 
in operation (67). 
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met, an end to the fire-damaged talking phase of Apollo .... 
The flight itself was kind of a bore compared to the three-day 
Gemini ... flights .... Wally, Donn and Walt chatted and fussed their 
way around the world 163 times (24: pp59, 300). 
The PAD had a small run-in with one New York reporter during the 
mission when a bulldozer in Maryland inadvertantly cut the communication 
lines to the Goddard Space Center, which serves as a backup to MSC in 
case the Houston base should be incapacitated. The first report of the 
cut was immediate--NASA had lost data information but not voice 
communications from the center, according to PIO Bob Gordon. During that 
time that the communications were partially lost, a PIO kept commenting 
about what was happening and when all things were restored to operating 
fully again, the PIO corrected a few errors that had been made. At this 
point, the New York reporter demanded that NASA tell him what had been 
said originally. The PIO simply refused to tell him anything concerning 
the first, error-laden report, saying that he did not have to give it to 
him. The matter ended there (53). 
During Apollo 7, there was a ~hange in the procedures made without 
the astronauts knowing about it. The air-to-ground communications went 
live. Until that mission, everything had had a six-second delay.1 From 
now on, all communications would be live except for a one-second delay 
which was necessary for the lip-synchronization to match the visual 
images on the televised pictures (103; 140). 
There was an item onboard Apollo 7 which caught the attention of the 
world--a television camera inside the command module that could 
broadcast pictures to earth with only a split second delay. Not everyone 
in NASA favored the presence of the camera. NASA Historian Jim Grimwood 
writes: 
via 
One piece of equipment got aboard Apollo 7 .•• in spite of the 
insistence of the engineers that it was not needed and the. 
ambivalence of the test-pilat-oriented astronauts. This was the 
television camera .... '-the-' device had been_going in and out 
of the craft '-since design concepts in 1964-1 as though it were 
lExcept for the passes in Gemini where the astronauts were informed, 
IHF-6," that they were being broadcast live to the world. 
276 
caught in a revolving door •...... most of the engineers viewed TV 
cameras only as nice things to have .....•. equipment considered 
as luxury items got axed. There were those who persistently argued 
for the inclusion of the camera. 
NASA personnel in charge of the public information activities, 
Scheer in Washington and Paul Haney in Houston, consistently favored 
the use of TV (56: p505). 
So did one of Joseph Shea's assistants, William Lee, who wrote in 
the spring of 1964, 
I take typewriter in hand to plead once more for including 
in-flight TV .... Since I-it-I has little or no engineering value, 
the weight penalty must be assessed against a different set of 
standards than is customary in such tradeoffs. One of the 
objectives of the Apollo program is to impress the world with our 
space supremacy. It may be assumed that the first attempt to land 
on the moon will have generated a high degree of interest around the 
world .... A large portion of the civilized world will be at their 
television sets wondering whether the attempt will succeed or fail. 
The question before the house is whether the public will receive 
their report of this climatic moment visually or by voice alone 
(56: p505). 
The first Saturday morning of the flight, the ground controllers 
told Schirra to turn on the television camera, which had not been 
scheduled to be turned on until Sunday evening. That order produced 
an explosion of sorts between ground personnel in the control room and 
the astronauts, most particularly Schirra. 
Schirra: You have added two burns to this flight schedule, you have 
added a urine water dump, and we have a new vehicle up here and I 
tell you this flight TV will be delayed without further discussion 
until after the rendezvous Iwith a spent booster-I. 
Capcom: Roger, copy. - -
Schirra: Roger. 
Capcom: Apollo 7, this is Capcom Number One L-in other words, 
Slayton was on the line 1.1 
Schirra: Roger. -
Slayton: All we have agreed to do on this is flip it. Apollo 7, 
all we have agreed to do on this particular pass is to flip, flip 
the switch on. No other activity associated with TV. I think we 
are obligated to do that. 
Schirra: We do not have the equipment out, we have not had an 
opportunity to follow setting, we have not eaten at this point, 
1 
Remember Collins' remark about when Slayton came on the radio 
during Gemini 10. 
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I still have a cold, I refuse to foul up our time lines this way 
(178: pp149-150). 
Schirra held to his word and refused to turn the television camera 
on. F1 i ght Di rector Chri s Kraft "got madder than he 11 , II remembers PIO 
John McLeaish. Years later, Schirra talked about the decision he had 
made that Saturday morning. 
Three guys were killed because of a short and we did a number 
of things to prevent this I-from'repeating-/. The television was 
something that we had never checked out in-orbit before and shortly 
after we were in orbit •.. they wanted us to turn the TV on. We did 
not have this on the flight plan for that time .... They told us, 
IIJust turn the switch on," but we weren't going to do that. The 
s£acecraft was using pure oxygen at that time .... We were in a 
L potential-, firebox. That's an easy thing to say--"Turn the 
switch on"--when youlre on the ground because there you can walk 
away from a fire. lIve been in I-television-I studios and have seen 
things short out there. The television was not to interfere with 
the flight plan. My excuse at that time ... was, "I don't want to 
interfere with the Howdy Doody Show" (140). 
Slayton, also in a later interview, agreed with Schirra's decision 
to not turn on the TV, despite Slayton's initial annoyance at Schirra's 
refusa 1. 
Schirra was the commander of his vehicle and he made his 
choice. It was all right •... I would have delayed the TV a day, 
too, if I had known what the schedule had been .... Schirra was the 
commander and knew the situation. We could argue all the time when 
he came back about the camera, we didn't, but he was up there and 
I respect his decision. At the time, no one on the ground really 
understood the situation I-in the spacecraft I (152). 
Meanwhile, on the ground, reporters were badgering the astronauts I 
physician, Dr. Charles Berry, about how he planned to cure the colds of 
the astronauts, which were obviously helping to make them irritable (in 
turn, irritating the ground controllers). Finally, Berry had enough of 
the questioning and snapped, "If I knew how to cure the common cold, do 
you think I would be standing here talking to you gentlemen? I would be 
sailing on my private yacht!'~ (97: p436). 
On Sunday evening, as was originally planned, the Apollo 7 
astronauts not only turned on the television camera but, despite their 
colds, turned on the charm as well. Schirra had cards printed with such 
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slogans as "Keep those cards and letters coming, folks," and he welcomed 
the viewers into the corrrnand module with the comment, "From the lovely 
Apollo room, high atop everything." Schirra had become the ham again, the 
warm astronaut many people loved. Together~ the astronauts made their 
presentation known as liThe Wally, Walt and Donn Show." It was a hit. 
There were more shows throughout the rest of the flight (97: p438; 159: 
October 25, 1968). 
The change in the flight schedule caught up with the astronauts again 
after the first television show and Schirra exploded once more. 
I have had it up to here today and from now on, I am going to 
be an on-board flight director for these updates. We are not going 
to accept any new games ... or do some crazy tests we never heard of 
before. Each I-new-I test is going to be reviewed thoroughly before 
we act on it" T97: p439). 
All that the ground controllers could say to that outburst was 
simply, "Roger." 
Schirra, not realizing that his voice was being carried live by the 
networks, became upset again at another time. He told the ground 
controllers, "You won't miss a hell of a lot if you don't get it here. 
We did not get the results you're after. We didn't get a darn thing 
in fact" (8: pI36). 
The press seemed concerned about Schirra's attitude towards the 
mission and the ground controllers. To the reporters, who were worried 
about the tension between the astronauts and the men in the control room, 
Paul Haney laughed off the situation with, n ••• something happens to a guy 
who grows a beard I-the flight was 11 days 10ng-1. Next thing you know, 
he starts to protest .... 11 The members of the media laughed and left the 
issue alone except for referring to it in future articles (97: p439). 
Mrs. Schirra was learning how to handle the reporters while her 
husband was in space. She had gained some experience with the news media 
with two other missions already completed. The wife of the space veteran 
had gone to the airport during an early part of the mission to pick up a 
friend and the reporters pursued her, ruining the occasion. To prevent 
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this from happening again, Mrs. Schirra made a deal with the media--if 
she posed for a picture of her picking up the morning newspaper, she could 
go on a shopping trip without any harassment from the reporters. The 
correspondents bought the idea and, that day, Mrs. Schirra went shopping, 
sans reporters (98: November 1, 1968). 
There was one reporter who was allowed into all the homes of the 
Apollo 7 families--Oora Jane Hamblin of Life. She had written some 
articles about the astronauts during earlier years (such as recording the 
emotions of the people in the galleries during John Glenn's speech before 
Congress) and was now a close friend of many astronaut families. It was 
not until February, 1967, that she actually had been given control of 
fulfilling the contract for Life. Her control came about as a result" of the 
October, 1965 New England power failure which blackened the offices of Life. 
She writes of what happened in the editorial offices of Life that night: 
We were sitting around, shooting the breeze when Phil Kunhardt, 
then an assistant managing editor, suggested it to me almost as 
a dare. I don't know what compelled him to choose me ...• As a 
wild guess, I thi~k perhaps he made the decision because I was known 
as a hard worker, that I get on well with people, and that I knew 
absolutely nothing about the kind of technology required to hurl a 
capsule at the moon. I have always suspected that Phil--or others 
others--thought I would work hard at trying to understand and that 
maybe, if the scientists could make it clear to an ignoramus like 
me, I could then, in turn, make it clear to the millions of Life 
readers who were probably as ignorant as I. Just a guess (6~ 
Hamblin eavesdropped on the families a lot over the next few 
years. During Apollo 7, she described Mrs. Eisele as having a "face 
full of terror" during the launch and worrying about her husband's 
flight. Lo Cunningham, wrote Hamblin, played cards and slept well. Jo 
Schirra never lost her "serene exterior" but developed a painful 
headache at one time. Hamblin was one of the best Life writers ever 
assigned to cover the astronauts, in the opinion of this author. Loudon 
Wainwright is also considered,to be another one of Life's top writers 
(98, November 1, 1968). 
Other happenings were taking place on the ground. At the White 
House, Joe Califano received a message from Larry E. Levinson, another 
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White House staffer. In the message, Levinson asked if the astronauts 
were to be promoted one grade higher upon their return, an event that 
was promised during the early Gemini flights by President Johnson. 
However, the plan, as originally conceived, was that no astronaut would 
be promoted to a rank higher than colonel in the Air Force and Marines 
or captain in the Navy. Levinson wrote, 
If this policy prevails, then the only change would be a 
promotion for Eisele from Major to Lt. Colonel. NASA, as you know, 
gives non-promotional awards to its civilians and possibly a 
special award in this case to Schirra I-who was already a Navy 
captain-I. -
Am-I safe in assuming that this was the way we will handle 
Apollo? (96). 
The answer was yes (96). 
There were other requests made at the White House. On October 
21, the television and radio networks wanted to know, an hour in advance, 
if possible, if they could transmit live any messages that the President 
might say to the astronauts the next morning when the astronauts returned 
from space. President Johnson replied in the affirmative (22). 
However, in reply to a NASA request, which he considered ludicrous, 
one White House staffer, Charles Maguire, wrote, "Someone at NASA should 
be put into orbit for this piece of junk" (102). 
Throughout the flight, most things had gone well, causing General 
Phillips to remark later at a press conference that the flight was 
"one hundred and one percent" perfect. But there were some small 
mishaps that had occurred during the mission. Just before the launch, 
someone at the gantry had carelessly let an escape elevator malfunction, 
thus removing an avenue of emergency egress in case of an accident. 1 
There was also a failure in the electrical distribution system of 
the spacecraft for a short while as even the backup system failed to take 
over properly, causing the ground controllers to reactivate the primary 
IAnother means of quick escape from the rocket was a slim wire 
that went from the spacecraft to an underground safety shelter located 
a few thousand feet away. In case of an accident, the astronauts 
would hook onto the wire and slide to safety (if they did not die of 
fright on the way down). And there was always the escape tower on top 
of the spacecraft which could take the entire command module off the 
rocket and drop it into the ocean a few miles away. 
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system. The ground controllers were alarmed enough at this that they 
ordered the astronauts to fire their big Service Module Propulsion 
System engine (SPS) to bring them 30 miles closer to the earth; in case 
of another failure, the astronauts could return home with a minimum use 
of power. There were difficulties with the biomedical sensors attached 
to the men's chests; Major Eisele reported that the wires of his sensors 
were heating up. There were about 50 minor mishaps of one sort or 
another. But, overall, the mission was deemed a success. Perhaps the 
best aspect was the firing of the SPS engine eight times during the 
flight. If any Apollo was going to go to the moon and back, the engine 
would have to work or else. Just or else. Nothing more needed to be 
said (90: pp289-291). 
On October 22, the astronauts were due to return but Schirra 
wanted to add another twist to the reentry procedures. The colds were 
still plaguing him and the others in the spacecraft. Because of that, 
they wanted to keep their helmets off so they could clear their eardrums 
as the air pressure inside the spacecraft changed during the descent. 
Ground said no because the astronauts I heads would not be properly 
supported--the couches had been designed for the men to use with their 
helmets on, not off. Schirra insisted on no helmets, telling Slayton 
that in case they died, "You can wear black armbands as long as you want 
but I don't want to put that helmet on." Once again, Schirra won and. 
on the way down through earth's atmosphere. the astronauts equalized the 
pressure in their eardrums. None suffered any injury because of what 
they did (90: P288; 140). 
They splashed down near the aircraft carrier Essex and President 
Johnson called them. His words were not only heard by the astronauts 
but by all of America. Eisele became a Lieutenant Colonel and awards 
were given to Schirra and Cunningham. Only upon their return to earth 
did the crew members realize that their words to the ground controllers 
had been heard live by the entire world, which surprised Schirra. He 
was also surprised at the fuss made by the media about his comments 
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while in space, especially about the refusal to turn on the television 
cmaera. He talked about his feelings later in an interview with the 
author: 
Having the delay was beneficial if you wanted to say something 
emotional or had a disagreement with someone and did not want it 
broadcast to the public. It was not that the talk was containing 
anything confidential but it was between air and ground, which 
was nothing that the public would be interested in listening to. 
Airlines don't fly with the guys in the cockpit having their 
voices being broadcast to their passengers. It may be cockpit 
chatter but those guys wouldn't be flying anymore, you can place 
bets on that. 
Essentially that's the way it is with the spacecraft. But 
when someone has to comment on the mission, it should be the guy 
in the cockpit. He's the guy in charge, he knows what's going on. 
The "Voice" should have been the guy in the cockpit, not someone 
else. 11m saying that in bitterness (140). 
The magazines printed their stories quickly. Time wrote about 
the astronauts: "they fought off ennui as they plodded through the 
humdrum housekeeping and engineering duties necessary to prove their 
craft moonworthy .... For astronauts and space watchers alike, the high 
points of the week were the television shows." Life was forced to hold 
back on the personal stories until its December 6, 1968 issue. It was 
in those pages that Schirra openly criticized NASAls planners: "We 
were much too busy ... for a first flight. It's easy to get cut from a 
flight crew but it is difficult for them to cut you down once youlre in 
flight." Here, Schirra again defended his decision to not turn on the 
television camera that one morning. Most of his article was spent 
defending the crew's decisions. A person might have wondered if the 
ground controllers should have been given equal time. Then, Schirra 
alluded to the image of the astronauts, reporting that during the 
flight, when feeling dirty and grubby, he had turned to Cunningham and 
said, "Just think, people think welre up here dashing around as space 
heroes." In the end, Schirra finally admitted that he and other 
astronauts were not like other men--he put his pants on two legs at a 
time--in space, of course. 
Eiesele wrote much about the computer and the problems encountered 
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with it. He wrote about it continually, all the way through his 
description of the reentry, when the computer finally died. Cunningham 
wrote about the physical aspects of weightlessness and how difficult it 
had been for him to sleep in space. Along with that, he discussed the 
space food and the cleanliness of the spacecraft during the flight. He 
also speculated on living a full life and mentioned the effects of the 
G-forces that had acted upon the astronauts during the ascent and descent 
(98: December 6, 1968). 
Dora Jane Hamblin had a hand in those stories too. She did not 
write them and neither did the astronauts. The men had dictated them 
into tape recorders or to Hamblin. She writes, 
In the case of the "flight stories " in Apollo, which were 
signed by the men but written by me, my primary concern was 
separating the important, salient and/or most interesting 
developments so that all three men did not tell the same story. 
I would tell them first to give me any personal reactions, then 
divide up the territory, so to speak, to let each develop a theme 
on part of the flight. Their own preferences obviously entered 
into this: one guy had the lunar module as his responsibility, one 
the command module, one the navigation, etc. 1I (64). 
Hamblin was not even allowed to take the stories to Life's offices 
for the editors to look at until the astronauts had held their first 
post-flight press conference. After that, along with NASAls clearance to 
make sure that no new technical material was being released, Hamblin 
took the stories to the editors, usually copy editor Joseph Kastner 
and managing editor George Hunt. However, she did not have to clear 
the stories with NASA that carried her own byline. She also stated that 
there were no guidelines given to her by either NASA or Life as to how 
she was to write her own stories or what questions she was to ask the 
astronauts (64). 
On October 27, 1968, the Russians closely followed the Apollo 
mission with another space shot, their first successful manned mission in 
many years. Georgi Beregovi, piloting his first mission in Soyuz 3, 
rendezvoused with the unmanned Soyuz 2 spacecraft. However, he did not 
dock with it, to the consternation of the Soviet public. It was thought 
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that the officials did not want to take such a risk with the Soyuz at 
that time. Like Apollo 7, Beregovi televised the images of the 
rendezvous and the interior of his spacecraft to the Russian populace. 
After more than 94 hours in space, the cosmonaut returned safely to 
earth (153: ppI62-166). 
On November 4, 1968, it was reported in Aviation Week that the 
Apollo 7 astronauts had shot more than 700 photographs during their 
mission. Then the writer noted: 
The mission used a very high-resolution film developed for 
Air Force reconnaissance satellites ... the Defense Department, 
State uepartment, Atomic Energy Commission and other agencies, for 
the first time, demanded seats on the NASA board selecting 
photographs for release (10: November 4, 1968). 
The U.S. chose to not release all of the photographs. There was 
speculation that the photographs would reveal certain mineral deposits 
somewhere on earth and touch off a "buying boom." In London, British 
scientists and engineers argued that the U.S. refusal to release the 
photographs was the best argument that the Europeans had to develop a 
launching facility and systems so they would not have to rely upon the 
Americans. The United States defended its decision because, lithe 
State Department does not like to release photographs of foreign 
countries, the Pentagon is worried about views of military installations 
L-belong to what country?:! and the AEC does not want its nuclear 
facilities shown ... " (10: November 4,1968).1 
On November 6, 1968, NASA published a policy statement concerning 
the release of information in future accidents. There would be an 
immediate announcement of tbe accident, said the statement, but the 
names of the victims would be held until the next of kin were notified. 
If the relatives were near the installation where the accident had 
occurred, then the notification of names would be given to the media 
INot too long after the, flight of Apollo 7, some citizens in 
Maine sent a request to NASA asking for a photograph, taken from 
space, of their state. NASA replied that no photographs of Maine 
were available. The citizens still wanted a photograph of their state 
and turned to another source--the Soviet Union. Sure enough, the 
Soviets supplied the desired photograph without much problem. 
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within one hour after the dispatch of information to the relatives. If 
the relatives lived farther away, then up to two hours would be allowed 
after the message had been sent to them before the news would be given 
to the media. That covered all personnel, not just the astronauts. But 
in case the astronauts were involved in another accident: 
Procedures for public announcement of domestic casualties 
not related to space flight involving astronauts will be the same 
as for all other NASA personnel except that the MSC must be advised. 
If injury or fatality occurs in flight, provision will be made to 
advise the family but in no circumstances will the information be 
delayed more than 20 minutes (69: p43; 103). 
In ~id-November, the temporary administrator of NASA, Thomas 
Paine, told the nation the news about the next Apollo mission. It had 
been designed to be a repeat of Apollo 7 but there had been rumors since 
the middle of the previous August that Apollo 8 would orbit the moon. 1 
On November 12, Paine made the news official. Apollo 8 would orbit the 
moon. There could be no lunar landing as the lunar module, necessary for 
a descent to the moon's surface, was not ready yet. But America was 
finally going to the moon (24: p294; 97: p440). 
10n August 19, 1968, the newswires had carried some stories that 
Apollo 8 might circle the moon. There was definitely support for this 
idea among NASAls employees. They looked upon the mission as simply 
changing the apogee (the farthest point of an orbit from the earth) from 
4000 miles to 250,000 miles, the distance to the moon. 
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FINALLY, AN AMERICAN FIRST 
Many Americans must have felt secure in that their country was 
finally going to do something first in the space race, which seemed to 
be going full steam again, despite the deaths of cosmonauts and astronauts. 
The Russian scientist Sedov had told the IAF in New York City on October 
25, 1968, that the Russians were not going to the moon. Then Beregovi's 
flight had touched off speculation in the West that the Russians were 
gearing up to go to the moon anyway.1 On November 10, lond 6, another 
Russian moon satellite, went to the moon, orbited it and returned 
safely to earth. Thirteen days later, Tass declared that londs 5 and 6 
were test flights preceding manned flights to the moon. On November 25, 
Ivestia, the Soviet government's newspaper, reported that the lond 
spacecraft, with certain modifications, could carry cosmonauts (90: 
p279) . 
The next day, a UPI report from Moscow stated: 
The Soviet Union is preparing to launch its most spectacular 
manned flight by dispatching shortly at least two, and probably 
three, men on a circumlunar flight. The moon flight, sources said 
today, may be undertaken before the launching of the American 
manned craft, Apollo 8, set for December 21 (162: November 23, 
1968) . 
Finally, on November 29, Tass reported, "Automatic space probes 
always precede manned flights .... The space route earth-moon-earth has 
been opened" (90: p279). 
The statements were more braggadocio than anything else. The 
Russians did not have a rocket as large as a Saturn V, which was 
necessary to put men in orbit around the moon, much less land on it. 
The Russians had not landed any spacecraft on the moon and could not 
be expected to do the same with a manned spacecraft if they had no 
experience (90: p280). 
In an interview, flight director Kraft revealed why the objectives 
IBeregovi's flight was clearly one intended to go only around the 
earth but the thought that he had rendezvoused with another satellite 
led Western observers to think that the Soyuz 3 was a checkout flight, 
similar to Apollo 7 (which was a spacecraft designed for moon flights 
but relegated to earth orbit for that mission) (90: p279). 
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of Apollo 8 had been kept secret until only a month before the flight. 
They I-the Russians-/ knew our schedule for the earlier 
flights but Apollo 8 was-kept quiet. We were aware that the 
Russians would try to get around the moon ... and in the summer of 
1968, we decided to chance on Apollo 8 around the moon. All of 
these problems were to scoop the Russians (93). 
Kraft was right. The Russians were scooped and they were trying 
to impress the world with what they were "doing." 
On December 1, 1968, Life magazine made another deal with the 
members of the astronaut corps. The editors of Life thought that they 
could put together a book about the first moon landing and they offered 
the astronauts $200,000 as an advance against the royalties for such a 
book. This money was in addition to the $200,000 that the corps received 
every year from Life. As he had done before, the astronauts' attorney, 
Paul Sawyer, passed on orders to Alan Shepard to instruct the other 
astronauts that they were not to talk to any non-Life writers about their 
personal feelings, except this time, according to writer Robert Sherrod, 
Sawyer cracked down so hard that lithe newer astronauts were walking 
around with tape on their mouths" (146; 26: May/June, 1973). 
Paul Sawyer talked of the book contract with this author in 1977. 
Until Apollo 8, there had been a dearth of interest in the 
space program for quite a while. But Apollo 8 brought in a whole 
new ballgame--the men were going to the moon. 
We brought in the book contract for the first moon landing 
right before Apollo 8. We were assuming that the book would be 
done by some famous author, whose name would make the book a 
runaway best seller. But, as it turned out, Life brought in two 
of their own writers, who were very competent still (134). 
On December 9, 1968, President Johnson held a party at the White 
House honoring Jim Webb. The Apollo 7 and 8 crews were there with their 
wives. So was Charles Lindbergh. In all, 23 astronauts and their wives 
were at the Presidential Mansion that evening, including Cooper, Schirra, 
Slayton and Shepard. Much NASA brass attended and so did the widows of the 
three astronauts who had died in the fire at Pad 34 (85: p748). 
Time came out with an article about the three astronauts of 
Apollo 8 in its December 6, 1968 issue. The article contained short 
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sketches about the men, their military backgrounds and their activities 
outside of NASA. Poet James Dickey, in another article in the same 
issue, was described as accepting an offer from Life to cover the 
launch. something he did because the astronauts had a deep significance 
to him. Dickey told the interviewer, "I can see life as hardly explored 
yet. These space guys are showing that miracles still happen." 
Time's Houston bureau chief, Don Neff.,wrote that the flight of Apollo 8 
would be greater than the flyby of Mars by Mariner 4. Researcher 
Sydnor Vanderschmitt, in the editor's column, mentioned that her interest 
in space was revitalized because of the upcoming mission (she had 
already worked on 12 other cover stories about space) (159: December 6, 
1968). 
Life printed stories about the astronauts. Dora Jane Hamblin was 
featured in the editor's column; whoever wrote the column stated that 
Hamblin had established a firm relationship with the families of 
Apollo 8. Astronaut Bill Anders. the lunar module pilot (without a lunar 
module to fly), was pictured at ease in the backyard of his home. He 
spoke of having faith in his equipment. Jim Lovell was shown with his 
youngest son, Jeffrey, whom Lovell joked about getting away from for 
a few days in Apollo 8. He also spoke of having faith in his equipment. 
Borman was described as having the right temperment to command the 
mission. He, too, spoke of having faith in his equipment (98: December 
20. 1968). 
At a pre-flight press conference. Borman told reporters that he 
looked upon Apollo 8 as a means to clear the air of all suspicions that 
certain items would not work properly. He also hoped that the mission 
would remove doubts from many minds about sending men so far from their 
home planet for the first time. He said, 
We designed Apollo, we said we were going to the moon ••• and ... 
finally when we get down to examining the details and saying we 
are really going, people start getting a little queasy about it .... 
But I have no hesitancy about the hardware (24: p303). 
Three days before launch, NASAls safety chief, Jerry Lederer, 
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almost undid the efforts to allay fears about the dangers of the flight. 
He said, 
... L-the mission would-I involve risks of great magnitude and 
probably risks that have not been foreseen. Apollo 8 has 
5,600,000 parts and one and a half million working systems, 
subsystems and assemblies. Even if all functioned with 99.9% 
reliability~ we could expect 5600 defects ... (24: p304). 
A person might wonder why there was all this talk about having 
faith in the equipment. It was no doubt on everyone's minds but there is 
no record of orders to intentionally discuss it. It appears to be 
coincidental. Frank Borman, in a letter to this author, denies receiving 
any instructions to stress the safety of the equipment. So did Hamblin, 
who had written the articles in Life's December 20, 1968 issue (15; 64). 
On December 21, 1968, the American people gathered at the beaches 
at the Cape and around their television sets across the nation. Friends 
of the Apollo 8 astronauts, who had received formal invitations from the 
crew, were at the VIP viewing stands three miles from the launch pad. 
Over 1351 journalists had signed in at the Cape to witness the first 
men leave humanity's three-billion-year-old cradle. When the engines of 
the Saturn 5 ignited, the eyewitnesses at the viewing stands could see the 
rocket lift off but heard no sound. Fifteen seconds later the sound 
waves came rippling across the sand and grass dunes and almost knocked 
the people off their feet. Apollo 8 was going to the moon (58; 69: p49). 
Nearly three hours into the mission, the command module was in a 
"parking orbit" around the earth while the astronauts checked their 
spacecraft's equipment. Then they fired the third stage which had 
remained attached to them. For more than five minutes, the engines 
burned fuel, boosting Apollo 8 to more than 24,000 miles per hour to 
escape the pull of the earth's gravity. When almost five hours had passed 
since the launch, Lovell called to Houston about the view witnessed by 
men from the farthest vantage point ever. 
Boy, it's really hard to describe what this earth looks 
like ••. the window is bigger lhan the earth is righl now. I can 
clearly see the terminator / where night meets day~. I can see 
most of South America all the way up to Central America, Yucatan and 
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the peninsula of Florida (118: May, 1969). 
Eleven hours after launch, Borman called Houston and asked permission 
to take a sleeping pill before he went to sleep. Houston concurred and, 
while Borman slept, Anders and Lovell kept busy doing other various 
chores but Borman had trouble sleeping. Soon, Lovell and Anders asked 
Houston for some radio silence so that their commander might sleep better. 
After sleeping about four hours, Borman became sick, threw up and had 
diarrhea. Houston did not know anything about this until the next day, 
when the ground controllers played back some taped telemetry that had been 
beamed down from the spaceship. In that batch of mechanical signals was 
a verbal ship's log made by the crew and, when the controllers listened 
to it, they heard the news about Borman's sickness. Lovell was then 
questioned about Borman by the ground controllers and he agreed with the 
tape. Soon after, Borman requested a private conversation with the 
astronauts' physician. While the regular controllers stayed in the 
primary control room, some others went one floor lower into a duplicate 
of mission control. From there, Dr. Charles Berry and an lIelite group II 
of maybe six men discussed the situation. There was not much to the 
conversation, held in secrecy from the public's ears. Borman was told 
to rest and drink fluids. The Apollo 8 commander blamed his sickness 
on the sleeping pill but the men on the ground thought that it was the 
first case of motion sickness to occur in the U.S. space program. The 
Russians had alway talked about their cosmonauts suffering from it, and 
now the Americans had IIcaughtll it too. The American spacecraft of Gemini 
and Mercury had been too small for the astronauts to move about the 
cabins freely but the Apollo cabin offered plenty of room as did the 
Russian spacecraft. Lovell, too, had suffered some motion sickness 
at the beginning of the flight when he had taken some star readings, 
which required him to leave his seat and move into the lower equipment 
bay but he did not suffer as Borman did (118: May, 1969; 24: pp306-307). 
Nearly halfway to the moon, the crew came on the airwaves with a 
television show. They attempted to photograph the earth but it was too 
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bright for the TV lens to record. Lovell demonstrated how to inject 
freeze-dried chocalate pudding desert with water. Anders showed how a 
toothbrush floated in the weightlessness and Borman seemed healthy 
again, much to the happiness of the controllers and obviously to 
himself (118: May, 1969; 24: p308).1 
At 50,000 miles from the moon, the crew finally could televise the 
pictures of the earth without difficulty and sent back the images. Lovell 
commented that if he was a space traveller from another planet, he would 
wonder if the earth was inhabited. He added that the earth looked like 
a "grand oasis in the great vastness of space II (118: May, 1969). 
After three days of flight, Borman surprised some people on earth 
by stating that the astronauts had not seen the moon yet since their 
windows were painted away from the small planet. With 17 minutes to go 
before the spacecraft disappeared behind the moon that Christmas Eve 
Day, it was still 1300 miles from the lunar surface. When five minutes 
were left, the astronauts had only 670 miles to go. Then Apollo 8 was 
gone from the view of the earth. Behind the moon, with no way to inform 
the ground controllers, the astronauts fired the SPS engine for more 
than four minutes to slow the spacecraft into a parkin~ orbit around the 
moon (118: May, 1969). 
When the command module reappeared and was in contact with earth 
again, Lovell described the view. 
Houston, the moon is essentially gray, no color. Looks like 
Plaster of Paris. Sort of grayish sand~ ... Co~ing up now are 
the old friends Messier and Pickering / craters / that I looked 
at so much on earth. And I can see the rays coming out of 
Pickening. They look quite faint, like changes in the mare 
L-lunar material / (118: May, 1969). 
A few seconds after Lovell spoke, Anders added his thoughts, 
saying, " .•. Earthshine is about as expected, Houston. Not as much 
detail of course as in sunlight, but you can see ... (118: May, 1969). 
IHowever, the pictures from Apollo 8 failed to convince ~he Flat 
Earth Society in London that the earth was a globe. They consldered the 
televised images to be showing only a flat disk (118: May, 1969). 
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During the second orbit around the moon, the astronauts turned 
their television camera on and transmitted pictures of the moonls surface 
to the earth. The astronauts continued to add their own commentary 
to the views . 
... The color of the moon looks like a very ~hitish~ray, like 
dirty beach sand with lots of footprints on it I Anders I . 
... There is no trouble picking out features that we learned 
on the map /-Lovell~ (118: May, 1969). 
In the third orbit, Lovell rested, Borman navigated and Anders was 
busy shooting still and motion pictures. The astronauts made a mistake 
in the photography assignments. They were supposed to shoot some black 
and white film through various color filters except they mixed up the 
films and ended up shooting some color film through the filters, ruining 
that batch of film (118: May, 1969; 123b: p129). 
While they orbited the moon, Borman read a prayer into the shipls 
log which was to be recorded on the ground and given to his Episcopal 
Church in League, Texas, where he was a lay preacher. Six hours after 
the television broadcast, Houston called Apollo 8 and told the astronauts 
what the reaction to the television show had been on earth. 
Your TV program was a big success. It was viewed this morning 
by most of the nations of your neighboring planet, the earth. It 
was carried live allover Europe including even Moscow and East 
Berlin. Also in Japan and in North and Central American and parts 
of South America (118: May, 1969). 
The flight of Apollo 8 also caused a first of another kind to be 
scored by the Americans. Radio Havana rebroadcast a transmission of the 
Voice of America, which had carried a tape of Apollo 8 1 s mission. Never 
before had that happened. 
However, the reception was not equally shared by some sports 
enthusiasts who had been watching a football game. The astronauts and 
ground controllers had kept in mind what had happened earlier in December 
when a television show, Heidi, had inadvertently cut into the telecast 
of another professional football game--the protests had been voluminous. 
Apollo 8 1 s broadcast from the moon caused a similar, smaller storm of 
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protest when about 2000 callers complained to CBS in New York about the 
disruption. Even in the astronauts' own neighborhoods in Houston, the 
television program failed somewhat to draw the children to the TV sets 
sets--Santa Claus was going through the streets at the same time, 
providing competition (8: p146). 
In the 85th hour of flight, on Christmas Eve, the astronauts sent 
another telecast to earth. Each man took a turn describing what he 
saw as the electronic eye of the camera scanned the lunar surface, only 
70 miles below. Then, as the spacecraft approached the terminator where 
there was sharp contrast, Anders said, "For all the people back on earth, 
the crew of Apollo 8 has a special message that we would like to send 
to you." With each astronaut speaking a part, they read the beginning 
verses of Genesis and then wished everyone a Merry Christmas (118: May, 
1969). 
Their reading of the Bible caught everyone off-guard. The chief of 
the PAO at Cape Kennedy, Gordon Harris, wrote in his book, 
The spontaneity of timing increased the impact of their action 
while also triggering a shrill protest from agnostics who tried 
to convince the federal court that astronauts had no right to 
express religious sentiments in outer space. That backfired 
against the atheists when thousands of God-fearing people petitioned 
NASA to allow the astronauts freedom to do as they wished. Action 
protest and reaction made news (69: p61). 
A Japanese newsman called a PIa to request a copy of the script 
from which the astronauts had read. The PIa referred the foreign 
correspondent to the Gideon's Bible in the reporter's hotel room. For 
JUlian Scheer, the reading of the Biblical passages was lithe biggest 
thrill" of his life and he still considers it that way. For many 
people, their emotions possibly paralleled what Scheer had felt. 
Apollo 8 had come at the end of a very depressing year. Vietnam was 
dragging on. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy lay slain by 
the hands of assassins. Chicago's Mayor Richard Daley had unleashed his 
IBorman later considered the reading of Genesis to be a success 
because a Catholic--Anders--had read the King James version of the 
Bible. 
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police upon the protesters at the Democratic National Convention, 
turning it into shambles and perhaps costing that party the Presidential 
election. The flight to the moon was an optimistic note on which to 
end the year (90: p305; 8: p155; 137). 
After the television show that evening, Apollo 8 disappeared behind 
the moon a few more times and then, during the last time that it was 
hidden from earthlings ' sight, the big SPS engine burned again for about 
three-and-a-half minutes. As the spacecraft came into radio contact 
with earth, Lovell called out, "Please be informed there is a Santa 
Claus!" (118: May, 1969). 
On their way back, the astronauts transmitted one more television 
show, about 110,000 miles from earth as their speed was increasing due 
to the pull of the earth's gravity. From the end of the telecast until 
about 30 minutes before the reentry, there was not much excitement on the 
recorded log of the spacecraft. Apollo 8 approached a very narrow 
corridor in which to enter the earth's atmosphere. If the ship plunged 
too steeply, it would burn; if the astronauts aimed too high, they would 
bounce off the atmosphere like a stone skipping off water to be lost 
forever. At 25,000 mph, Apollo 8 hit the outer fringes of earth's air 
and became a fireball of 5000 degrees as the astronauts had aimed their 
path for reentry perfectly (118: May, 1969). 
When they hit the water, the men in Mission Control went wild. The 
controllers waved tiny U.S. flags and started smoking their traditional 
post-flight cigars. Miles away, the astronauts were hoisted into 
helicopters and taken to the aircraft carrier Yorktown, which was 
floating near the splashdown point. It was a momentous occasion for 
everyone (118: May, 1969; 24: p312). 
Congratulatory messages poured into the U.S. from across the world. 
The Soviet Union and other Communist nations sent them too. Everyone 
was impressed by the flight., Dr. Gilruth remarked in an interview later, 
"When Apollo 8 got to the moon, the race ended. We had really broken the 
back of their [-the Russians'~ opposition •... That was the driving 
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force." What Gilruth meant was that it had been the Russians who had 
provided the impetus for the Americans to go to the moon. Flight director 
Kraft said that once Apollo 8 was flown, it was easier for the rest of the 
flights to be accepted by the public as there was now confidence in the 
ability to send men to the moon (118: May, 1969; 93; 48). 
The media went wild too. Newsweek carried a composite photograph 
of the Apollo 8 astronauts, their spacecraft and the moon on its cover 
for the January 6, 1969 issue. That issue contained the televised 
pictures and scenes of the astronauts I wives and children. The story 
was complete, even to the point of telling how the astronauts had 
increased their speed accidentally by venting urine overboard. There 
was a special section describing how the craters on the far side of the 
moon acquired their names. u.s. News and World Report had a subheadline 
announcing the "trail-blazing flight of men from earth around the moon 
and back. The journey packed with 'firsts ' almost guarantees Americans 
will walk on ... the moon by mid-1969." The usually non-emotional 
news magazine wrote that the astronauts "made it seem easy. They were 
cool, non-ruffled--even laconic in tone." The editors of that magazine 
had a quote about the astronauts from NASA Administrator Tom Paine: lilt 
was a triumph of the squares." Borman said, "We1re the last of the good 
guys. II The magazine carried brief biographies of the astronauts, content 
to describe the mission more than the men! But without the men, the 
media would not have had the interest in the mission that they did. 
The international competitiveness showed when the writers of U.S. 
News and World Report pointed out that the three Apollo 8 astronauts had 
more than twice the time in space of the entire Russian cosmonaut team. 
Ironically, the usually fact-conscious magazine slipped when it reported 
that the astronauts had to cope with the cold and heat of space, as if 
they were personally fighting them all the way to the moon and back. 
Such was not the case; the spacecraft took care of that job for them. 
The only trouble the astronauts encountered was their motion sickness 
(163: January 6, 1969; 122: January 6, 1969). 
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The next issue of Newsweek carried eight pages of Apollo 8 color 
photographs of the moon and the earth. Accompanying the photos was a 
a short comment, including the following paragraph. 
Home safely from the moon, Apollo 8 astronauts Frank Borman, 
James A. Lovell, Jr. and William A. Anders found themselves 
relentlessly earthbound last week. They had to submit to endless 
briefings and confront ....... mail and telegrams ... all proof that 
their lives will never again be free of the moon's influence (122: 
January 13, 1969). 
National Geographic joined the crowd of publications printing 
stories about the mission. Its May, 1969 issue was packed with photographs 
and the article was written by General Phillips, the Apollo program 
director, who used radio transcripts (including those of the television 
shows) and his own commentary to describe the flight (118: May, 1969). 
Time named Anders, Borman and Lovell as its liMen of the Year." It 
reported that although the men had not erased the other events of the 
year, they had overshadowed them. They were also privileged, said 
Time, to put their names alongside of Lindbergh, Captain Cook, Marco 
Polo and the artic explorer, Amundsen. The Apollo 8 astronauts "risked 
their lives," and had "courage, grace and cool proficiency .... " Time 
also commented that in the wake of the "rollicking Wally, Walt and Donn" 
show, Apollo 8's television shows seemed businesslike, almost staid yet 
exciting (159: January 3, 1969). 
On January 6, 1969, astronauts Mike Collins, Buzz Aldrin and Neil 
Armstrong were called into Deke Slayton's office. As they stood there, 
Slayton simply said, "You're it." They knew what he meant--they were 
gOing to land on the moon (2: p201).1 
On Janaury 9, 1969, the Apollo 8 astronauts journeyed to 
Washington, D.C. to meet President Johnson at the White House. When 
the President presented medals to the astroanuts, he said that they 
represented all nations, all races, all religions and all of the 
ICollins had originally been a member of the Apollo 8 crew until 
he had to undergo an operation for a pinched nerve in the neck. He was 
replaced by Lovell. In turn, Collins, upon verifcation that the neck 
operation would not impair his flying abilities, was put back to the 
Apollo 11 crew, bumping Fred Haise, the original command module pilot for 
that mission (24: pp312-313). 
297 
ideologies of the people of earth. In return, the astronauts presented 
the President with a photograph of his ranch, taken from the vicinity of 
the moon. Following the White House ceremony, the astronauts went to 
Capitol Hill where they addressed a Joint Session of Congress. They then 
went to the State Department where the men held their first post-flight 
press conference. Julian Scheer introduced the men and stepped away 
quickly to let them answer the questions thrown at them by the reporters. 1 
After that was finished, they retreated to the White House once more for 
the last big bash thrown by the President. Not only were the Apollo 8 
astronauts there but so were all other astronauts, past and present. 2 
That same day, it was officially announced that Collins, Armstrong and 
Aldrin would be the men going to the moon on Apollo 11 (24: p312; 137; 
122: January 13, 1969). 
The next day, the Apollo 8 astronauts continued on a journey that 
might have been harder than the one they had flown to the moon--the 
journey of tours, speeches, handshakes and interviews. They went to New 
York City for a tickertape parade on IIApollo Way (Broadway was renamed 
for that day)1I and a visit to the United Nations. They then put in 
appearance at football's Super Bowl. Next there was a parade in Houston. 
A spot in President Nixon's inaugural parade was saved for them, complete 
with a command module and a replica of the lunar module. The old days 
of NASA had returned. The American public thought so too. After years 
of absence, the heroes were back (122: January 13, 1969). 
lAll of the crews flying the remainder of the Apollo flights would 
now hold their post-flight press conferences at the State Department (137 
(137). 
2 Except John Glenn. See p142. 
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THE CHECK-OUT FLIGHTS 
On January 14, 1969, the Russians went at it again, launching 
Soyuz 4 into earth orbit with cosmonaut Vladimir Shatalov aboard. The 
next day, another Soyuz was launched, carrying three cosmonauts, Yevgeni 
Khrunov, Boris Volinov and Alexei Yeliseyev. The day after Soyuz 5 was 
put into orbit, the two ships docked, achieving the first linkup between 
two manned spaceships. As the spacecraft docked, Volinov made a bad 
choi ce of words and broadcast to the world, "He IS /-Shata 1 ov in Soyuz 4-:./ 
raped us ll (153: p169; 159: January 24, 1969)_ 
After the docking was completed, cosmonauts Yeliseyev and Khrunov 
transferred to Soyuz 4, thus effecting the first crew exchange in space. 
Aviation Week reported that the cosmonauts had studied how a rescue 
mission would be performed if one was ever necessary_ On January 17, 
Soyuz 4, with its expanded crew of three, returned to the soil of Russia 
and on the next day the lone Volinov followed suit in Soyuz 5 (153: 
ppI69-176; 10: March 17, 1969). 
Apollo 9 was due to be launched on February 28, 1969 but it was 
postponed for three days because the astronauts had caught the common 
cold. The delay caused by the colds cost NASA $1.5 million. On March 
3, astronauts Dave Scott, Jim McDivitt and Rusty Schweickart were ready 
and walked to a van from their suiting room to be taken to their command 
module, sitting more than 300 feet above the ground. A few hours after 
they were sealed inside the spacecraft, their large Saturn 5 vibrated 
the ground and roared into earth orbit (8: p159). 
The purpose of Apollo 9 was to check out the lunar module in 
orbit around the earth. In the shadow of Apollo 8, this flight seemed 
less dramatic. Even flight director Kraft mentioned that fact, yet 
added that Apollo 9 IS fl i ght was more complex and II is even more 
dangerous than Apo11 0 8" because of the work required of the astronauts 
in maneuvering the two spacecraft apart and together (90: p204; 8: p159). 
The "less-important ll attitude towards Apollo 9 prevailed throughout 
the media. Although the flight was more complicated than the previous 
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flights, it lacked the excitement that Apollo 8 had generated. Two 
hundred fewer journalists (1,107) than had been at Apollo 8's liftoff for 
the moon witnessed the launching of Apollo 9. After the flight, only 
15 articles about the mission would appear in magazines as compared to 
33 which had been written on Apollo 8 and 21 about Apollo 7 (127: March, 
1968-February, 1969; March, 1969-February, 1970). 
When the command module (CM) separated from the third stage of the 
Saturn, the astronauts turned it around and docked with the lunar module 
(LM), which was nestled in the upper portion of that stage. Slowly, they 
withdrew it from the unit and, later, astronauts Schweickart and McDivitt 
entered it to "power up" the LM's systems. Eventually, the astronauts 
separated their two spacecraft to a distance of 100 miles and docked again 
after a chase around the earth. Once the rendezvous had been completed, 
the mission was 97% accomplished. 
Another aspect of the mission called for Schweickart to put on a 
Portable Life Support System (PLSS) backpack, which would be used by 
astronauts on the moon's surface, and make his way from the LM to the CM 
while the spacecraft were docked. He was to do this to see if the 
transfer could be completed in case the tunnel joining the two spacecraft 
became impassable. 1 But before Schweickart could step outside the LM, he 
became sick and vomited twice while still inside of the spacecraft but not 
in a totally enclosed spacesuit. NASA ordered the spacewalk forgotten 
lest Schweickart vomit in his helmet, blinding himself or perhaps even 
suffocating to death. Another request for a private conversation 
came from the astronauts and, once more, a group of select individuals 
went to the alternate control room to discuss the situation. This time, 
the astronauts did not want it disclosed to the public that Schweickart 
was sick. They were embarrassed and resented the public disclosures 
of the astronauts suffering diarrhea and nausea. Slayton wanted to 
hold back the news of the private conversation but Gilruth and others 
said no--it had to be released. Soon, there was a begrudged compromise 
IThe astronauts in the LM had to return to the CM since the CM was 
designed to reenter the earth's atmosphere; the LM could not do this as it 
was not able to protect the crew from the heat of reentry. 
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and Gilruth ordered the release of a statement paraphrasing the 
conversation. The astronauts were furious. Said one astronaut on the 
ground, 111111 never tell the ground a God-damned thing from up there. 1I 
The situation went before Tom Paine (who had just been appointed as the 
permanent administrator of NASA) and he ordered a IIhold ll to be placed upon 
the information. The media suspected that vital information was being 
held back and tension soon was in the air (159: March 14, 1969). 
Dora Jane Hamblin commented on this aspect of reporting in a 
letter: 
They I-the astronauts-I were always complaining that they 
couldnlt mention physical problems without having all the world 
know about them and they repeatedly asked for more privacy in 
these areas. They wanted to tape record, for example, episodes 
of air sickness or urinary problems, etc., so that the medics 
could examine everything after the flight, instead of discussing 
them over the open microphones from the spacecraft to flight 
headquarters. Reporters could hear all those open reports and 
pounced on them, to the disgust of the guys. I tend to agree 
with the men (64). 
Rusty Schweickart also offered his opinion about how he felt in 
regards to the public looking in on his activities, although he was not 
referring specifically to the problems he encountered during Apollo 9, 
in a letter. 
It gets a little like being an animal in the zoo--everyone 
gawking and somehow having the right to probe and poke .... I 
am I-Schweickart's emphasis-I somewhat private about my 
activities ... (142). -
Obviously, Julian Scheer was not kidding when he once remarked that 
NASA had such an open information program that lithe world knew every 
bowel movement of every astronaut ll (137). 
The tension about the withheld news cleared the next day when 
Schweickart felt better, and in agreement with McDivitt and Scott, 
decided to perform an abbreviated EVA. 1 The two spacecraft were 
depressurized and, slowly with an inch clearance, Schweickart backed out 
IJust how the matter was resolved and how Time acquired the 
information about Schweickart's troubles is not known to the author. 
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of the LM onto its "front porch" where he stood for 46 minutes. In the 
CM, Scott opened the hatch and stood in the opening. The two astronauts 
shot pictures of each other, ignoring the calls of the Capcom. 1 At One 
time, the Capcom pleaded, "Hey, does anyone up there read me?1I 
Schweickart went back inside the LM, secured the hatch, and, upon the 
tenth call from Houston, the astronauts decided to finally answer (159: 
March 14, 1969). 
Apollo 9 marked a return to naming the spacecraft, this being done 
out of necessity since there were now two spacecraft in flight at once 
and they could not both be "Apollo 9. 11 The CM was called IIGumdrop,1I The 
LM that Scott described as lithe biggest, friendliest, funniest-looking 
spider I've ever seen,1I was named, appropriately, IISpider.1I During the 
walk in space, Schweickart, too, needed a call sign and, since the 
red-haired astronaut was wearing a bright red helmet, he was aptly 
nicknamed, IIRed Rover.1I When the EVA was over, PIO Jack Riley told the 
world, IIYou've heard it here ..• /-the-.l adventures of Red Rover and his 
friends, Spider and Gumdropll (159: March 14, 1969). 
The rest of the flight was exceptionally quiet. The astronauts 
sang IIHappy Birthday" to Kraft and to their secretary. The ground 
controllers beamed up news and sports scores. At one point, the 
controllers allowed the astronauts to oversleep a wakeup time by two 
hours. One day during the flight, a NASA official said that the 
highlights of that day would be the "sleep cycle and the wake-up 
peri ad" (159: March 21, 1969; 122: March 24, 1969). 
On a Sunday during the mission, Julian Scheer called the manager 
of the Beatles to request permission to use the song "Yellow Submarine" 
in a presentation about Apollo 9. He was sold the rights for that use 
for only one dollar, possibly the most inexpensive sale of Beatle 
material ever made (137). 
When Apollo 9 was scheduled to reenter on March 13, the astronauts 
looked with worry upon their intended landing zone below. They called 
IThe Capcom was always another astronaut and was the only member 
of the ground control team allowed to speak to the flight crew since 
astronauts, like all pilots, tend to have a language all of their own. 
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down and discussed with Houston what the controllers had been reluctant 
to tell them--that the landing site was choppy and stormy. It was 
decided that the astronauts would go around the earth once more than 
they had planned to do; this additional orbit would put the crew in the 
water about 535 miles to the south of the original splashdown point but 
still within range of the recovery forces. The Apollo 9 astronauts 
then separated from the unmanned "Spider" for the last time and also 
jettisoned the big Service Module, which supplied the bulk of the CM's 
oxygen, electricity and maneuverability, as the procedure called for 
doing. In the CM, the only portion of the entire Saturn 5 rocket which 
was aerodynamically designed to reenter the earth's atmosphere without 
burning up, the astronauts watched the flames of reentry glow around 
their windows. They settled onto the calm water of the Atlantic Ocean 
within sight of the television cameras which beamed back the sights live 
to the American public (10: March 17, 1969; 122: March 24, 1969). 
The March 28, 1969 issue of Life showed the return of the Apollo 9 
astronauts to earth and Houston but not much else, except for a poem that 
had been written by Scott1s daughter, Tracy. There were no personal 
·stories in any of the later issues. Again, the personal stories may have 
been bumped by other news. The next week's issue of Life carried the 
stories about former President Eisenhower's death and funeral (98: March 
28, 1969, April 4, 1969). 
Schweickart, several years later, remarked in a letter, 
As to our Apollo 9 stories in Life, I do not recall exactly 
what happened (and do not care eitherT: To the best of my 
knowledge, we did write and they did edit and publish--but, if you 
/referring to the author-/ have not found them, perhaps my memory 
1S leaky. It is just not important to me (142). 
Apollo 10 was hard on the heels of Apollo 9, coming only two months 
afterwards. The number of journalists who attended the launch this time 
was up from Apollo 9, now being 1,519, the most ever for a launch to that 
date. There had been much speculation that Apollo 10, designed to be a 
checkout of the LM around the moon, would conduct a landing but NASA had 
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ruled out that possibility publicly on March 24. One reason was that 
Apollo 10's LM was too heavy for such an operation and another was that 
the lighting conditions on the moon, at the planned time of arrival of the 
Apollo 10 crew, would not be the best in which to attempt a landing. Mike 
Collins, in his book, writes that if he had had his way about scheduling 
the missions, he would have delayed the launch of Apollo 10 until Apollo 
II's lighter lunar module was ready; he would then have given that LM to 
the Apollo 10 crew and ordered them to go for the landing. Despite the 
fact that many people wanted Apollo 10 to land on the moon, its commander, 
Tom Stafford, the rendezvous expert of Geminis 6 and 9, believed in 
trying out the LM first and probably would not have wanted to have been 
the first man on the moon (24: pp326-327; 69: p49; 10: March 17, 1969). 
Almost as soon as the astronauts of Apollo 10, Stafford, Gene 
Cernan and John Young, were in space on May 18, they began one of the most 
televised odysseys in space history. They carried the first color 
television camera aboard any spacecraft and used it to the hilt. The 
addition of a small black and white monitor also made it easier for the 
crew members to see what they were showing to the folks back home. The 
first show lasted 22 minutes and illustrated the docking of the CM to the 
LM, still in the upper portion of the third stage of the Saturn. The 
next show was of the CM's interior and the crew performing its tasks. 
Four hours after liftoff came the third show, lasting for 13 minutes, 
as the spacecraft separated from the third stage. Then, at 21,000 miles 
out, only an hour after the previous show, the men televised pictures 
of earth to earth (10: May 26, 1969). 
The reason for the saturation of television signals pouring from 
Apollo 10 was the attitude of the crew. Tom Stafford had been in charge 
of developing air-to-ground television communications almost from the time 
he joined NASA in 1962. He wrote in Life later, 
I fought long and hard to get that high resolution color 
television camera on board. We had had black and white on board 
before but it didn't produce the total grandeur in spectrum that 
we had all seen in space .... I really wanted to show it and share 
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it because it belongs to all people and I have been happy to learn 
that they appreciated it (98: June 20, 1969). 
Gene Cernan, the LM pilot for the mission, was called lithe most 
PR conscious astronaut of them all,1I by NASA Protocol Officer Gene 
Marianetti. In Life, Cernan stressed the importance of having live 
television on the flights because "what you're seeing didn't happen 
yesterday and you're not watching a replay. You're watching history as 
it happens. 1I An AP reporter quoted Cernan as saying that the crew elected 
to take the television camera on the mission so the public IIcan see what's 
behind the 'Gee whizzes' and 'Oh gollies' that we speak of during the 
flight ll (8: p169; 98: June 20,1969). 
Roy Neal, of NBC News, offered this author an additional 
explanation of how the color TV camera got on board the command module. 
We had been trying for years to get NASA to put television 
cameras in the spacecraft. Chris Kraft told NASA that if the 
missions to the moon weren't going to have cameras on board, then he 
was going to back out of the entire deal. 
After Apollo 7--this was the first flight with TV, an RCA 
black and white which the crew used to deliver some pictures to 
earth and Stafford and-Cernan were acting as Capcoms for this 
mission so they could see first h~nd what w~s being sent back--there 
was this party. Stafford, Neil/Armstrong / and Cernan were 
there. They saw the RCA man there and someone said, IIPretty 
lousy TV today! II 
Well, in the crowd was this little man who made some remark 
about being able to put color TV in the spacecraft. Stafford 
got interested in what this little man was saying and soon Stafford 
was in a back room with papers spread allover the place with a 
top RCA engineer. Stafford said he wanted color on his mission. 
Westinghouse and CBS were able to supply off the shelf 
equipment which worked. It was a TV camera where different color 
filters revolved around in front of the lens and another unit on 
the ground would then be in synchronization with the one in the 
spacecraft so the images on the ground would come out in color, not 
in black and white •... 
Another thing about the crew. Deke Slayton was opposed to 
holding direct interviews with the members of the crew so they 
supplied the networks with ten hours of videotaped interviews of 
what would be happening with Apollo 10 covering all aspects of the 
mi s s ion (119 b ) • 
John Young was the pilot of the command module for the mission and 
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he wrote in Life that, at first, he was against the use of the television 
camera but its "recording" values changed his opinion about the use of it; 
it seems that the PR value of the camera did not impress Young. According 
to a source at NASA, whose name best not be revealed by the author, Young 
is sometimes indifferent to the public relations aspects of NASA. It was 
said by this source that Young had divorced his first wife just before the 
Apollo 10 but he did not inform anyone ,at NASA about it. This caused some 
embarrassment to NASA when some reporters approached his former wife, 
Barbara, only to find out that she was not his wife anymore. As the 
source stated it, there was a quick "dressing down" of Young by several 
of the NASA hierarchy for not letting the space administration in on the 
knowledge of his divorce (98: June 20, 1969). 
Roy Neal offers his opinion of Young: 
John doesn't enjoy being in front of a microphone. He realizes 
the requirement of doing PR work because of his buddies. He 
protects his men I-Neal said this in 1977 when Young was in charge 
of the Astronaut Office in Houston-' yet he opens up and when he 
does, he is spectacularly good, es-p"ecially in explaining the work 
that the astronauts do (119b). 
With a crew of two astronauts who loved the television camera for 
its PR value and another astronaut who liked it for its recording values, 
Apollo 10 swung into lunar orbit three days after launch. From there, 
the astronauts beamed back another television show from a height of 
61 nautical miles above the lunar surface. The Apollo 10 astronauts were 
earning a reputation for being the salesmen of the space program. During 
one telecast, the astronauts increased their airtime from 15 to 72 
minutes and the networks objected strongly about the loss of their 
valuable time (8: ppI69-170; 10: May 26, 1969). 
As they orbited the moon, Stafford and Cern an floated into the 
lM, codenamed "Snoopy" and, after sealing the tunnel, separated from 
"Charlie Brown." While Young kept a vigil for them in the CM, Stafford 
and Cernan descended to a little less than ten miles to "barnstorm" the 
moon, as one Life writer put it. During their "barnstorming," the LM 
pilots overflew a mascon (a mass concentration of heavy lunar material 
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which exerts a gravitational pull that is stronger than the rest of the 
surrounding lunar area) and Snoopy was jostled into a wild rotation. 
Cern an called out, "Sonuvabitch!" (which was appropos for Snoopy) and 
the entire world heard every syllable. 1 The situation was not as serious 
as some people might have then thought--that the LM would plunge to the 
surface of the moon--and the astronauts regained control quickly to 
complete the rest of their barnstorming. As they continued to fly above 
the 1 unar surface, Stafford photographed geo 1 ogi ca 1 detail s unti 1 hi s 
camera malfunctioned. Then he let loose the second set of choice words: 
"Ah, shit!1I The public did not take too kindly to the astronauts using 
profane language in the heavens and many people let NASA know their 
feelings. But the media came to the rescue of the LM pilots, stating 
that the men had every right to say what they did if the going became 
tough. Buzz Aldrin states in his book, "Besides preparing the way for 
our flight, Tom and Gene were also establishing the reality of the 
astronauts--we were, after all, human." At the Cape, someone hung a sign 
that read, liThe Flight of Apollo 10: For Adult Audiences Only" (8: p176; 
2: p207; 10: June 2, 1969). 
While Cern an and Stafford went about dipping down close to the moon 
and back up, Young was busy circling the planet, taking photographs and 
performing other experiments. He later commented that III was so busy 
that I didn't feel lonely. The moon fascinated me like Africa once 
di d" (98: June 20, 1969). 
The two spacecraft joined again and Stafford and Cern an left 
Snoopy for the larger cabin of Charlie Brown. Then they jettisoned 
the lM to leave it parked in a lunar orbit. A little while later, they 
fired the SPS engine to return to their home. On the way back, a voice 
broke some news to the world: IIWe are in the process now of commencing 
scientific experiment Sugar-Hotel-Alpha-Victor-Echo. And it's going 
!Cernan's exclamation caused Collins to later write, in jest, that 
Cernan should have had his Boy Scout membership revoked and that NASA 
had to hire four more secretaries to handle the influx of mail from people 
who did not care for such language. 
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to be conducted like all normal human beings do it." What the men were 
doing, for the first time by any astronaut, was to shave in space. Just 
before launch, Deke Slayton had gone to a local store at the Cape and had 
bought brushless shave cream for about $2.50. That, with a normal 
razor, worked well since the cream kept the whiskers from floating about 
the cabin. This may seem insignificant but the Whirlpool Corporation had 
spent $10,000 of tax money to develop a shaver for space use, which 
failed (10: June 2, 1969; 98: June 20, 1969). 
On May 26, 1969, the crew of Apollo 10 returned to the waters of 
earth and went through a series of debriefings. The number of articles 
written about the flight in magazines did not increase significantly 
from the number about Apollo 9 (only 16 compared to 9's 15), but there 
was interest. Aviation Week, in one issue, carried 13 pages about the 
mission, most of them being written material describing the mission in 
detail. Life published the astronauts' personal stories and the other 
news magazines published their load of stories of the flight. U.S. News 
and World Report scooped everyone else in the magazine trade by 
announcing, in early June, that Neil Armstrong had been chosen as the man 
to walk first on the moon but it erroneously reported that he and Aldrin 
would explore the moon for 22 hours. As it was, they were on the moon 
in the LM for about that time but they walked on it for no more than 
three hours (98: June 20, 1969; 10: June 2, 1969; 163: June 2, 1969). 
The stage was set for what many people regard as the most momentous 
occasion to happen in the history of humanity. According to NASA's 
launch schedule, the next flight was the one to put men on the moon. 
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THE MEN ON THE MOON 
In early 1968, Julian Scheer sent Dr. Gilruth a memo discussing the 
philosophy of the PAO. He stated that the PAO was to be neither passive 
nor aggressive but largely reactive and "not seek coverage of space 
but ... L-would / break our backs making our facilities and our people 
available." Scheer added that there would be no "free rides, no free 
meals, no glad-handing." Then Scheer changed the subject of the note 
to discuss Gilruth's chief PAO at MSC, Paul Haney. Haney was acting out 
a dual role; he was almost devoting himself full time to being the "Voice 
of Mission Control" while trying to control the overall operations of the 
MSC's Public Affairs Office. Scheer, who had fired Powers in 1963 for 
doing the same thing, had not changed his attitude at all towards 
his personnel being in the limelight and he wanted Haney to cease this 
practice (56: p616). 
Scheer preferred not to fire Haney though so he instructed him to 
do one of two things: Haney could either retain control of the PAO under 
Gilruth and drop the practice of being the "Voice;" or he could cant nue 
to work with mission commentary and be replaced as the head Houston PAO 
by someone else. Scheer claims that there was tremendous interest by 
the media in the flights and they were not totally satisfied with the 
job that Haney was doing since he was doing one too many things to be 
effective. Scheer also told this author that some of Haney's staff 
acted as if they had their hands tied because of their boss' dual role, 
which did not allow him time to concentrate fully on making decisions 
about the office's operations. Haney chose to accept neither alternative 
and he wanted to remain as he was (137). 
Then Scheer offered Haney a chance--before Apollo 10--to stay with 
NASA. He ordered Haney to come to Washinqton, D.C. for a while and 
skip that mission so the two men could straighten out their differences. 
After that, Scheer said, Haney could return to the PAO in Houston and 
handle the publicity for the lunar landing. The friction continued 
though. As it finally ended, Scheer and Gilruth conferred on the matter 
309 
and Gilruth fired Haney just before Apollo 11. Yet Scheer was blamed for 
Haney's dismissal. He cOlllTlented, years later, that he felt "like the 
President firing the Air Force One pilot" (137; 47). 
Gilruth said in an interview, 
Things just weren't working out with Paul. It's tough to be a 
Public Affairs man and a front spokesman. He feels that he is 
doing the job and yet he is not representing the program. Haney 
did too much .... Julian took the rap for firing Haney, not me. 
He I-Haney I was the best man we've ever had (47). 
Scheer said that Haney took a parting shot at his Washington boss 
by stating that Scheer wanted to handle the commentary himself. Scheer 
claims that he never wanted to sit in front of a console telling the world 
about the missions nor did he want to sit through long hours of simulations 
to familiarize himself with the different aspects of the missions. Scheer 
then sent Brian Duff down to Houston to take over Haney's position. Duff 
did not become the "Voice," however. That responsibility was given to 
a number of people, including Jack Riley, Doug Ward, John McLeaish and 
others. No longer could the "Voice" be identified with only one or two 
people as it had been when Powers and Haney were associated with it (137; 
56: p616). 
Scheer shifted the PAO into high gear for the Apollo 11 mission. 
He made three broad changes in the standard operations of the public 
affairs office for the mission: 1. he did not care for the round-robin 
type of interviews where one astronaut of a crew talked to the newspaper 
reporters, another to the radio-television folks and the third to the 
magazine writers. Scheer claimed that this produced a stereotyped 
character. Now, he wanted the astronauts to be accessible to the public. 
He advocated taking Armstrong to his native state of Ohio where he would 
be filmed by NASA so the television networks could use the film during 
the mission to show the public some of Armstrong's background. Scheer 
wanted to do this since the networks needed "human" stories about the 
astronauts to air during the long mission. Otherwise, the telecasts 
would become repetitious. Slayton gave in grudgingly to this request. 
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He allowed more reporting about the crew to be done while they were in 
training but he drew the line when reporters wanted to contact the 
families. Slayton said, "Landing on the moon does not change that L-the 
Life contract with the astronauts for their personal stories-1;" 2. Scheer 
arranged for a pool of five members of the media to be present to 
observe the final rehearsal for the EVA (the moonwalk in this case) and 
he set up press conferences with the astronauts to be held only five 
days before the launch; and 3. Scheer then had members of the NASA 
hierar.chy write material for a project planned by the New York Times. 
He next went over the lists of people who had been invited to the 
launch and expanded it, bringing in people who had never been to a launch 
before (56: p617). 
For Apollo 11, Scheer became more aggressive than normal in 
administering the public affairs work. He used the public interest in 
the moon mission as a lever to force others-within NASA to accept his 
theories (56: p617). 
On June 15, a reporter from the New Yorker arrived at MSC. Henry 
Cooper had arranged with his editors to stay in Houston from long before 
the mission began until days after it ended. Cooper said in an interview, 
Because of the nature of American journalism, reporters 
can't do follow-up or preliminary stories. Very few magazines 
and newspapers let their reporters go from beginning to end. I 
had an advantage .•.• Because of the nature of the New Yorker, I 
had a unique approach. Everyone else had a deadline, I had none ..•. 
r was doing it out of my own interest (28). 
For nearly a month, Cooper was practically the only reporter in 
Houston, outside of those who were there regularly as part of a beat. 
His persistence would payoff at a later date when he wrote a book about 
the almost-disastrous flight of Apollo 13 where his knowledge about NASA's 
operations showed to his advantage (28; 27). 
On June 16, press briefings commenced in Washington, D.C. at NASA 
Headquarters when NASA released a 2S0-page press kit for the mission (in 
comparison, the Gemini 3 press kit had had only 48 pages). Out of 
retirement came Howard Simon of the Washington Post, who had last 
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covered the Flight of '76 about two-and-a-ha1f years before. He was now 
an editor for the newspaper but decided to handle one more space mission 
by himself (69: p29: 151). 
As things moved closer to the launch date, July 16, everything 
moved at a faster pace. Yet, on the Fourth of July weekend, the astronauts 
took time off and went home to be with their families. At the Cape, hotel 
prices for the weeks of the launch went up to $60 per night. Car rental 
agencies were pulling in cars from allover Florida to the Cocoa Beach 
area. Apartment landlords raised the rent for visitors using their 
facilities (8: p186). 
On July 5, the astronauts held a press conference in Houston. They 
were on a stage surrounded on three sides and overhead by a plastic 
enclosure. Behind them were fans to blow the air away from them into 
the audience of reporters. NASA had had enough trouble with colds and 
other sicknesses in the past and wanted to take no chances with the 
crew of Apollo 11. In the crowd sat author Norman Mailer, who later 
wrote a book about the Apollo 11 venture, Of A Fire On The Moon. 1 Mailer 
in the book, seems vicious towards what he saw at the press conference. 
He calls Armstrong "wooden" and "remote" in bis appearance. Mailer 
also suggests that Armstrong would have been "more extraordinary in 
fact if he had been a salesman making a modest, inept, dull little 
speech for then one would have been forced to wonder how he got his 
job .... II A 1 dri n, writes Mailer, was 1 i ke a tank, du 11 and ponderous 
who talked in his own technical jargon, unable to translate his thoughts 
into everyday English. Collins, on the other hand, is described by 
Mailer as a man who joked about things, was cunning and shy yet supplied 
a good ending to the press conference. Mailer notices that Collins was 
not asked many questions and the author suggests that the layout people 
of magazines would more than likely lop Collins off the pages (98: 
November 14, 1969). 
Two interesting comments were made by Armstrong during the press 
IThe book bombed in book sales. 
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conference. In the interview for the magazine writers in the Lunar 
Receiving Laboratory (LRL; where the astronauts and the moon material 
that they would bring back would be quarantined for three weeks upon 
their return), Armstrong seemed to tell the reporters that he would be 
a hero on his own terms, not those dictated to him by the media nor the 
public. When asked if his privacy was invaded, Armstrong replied, yes, 
but "wel re required to do these things /-ta1k to the media~ just as 
salmon swim upstreamll (98: November 14, 1969). 
Mailer was writing his book for Little and Brown publishers, a 
subsidiary of Time, Inc., but Time, Inc. was not a part of Life and for 
that reason, the astronauts were excluded from talking to him because 
of the book contract they had signed with Life. His contact with the 
astronauts was very limited. Armstrong told writer Robert Sherrod in 
1971, III understand Mr. Mailerls exposure to me is confined to one 
press conference" (26: May/June, 1973). 
Paul Sawyer, the astronauts I attorney, says that although Mailer 
was writing for a subsidiary of Time, Incorporated, the astronauts had 
never been offered any money by Time, Inc. to help write Of A Fire On 
The Moon. Sawyer also says that Mailer told the people at Time, Inc. that 
he did not need to talk to the astronauts in order for him to successfully 
write his book (134). 
There was another press conference at the Cape two days before the 
launch--this one was televised completely with the astronauts in a near 
empty studio and the reporters in another location so the astronauts 
would not have to be exposed to any germs that the reporters might be 
carrying. The crew wore brightly colored beach shirts as they fielded 
the reporters I questions. Armstrong handled most of them. Collins said 
that he was embarrassed by the position in which fate had put him; he 
requested that the newsmen take it easy on his family while he was gone. 
Again, it was Collins who appeared to be the most relaxed of the crew 
(178: pp260-261; 8: p184). 
Dr. Charles Berry caused a minor flap when he announced that he 
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would not allow President Nixon to eat with the astronauts the night 
before the launch. Again, the reason was fear of germs. Astronaut 
Borman criticized Dr. Berry for cancelling a prime morale booster. As 
it was, the President did not show for dinner that night. Collins writes 
in his book that the episode offered some comic relief for the astronauts 
because it seemed ridiculous to prevent them from coming into contact 
with the President since they were in daily contact with dozens of other 
people. The President found himself thrown into a touchy situation, 
explains Collins. If the astronauts became sick in space, the President 
could then be blamed and, even if they did not turn sick, he would be 
held as having disregarded the astronauts' physician (who was rarely seen 
by the astronauts and seems to have been held in contempt by some of 
them). However, NASA Administrator Paine apparently was germ-free and 
had dinner with the men on the eve of their launching (24: p349; 2: p21S; 
8: p186). 
As the launch date approached, the astronauts no doubt had many 
things to think about and one of those was buying some extra insurance. 
Aldrin writes in his book that, "The three of us ..• bought ourselves some 
insurance for our families in the extremely remote possibility that we 
might not return." Another item that the astronauts were concerned 
about was the publicity that would arise from their flight. Colonel 
Aldrin's sister mentioned that her brother was beginning to worry about 
the loss of privacy and freedom. Collins was worrying that his family 
would be subjected to close public scrutiny. His 73-year-old mother 
said, "He doesn't thi nk an old lady 1i ke me should have to put up with 
that." 
John W. Wilford, of the New York Times, writes 
The astronauts' concern about such things was one of the 
latest facts of existence for all three and one thing was 
certain ..• a1l that was in their personal past would be merely 
prologue and life for them--and perhaps the wor1d--wou1d never 
be the same again. 
There were people who were making sure that the world would never 
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forget the flight of Apollo 11. The media hit the Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) like a tidal wave. A total of 3,497 newsmen were at the Cape for 
the launch, more than 800 were from foreign countries. About a week 
before the launch, 1500 reporters suddenly appeared at Houston to join 
Henry Cooper of the New Yorker. At the Cape, ABC-TV supplied 254 
commentators, engineers and technicians to handle its operations, CBS 
had 244 personnel, including the recently retired Wally Schirra, and 
NBC brought along 147 personnel. At least 445 people represented 
magazines as writers and photographers (69: pp28-31; 28). 
From other nations came 118 correspondents from Japan, 82 from 
Great Britain, 81 from Italy, France had 53, Argentina 52, Germany 44, 
Canada 38, Spain 27, Brazil 26, Australia 25, Mexico 21, Switzerland 20, 
Belgium 19, Korea 15, the Netherlands 10, Chile and Venezuela 9 each, 
Columbia 8, Costa Rica and Sweden 7 apiece and Israel 6. Czechoslovakia 
Denmark, Panama, Nicaragua and Peru had 5 representatives each; four 
each from Ecuador, Finland, Iran and South Africa; three each from 
Bolivia, Greece, Luxembourg, Turkey and Uruguay: two each from India 
Angola, Austria, Ireland, Lebanon, Malta, Romania and Yugoslavia; and 
one reporter each from Guatemala, Egypt, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, 
Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Rhodesia, Somalia, Swaziland and Wales 
(69: pp28-31). 
The European radio-television network bought time from commercial 
satellite circuits to supply coverage to the nations there. U.S. 
networks built their own studios at the launch site and paid NASA for 
rent and electricity (69: pp28-31). 
The PAD was extremely active. The information plan for the PAD 
alone came to 84 pages; this covered organization, security, news center 
operations, commentary, news briefings, communications network, 
photography, guest provisions and contractor activities (NASA used some 
outside help occasionally in the public affairs business but not all 
that often). Eighty-five NASA PIOs stood by to assist the media and 
18 more people came in from the Air Force and civilian ranks to provide 
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additional help. The U.S. Information Agency supplied interpreters to 
help the members of the foreign media. At five and four days before 
launch (T-5 and T-4), NASA replayed the tape of the June 16 mission 
briefing for the reporters. On T-2, Westinghouse described the television 
system of the spacecraft to the media. That same day, Dr. Debus, the 
director of KSC, Gilruth and von Braun held a joint press conference. 
On T-l, TRS Systems briefed the media on the LM abort procedure in 
case something should go wrong during the descent to the moon. Major 
public affairs people received contingency plans in case problems 
should occur during the launch, the flight to the moon, while the 
astronauts were on the moon, on the way back or during the reentry. 
Approximately 200 personnel were temporarily assigned to the PAD (69: 
pp28-31). 
The PAO also: 
--supplied 15 telephones with 40 call directors at the KSC 
newscenter and installed 15 more pay phones there; 
--installed more than 206 phone circuits at the press site while 
the media leased 1000 more from Southern Bell; 
--provided recorded status reports from T-3 through launch. This 
was called more than 2400 times during those four days; and 
--paid Chic Sales $20,000 to take care of people at the press 
site and other places. 
Perhaps an impressive figure was that of the overall operations 
of the PAD at KSC for Apollo 11. The cost came to $450,000, which 
was one-third of that year's budget for Public Affairs work and there 
were still two more moon missions scheduled for that fiscal year. That 
money was used for janitors, utility service, rental of the news center 
at KSC (located on the tenth floor of the Cape Royal Hotel in Cocoa 
Beach), renting the bleachers used at the press site, printing 
publications, reproducing news releases and transcripts of air-to-ground 
conversations, photography, transportation, couriers and the hiring of 
translators (69: pp28-31). 
In the middle of all this, the head PAO at KSC, Gordon Harris, 
suffered an attack of appendicitis on T-5. Yet his doctors allowed him 
to leave the hospital to observe the launch from the guest viewing 
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site--attended by a doctor and a nurse who suddenly found themselves with 
front row seats. Power talks (69: p31). 
After the launch, the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism 
computed the figures for the press attendance at the Cape on the day of 
the launching. Only the opening of the United Nations in San Francisco 
in 1946 and in New York City in 1947 had more journalists attending them 
than were at the Cape for Apollo 11 (69: p206). 
Across the world, many nations prepared for the day that Armstrong 
and Aldrin would step upon the moon. Columbia cancelled all soccer 
games for that day. A Yugoslav newspaper offered $800 to the reader who 
could predict what Armstrong would say when he first set his foot on the 
lunar soil. Brazil's government ordered all church bells to ring on that 
day. Venezuela was set to declare the day a national holiday, which 
is what President Nixon did in the U.S., ahead of time, anticipating 
the success of the mission. The U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro set up 
a large television screen in the Museum of Modern Art. so passers-by 
could watch the progress of the mission. Meanwhile, in Florida, the 
"No Vacancy" signs were lit at motels for at least 50 miles around the 
Cape. Titusville youngsters were charging $1.00 per head for people 
to sit on their lawns while they watched the launch. Entepreneurs 
were everywhere. One lady collected 480 pictures from NASA and mailed 
them to 10 European newspapers for a price but the newspapers could 
have had them for the same price at which the lady had obtained them--
nothing (69: p32; 8: p188). 
On the eve of the launch, the Reverend Ralph Abernathy led a "Poor 
People's March," complete with a mule-powered wagon, to the gates of 
KSC to protest the use of money for space exploration when more important 
things on earth needed to be done first. NASA Adminstrator Paine and 
Julian Scheer met with Abernathy and others from the march to explain 
that the money being used for the mission had already been spent and 
that cancelling the mission would waste more money than would be used 
if the mission was completed. Paine offered to pick up a delegation 
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from the march the next morning and transport them to the observation 
site so they could watch the launch. When the NASA bus arrived the 
following morning, there were food packets on each seat and 100 men, 
women and children of the march joined other guests in the VIP stands. 
Paine had wisely averted a confrontation (69: plIO; 8: pI91). 
The Soviets did not want to be scooped by Apollo 11. On July IS, 
they launched a moon probe, Luna-IS, designed to orbit the moon (the 
first Russian spacecraft to do so), land softly on the surface and 
return to earth after picking up some soil samples, although the Russians 
did not admit to this. By the time Armstrong, Aldrin and Collins were 
ready to be launched into space, Luna-15 had already swung into orbit 
around the moon. Some NASA officials were furious. They asked the 
Soviets for information about their moon mission but the only answer was 
that it would not interfere with the Americans. Finally, after a call 
was placed to Moscow by Borman (who shrewdly reversed the charges), the 
Americans were given the orbital information about Luna-15 and they 
then deducted that it would present no hazard to the Apollo 11 astronauts 
(178: p265; 153: p204). 
At 6:25 on the morning of July 16, 1969, the astronauts of Apollo 
11 emerged from their robing center in their spacesuits and headed past 
photographers to the towering gantry and rocket, miles away. At 
7:30 a.m., the temperature under the tin roofs of the viewing stands 
was already 100 degrees Fahrenheit. One of the NASA contractors passed 
colored hats around, increasing the atmosphere of a carnival setting. 
(178: pp261-263). 
Among the visitors in the VIP stands were former President and 
Mrs. Johnson, Vice-President Agnew and the representatives of the 
Poor People's March. Television's Jack Benny and Johnny Carson stood 
there too. In all, there were 56 ambassadors, two foreign ministers, 
33 senators, 206 congressmen, the Secretaries of HEW, Commerce, 
Transportation and Interior, 19 governors, 225 French industrialists 
and 129 Korean Parliamentarians. At another site, reserved exclusively 
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for astronauts and their guests, Charles Lindbergh stood with the new 
breed of pilots; he was there at the invitation of Collins. Lindbergh 
later wrote Collins, "There would have been constant distractions for me 
in the area with VIPs, among whom I refuse to class myself, what a 
horrible designation!" (24: p451; 69: plOl). 
Just less than a million people surrounded the region in the morning 
heat awaiting the launch. CBS· Walter Cronkite and Wally Schirra overflew 
the area in a helicopter to their press building. Schirra remembers that 
the roads were packed with traffic. NASA had once expected two million 
spectators to show for the launch but some sources say that only 750,000 
people were there that morning (69: p211; 140). 
As the astronauts were preparing to enter the command module, 
Coll ins handed a small brown bag to "the czar of the launch pad, I! 
Guenther Wendt, who was in charge of the support team on the gantry. In 
the bag was a joke that Collins had whipped up for Wendt, an avid 
fisherman--an uncured minnow nailed to a board with a plaque that read, 
IIGuenther·s Trophy Trout.1! But Collins was worried about the "trout ll 
spilling out of the bag in front of the television cameras that were 
capturing the scene. No one saw it except Wendt and his crew who had 
a good laugh (24: pp359-360). 
Armstrong had entered first, taking the couch on the left side of 
the CM and then Collins went in, moving to the far right. As the 
technicians helped those astronauts adjust themselves in the spacecraft, 
Aldrin stood by himself for 15 minutes on the gantry, looking out over 
the masses of cars and people miles away who had come to watch him and 
his fellow astronauts take to the skies (2: p219). 
Just before launch, Collins worried about something else besides 
the minnow that he had given Wendt. After the hatch had been sealed, 
the CM pilot noticed that a pouch on Armstrong·s left suit leg was 
near the abort handle and could snag it, possibly exploding the CM 
away from the Saturn rocket, producing what would be considered to be 
the biggest goof in history. Armstrong rearranged the pouch and all 
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was safe. Collins remembers thinking: 
Jesus, I can just see the headlines now: IIMOONSHOT FALLS 
INTO OCEAN. Mistake by crew, program officials intimate. Last 
transmission from Armstrong prior to leaving launch pad reportedly 
was 'OOpS'1i (24: p364). 
At 9:30 a.m., the large engines of the Saturn 5 rocket, each 
nozzle bigger than the command module, fired and Apollo 11 was on its 
way. In the CBS news booth, Cronkite was yelling, IIGo baby. GO!" The 
sound of the launch blasted the spectators just as the other Saturn 5s 
had done and then, with only a contrail to remind people of the path of 
the rocket, the astronauts were gone (118: December, 1969; 99: November 
17, 1970). 
As the spacecraft rounded the earth preparing to fire into the 
lunar journey, Collins noticed a sunrise as the crew emerged from the 
shadow of the earth and exclaimed, IIJesus Christ, look at that horizon! 
Goddamn, that's pretty, it's unreal. 1I Fortunately, Collins' words were 
not broadcast to the ground, otherwise he might have been kicked out 
of the Boy Scouts too along with NASA having to hire even more 
secretaries to handle his comment (24: p368). 
Collins unstowed an item that he and the other Apollo 11 
astronauts did not favor--the television camera. He writes in his 
book, 
Our TV camera was the eye of Apollo. It was also late getting 
delivered and was a bloody nuisance of an afterthought that was 
not required for the safe completion of our flight; therefore we 
didn't want to fool with it. Reluctantly we agreed to turn it 
on a couple of times as specified in the flight plan, but we 
weren't happy about it and we didn't even practice with it, 
and we didn't rehearse any shows. We simply didn't have time to 
fool around with it. Neil and Buzz didn't know how to turn it 
on or focus it, and my knowledge of it was pretty sketchy. In 
flight we found the best thing to do was use masking tape to 
stick the monitor on top of the camera so we could tell which 
way to point it, a jury rig that is ridiculous when compared to 
the mathematical precision and extensive rehearsals that 
accompanied our other preparations. But TV couldn't kill us 
and a lot of other things could.... . •. the last bit of advice we 
got about TV was something to the effect of: IIGee, I hope you 
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guys will put on some great shows. You know, there will be a 
billion people watching, so don't screw it up, O.K.?" (24: p350). 
The first show from Apollo 11 was short because the spacecraft was 
in such a position that its signals could reach the ground station 
at California for only a few moments before the command module flew out 
of range. The TV camera went back into storage as the astronauts prepared 
to fire the third stage engine to put them on the track to the moon. 
After that was done, like Apollo 10, the CM separated from the upper 
stage, revolved around and plucked the LM from the top of its third 
stage cocoon. At 130,000 miles out, the astronauts who were reluctant 
to use the TV camera, beamed back pictures of the earth. Armstrong 
described everything in detail and then the quiet, shy Collins decided 
to give everyone on earth a case of nausea. He turned the camera 
slowly as he pointed it at his home planet, saying, "OK world, hang onto 
your hat. I'm going to turn you upside down ...• You don't get to do 
that everyday" (24: p386). 
After an eight-hour sleep, the astronauts had a mid-course 
correction cancelled since the flight was going so well. Due to the 
cancellation, they had some extra time to putter around and open the 
tunnel between the CM and LM sooner than planned. Then Aldrin decided 
to do an impromptu television show and called Houston to inform them 
that a show was on the way. In turn, Houston informed some surprised 
networks to prepare themselves for the show. It lasted 96 minutes 
and opened with Armstrong in the tunnel handling the docking probe. 
Aldrin moved into the LM, taking the television camera with him. As he 
explained the LM, he pretended to push the abort button and straight man 
Houston cried, in mock horror, "We don!t recommend that." Aldrin worried 
, '. 
about the restraining straps in the LM's harnesses pulling his pants 
down in front of 50 million people but Houston informed him that they 
could not see that low. Collins appeared, saying that he was filling 
in for the "czar "--as Armstrong had been called by the Soviet newspaper 
Pravada--who was brushing his teeth. According to Aldrin, the show was 
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well-received by the public (178: pp265-266; 2: p226; 24: p386). 
Houston continued to beam up the news of the day to the astronauts. 
At one point, the Capcom told of a reporter who had interviewed Mike 
Collins, Jr. The younger Collins had been asked what he thought of his 
father going down in history, to which Mike had replied, "Fine, what is 
history anyway?" A number of the astronauts possibly respected young 
Collins for his answer (24: p388). 
On the fourth day, in the tenth orbit around the moon, Aldrin and 
Armstrong climbed into the LM, sealed the tunnel and parted from the CM, 
leaving Collins by himself. At Houston, behind the consoles in Mission 
Control sat many people associated with NASA--George Mueller, Gene~al 
Sam Phillips, Gilruth, Slayton, Lovell and Anders. In a glass-enclosed 
room behind the control room sat von Braun, John Glenn, Tom Paine and 
Robert Seamans (then the Secretary of the Air Force). 
As the LM, codenamed "Eagle," began its descent, it was drawn 
slightly off course, unknown to the astronauts though, by the mascons 
that had affected Cernan and Stafford in Apollo 10. The LM's computer 
guided the Eagle down until the last few seconds when Armstrong saw that 
they were headed for a field of boulders. With less than a minute's 
worth of fuel left, Armstrong flew the Eagle past the boulders and 
settled upon a flat part of the Sea of Tranquility (if the astronauts 
had run out of fuel, they would not have crashed but would have fired 
the ascent engine, aborting the landing to return to the CM). 
Armstrong' s first words were, "Houston, Tranquil ity Base here. The 
Eagle has landed." The time was 4:17 p.m., EST, July 20,1969. 
The world erupted in jubilation. At MSC's newscenter, the newsmen 
"were giggling wildly, waving their arms and yelling." The astronauts' 
wives were solicited for their opinions. Mrs. Armstrong could only 
say, "Good ... good ... good ... " In Italy, 25,000 people were watching a 
performance of "Aida" in the Roman Arena at Verona when, during the 
first intermission, the news of the landing was announced to the 
audience in four languages. Members of the crowd pulled tiny American 
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flags from their pockets and waved them about. The bells in Brazil 
pealed. At Yankee Stadium in New York City, 35,000 baseball fans sang 
IIAmerica the Beautiful. 1I In Ohio, a photographer recorded the elderly 
Armstrong's impressions as they waited to watch their son walk on the moon. 
Meanwhile, Aldrin silently held communion on the surface of the moon, not 
making much of an issue of it to avoid the battles that had erupted with 
Apollo 8's crew reading from the Bible (8: p205; 178: p272; 118: December, 
1969) • 
Hours later, Armstrong opened the hatch and, with Aldrin's guidance, 
backed out of it to step down the ladder onto the surface. Aldrin had 
thought (in the previous spring) that because of the precedent set 
during the Gemini flights where the spacecraft commander stayed inside 
the spacecraft while his partner performed the EVA, he should be the 
first on the moon; but he was dissuaded by several arguments: 1 .. Armstrong 
was from the second group of astronauts while Aldrin was from the third 
group, which gave Armstrong more rank than Aldrin; 2. Armstrong was 
a civilian which appeared better to the world for America's image; and 
3. Armstrong himself had told Aldrin that he did not want to pass up 
the chance to be the first on the moon. So, Armstrong went out first 
with his first words in his head. There had been wide-spread discussion 
in the pre-launch days about what Armstrong should say and, finally, 
Julian Scheer put an end to it when he wrote a sharp memo to NASA 
hierarchy, stating, in effect, Did Queen Isabella tell Christopher 
Columbus what to say? The choice was left to Armstrong (2: pp205, 234). 
On the way down the ladder, Armstrong forgot to pull a small 
handle to deploy a smalJ black and white television camera which would 
telecast the image of him descending to the surface. He backed up, 
unfastened the camera and the image suddenly appeared to the world--
upside down at first but this was rectified by a converter in Houston. 
Almost six hours after the LM had set down, Armstrong left the last 
rung of the ladder. III'm going to step off the LM now. That's one 
small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind ll (118: December, 1969; 
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2: p234). 
Fifteen minutes later, Aldrin backed out of the LM. Together, the 
astronauts set up experiments on the lunar soil and placed a TV camera 
away from the LM but aimed at it. Armstrong read the plaque attached to 
one of the LM's legs, stating that man had come to the moon in peace that 
day and it was signed by the three Apollo 11 astronauts and President 
Nixon. Next, the men pounded a staff into the stiff soil and unfurled 
a spring loaded American flag, which looked like it was flying in the 
airless environment of the moon (to avoid commercialism, NASA had 
gathered all the U.S. flags that a person could buy, removed all 
identifying labels, jumbled them together and then had a secretary 
walk into the room where the flags were and pick one for the flight). 
Then the astronauts were instructed by the Capcom to move to a position 
where the television camera could see them. As they bounced to that 
spot, they were informed that the President would be calling them from 
the White House. They waited and, finally, Bruce McCandless, the Capcom, 
told the President when to speak. The message was congratulatory and 
contained wishes for a safe journey home. After that, the astronauts 
went about the surface collecting rocks, including a purple one. At 
the end of their EVA, Aldrin went inside the LM first, followed shortly 
by Armstrong, who had spent two hours and 20 minutes outside the LM. 
On the way in, one of the astronauts' PLSS backpacks snapped off the 
circuit breaker necessary to fire the ascent engine but it was later 
discovered that it could still be pushed in (118: December, 1969; 178: 
p277; 2: p214). 
While the astronauts were still on the moon in their LM, Luna-15 
crashed a distance from them and, with that failure, the U.S. was 
assured of being the first nation to obtain lunar soil (118: December, 
1969). 
The astronauts went to sleep in the lunar module following their 
walk and then, after staying on the moon for about an entire earth day, 
they fired the ascent engine to return to Collins who was orbiting high 
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above them and who had been unable to locate their base from his orbital 
track (118: December, 1969). 
On the way home, the astronauts cancelled more than 250 envelopes. 
Until 1973 when Aldrin disclosed it in his book, it was thought that the 
only envelope carried and cancelled aboard Apollo 11 was the one given to 
the Postmaster General after the flight. The other envelopes were kept 
by the astronauts. This may seem insignificant but this episode should 
be remembered when Apollo 15 is discussed (24: p426; 2: p48). 
The men also sent back another television show. Armstrong could not 
show the moon rocks but the next best thing--the cases that contained 
the rocks. Collins illustrated weightlessness and its effects upon water 
in a spoon. On the day before splashdown, the men televised another show 
for the people on earth; this one contained personal messages from each 
of the astronauts about their impressions of the trip. None spoke for 
more than a couple of minutes. Collins described the CM a bit more, 
Aldrin became philosophic, discussing the meaning of the flight and 
Armstrong thanked the Americans who had made the trip possible (24: 
pp426-433). 
On July 24, the command module hit the waters of the Pacific Ocean. 
The astronauts immediately donned isolation garments and, looking like 
creatures from another world, were hauled into a helicopter and taken to 
the aircraft carrier Hornet where they were put into a portable, 
trailer-sized LRL, called the Mobile Quarantine Facility (MQF). President 
Nixon was on hand to receive the men, the first time that this had ever 
been done by a President. Inside the MQF, the astronauts were joined by 
a flight surgeon and a mechanical engineer. The ship docked at Pearl 
Harbor, where crowds greeted them. Then the MQF was placed inside of a 
C-141 jet cargo plane and flown to Houston. There the men were placed 
in the MSC's LRL for three weeks. Other people were selected to be with 
the astronauts in the LRL for those 21 days. 
One of those other people was PIO John McLeaish, who was to 
provide reports to the media about what the astronauts and others in the 
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LRL were doing during their stay. Collins states in his book that 
McLeaish's presence might have deterred some reporter from crashing into 
the LRL, from where he could hope to send a stream of exclusive reports 
(once a person was admitted into the LRL, he or she could not leave until 
the astronauts did in mid-August since everyone in there was considered 
to be under quarantine). The astronauts liked McLeaish but they were 
hoping for some time off when they could do anything they wished without 
having it reported to the media (24: p445-448). 
The news of Apollo II's trip caused various reactions. Some people 
were obviously pleased by it while others, saying that the trip 
represented the American government, dismissed it. Fist fights in 
Mogadiscio, Somalia broke out because of the flight. As can be expected, 
offers to the crew to appear everywhere appeared from various sources. 
One place in Atlantic City offered the astronauts $100,000 apiece for 
one week's engagment (what the astronauts would have done to entertain 
the crowds is not known). Children were named Apollo, Columbia (the 
name of the command module) and for the astronauts. 
The astronauts and everyone else in the LRL, including one female 
who had wrangled her way in, were released on August 10, 1969. As soon 
as Aldrin was home, members of the Italian "paparazzi" were waiting for 
him. He did not think that they would bother him but soon they were 
at the door. He explained that all interviews would first have to be 
cleared with NASA. Aldrin then left to go downtown to buy a new suit 
and, sure enough, the paparazzi followed. Aldrin cut through Ellington 
AFB, an open base, but he managed to have the guard slow his pursuers 
just enough for him to lose them. The ruse failed as the paparazzi 
caught him only minutes later.(2: p26). 
Armstrong was having similar difficulties. He was sitting beside 
his backyard pool when he discovered three Japanese journalists climbing 
the fence. Quickly, he ordered them out of his yard. 
While the astronauts of Apollo 11 were discovering that the 
media and the public were attempting to get a closer look at them, some 
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more astronauts were joining NASA, except that these men were already 
astronauts. The Air Forcels MOL Program was cancelled in the summer of 
1969 and its astronauts were transferred to the ranks of those who had 
been training with NASA for years. This seventh group of pilot-astronauts 
consisted of Karol J. Bobko~ Robert L. Crippen, Charles G. Fullerton, 
Henry W. Hartsfield, Jr.~ Robert F. Overmyer~ Donald H. Peterson and 
Richard H. Truly (116: MSC 76-168). 
The cross-country trip for the Apollo 11 astronauts started with 
the characteristic journey to Washington~ D.C. where the men addressed 
Congress~ stopped at the White House and held a press conference at the 
State Department. Then, in one day, they visited New York City, 
Chicago and Los Angeles with their families. As if that was not enough, 
the Apollo 11 crew and their wives were sent on a round-the-world trip 
in a presidential jet. The itinerary for that trip included Mexico, 
Columbia, Brazil, Spain, France, Belgium~ the Netherlands, Norway, 
Germany, England, Italy, the Vatican, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Zaire, Iran 
India, East Pakistan, Thailand, Australia, Korea, Japan and, finally, 
close to home, Canada. At Bombay, India, a crowd of over 300,000 people 
turned out to greet the astronauts, stunning the entourage by the sheer 
mass of humanity gathered there. The trip lasted from September 24 until 
November 5, when the group arrived back in Washington, D.C. At the 
White House upon their return, President Nixon told the men that 
"certainly the first men ever to land on the moon have demonstrated that 
they are the best ambassadors America could ever have on this earth .•. " 
(164: Senate 92-40, p80). 
Aldrin remembers the scene upon returning home: 
Most of the country reacted as though weld never been gone. 
Little press coverage of the trip appeared in the United States--a 
nice situation which, in retrospect~ is sad because it would have 
been nice for the general public to share in this particularly 
American triumph. Yet at the same time we were asked to carry 
members of the press on the plane, one and all we refused. On 
board the plane was the only place we had privacy and could relax. 
The press had been along during our one-day cross-country tour 
and had proved a bit bothersome (2: p85). 
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Aldrin also worried about the future. When he once went to 
Chicago to make a speech, some liquor had been provided for him in his 
hotel room and, when he returned to his room that night after giving his 
appearance, he discovered the liquor was gone. He writes, III ordered 
myself a couple of drinks from room service and with some bemusement, 
wondered if fame would prove as fleeting as the liquor supplyll (2: p244). 
The crew soon split and went their own ways. Aldrin attempted to 
go back to the Air Force and suffered what he called "a good old American 
nervous breakdown. 1I He went on to develop his own research group and take 
part in some television commercials. Collins was appointed to the 
State Department to work with public affairs; he soon quit that post and 
became the Director of the National Air Museum at the Smithsonian 
Institute. Armstrong, a quiet man to begin with, seemed to withdraw 
further into a shell of some sorts. One source said that Armstrong 
envisioned a IICharles Lindbergh aura ll about himself; the source also 
said that Armstrong would not allow his children to be photographed for 
fear that they might be kidnapped (a la Lindbergh) and that he has his 
speeches copywrighted so no one else could use his material. The first 
man on the moon left NASA in 1970 and eventually became a professor of 
aeronautical engineering at the University of Cincinatti. 
Apollo 11 was destined to go down in history as the fZight. John 
Glenn had been the man until Armstrong set foot on the moon. People 
remember Armstrong but not many of the other astronauts. But in 
1969, it was Armstrong, Aldrin and Collins and, as Frank Borman told 
them one night after their flight, IIAll things ... all material thingsll 
would belong to the crew of Apollo 11 if they played their cards 
right (2: p55). 
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IN THE SHADOW OF A GIANT: APOLLO 12 
Apollo 12 is destined to live forever in the shadow of what many 
people consider to be mankind's greatest venture. As the shot was being 
prepared, 2,262 reporters and photographers descended upon the Cape, about 
1200 less than had been there for the previous flight (69: p49). 
The media seemed to have the attitude that Apollo 12 was not going 
to be as spectacular as Apollo 11 had been. As Mike Collins puts it, 
if a moon flight was compared to the Super Bowl, who would want to keep 
seeing the same Super Bowl over and over all the time. Thus, it was 
inevitable that the interest was going to die off. Collins states: 
First, Apollo 11 was perceived by most Americans as being an 
end rather than a beginning and I think that is a dreadful mistake. 
Frequently, NASA's PR department is blamed for this but I don't 
think NASA could have prevented it. It's simply the American way 
(24: p464). 
Life conceded that its star guest-writers were dropping in value as 
performers. In the November 14, 1969 issue of Life, a reporter, states: 
History gives few prizes to its second run heroes ... however 
daring their achievements.... . .. the men of Apollo 12 have more 
of the flair and flamboyance of traditional heroes than Neil 
Armstrong,_Edwin Aldrin and Micahel Collins ... L the Apollo 12 
astronauts / are more relaxed, voluble, humorous and daredevil ish 
(98: November 14, 1969). 
In that same issue, Norman Mailer delivered his critical comments 
about the Apollo 11 crew (mentioned earlier in this thesis). This might 
seem that Life was turning on the first crew to the moon but several 
people have told this author that that was not the case. Michael Collins 
believes that Life printed what Mailer wrote because it was "just making 
space for a 'superstar's' opinion" (98: November 14, 1969; 25). 
On November 14, 1969, with President and Mrs. Nixon in attendence 
and with just as much power as the other moon rockets, Apollo 12 left 
the bounds of earth with astronauts Pete Conrad, Dick Gordon and Al 
Bean, a rookie who was acting'as the LM pilot. As other crews had done 
before them, they televised shows back to earth and, after three days 
of flight, they entered into lunar orbit. Conrad and Bean entered the 
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LM, "Intrepid," and separated from Gordon, leaving him by himself in the 
CM, "Yankee Clipper." By now, the planners at NASA had learned about the 
mascons which had caused so much trouble for Apollos 10 and 11. With 
this knowledge, the flight of Apollo 12 was practically perfect. Intrepid 
settled down on the moon just about where it was supposed to rest. The 
preciseness helped because the astronauts were to journey to an "ancient" 
spacecraft that had been on the moon since the mid-sixties--Surveyor III--
which had helped to map the area where Apollo 12 had landed. Conrad and 
Bean stayed on the moon's surface for more than 31 hours, during which 
they were outside the LM for about eight hours (69: p101). 
The television show that was supposed to be transmitted from the 
surface of the moon never took place. When the astronauts were setting 
up the TV camera outside the LM, one of them inadvertantly pointed the 
lens at the sun, burning out the electronic scanner. Therefore, the 
world had to once again rely upon only radio to determine what was 
happening on the moon. 
During one of their two EVAs, the astronauts were deploying the 
various experiments when one piece of equipment failed to unfold as 
it was designed to do. One of the astronauts tried to pull it apart but 
it did not budge. Finally, in frustration, he hit it with his hammer 
as most people might do with a mechanical object that fails to please 
them. The ground controller praised the men for showing the world what 
"Yankee ingenuity" was all about. After their stay was finished, Bean 
and Conrad returned to the CM and Gordon, bringing not only moon rocks 
with them but also parts of the Surveyor as well. 
While the astronauts of Apollo 12 were gone, Neil Armstrong and 
Buzz Aldrin met the media in a press conference. Aldrin had been 
misquoted by a newsman whom he had never met and he was upset at the 
incident. What had happened was that Aldrin had spoken to a relative 
of his and said that, contrary to what some scientists had said, there 
was no possibility of the moon rocks catching on fire when exposed to 
pure oxygen. The relative later repeated the story to a man he met on 
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on an airplane. The other man turned out to be a reporter and shortly 
after he had talked to Aldrin's relative, a story appeared in a newspaper 
under the headline, "Aldrin Fears Lunar Rocks." Aldrin's relative was 
embarrassed, as was Aldrin, who became incensed about the inaccuracy of 
the report. At the press conference, Aldrin lashed out at the media but 
told the reporters that he was not aligning himself with Vice President 
Agnew, who was attacking the media at the time. Aldrin remembers in his 
book: 
I urged them to try harder to be accurate and asked that they 
not invent drama where no drama existed. As I concluded, I tried 
to inject a little humor by apologizing for the fact that we seemed 
so dull that invention was sometimes necessary to attract readers 
and listeners. 
There was a moment of silence, followed by the usual 
questions--this time all directed to Neil and none to me. 
Afterward, a couple of newsmen I knew came up and apologized. I 
insisted that an apology wasn't necessary and that .•. I felt most 
of our coverage was actually quite good but that the exceptions 
were fairly disastrous. 
I would have preferred that the matter be dropped at the 
press conference but it speaks well of the freedom of the press in 
this country that they were unafraid to publish criticism directed 
at them. What's more, they went to great lengths to quote me 
accurately (2: pp249-2S0). 
On November 24, the astronauts of Apollo 12 returned to earth, 
plopping down in the warm waters of the Pacific and being picked up by 
the Hornet. It was almost a rerun of Apollo 11. From the Pacific, the 
men took the same route as Collins, Aldrin and Armstrong and ended up in 
isolation in the LRL in Houston. The White House ran into a small snag 
on the military promotions for the astronauts since it was standard 
procedure to promote the officers for only one flight, customarily their 
first one. Thus, Gordon and Conrad, Navy lieutenant commanders, were 
ineligible to be promoted to captains since they had already been 
promoted following their Gemini flights. President Nixon ordered the 
policy suspended and promoted all three astronauts one grade (148). 
In the LRL, another little hassle erupted. Doug Ward, 
the PIO in there with the cr~~ to report day-to-day occurrences to the 
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media. The Apollo 12 crew members took a dim view of this as they did not 
feel that the Apollo 11 crew had set any precedent by allowing a PIa to 
live with them during its stay in the LRL. Bean, Conrad and Gordon did 
not have anything against Ward personally but they did not care for 
a journalist to be in the LRL with them. Ward called Slayton to ask him 
to talk to the crew explaining Ward's role--he was to report to the media 
what the highlights of each day were, not give a second-by-second account 
of what the astronauts were doing. One day the astronauts scheduled 
a briefing for the Flight Operations staff and Ward was told that he 
would be invited into the briefing. But, according to Ward in an 
interview in 1977, "it was obvious to me by the time I was called in 
that they had covered everything." Alan Shepard, who had been there, 
was putting on his coat and was leaving along with some other astronauts 
who were assigned to later moon flights. 1 Ward, put off by such tactics, 
called Howard Gibbons, another PIO who was Ward's contact man on the 
outside, and complained about the circumvention. Gibbons called Slayton 
to relay the complaint. The reply to Ward was that he could obtain 
material from the transcript of the briefing. Ward did not accept this. 
He felt that the transcript could not substitute for the give-and-take 
of spontaneous questioning (166). 
Ward had never been told by his superiors to attend the briefing; 
he had made up his own mind to go to it. When Gibbons told the media 
that Ward had not been instructed to go to the meeting, the reporters 
thought that Gibbons meant that Ward had been told explicitly not to 
go to the briefing, which was not the case at all. In stories that 
appeared in newspapers, it looked as though PIa was against PIO and 
Julian Scheer was dragged into the fracas. He called Houston to find 
out what was happening, was told the facts by his men in the PAO and 
was satisfied to discover that it was the media, not his men, who had 
IShepard and the others who were with him were not in the LRL 
but outside of it, speaking to those inside through the use of 
microphones and speakers. If Shepard had been inside, he never would 
have been allowed to leave as he did. 
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created the confusion, although he was not pleased that the confusion 
existed. Next, some of Slayton's superiors jumped on him in a "forceful" 
manner about the exclusion of Ward from the briefing, even though Slayton 
had had nothing to do with the incident. Slayton attempted to make 
amends with the media, said Ward in an interview years later, by becoming 
amiable for a while. Ward recounted later that he should have gone to 
Slayton about the issue rather than go through an intermediary (166). 
However, the Washington Post was in error about the episode. In its 
December 9, 1969 issue, the Post claims that Ward had been excluded from 
the briefing by Gibbons; that another PIO, Terry White, was "burnt up" 
about the situation; and that Slayton had been the person who had ordered 
Ward barred from the briefing to protect the Life contracts (168: December 
9, 1969). 
Ward says that the Life contracts had nothing to do with his 
exclusion. Gibbons, as discussed, did not prevent Ward from being there 
nor did Slayton. Terry White, in an interview, did not remember being 
"burnt up" about the incident (in fact, he had to think for a few moments 
before remembering the incident at all. The only thing that might be drawn 
out of this tempest in a teapot was that it was Shepard (who had grumbled 
something about the press being present as Ward walked in) who might have 
had a say about keeping Ward out, for whatever reasons he had. Other than 
that, it was a case of everything becoming misplaced when it came time to 
place attribution (166; 175). 
The December 5, 1969 issue of Life showed the "Go-Go" astronauts 
of Apollo 12 sitting atop their three gold Corvettes. 1 The writer of the 
article had an interesting way of loosely describing a half-billion 
dollar journey to the moon and back; he wrote that the astronauts had 
"wisecracked" their way through the mission while performing their 
sceintific duties. In the next issue, Life wrote that Apollo 12 had been 
been so successful that longer periods of time would be given to 
IAstronaut Jim Irwin writes that some of the flight crews could be 
identified by the cars they drove, like Apollo 12. Apollo 15's crew, to 
which Irwin belonged, drove a red, white and blue combination of cars. 
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the astronauts of future moon missions to explore the moon for scientific 
purposes: IINASA hopes this will placate its own scientists, some of 
whom have quit the program in recent months. 1I1 In the December 19, 1969 
issue of Life, Conrad simply wrote about all the fantastic times he had 
had on the moon. Bean referred to the good times too and to the 
scientific packages only a little. Gordon discussed the possibility of 
returning to the earth alone if the LM did not come back up from the 
surface of the moon. He also mentioned that he had felt frustrated 
at not being able to go down to the surface of the moon after going so 
far to be near it (98: December 5, 1969, December 12, 1969, December 19, 
1969). 
The flight of Apollo 12, which had gone so smoothly, as did Apollo 
11, led the nation to fall into a slumber regarding moon missions and 
the public interest had fallen considerably by the time the next mission 
was ready to go. It was all too peaceful and, as had happened 
with Apollo 204, another shock was coming to jolt the nation's 
complacency. 
IAmong the scientists at NASA who were leaving were three of the 
scientist-astronauts: Brian T. O'Leary, Frank C. Michel and John H. 
Llewellyn (116: MSC 76-168). 
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THE LITTLE U~ THAT COULD - AQUARIUS 
On January 6, 1970, NASA announced that three astronauts had been 
grounded for disobeying flight orders unrelated to space flights. What 
had happened was that Al Bean, on December 16, had thought he had been 
cleared for takeoff from Ellington AFB but he had not and he had taken 
off without a departure release. On December 17, in separate flights, 
astronauts Walt Cunningham and Joe Kerwin (who was later to fly in 
Skylab 2) had failed to list "a suitable departure airport before 
takeoff." Shortly thereafter, Deke Slayton had grounded the men until 
January 23 (116: MSC 70-5). 
Not much else happened between Apollo 12 and Apollo 13 that was of 
much significance. In its April 13, 1970 issue, Time was prophetic, 
writing that while the interest in space flights was going down, NASA 
was still interesting: " .•• there is nothing routine about the mission 
planned for astronauts James Lovell, Fred Haise and Ken Mattingly. It 
may well prove to be the most challenging test yet of man's skills in 
space." Time did not know how true that statement was to be. The 
writer pointed out that to prevent a repeat of what had happened to 
Apollo 12's lunar TV camera, a new flare-resistent color TV camera would 
be taken on Apollo 13 and a black and white TV camera would serve as a 
spare (159: April 13, 1970). 
In Milan, Italy, the newspaper I1Giorno summed up what seemed to 
be the world's attitude towards the upcoming flight, "Too Perfect," read 
a headline above a story about Apollo 13. "The Public is Getting 
Bored" (159: Apri 1 20, 1970). 
The day before the launch, there was a crew substitution, the first 
ever in NASA's history. The members of the crew had been possibly 
exposed to the measles and NASA's physicians discovered only Lovell and 
Haise were immune to them. Mattingly was not. Because of that, 
Matti ngly was removed from th'e fl i ght to be repl aced by the backup 
command module pilot, Jack Swigert, who had to prove himself to lovell, 
the spacecraft commander, who did not think at first that Mattingly 
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knew enough about the mission to take Mattingly's place (159: April 20, 
1970; 122: April 20, 1970). 
On April 11, 1970, Wally Schirra and Walter Cronkite drove to the 
CBS press site. On the launch day for Apollo 12, they had flown to the 
site in a helicopter to avoid the crowds on the roads but noticed that 
the traffic was not enough to justify flying. So, for Apollo 13, they 
drove through the streets unencumbered, by tourists. The low of the Apollo 
program had hit from the viewpoint of public interest. Only 1,107 
journalists bothered to come to the Cape to watch the blast-off. It was 
as if the flights were now mundane. The interest was dying (69: p49; 
140) . 
The astronauts were strapped in their couches, their CM's hatch 
was shut and the gantry crew folded their equipment to leave the 
astronauts by themselves. The nearest people were those in the 
blockhouse, which still shook every time one of the moon rockets left 
the earth. The blast-off came and the rocket went. That was about the 
attitude of the journalists too. Some skipped across the Gulf of 
Mexico to Houston and the remainder hung around the Cape waiting for the 
mission to end peacefully about ten days later. Things just did not 
work out that way. 
On the way to the moon, the astronauts transmitted two color TV 
shows to the rest of humanity. But some of the networks were not too 
favorable about using anymore of their air time to show the public what 
had been seen many times before. CBS and NBC chose not to air the 
shows in order to continue showing some sports games. The only people 
who saw those shows either watched ABC or else they were the technical 
personnel of the other two networks watching the input from NASA to 
their studios (159: April 20, 1970). 
The flight was proceeding so smoothly that one controller remarked 
that the astronauts were "putting us to sleep down here." Another team 
of controllers whittled away the time by discussing the number of times 
the number 13 had appeared in the mission. It was Apollo 13, launched 
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on April 11 but at 1313 Hours (1:13 p.m., CST). And then April 13 
arrived (27: p7). 
On the evening of April 13, the crew televised another show back to 
earth. It began with Lovell turning the camera around in the cabin of 
the CM, saying, "What we plan to do for you today is start out in the 
spaceship Odyssey (the CM) and take you through from Odyssey in through 
the tunnel into Aquarius (the LM}." Haise floated near the tunnel and 
Lovell, holding the camera, followed him in to the LM. There, Haise 
described the moonship. After that, it was back into the CM where 
Lovell showed Swigert, hard at work but who managed to spare a second 
to smile at the lens. Lovell kept commenting about what was what inside 
the CM and talking about the upcoming moon walk. Finally, the Capcom 
broke in and suggested that they call it a show. Lovell agreed, said 
goodby to the earth folks and wished everyone a good night. It was 
nine o'clock (27: ppl0-14). 
A few minutes later, the astronauts turned on small fans in their 
SM's oxygen tanks to stir up the liquid oxygen in order to keep it from 
settling in various layers at different temperatures. However, unknown 
to anyone, one of the fans had been tested two weeks before at the Cape 
and had been left on for eight hours. When the fan was designed there 
was no thought given to it overheating even when left on for such a long 
period of time (much past its intended limit). But that was when the 
fan was operating on the 28-volt current of the Service Module on which it 
was designed tO,be operated. However, the checkout procedure had used 
65 volts, which had burned out many wires and had caused a safety 
device to fail. When the fans were turned on after the third TV show, 
that fan overheated, causing the pressure in the oxygen tank to increase 
to the point where the tank finally blew up. This explosion blasted 
one side panel off of the SM. It was fortunate in some regards that the 
panel blew off, otherwise the CM, on top of the SM, might have popped 
off like a cork out of a bottle which would have left the astronauts 
with no rocket power to use to come home. An explosion would not 
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really be the term to use: a tank failure is how the NASA officials 
referred to the accident (27: ppI9-21). 
The first notice of the accident came when Swigert called the 
ground and said, "Houston, we have a problem here. 1I He had felt a 
shudder run through the ship and knew that something was wrong, although 
he did not know what. Lovell had been floating above his seat when he 
heard a bang. Haise had been in the tunnel when he noticed it vibrate 
up and down. To Haise, that was strange as the tunnel usually vibrated 
side to side if it shook at all. The time was 9:08 p.m., CST (27: p22). 
Haise came through the tunnel and Swigert unclipped himself 
from his seat, raced for the tunnel and slammed it shut after Haise had 
entered the CM. The warning lights came on. The pulses of the 
astronauts went from 70 to 130 per minute. 
At the time of the tank failure, Apollo 13 was 206,000 miles from 
the earth and far beyond the point where Odyssey could turn around on 
its own power to return to earth. The astronauts and the ground 
controllers discussed what to do. The power was dropping and within an 
hour all the power to the CM from the Service Module was gone. Haise 
simply told Houston, "Itls dead." 
The thought of a lunar landing was gone. On the next day, at 
2:43 a.m., the astronauts fired the descent engine of the LM to put 
them on a whip-around course around the backside of the moon. As the 
men went around the backside, silence set in as the moon blocked the 
communications to the ground. Lovell had seen the moon before but 
Haise and Swigert gazed at the pock-marked surface only 130 miles 
away. They had come so close but it was all so far now. Lovell soon 
pulled the others away from the windows. After they came around the 
moon, they fired the descent engine of the LM once more, 18 hours after 
the previous burn. It was a mid-course correction to help them 
return to earth as soon as possible. Instead of leaving the LM behind, 
as the other crews to the moon had done, Apollo 13 kept their Aquarius 
with them, using it as a IIlifeboat" since it had power and the CM had 
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none (122: April 27, 1970; 27: pp91-94). 
At MSC, NASA had created pool positions for the electronic and 
print media in glass-enclosed booths at the rear of mission control. The 
media had always been able to monitor the previous flights but reporters 
had been barred from mission control. Now, for the first time in NASA 
history, the media was able to watch the personnel in the control room 
and listen to what they were saying to each other. However, at the time 
of the accident, the pool positions were unmanned. But not all was 
lost. In the MSC news center was a pool control room where 100 networks 
were receiving information constantly from all of NASA on a 24-hour 
basis. The pool control was designed to distribute this information and 
to alert the correspondents if anything unusual happened during the 
flight. That night, Bill Johnson of NBC News was at the pool control 
room when he heard the news of Apollo 13's troubles. He called Roy 
Neal, who was at the home of astronaut Ron Evans, having supper with 
Evans and a number of other people, including about half a dozen 
astronauts (119). 
Neal describes what happened then: 
I discussed the situation briefly with Tom Stafford L-also at 
Evans' home I who was second in command of the astronaut office 
at the time~ He checked his office, found out that there was 
real trouble aboard the spacecraft, then I and the astronauts 
went to mission control. We arrived about 15 minutes after the 
first trouble call (119a). 
Neal was the first reporter to the pool position set aside for the 
electronic media in mission control and began to work immediately., With 
him, as pool producer, was Jack Kelly of CBS. Neal continues: 
Our first pool report went out approximately 20 minutes 
after the problem began. We then fed reports continuously for 
about 14 hours. That was followed by frequent reports during 
the next 36 hours. 
Pool headquarters began contacting the TV and radio networks 
within the first few minutes of the first call from the spacecraft. 
Most nets heard the problem as it developed since they all had 
air-to-ground audio feeds terminating in their-pewsrooms. The 
biggest thing we I-in the pool position at MSC~ had to offer, 
of course, was the information from the Flight Directors, which 
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was only available in mission control (119a).1 
Not all of the networks were able to move rapidly at getting the 
information out to the public. Everyone at CBS had gone to dinner but 
ABC was fortunate in that a director had scheduled a meeting of his 
personnel at the time of the accident, thus ABC was able to put the news 
on the air first. At NBC, Fred Reinstein found himself without his 
operating personnel to help him so he gathered some secretaries to assist 
feeding the information from the MSC pool position to the public. At 
MSC, the pool position for the print media remained empty for a short 
while before anyone arrived to man it (119b). 
Leo Janos, the Houston bureau chief of Time, moved fast to get the 
news. He found another Time staffer who knew the technical material 
about space flight and together they went to MSC, Janos hoping to 
concentrate on the human side of the story. Janos talked about his 
efforts later with this author: 
I didnlt know anything about the hardware. I wanted the men. 
There had been this laconic voice coming over the radio ... "Houston, 
we have a problem." It was so calm. I would have been screaming, 
"Houston, the whole place is going and 11m gonna die!" It was a 
great story. There is man in his little coffin forever and ever 
to become the Star of Bethlehem .... I went for the transcripts, 
dramatizing what it was like. The human emotion aspect to this 
was compelling as hell .... 
I went with a stringer who knew the hardware to a 
debriefing. I knew nothing. During the talk with this guy 
/ a flight controller /, I forced myself to keep awake because 
he was talking about a lot of technical stuff. Then, when it 
was over, I said to the guy, "Gee, I appreciate this information." 
You know what the guy says then? "Oh, roger." That 
personified the attitude of all the NASA people for me then. Here 
we are, on top of a great story and this guy says, "Oh, roger" to 
a thank-you (79). 
The news spread across the world and nations offered the U.S. their 
~According to Gilruth, the members of the Flight Operations teams 
had resisted the idea of creating pool positions in the rear of mission 
control because the controllers did not like the idea of journalists 
looking over their shoulders. Gilruth also stated that it was up to 
media to select who would be in the pool positions (48). 
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help in whatever way they could be of use. The Soviet Union told the 
Americans that its navy would be ready to assist in the recovery of the 
astronauts upon splashdown if the U.S. government desired the assistahce. 
While everyone on earth waited in suspense, the temperature in the 
unpowered eM dropped to 38 degrees Fahrenheit, making it virtually 
impossible for the astronauts to sleep in there. The air also started 
to foul. A jerry-rigged system was made, using hoses, lithium hydroxide 
cannisters from the LM and eM and a lot of tape. Soon, the air was 
better. The astronauts could not vent their urine outside because the 
flight plan was now so critical that even the force of the urine 
being dumped would cause the spacecraft to drift off course by a minute 
amount, necessitating the use of precious fuel to correct for it. Haise 
scrounged around the LM and came up with plastic bags and a five-gallon 
can in which to store the urine. A water gun in the eM leaked and 
Swigert had wet feet. On the night of April 15, there was another 
mid-course correction. The astronauts tried to find stars but gases 
still venting from the SM clouded many of the observations in addition 
to causing the spacecraft to continuously drift away from the flight 
path. Haise was so cold in the eM that he went into Aquarius to warm 
himself but it took four hours_for him to stop his shivering. The 
astronauts, tired from lack of sleep, started making mistakes as Houston 
kept sending additional information for them to use to get home (122: 
May 4, 1970, April 27, 1970). 
Pete Conrad was at the Lovell home in Houston. Neil Armstrong 
went to comfort Mrs. Haise, seven months pregnant. In Denver, Swigert's 
mother went into seclusion while his father continued to remain awake, 
following the details of the flight (Swigert was a bachelor). President 
Nixon visited the Goddard Space Center near Washington, D.C. for 45 
minutes to learn more about what was being done for the astronauts. 
In Houston, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission was breathing 
down the necks of NASA officials because the LM carried an 8.36-pound 
container of radioactive plutonium. It was to be used with the lunar 
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experiments and left on the moon. The fear was that once the LM was 
cast loose from Odyssey near the earth, it would be scattered over a 
widespread area during the reentry. The NASA controllers were trying 
to convince the AEC official that the remains of Aquarius would hit the 
Indian Ocean, sink and the only effect of the plutonium would be to 
keep some fish warm at the bottom of the ocean. At the rear of mission 
control were several NASA brass and also many Congressmen. The PIOs 
were providing running commentary and the flight teams held briefings 
for the media after each change of command. The flow of information 
from Houston to the world never stopped (122: April 27, 1970; 27: p159; 
104). 
At 6:53 a.m. on April 17, the final mid-course correction was 
made. Shortly thereafter, the astronauts fired the explosive bolts 
holding the SM to the eM and waited, cameras ready, for the SM to drift 
into view. It rotated rapidly as it sailed by, revealing a gaping hole 
and a long brown streak staining its side. The astronauts were able to 
only shoot a few photographs because the service module was soon gone 
from view. With the service module gone, the astronauts prepared for 
reentry, which was fast approaching. The LM was still attached to the 
CM. In the windows, the earth was growing noticeably larger by the 
second as the earth's gravity pulled the two spacecraft faster and 
faster to 25,000 miles per hour. Swigert busied himself with star 
sightings, trying to find some on which to align the navigation systems 
but ice particles accompanying the spacecraft confused him. Lovell, 
in the LM, kept adjusting the attitude of the spacecraft as they 
neared the earth, preparing to jettison the LM. At one time, Lovell 
grumbled to the ground controllers about what lousy calculations they 
were sending up to the crew. Finally, Lovell thought enough time had 
passed and he shot through the tunnel into the now-powered-up CM. 1 
Turning around, he took one last look at Aquarius, which had become 
a garbage can containing all of the astronauts' refuse, closed the hatch 
10dyssey was now operating on its internal power which had been 
shut off shortly after the accident since the CM's batteries would last 
only for a few hours and they would be needed during the reentry. 
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and took his place in the CM. The air pressure in the tunnel between the 
two spacecraft was increased by the astronauts. At 11,000 miles from their 
intended splashdown point, on the backside of the earth (which means that 
they were much closer than that distance to the earth), and flying at 15,000 
mph, the astronauts jettisoned Aqaurius when they unlocked the 14 latches 
holding the spacecraft together. The compressed air blew the LM away. Later, 
as the astronauts swung around the dark side of the earth, the LM burned up 
while plunging through the atmosphere towards the Indian Ocean where its 
radioactive debris sank to the bottom (27: pp164~199). 
Meanwhile, the ground controllers were concerned that the 
heatshield of the CM might have been damaged by the explosion in the SM. 
As the astronauts raced at 25,000 mph, they arched down through the 
atmosphere. The last thing Houston and the rest of the world heard from 
the spacecraft before the heat of the reentry cut the communications was 
Lovell saying, "Thank you" (27: p195). 
When three and a half minutes went by after the blackout began, 
Capcom Joe Kerwin called the spacecraft since that was all the time 
normally taken up during the reentry when the communications were 
inoperable. Thirty seconds more went by, still no answer from Odyssey. 
Another minutes wnet by. The controllers began to worry that something 
was wrong. Finally, Swigert called in, "OK Joe," he said. Nine minutes 
later, at 12:07 ~.m. (CST) in front of cameras transmitting to the largest 
TV audience in the world, Apollo 13 arrived home (27: p197).1 
Although the spacecraft was resting in 81 degree water, the astronauts 
could still se their breath in the chilled CM. When they were taken 
aboard the aircraft carrier Iwo Jima, the physicians there said that the 
astronauts were in the worst shape of all the astronauts they that had 
examined after returning from space flights (this is understandable 
since the astronauts had not really slept since the accident had 
bappened four days before). One of the astronauts told the doctors 
· 1Upon completion of the mission, Grumman Aircraft, the manufacturer 
of the LM, submitted a "towing" charge to North American Rockwell for the 
300,000 mile trip. The NAR officials chose to ignore the jest. 
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before he went to bed~ after guzzling fruit juices, that he did not know 
how much longer the crew could have continued the flight (98: May 1, 1970; 
1 27: pI99). 
Americans breathed a sigh of relief and went wild. For a few days 
it seemed that all the world had been captivated by the drama of the 
space flight. Yet, the number of magazine articles about Apollo 13 
numbered fewer than those that had been written about Apollo 12. Robert 
Gilruth remarked in an interview that IIwe were fortunate that the press 
was in mission controlll at the time of the oxygen tank failure. 
Congressman Olin Teague, head of the House Space Committee, felt the 
same way. According to Roy Neal~ after the flight~ Teague grabbed 
Gilruth and said~ IIBob, you know, it was good that we had those guys 
{-the media~ in there when the accident happened. We should always have 
them there ll (119; 48; 127: March~ 1969-February~ 1970~ March~ 
1970-February, 1971). 
Members of the PIO at MSC regard Apollo 13 as being the high 
point of their effectiveness; these people include John McLeaish, Jack 
Riley and Terry White. White says that the public information office 
responded quickly to getting information to the newsmen during the 
mission. Members of the media agree with this statement and with the 
thought that the mission was the highwater mark of the PIO's 
effectiveness (104; 129; 175). 
Professor Louis Alexander of the University of Houston writes in 
a letter: 
The difference between Apollo 13 and previous flights, in 
terms of NASA PR, resulted from the implementation of a new 
policy just before Apollo 13 began. That change in policy 
resulted from the efforts of a new appointee as head of public 
information I-Brian Duff-I--he was both intelligent and sincere 
with NASA and with the press. 
Members of the press thought the policy change was coincidental 
with the need of NASA to reach Congress for more budget in the wake 
IOn the last day, the astronauts ran out of water in the eM. 
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of public decrease in interest after the first moon landing .... 
NASA cooperated to the nth degree and the reporting that 
resulted was far more prompt and far more complete .... 
I consider NASA's permitting full freedom to be the evidence 
of full coop~ra!ion under the new policy. That freedom continued 
throughout / in / the presence of reporters, in shifts in the 
viewing and-listening booths I-at the rear of mission control-/ (6) - -
Roy Neal says of the mission: 
The great highlight of Apollo 13 was we had fought for a long 
time to get the ~ital information of the flight controllers' L communication -1 loops and we were the eyes and ears on mission 
control for this mission and everyone thereafter (119). 
The astronauts of Apollo 13 wrote their own versions of the flight 
in the May 1, 1970 issue of Life. Lovell wrote that he thought the 
Apollo program had matured because of Apollo 13. He also revealed that 
he had seen the movie "Marooned" just before the flight (which was 
about an Apollo spacecraft and its crew stranded in space with no hope 
of returning to earth) and this made him think about the possibility of 
being in space forever. Swigert wrote that he had practiced on a 
situation in a simulator where only 2 fuel cells and one oxygen tank 
failed. He had not thought it possible for three fuel cells and both 
oxygen tanks to quit. The flight, wrote Swigert, gave him more 
confidence in the space program, not less. Haise described the physical 
aspects of the flight, writing, "I'm not a romanticist." In their 
stories, Haise and Swigert attributed the control and planning of the 
rescue to the ground controllers (98: May 1, 1970). 
Years after the flight, Haise wrote in a letter, 
I feel their effectiveness I-that of the PIO-I was more due 
to the fact that Apollo 13 was one hell of a story. It was as 
good as any mass murder for getting banner headlines. Apollo 11 
was also a winner but I suppose Apollo 13 had more human interest 
because of the impending human tragedy (63). 
Lovell writes of the flight: 
It is human nature for individuals, indeed entire populations 
to become complacent when things are going well; and in the space 
program, most of the flights were successful so the flight crew 
of Apollo 13 was not overly concerned with the fact that prior 
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to the explosion we were competing with the local baseball game. 
In general, the press handled the report on Apollo 13 accurately. 
As is characteristic of the press, they tended to overdramatize 
the dangers. 
The Lovell family's relationship with the press during Apollo 
13 was excellent .... My family had no problem along these lines (100). 
Writer Henry Cooper, of the New Yorker, wrote a book about the flight 
flight, entitled, 13, The Flight that Failed, which was drawn largely 
from material that Cooper had written in the magazine. The time that 
Cooper had spent hanging around NASA during the earlier flights paid off. 
He had brief talks with Haise and Swigert but Lovell refused to talk 
with him, says Cooper. When Cooper sent Lovell a copy of the draft for 
him to check for errors, Lovell still held back his comments. Cooper 
speculated at the time that Lovell was not talking because he was writing 
his own book about the mission or because he was protecting the contract 
that he had with Life (no book written by Lovell ever appeared in print). 
The writer also noticed that whenever Haise and Swigert appeared somewhere, 
Lovell was not with them. However, this author had no trouble in 
obtaining replies from Lovell in 1976 concerning his views upon various 
subjects (28; 100). 
The flight of Apollo 13 had re-awakened a slumbering nation, 
informing the public that space flight--although it had been made to 
appear easy--still contained dangers. For their part in the flight, the 
Apollo 13 astronauts were awarded Medals of Freedom by President Nixon 
shortly after the spacemen had returned from space. Another Medal of 
Freedom went to Sigmund Sjoberg, the flight operations director for the 
mission (69: p49; 122: April 27,1970). 
No one said anything about the PAO receiving any medals or 
commendations for its work. But then, the PI~s would possibly have 
turned down any such offers since they considered the work to be normal 
for them. The University of Missouri once gave the PAO a citation for 
its overall efforts in the space programs. The PAO was also nominated 
for a Pulitzer Award but Scheer turned it down because the public 
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information officers of NASA were not members of the working press for whom 
the Pulitzer was designed (137). 
The Apollo 13 astronauts earned another, less-known, designation--
they were the last astronauts to write their personal stories for Life. 
In 1967, the editors of Life had foreseen the public interest in the 
astronauts fading after the first moon landing and, when the contract 
for the personal stories was renewed, the editors wrote a stipulation 
that the contract would end one year after the first man walked on the 
moon. Thus, on July 20, 1970, the contracts that the astronaut corps 
had had with Life since 1959 came to an end. After that time the 
astronauts were free to write for whomever they chose. Attorney Paul 
Sawyer says that no publications came running to the astronauts to buy 
the rights to their personal stories. Sawyer adds, IIS0 there we were, 
like a bride at the altar waiting for a bridegroom. 1I An era that had 
sparked so much controversy in past years ended with little notice by 
either Life or the people who had so strongly opposed the magazine's 
connection with the astronauts. Gone, along with much of the fanfare 
of earlier flights, was Life (134). 
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THE BREAKING OF THE ASTRONAUT IMAGE 
Between Apollos 13 and 14~ some interesting events took place around 
the NASA community. Since the Life contract had faded away, the astronauts 
were now subsisting on their salaries and not much else. In the summer 
of 1970~ David Wolper Productions offered to produce a television 
documentary about the astronauts and their families. The families of 
the astronaut corps would receive $100,000 plus 50% of the profits. There 
was an advance payment of $60,000 which was split 60 ways. The rest of 
the money never came through as the project fell apart. And not 
everyone wanted to share equally (26: May/June, 1973). 
Astronaut Tom Stafford~ sitting in as the head of the astronaut 
office for Alan Shepard (who was training for Apollo 14), called the 
widows of the eight astronauts who had died and asked for their 
participation in the film production. When Mrs. Grissom read the 
contract later, it became obvious that the astronauts were going against 
the widows. The terms stated that~ after five years of widowhood, the 
women would no longer be eligible to receive a part of the proceeds from 
ventures entered into by the active astronauts, such as any more 
contracts with other media for their personal stories. Mrs. Grissom 
called Stafford to complain and he told her that she was the only widow 
to have voiced a differing opinion about the terms. Later, in talking 
with Mrs. Beth Williams, widow of C.C. Williams~ Mrs. Grissom learned 
that Stafford had told Mrs. Williams the same thing. Then, the widows 
talked to a lawyer who made their position clear to the other astronauts: 
their husbands had given their lives and all they wanted was their share 
of the money coming to the astronauts. At that time~ Mrs. Grissom was 
being paid a widow's pension of $299 a month by the government (59: 
pp220-221). 
After the astronauts heard from the lawyer, Pete Conrad visited 
the Grissom household to tell Mrs. Grissom, "If your husband was just 
in the Air Force, you would have been given one year to get out of your 
house if you were in base housing." Mrs. Grissom countered by pointing 
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out what the Original 7 had thought: that the astronauts, including the 
widows, would equally share the proceeds from any sales of their personal 
stories. Finally, Conrad said that many of the astronauts did not want 
to share anything with the widows. "They I-the newer astronauts-I won't 
even know who Gus Grissom was," said Conrad. "If they don't," replied 
Mrs. Grissom, " ... then they'd better find out" (59: pp220-221). 
She eventually received her share of money from the Wolper project 
($1000) even though she had not signed the contract; if she had done so, 
she would have cut herself off from receiving any future proceeds. Then 
she received a letter from Shepard stating that a new policy was being 
implemented. It stated that when the youngest child of an astronaut's 
widow reached age 18, then the benefits would be severed (59: p222). 
At times, Mrs. Grissom found it hard to relate to some of the 
astronaut community, even before this incident, and it was no fault of 
hers. One night at an astronaut party, to which she had been invited by 
the Schirras, she was told that several of the families were planning to 
go to Acapulco for the Easter holidays that year. Then one of the wives 
snapped, "But there's no widows going to be allowed on this trip L-sic~. 
It's going to be a fun trip" (59: p216). 
Another incident happened when Apollo 11 went to the moon. A 
committee had been appointed by NASA to study what symbolic items might 
be left on the lunar surface. One suggestion was the mission patch 
that had been worn by the Apollo 204 astronauts when they died. 1 Al 
Shepard was not in favor of this thought. He did not feel that the 
patch should be taken on the flight since Apollo 1 had never flown. He 
telephoned Mrs. Grissom and was told by her that she was in favor of 
Aldrin and Armstrong taking it with them. "1'11 go along with your 
decision on it," said Shepard. "But I don't think you should do it" 
(59: p219). 
Mrs. Grissom recalls in her book: 
I don't know why he was against it .... I called Pat I-White-I 
and Martha L-Chaffee~ and they both went along with it. T said,-
1The patch was labelled as Apollo 1. 
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Pat, you want to know how I feel about it, I don't care what Al 
Shepard does think. I don't think it's any of his business (59: 
p219). 
Finally, Mrs. Grissom cut the ties with "Togethersville," a term 
that was used to describe the astronaut community, although it was not a 
geographical term since they lived a distance from each other in little 
clusters. In the middle of January, 1971, she walked into the Clear Lake 
City law office of lawyers Ronald Krist and Kenneth McConnico and asked 
for help. After a few weeks of deciding where to act and where to make 
their move, the two lawyers flew to Titusville, Florida and, on January 
25, 1971, filed a $10 million suit for negligence against North American 
Rockwell (NAR) on behalf of Mrs. Grissom. 1 By the time the lawyers 
returned to Houston, the news of the suit had already preceded them. 
They were mobbed by reporters at the airport. "How does it feel to be 
famous?" asked one reporter. 
nOh, are we famous?" asked Krist. 
"You're definitely famous," was the reply. 
The fame of the astronauts, and particularly this case, had spread 
to the lawyers. They found their telephones ringing day and night. They 
were invited to sit with attorney Melvin Belli on a television show to 
discuss the differences between German and American legal systems. Mrs. 
Grissom and Krist went to New York City to appear on NBC's "Today." 
The newsmen bothered Mrs. Grissom so much that she had to obtain an 
unlisted telephone number. The other widows of the Apollo 204 astronauts 
were asked by the media if they were participating in the suit; they 
were not. A six-page article appeared in Life--unusual attention for 
any law firm to have lavished upon a lawsuit (98: September 17, 1971; 
59: pp228-229). 
North American Rockwell filed a "pro forma" reply, stating that 
Colonel Grissom had been negligent on "the premises," as the company 
IThe question of where' to file the suit was for several reasons. 
The accident had happened in Florida, the family resided in Texas and 
the manufacturer of the CM was in California, each state having 
different statutes of limitations. 
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referred to the command module. This was something that a NAR official, 
Dr. John McCarthy, had hinted at during the Senate hearings of 1967 and 
who had been forced to retract his statement when Congressman James 
Fulton of Pennsylvania found the remark to be offensive to the astronaut's 
character (90: p203; 98: September 17, 1971). 
Some people thought Mrs. Grissom was suing the U.S. government, 
which was not the case. Ron Krist offers his view of her patriotism: 
I think it's patriotic to institute a suit against a 
corporation that has a five billion dollar contract paid by the U.S. 
tax payers, if they botch the work after we pay them five billion 
dollars, I think it's patriotic to make them toe the line and 
account for it (59: p230). 
However, the angry letters came in, blasting Mrs. Grissom. A 
number of them were bitter: 
I hope you lose your case and that you receive no money .... 
The world is already full of hungry money suckers such as 
you .... You're very, very sick. Go to Russia and stay! 
My husband works for NAR and also met your husband .... Perhaps 
you have forgotten your husband volunteered .... If you must 
strike back, why not go dig up his remains? Why must you help 
the communists ... ? (59: p231) 
Dr. Robert Gilruth sent a bitter letter that he had received to 
Mrs. Grissom. Accompanying the letter was his own note: "Dear Betty, 
I am passing this on to you since I am sure you want to know what people 
are thinking" (59: p231). 
wrote, 
And there were letters that supported her. A Methodist minister 
Fight on. I just want to support you in your suit for 
your rights in relation to the tragic callous lack of safety 
for your husband in the flight program. I'm with you in spirit 
and with a sense of shame that you must stand alone to call 
for the most elementary expression of justice (59: pp231-232). 
More encouragement arrived in the mail from many places: 
I'm all for you and so is the rest of my family ..•. 
Hope you get the entire sum ....... even though money 
cannot in any way erase your grief. 
Your journey is embarkation on a course of action bringing 
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about direct and indirect confrontation with the establishment .... 
Congratulations for your lawsuit ... (59: p232). 
The battle would continue for almost a year. 
In the July 31, 1970 issue of Life, a story about Alan Shepard 
written by Loudon Wainwright, appeared. Wainwright, who had been a staff 
writer for Life from 1959-61, was back to write the story about the man 
who had just been officially announced as having been selected to be on 
the Apollo 14 crew. 1 Wainwright treated Shepard fairly, showing both 
the good and bad sides of the first American astronaut. The writer 
stated that: 
--Shepard was aloof; 
--Shepard applied ridicule to the scientist-astronauts, telling 
jokes about them from time to time. The scientist-astronauts 
claimed that Shepard was unsympathetic to them and was icy towards 
them when it came time to disqualify them from flights; 
--Shepard set himself up in an apartment while the other astronauts 
moved into houses near MSC when the space administration moved to 
Houston in 1962; 
--Shepard lived in a $150,000 house in an exclusive Houston 
neighborhood. "Just too big," said his daughters, preferring his 
country home; 
--he had discussed his secret ear oper~tion with Deke Slayton 
in 1968 before he went to California I which seems odd since 
everything that the other astronauts did had to be cleared 
through Shepard yet Shepard did not feel obligation to divulge some 
of his activities to them--this seems unfair I; 
--Shepard had set up a ten day lecture series for himself at North 
American Rockwell's California plant so he could study the CM. He 
also arranged another tour at the LM's home at Grumman Aircraft 
Corporation on Long Island; 
--Shepard was concerned that he was projecting the image of 
the "hustling" astronaut to the public; 
--Shepard tended to brush off the public as it did not understand 
him; and 
--Wainwright hinted that Shepard had been put back to Apollo 14 
because of his incompetence (98: July 31, 1970). 
lIt has been stated by several sources that Gordon Cooper had 
been originally slated to be the commander of Apollo 14 but, as the 
sources have told this author, an impending divorce in Cooper's crew 
and his love of fast cars, kept those men from flying the mission. He 
retired on July 31, 1970. Upon the announcement about Shepard, Cooper 
was in London and a reporter asked him for a comment about Shepard's 
selection. Cooper replied, III would rather not speak too much of Captain 
Shepard. I have my own feelings about him." The rivalries were still 
present. 
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In all, the article was not too kind towards Shepard, who had been 
well respected nine years before when he flew in MR-3. Wainwright 
writes in a letter: 
I had no special instructions on the Shepard story in 1970. 
Since it was not a story carrying his byline, we did not seek his 
approval. Whenever a story appeared under my byline about the 
astronauts, I said pretty much what I wanted to say, and no one 
at Life ever suggested that I either put the kid gloves on ... or 
take them off .... 
When there were no longer contractual ties, the writing wasn't 
so reverent as it had been in the beginning (165). 
From the looks of Wainwright's article, he was not kidding. Life's 
protection of the "s imon pure guys" image (as Buzz Aldrin labelled 
Life's portrayal of the astronauts) fell away when the contracts faded 
from the scene. It is interesting to note that Wainwright's article 
came right after the contracts had expired--only 11 days before. One day 
in a bar, a Life editor reportedly said, "Let's tell what the astronauts 
are really like," but could not because, at the time of his statement, 
the contracts were in effect. Now, in the summer of 1970, Life's editors 
and writers finally had their chance to show "what the astronauts are 
really like." They did not go wild with pent-up hostility (this author 
doubts there was any), but the article about Shepard was not the 
friendliest ever written about him (26: May/June, 1973; 2: p301). 
Another issue of Life that came out that summer carried a one-page 
article by Gene Farmer, who had been working on First on the Moon with 
the Apollo 11 astronauts and Dora Jane Hamblin. Farmer wrote a follow-up 
story about those astronauts, telling what they were doing one year after 
gOing to the moon. He said that Armstrong had not really changed from 
what Farmer had known of him before the flight. The first man on the 
moon told Farmer, liThe principal change in my life has been that people 
now keep asking me how my life has changed." Aldrin, according to 
Farmer, had changed the most and Collins, now working in the State 
Department, had changed some because, "going to the moon did remove 
a whole lot of things from my shopping list." Farmer editorialized at 
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one point: 
The decorations, the honorary doctorates, even the flight 
itself have, I think, changed the three astronauts in ways that 
not one of them yet fully recognizes even in himself, let alone in 
the other two. The common denominator of change seems to be a 
determination to repay society. Each knows that there was a big 
element of chance in his emergence as "a hero," for the first 
lunar landing could well have been achieved by another Apollo 
crew (98: July 24, 1970). 
Apollo 14 was launched on January 31, 1971 and, with astronauts 
Stu Roosa and Edgar Mitchell with him, Alan Shepard was on his way to the 
moon. Five days after launch, he and Mitchell descended to the Frau 
Mauro region for a 33-hour stay. They brought along a three-wheel cart 
to carry the moon rocks and tools as they walked for several miles 
across the lunar surface. The cart, weighing only 25 pounds in the lunar 
gravity, bounced continuously, spilling items so often that one astronaut 
would follow the other, picking up whatever fell. On February 6, the 
astronauts made a second journey out of the LM to collect more moon 
rocks. While on this excursion, Shepard affixed a six-iron golf head to 
a digging tool, dropped a few golf balls and drove them for "miles 
and miles and miles. 1I Then the men packed up every:thing, dumped what 
was unnecessary for the flight home out the LM hatch and launched 
themselves from the moon. During the three day flight home in the CM, 
Mitchell silently tried some ESP experiments with some ground-bound 
friends. 1 On February 9, the astronauts reached home and were put into 
two-week quarantine at MSC. It was the last time any crew spent time in 
the LRL (118: July, 1971). 
The media reacted with a bit more enthusiasm towards Apollo 14 than 
towards Apollos 12 and 13. There were 35 articles about the third mission 
to land on the moon and about five more articles were on Shepard alone. 
Shepard cannot be thought of as a reason for the increased publicity or 
the increased attendance at the Cape when the mission started. The 
IAccording to an article in the Daily Nebraskan, the college 
newspaper at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Mitchell told a 
college audience at that campus that his experiments had been 
Successful (30). 
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reason was more than likely the flight of Apollo 13. The number of 
correspondents at Apollo 14's launch was 2,355, which was 436 more than 
had been at Apollo 13's departure (69: p49; 127: March, 1971-February, 
1970) . 
Gordon Harris attributes this surge of attention to the trouble 
with Apollo 13 . 
... we learned that problems made news, while the successful 
performances of rockets and spacecraft and astronauts were 
accepted as routine, a phenomenon difficult for space engineers 
and managers to accept, as the public relations staff learned 
(69: p48). 
After the flight of Apollo 14, many articles concerning Mitchell's 
ESP experiments appeared in newspapers and magazines. What he had been 
trying to learn was if people could communicate with one another without 
having to use electronic communication channels. Mitchell, in reply to 
a question by this author, writes, 
Out of the hundreds of articles r-about his ESP work-I, only 
a handful have been disappointing. I-have been treated well by 
the press because I have tried to work with their needs .... Almost 
every paper has carried several articles--most were not too bad 
(113) . 
On February 22, 1971, Julian Scheer wrote the lead for a story that 
the public affairs office was preparing to release to the media. That 
press release was the announcement of his resignation as NASA's Assistant 
Administrator for Public Affairs, effective March 22, 1971. Scheer 
calls the writing of that lead, "the only dishonest thing I ever did 
whil e I was in NASA" (137). 
The press release contained praise for the head of the PAO: 
... under Scheer's direction, NASA anticipated and planned for 
press needs in connection with Apollo manned flights, including a 
worldwide communications network for disseminating television 
pictures live from the Moon on Apollo 11 .•. ; developed worldwide 
exhibit programs, began regular television and radio network 
services, started a varied publications program, produced over 100 
major motion pictures on the agency's programs for public 
distribution, and developed an innovative elementary and secondary 
school education program. Activities in Washington and at 11 
other NASA locations are directed from Headquarters .... 
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He was awarded NASAls Exceptional Service Medal in 1968 and 
NASAls highest award, the Distinguished Service Medal, in 1969. 
NASAls Public Affairs program received several national awards, 
including the 1970 University of Missouri School of Journalism 
Special Achievement Award which cited the NASA program "for its 
outstanding, almost inconceivable, contributions to journalism 
technology and progress through highly complex communications 
facilities and networks which have enabled the people of Earth to 
be witnesses to man's pioneering journeys into space and to the 
Moon; for its cooperation with the mass media of communication 
of the world--and especially with those of the United States--in 
making available the continuing story of the American space program; 
for its recognition of, and dedication to, the proposition that 
as the frontiers of space are explored there is the incumbant 
responsibility on government to exoand the frontiers of journalism 
so that the publ ic will be fully informed" (116: 71-28). 
While some people may think that the "dishonest thing" that Scheer 
did was to pat himself on the back in the press release, possibly the most 
dishonest thing he did was to not list the reason why he was leaving NASA 
NASA--he had crossed wires with Congress. 1 Scheer says that his dismissal 
revolved around the manner in which invitations to the KSC launches were 
handled by him--specifically, why he kept refusing to supply launch 
invitations on an unlimited basis to Dr. James R. Maxfield, a Dallas, 
Texas researcher and cancer specialist. Scheer's successor, John P. 
Donnelly, confirms Scheer's statements on this subject (137; 33). 
Maxfield had the habit of arriving at Cape Kennedy with planeloads 
of friends, who came at his invitation. This had started when Maxfield 
saw the first Saturn launch in 1961 and continued through the rest of the 
decade into the 1970s. He never brought less than a planeload of his 
acquaintances. The most that arrived at one time at the Cape were five 
planes at one time. His son, Morgan Maxfield, a Kansas City businessman, 
brought an entourage to the Cape from Kansas City on one occasion. aboard a 
chartered 747. The Maxfields took care of their guests. Once, when a 
group was brought to Florida, they went to Disneyworld first (about 40 
miles from the Cape), and arrived at the launch complete with a police 
IAccording to Scheer, he had only written the lead; someone else 
in his office had written the remainder of the press release. 
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escort around the buses. It did not seem as though the Maxfields were 
causing the government any expense but rather the inconvenience of having 
300-400 people who were not expected show up at the launch viewing stands 
(69: p213; 70; 137). 
Maxfield said in a conversation: 
There was some difficulty in getting the people out to the 
launches. We just simply passed the word around that we were 
gOing and if anyone wanted to come along with us, they could .... 
They paid their expenses while on the trips .... 
About the NASA information program--the general public was 
never informed very well by NASA about what was going on. NASA 
did a lot of publicity. Julian Scheer, and the newscasters were 
part of this, only pointed at a hunk of metal. They didn't tell 
the public that for every dollar spent on space, there was five 
dollars coming back in spinoffs in the medical fields, in medicine 
and in many other areas. 
We felt this was important that the public get the facts. 
They got only half-facts from NASA. We felt that by inviting many 
people from various areas, we could help spread this information 
about (110). 
In essence, it appears that Dr. Maxfield and his son were trying to 
run the public affairs of NASA. 
What Scheer wanted to do was to limit the number of passes available 
to Maxfield. It did seem rather strange that the doctor was bringing in 
more people than were allotted for the White House (20) and the 
Vice-President (10) combined. Scheer preferred to keep Maxfield limited 
to less than 25 passes per launch but the director of NASA's public 
affairs ran into stiff opposition, he said, from Congressman Olin E. 
"Tiger" Teague, of the House Science and Technology Committee, who was 
the U.S. Representative for the Texas district in which Maxfield lived. 1 
Teague said that the Maxfields did more than any other individuals to 
sell the U.S. space program. It was Teague, claims Scheer, who resented 
his way of handling one of Teague's more important constituents (69: p213; 
70; 137). 
According to Scheer, Teague tried to oust him when Webb was in 
power but failed. Next came Paine, who also did nothing to fulfill 
Teague's desires. When Paine left NASA in 1970, George M. Low became 
IAlthough not the House Space Committee, Teague's committee dealt 
heavily with NASA's operations. 
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the acting administrator. In early 1971, Scheer offered Low his 
resignation; his reason for wanting to leave NASA was that he was putting 
in just too much time--up to 15 hours a day for seven days a week. Scheer 
did this on the advice of his wife, Webb and Paine but Low asked Scheer 
to stay \'Ii th the space agency, whi ch Scheer did (137). 
Then, shortly after Scheer had made his request to part from NASA, 
Low called Scheer and rather awkwardly told Scheer that the world would 
appreciate what the public affairs director had done during his years at 
NASA but things were changing and it was time for Scheer to leave. 
Scheer believes that Teague had finally found an administrator to dump 
him. He agreed with Low and offered to resign in March, 1971. President 
Nixon heard of Scheer's "resignation" and called him to ask him if he 
wanted to stay but Scheer said that he thought it was best for him to 
1 eave (137). 
In Scheer's place, Low appointed the astronauts' attorney Paul 
Sawyer to act as a consultant on NASA's public affairs policies after 
Scheer left. The Washington Post editorialized about Scheer's 
temporary replacement: 
There is something strange about the decision of NASA to 
bring in ... lawyer Paul Sawyer as a consultant .... NASA has had, 
for a decade now, what seems to us and to most journalists to be 
the most effective and most honest public information program 
in government. It is hard to see why public monies should be 
spent to study it, particularly when the man chosen to make the 
study has represented the astronauts in recent months in negotiating 
private contracts for the stories of their private activities. 
Lying behind the move, of course, is the decision of NASA's 
acting administrator, George Low, to fire Julian Scheer who has 
run the agency's public affairs department for nine years. Mr. 
Scheer survived the first two years of the Nixon administration 
largely because of the remarkable job he has done in creating 
NASA's exceptionally good public image. In the process, however, 
he has alienated some powerful members of Congress by refusing to 
cater to their every wish, such as providing special facilities 
for their friends during the various lunar expeditions. The 
pressure for his departure, it seems, had become more than NASA 
was willing to withstand, particularly now that it is less popular 
on Capitol Hill than it once was. 
But there is nothing in Mr. Scheer's departure that would 
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seem to call for re-thinking the highly effective policies he 
administered for so long. Mr. Scheer fought long and hard for the 
view that the public had a right to know as much as possible about 
NASA and it is largely because of his efforts that NASA permitted 
live television and radio coverage of all major space 
activities .... 
Even assuming that the new men now running NASA have a 
legitimate reason for wanting a consultant's advice on public 
information activities, the decision to get that advice from 
a lawyer for the astroanuts is highly questionable .... Thus, 
regardless of Mr. Sawyer's qualifications or motivations, he is 
cast into an impossible situation; he cannot recommend anything 
that can conceivably be construed as limiting NASAls public 
information operations without being open to the charge, whether 
fairly or unfairly raised, of doing it to help astronaut-clients 
of his law firm. 
It is always disappointing to acknowledge that a few 
malcontents on Capitol Hill can force the firing of a competent 
public official. But it is profoundly distressing to think that 
the new hierarchy at NASA is so insensitive to the public interest 
as to see no conflict in asking the astronauts I lawyer for help in 
working out a new public information policies and picking a new 
public affairs director (167: March 27, 1971). 
Attorney Sawyer, who acted as a consultant for only five weeks 
(during which time, Al Alibrando, who had been Director of Information 
for f4anned Space Flight, was the NASA official in charge of the PAD), 
was paid less on a per diem basis than he would have earned in legal 
fees. He said in an interview in 1977, 
The whole deal about the conflict of interest was kind of 
silly. If NASA had told the astronauts to go out on the parade 
field and stand at attention, they would have done it. I wasn't 
there acting for the astronauts. I was working on the whole 
aspect of the public information program .... There was no conflict 
of interest ... (134). 
From what this author has researched, there is nothing that 
indicates that Sawyer ever made any recommendations on behalf of the 
astronauts. But the Washington Post did raise a good point: even if 
Sawyer was not prejudiced towards acting in the astronauts I favor, that 
thought might linger in the minds of many people and it would be hard to 
remove that thought although it also must be remembered that the Louis 
Nizer law firm was not being paid any money to work for the astronauts 
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so there was no financial obligation for Sawyer to be considerate of 
the astronauts during the weeks he spent acting as a consultant. 
As for Scheer being fired because of Congressman Teague, George 
Low does not believe this. In a letter he wrote to the author, he 
said that he would prefer to not discuss the matter but added, "I will 
tell you that the story you have heard concerning Mr. Teague is not 
true." 
Representative Teague explained his role in the affair to this 
author in a letter: 
... the problems with Mr. Julian Scheer did not originate 
with Dr. James Maxfield. The problems arose with the general 
way in which Mr. Scheer handled the attendance at the NASA 
launches at Cape Kennedy. 
In the district of almost every Member of the Science 
Committee, some incident had been handled in a way that the Member 
was not satisfied with the work of Mr. Scheer. For example, one 
incident_that I remember--a Dean of Engineering wanted a pass to the 
launch L sic~ and could not get one, although a professor serving 
under the Dean was sent one which was unsolicited and could not 
be used. This is an example of many, many cases. In many ways, 
it is my opinion that Mr. Scheer did an excellent job. But in 
some areas. in particular dealing with people, he was less than 
desirable. 
I have been personally contacted a number of times since Mr. 
Scheer left NASA concerning his employment; and each time, I 
have recommended him. As you mayor may not know. our Committee 
reduced by a considerable amount, the amount of money authorized 
for his office. There was not once complaint from anyone, 
newspapers or magazines. For a period of time, our Committee was 
flooded with complaints concerning Mr. Scheer's handling of passes 
for the launches. In my mind, there is no question that Dr. 
Maxfield spent more of his personal money to promote the space 
program and was responsible for plane loads of business people from 
the whole Texas area and from Kansas City to attend the launches. 
A number of people did this, a number of industries did this; and 
knowing what was happening on Capitol Hill, it was most important 
that we do everything we could to convince American citizens that 
the space program was a worthwhile project. 
It was my feeling most of the time, and I know the feeling 
of other Members of the Committee, that Mr. Scheer's attitude 
was that our Committee was just a necessary nuisance. Very few 
people know how close we came to not being able to get the money 
for the space program for a number of years. As far as I am 
says, 
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concerned, it was strictly a part of Mr. Scheer's job in which 
I felt he failed. There was nothing personal then; there is 
nothing personal now. 
For sure, I was not the only one prodding Mr. Scheer to either 
change his ways or get some administrators to change his job 
(156). 
Gordon Harris, at Cape Kennedy, believes Teague is right. He 
Low had his own reasons for firing Scheer. But Congress did 
have something to do with Scheer leaving. L-Senator~ Margaret 
Smith went after NASA, with Goldwater behind her, saying that 
they had supported NASA's public relations and had got no answers 
to items they were interested in--nothing (70). 
While Scheer believes that Teague was the man who was out to 
eliminate him from his job, it would seem plausible that Scheer has made 
him his personal scapegoat. But most of the evidence points out that 
there were members of Congress, particularly in Teague's Committee, who 
were upset at his performance. It does appear, however, that Teague did 
have much to do with Scheer's firing. How much Teague had to do with 
Scheer's replacement is not known but, on August, 15, 1971, John P. 
Donnelly took over as the Assistant Administrator of Public Affairs 
for NASA, relieving Alibrando (123a). 
In early 1971, Alan Shepard had visited the launch site of 
MR-3 (presumably while he was at the Cape preparing for Apollo 14) and 
found it to be decaying. He managed to bring NASA's attention to this, 
thinking that the launch pad of the first American manned mission should 
somehow be honored as a historical spot. NASA agreed and an effort 
to dedicate the site began. On May 5, 1971, the tenth anniversary of 
Shepard's first flight, Shepard returned to Launch Complex 5/6 at the 
Cape. So did 3,000 officials and employees of NASA. The old blockhouse 
had been outfitted with the same equipment as had been in there on the 
day of the Redstone launch. President Nixon and Vice-President Agnew 
sent notes of congratulations to Shepard for his work over the years 
with NASA. While Shepard's father and the astronaut watched, their 
wives unveiled a bronze plaque that stood on the launching pad and bore 
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a profile of the astronaut and the following legend: 
ALAN B. SHEPARD, JR. 
The first American to penetrate outer space 
began his flight from this launch complex in 
Freedom 7 on Mercury Redstone No. 3 at 
9:34 A.M. May 5, 1961 
From this beginning, man reached the Moon. 
John F. Kennedy Space Center 
National Aeronautics and ,Space Administration 
Shepard mingled with his old friends for awhile, some who were 
still working on Apollo, and then returned to Houston to resume his old 
job of being the Head of the Astronaut Office (117: Kennedy Space Center 
Story: ppI68-171). 
In the middle of 1971, a NASA custom was discontinued, possibly to 
the relief of the astronauts. The "Week in the Barrell! had come to an 
end. NASA Protocol Officer Gene Marianetti stated in an interview that 
liThe Week in the Barrel" was called off because there was not much demand 
anymore to have the astronauts put in appearances around the country. 
Essentially, said Marianetti, what had happened was that Slayton one 
day said, hey, we're not flying as much anymore, so let's tone down the 
program a little. NASA hierarchy agreed. Since that time, the requests 
for astronaut appearances have been handled by the astronauts' office 
and NASA Headquarters. Occasionally, schedules for tours similar to 
the "Week in the Barrel" would still be set up but as a weekly 
occurrance, it was gone forever (109). 
On July 23, 1971, the New York Times and the public information 
office of NASA released statements to the media that the Times had made 
an agreement with attorney Paul Sawyer for the personal stories of the 
Apollo 15 astronauts and Harrison Schmitt (due to fly on Apollo 17 as the 
first and only geologist-astronaut to visit the moon). The NASA press 
release reads, in part, 
Terms of the agreement call for one byline article each by 
Apollo 15 astroanuts .•• for publication after the post-mission 
press conference and three byline articles by Astronaut Schmitt 
while the crew is on the lunar surface. 
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The New York Times Special Features L-the syndicate division 
?f the newspaper~ also has rights of taking still photographs 
1n the homes of Apollo 15 crew members at the time of their 
first return from the mission and rights to interviews with family 
members. 
The agreement ... provides for payment by the Times Special 
Features of 50% of the gross proceeds from the syndication of the 
articles (116: MSC 71-51). 
Newsweek did not think too much of the efforts of the New York 
Times. It recalled an editorial from the Times' earlier days that 
states: 
The motive of private profit has an honorable and legitimate 
place in the world of commercial endeavor but that world does 
not embrace the tasks /-of~ astronauts .... They should not be 
allowed t~ reap enormous private profits from the outside 
sources L referring to Life and Field~ (122: August 9, 1971). 
Newsweek reported that the Times was being hypocritical by offering 
the astronauts money for something that the Times had originally blasted 
Life, Field, the astronauts and NASA for doing. It was as if the Times 
was saying, liDo as I say, not as I do. 1I In the Newsweek article. a 
Times spokesman tried to clear up the muddy waters around the issue by 
stating, "Well. at least they will not reap eno!'l11ous profit" {122: August 
9, 1971}. 
Newsweek was correct for condemning the Times. This author has 
attempted to question several people at the Times as to why there was a 
change in attitude towards offering money to the astronauts for their 
personal stories. There have been no replies to the queries sent. 
The day before launch of Apollo 15, Jim Irwin, the LM pilot, spent 
some time playing handball, so much that he completely dehydrated 
himself and, without his knowledge, lowered the level of potassium 
in his body. This would affect him later in the mission and cause 
Some strain between NASA and the media once more (77: p27). 
On July 26, 1971, Apollo 15 took off with Irwin, Dave Scott and 
Al Worden on board. The mission was the most scientific one to that 
date. The target of Irwin and Scott, who were going to the lunar surface 
in the LM, "Falcon," was the long Apennine mountain range where some 
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peaks rise to more than 15,000 feet. On July 30, the Falcon settled 
near Hadley rille between a number of mountains. After they were on the 
moon--and partly crushed the bell of their descent engine--Scott poked his 
head out of the upper hatch of the LM, looked around and told Houston 
what he saw. Near him were mountains taller than Mt. Everest, in relation 
to their surroundings; a meandering gorge a mile across, 1000 feet deep 
and 70 miles long; and a fantastic vista one of the moon's mountain 
ranges. Craters were abundant in the area. Scott slipped back inside 
the LM, sealed the upper hatch and then he and Irwin rested for a short 
time before making their first trip outside the LM. Nine hours later, 
they left the Falcon. One of their first discoveries was a thick, dark 
powdery dust covering everything, including portions of their white 
moon suits, cameras and other gear. They set up a color TV camera and, 
while the world watched, unfolded a weird contraption that soon took 
shape as a small cart. It was the first Lunar Rover, or "Moon Buggy'" 
to some people. The astronauts then unloaded their gear on it, mounted 
the TV camera on a center support and buckled themselves into the 
seats to go zipping across the moon at a top speed of nearly ten miles 
per hour. They headed for the gorge first for a look. As they took 
panoramic pictures with their still cameras, a ground controller 
operated the TV camera on the Rover to follow the astronauts (there was 
a one-second delay because of the distance that the radio and television 
signals had to travel). The TV could work only when the Rover was 
parked and its parasol-antenna was aimed precisely at the earth. With 
its television shows, NASA was improving substantially (118: February 
1972) . 
On earth, the television pictures were being transmitted to the 
networks by NASA but the networks were not always transmitting the 
images to the public. Wally Schirra and Walter Cronkite sat in the 
CBS studios with other personnel watching the shows being broadcast 
from the moon. Schirra recalls: 
We were sitting there watching the shows when Jan Armstrong 
I-the wife of the astronaut=t called and asked why we were 
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not putting the show of the Rover out over the air. I had to tell 
her that we wanted to ... but the commercial advertisers didn't. 
Cronkite and Frank Stanton I-the President of CBS-I wanted 
air time but the advertisers would not buy the time. Dave Scott 
demonstrated the law of physics with a feather and a hammer but 
the whole world couldn't see it because we were competing with the 
soap operas (140). 
It would have been a gallant but futile effort for CBS to have 
attempted to air the shows by itself without any advertisers. The 
network had been hurt somewhat during one of the Gemini missions when 
it televised a countdown for several hours before the whole launch 
was called off. That possibility did not exist this time but there 
would have been a hole in CBS' profits if the network had continuously 
shown the telecasts from the moon live. Instead, the networks seemed 
to be content with clipping highlights from the moon telecasts and 
running those on their evening newscasts. 
The exertion of the first EVA, which covered more than six miles, 
proved telling on Irwin. It lowered his potassium level even more as he 
sweated in his suit. Another thing that affected him was that he could 
not get the water bottle in his suit to work properly as he walked about 
the moon, further dehydrating him (77: p73). 
As the men pushed a drill into the stubborn soil of the moon, the 
TV camera caught them stuggling with it, something that neither 
astronaut cared for the world to watch. The physical efforts were 
beginning to show even with Scott as his fingers began to swell inside 
the tight gloves from the exercise (118: February, 1972). 
As Scott and Irwin returned to the LM after their first EVA, Worden 
soared above them with a modified SM, mapping the moon with a score of 
various instruments. The next day, August 1, Scott and Irwin went on a 
second EVA, 7.64 miles long, during which they travelled half a mile up 
Mt. Hadley Delta. l On August 2. the lunar astronauts took their third and 
final EVA in the Rover, adding another three miles to their log. After 
IMt . Hadley Delta was NASA's way of distinguishing that mountain 
from Mt. Hadley, which was nearby. The delta is not a river in the sense 
to which earthlings are accustomed; it is only a means of identification. 
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their return, Scott stood before the remote controlled TV camera and 
demonstrated Galileo's Principle by dropping a Falcon feather and a 
halllTler. They hit the ground at the same time. "How about that," said 
Scott. IIHe I-Galileo / was right. 1I When Irwin found that he had 
finished his work but Scott was still busy at his chores, he spent 15 to 
20 minutes bouncing around the LM like a young boy (77: pp65-86; 118: 
February, 1972). 
Then, with the Air Force Hymn playing from a tape recorder in the 
LM, Air Force officers Scott and Irwin took off from the moon, watched by 
the world 250,000 miles away as the TV camera on the Lunar Rover caught 
their ascent in its lens. After they left, the TV operator at MSC 
panned the camera around Falcon's base of operations as if to make sure 
no one else was there {118: February, 1972}. 
After the Falcon had docked with the CM, Irwin moved inside the 
larger spaceship and felt some minor pains in his chest but he chose to 
ignore them. Then, after the astronauts undocked from the LM (leaving 
behind some items because both Scott and Irwin had thought that the 
other had taken them into the CM), Slayton made one of his unusual 
radio appearances when he told the crew to take some sleeping pills. 
Irwin, not knowing it, was suffering from a "bigeminy rhythm," which 
means both sides of the heart are contracting at once in confusion, thus 
tiring the heart rapidly. ~~hile taking his suit off, Irwin felt tired 
and wanted to lie still for five to ten minutes. The Capcom called the 
crew once and inquired if they had taken the sleeping pills. The 
message from Apollo 15 was that the astronauts did not think they were 
necessary and preferred not to take them. Scott was now beginning to 
show symptoms of bigeminy rhythm too. 
During the flight to earth, the astronauts crowded together in the 
CM to float before the TV camera and conduct the first air-to-ground 
press conference ever held in space. It was a hit with the media. One 
questioner asked what did the astronauts want and not want to do again. 
Scott said that he liked being on Mt. Hadley Delta and seeing the entire 
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panorama from the upper hatch of the LM; Worden liked the engine burn that 
put the spacecraft into lunar orbit and the burn putting them towards 
the moon from the earth; and Irwin said the liftoff from the earth was 
his high point and falling in front of the TV camera while on the moon 
was his low spot of the mission. Then, Worden performed an EVA, 
retreiving precious film packages from the SM since that module 
would have to be jettisoned before the reentry (118: February, 1972; 
77: pp92-102). 
When the astronauts returned to earth, Irwin was still not feeling 
well. During the physical examinations, the astronaut almost fainted. 
For a few nights, when he slept, he felt as though his body was tilted. 
On the airplane from Hawaii to Houston, the astronauts pulled out a 
stamp cancellation device and cancelled 650 envelopes which they also 
autographed. The envelopes had been carried on the moon by Irwin and 
Scott (77: ppl14-118). 
Because they did not have to be quarantined, the astronauts went 
home upon arriving at Houston. At Irwin's home, the press was waiting 
for him and they apologized to the family for intruding upon their 
privacy (77: pl18). 
During the debriefings, the crew slipped away to rendezvous, with 
NASA's blessings, with the writers from the New York Times. Irwin writes 
in his book, To Rule the Night, 
They talked to the three of us separately and picked our 
brains about our first impression of the flight. I thought it 
was an imposition. Here we were, not back to normal physically 
and still involved in debriefing the flight. Yet we had to go 
to the motel and spend an hour or two with these Times people. 
I got into a little trouble about this. I told them exactly 
what I thought (77: pl19). 
What Irwin meant in his last two sentences was that he told the 
Times reporters about his impressions of God while he was on the moon; 
of the tilting feeling when he slept on the aircraft carrier; and that 
"something liS not right yet" with him physically. The article went 
through NASA for clearance and the public affairs people at NASA 
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decided that none of Irwin's information had been released to the rest of 
the media yet so it was eliminated from the article. Writes Irwin, liThe 
Times people were a little chagrined that it was handled this wayll (77: 
pl19). 
Bob Gordon, a PIO at MSC, says that Dr. Berry decided to call a 
press conference shortly after it was learned that Irwin had told the 
Times about his ailments. It was mentioned to this author by flight 
director Kraft that Berry had realized during the mission that the 
astronauts were having heart problems but he had chosen to not inform 
the crew about the situation for fear of informing the media as well 
since reporters were listening in on the conversations (93; 53).1 
Irwin writes in a letter, 
Dave and I had our heart problems after we left the surface 
of the moon. However, we were not informed of this until we 
returned to earth. This omission of a possibly very vital 
transmission concerning our welfare represented a gross injustice 
to us and the space program. I would have welcomed a call from 
Dr. Berry or any other doctor regarding medical advice. That 
was their purpose for monitoring us (78). 
On August 13, 1971, Dr. Berry, along with Bob Gordon, held the 
previously mentioned press conference. During that confrontation with 
the media, Berry mentioned that he had seen signs of the trouble with 
Irwin one-half hour before the launch. The doctor also said that he 
noticed the signs again when the astronaut was on the moon and, most 
particularly, when Irwin was on the way home. During the return trip, 
Berry added, he noticed that Scott was suffering from the same symptoms 
The physician said that the signs were associated with fatigue and that 
it meant the astronauts had to rest. The doctor also told the reporters 
that, as of the time of the press conference, there still had been no 
medical debriefing of the crew although the men had been examined aboard 
the aircraft carrier immediately after the flight. Berry then virtually 
admitted that he had first learned about Irwin's dizzy spells and the 
IThe flight surgeons of NASA receive information about the 
astronauts through telemetry containing the impulses of the medical 
sensors placed at different locations on the astronauts' bodies. 
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astronaut's tilted sensations from the PIO who had read the transcript of 
the Times articles. Yet, when Berry was asked if that was the first time 
that the medical officers of NASA had learned about those symptoms, he 
replied no, that the physician aboard the aircraft carrier had been told 
about them by Irwin (116: Apollo 15 PC-59). 
Some reporters were put off by Berry. They questioned why he had 
not called the press conference days before. They also claimed that 
Berry had previously told them that all was normal with the astronauts 
which misled them into believing it. Berry pointed out that surely 
some of the press had seen Irwin since the flight and that he did not 
look as though he was suffering. One reporter said that he thought 
Irwin looked dizzy. Berry started grasping for explanations as to why 
he had not told the media about the situation. A reporter asked if 
Washington had told Berry not to talk about the heart problems. Berry 
answered no, he had not been told what to do by anyone. Then Berry was 
asked if he had issued any orders to be silent. Berry replied no to that 
too but he then clarified himself: 
... let me be clear about that, there has been and there 
always is, that the material that is done in medical examinations 
and the material that come from the medical debriefing and its--you 
know, everything that goes on tape at these things is stamped 
confidential and all that sort of thing, all of that is done and is 
done medically confidential as well as just being confidential to 
the program ....... other than that, there has been nothing else 
that's been done (116: Apollo 15 PC-59). 
Berry was becoming flustered as he answered the questions but 
he finally dug up a plausible excuse for his refusal to discuss the 
situation any earlier--that the matter was between patients and their 
doctors, which is usually respected by everyone else. Note how Berry 
talks in the following paragraph when he discusses the patient-doctor 
relationship . 
... knowing Jim as he is, he tends to be a pretty 
introspective kind of guy anyway, and I suspect that what he 
said, was well, this isn't, you know4 it's not really botherinq 
me--you know, it's here and I'm still able to do everything that 
I need to do, and Dave's convinced I can, and I'm convincea I can, 
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so there's--I don't think it's interfering and I don't, so I'm 
not bringing it up. I think some of that again, you've got a 
problem that you gotta, we gotta face this and we might just as 
well say it out,_we're going around it allover the 
L communications-1 loop here, so let's we ought to bring that 
one out, too. Everything you say in that spacecraft, and this 
causes all kinds of problems for me, as a physiCian or anyone of us 
as physicians, try to monitor that activity, is a fact that 
anything that those guys say does not have any doctor-patient 
confidentiality whatsoever. They're left with a position where 
they've gotta say it and it's going to be, you're going to be 
sitting over here in the room listening to it and the next thing 
that happens, and furthermore, it's going to be printed out and 
handed to everybody. And that's the same as if you come to me 
in my office up here and we talk about your case of gonorrhea or 
whatever and I end up putting that out in the public press .... 
... that's the kind of position that we're in. And I'm sure that 
hampers the flow of information •... 
_ ... if you_do have something that comes from that 
L conversation~ that is gOing to impact the mission, in any way, 
that I think that has to be said, and must be said to the public 
and to the press, I thoroughly agree with that but I think that 
there ought to be the capability, which there is not, for an 
individual to talk--for a patient to talk with the physician and 
that does not exist (116: Apollo 15 PC-59). 
The media remained split about Berry's explanation that there 
should be doctor-patient confidentiality in the space program (he had 
certainly used it with some degree of privacy during Apollos 8 and 9). 
Louis Alexander of the University of Houston's Communication Department, 
writes, 
The press was critical of Dr. Berry and NASA for not 
notifying the press of Irwin's heart condition. It looked like a 
throwback to me of the old policy of waiting till NASA had the 
answer and an official position to take before letting the press 
in on it. For some reason ..• the press was less critical or 
resentful, generally than it had been previously of NASA 
withholdings. Maybe the doctor's invocation of client-professional 
relationships had something to do with it, maybe not. I cannot 
personally say (6). 
Yet Howard Simon, managing editor of the Washington Post, said in 
, 
1976 that the situation concerning the medical information was handled 
wrong. He stated that "it should have not been restricted" (151). 
Despite the rather correct flap about the heart conditions of the 
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astronauts by the media, the mission was deemed a success by all. 
Practically every article written about Apollo 15 was favorable and many 
mentioned that it was an uplift to the hopes of future moon missions 
and expecially to NASAls hopes for future funds (159: August 9, 1971). 
The cancelled envelope situation was another breed of problem 
though, particularly for the astronauts of Apollo 15. The way that had 
started was when a former space industry representative to the Cape, 
Horst (Walter) Eierman had contacted Scott in May, 1971 about carrying 
the envelopes to the moon. Scott then approached Worden and Irwin about 
it, thinking that they could use the money from selling the envelopes to 
Eierman as a trust fund for their children. Following the flight, in 
September, 1971, Scott mailed 100 of the envelopes to Eierman, now in 
West Germany, and each astronaut received $8000 for their troubles. In 
October of that year, Scott told Irwin that they were in trouble because 
Eierman was selling the envelopes in Europe--which had not been part of 
the deal. The crew members sent the bankbooks back to Germany and tried 
to call the deal off. How Scott had heard about the selling is not known 
although Irwin speculates that there may have been a leak to the 
European press. An embarrassing situation was on the horizon. The crew 
went to Belgium to meet the King of that country and, when they were 
there, there was mercifully no mention of the envelopes being sold to 
anyone. For awhile, the astronauts breathed a sigh of relief. 
Periodically, when at home, the crew received reports that the envelopes 
were being sold for as much as $1500 apiece. Until the next spring, the 
issue slowly brewed beneath the surface and was not known by many 
people (77: pp228-230). 
On November 8, 1971, some action was taken as the result of the 
medical trouble aboard Apollo 15. Gilruth, Kraft, Low, Fletcher and 
some others, including John Donnelly of the PAO, met to discuss what 
could be done if such a situation arose again. They reaffirmed what 
had been put into effect on May 13, 1969 by Tom Paine. Paine's 
statement had said that if a private conversation was requested by the 
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astronauts, then the following ground rules would apply: 
1. Flight crews and/or the Mission Director may request a 
private conversation at any time. 
2. The Public Information Officer responsible for Mission 
Commentary at the time of the request will be notified in advance 
of the requested conversation and will monitor the conversation in 
real time with the Mission Director. 
3. A summary of the conversation will be released at the discretion 
of the Office of Public Affairs. 
4. Tapes of the air-to-ground conversations will not be released 
(148). 
In the meantime, Mrs. Grissom was busy with her lawsuit. In the 
fall of 1971, both she and North American Rockwell officials were 
testifying about what they knew. Her case in Florida had been dismissed 
on the grounds that the action was past the statute of limitations but 
then her lawyers found a new avenue--if it could be proved that the 
victim of an accident suffered during that accident, then the suit could 
remain. Lawyers Krist and McConnico realized that they had the best 
records for which a person could hope to use that Gus Grissom had 
consciously suffered from the fire--the NASA tapes from the spacecraft 
monitors. North American Rockwell obtained a court order to go through 
Grissom's personal papers, including some related to Gemini rather than 
Apollo. Mrs. Grissom's lawyers kept moving with their case. Then, one 
day, they were approached by the lawyers of NAR to discuss an out-of-court 
settlement. For three days, they met about such an arrangement, settling 
on the amount, Mrs. Grissom was awarded $300,000. After expenses and 
attorney fees, she received $60,000 and each of her two sons was 
awarded $75,000. The other two widows, even though they had not filed 
suit, were later awarded similar amounts. The $350,000 represented 
$25,000 for each second that Gus Grissom had suffered in the fire (59: 
p248). 
By the time Apollo 16 flew to the moon in April, 1972, many 
astronauts had left NASA for various reasons. Some went on to 
well-paying jobs and disappeared from the front pages. Some returned to 
what they had been doing before they worked with NASA--usually those were 
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the scientist-astronauts. It had been known for some time that the last 
moon flight would be Apollo 17, whose crew had already been selected. 
After that there would be three manned Skylab missions. There was also 
talk about a joint Russian-American mission using the Apollo and Soyuz 
spacecraft with the heavier and more maneuverable Apollo performing the 
active maneuvers during the docking. l Including Apollo 16, that meant 
only 18 more astronauts were going to fly in space. Beyond those missions 
was the Space Shuttle, due to fly in 1979. The prospects of immediate 
flights for several astronauts appeared slim. When Apollo 16 flew, 16 
astronauts had already left NASA (they were Carpenter, Cooper, Glenn, 
Schirra, Armstrong, Borman, Aldrin, Collins, Cunningham, Gordon, 
Graveline, Michel, Bull, Llewellyn, Holmquist and O'Leary) and eight 
others had died. The ranks were dwindling. 
One day in the spring of 1972, before Apollo 16 flew, Jim Irwin 
was flying with Deke Slayton in a T-38 when Slayton asked Irwin how many 
envelopes the astronauts of Apollo 15 had carried with them to the moon. 
Irwin told him there had been 400. Slayton said that he had heard another 
number. Irwin said that the other number was inaccurate and referred 
Slayton to Scott for further information. The next day, Slayton called 
Al Shepard and Scott together for a conference. Irwin was fishing at 
that time and, when he returned, he found Slayton was much concerned 
after having heard the complete story. Slayton then called his superiors 
and the story was given to the media. As Irwin writes in his book, "This 
invited the response of Congress and the Senate Space Committee felt 
that they had to investigate" (77: pp232-233). 
In the middle of this brouhaha came Apollo 16. It had been 
postponed from March 17 to April 16, 1972 because of a variety of 
mechanical troubles with the systems of the CM, LM and the moon suits. 
Astronaut Cbarles Duke had been sick for awhile but that had not had any 
INASA officials were skittish about the joint, international 
mission because on June 29, 1971, Soyuz 11 returned to earth after its 
three cosmonauts had been in a space station for 29 days and, during the 
reentry, the air leaked out of the spacecraft, causing air embolism, 
killing all three men (153: pp238-246). 
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effect upon the delay. On April 16, the men at Cape Kennedy put Duke, 
Ken Mattingly and John Young into space. Their launch was witnessed by 
the second largest group of correspondents to gather at the Cape for a 
blastoff. At least 2,641 reporters had registered for the launch, 
800 short of the figure set by Apollo 11. A number of the spectators who 
had shown up to watch the launch were Duke's relatives, who became 
known as "Duke I s Rai ders II to the KSC-PAO staffers (69: pp49, 104). 
Gordon Harris remembers, 
We saw to it that bright yellow school buses were stashed 
away in Cocoa Beach out of sight of the big boys from Washington. 
Charlie's aunts, uncles, nephews and kissin ' cousins somehow got 
word where to find those vehicles. They were on the space center 
when Duke took off for the moon (69: p104). 
Young and Duke went down to the surface of the moon in the LM, 
"Orion," and took another Lunar Rover with them. Among the instruments 
they carried was a camera using special films to be aimed at the earth to 
take photographs showing how far the atmosphere really extended from 
the planet (the films later revealed that the faintest edges of air 
around the earth extend to about 100,000 miles). After a few days in the 
Descartes Mountain Range, Young, Duke and Mattingly returned, 
arriving in earth's waters on April 27, 1972 (118: Dcember, 1972). 
The number of magazine articles on Apollo 16 was the second highest 
after Apollo 11. They totalled 39 but the number could be deceiving. As 
time went on with Apollo, more articles appeared but they seemed to 
have less text and more photographs. CoinCidentally, the same thing had 
happened during ~he Gemini program (127: March, 1972-February, 1973). 
After Apollo 16, the attention returned to the astronauts of 
Apollo 15. NASA officials found out about the extra envelopes that had 
been on the moon--NASA had given permission for the astronauts to carry 
only 243 envelopes with them--and then discovered that the astronauts 
IAccording to Harris, there was a quota system of how many passes 
to a launch that each astronaut could have and the number of Duke's 
relatives--who had invited themselves--greatly exceeded the limit. To 
keep the Washington officials from finding out about this group of Duke's 
relatives, Harris had them hidden from sight until just before launch 
(70) • 
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had also carried a small sculpted aluminum figure to the moon, leaving it 
there as a small, personal gesture to the deceased astronauts and 
cosmonauts. liThe Fallen Astronaut" had been designed and made by 
Belgian artist Paul Van Hoeydonck with the understanding that there 
would be no commercial or personal exploitation. But Van Hoeydonck did 
not keep his part of the bargain. After the flight, he put 950 copies 
of the statue up for sale through the Waddell Gallery in New York for 
$750 apiece. Scott tried to stop the sales but failed (59: pp240-241). 
For the second time in the history of the U.S. manned space 
programs, reprimands were handed down to members of the astronaut corps. 
At the end of the investigation about the envelopes and the statue, 
NASA issued this statement: 
In recognition of the apparent intent of the Apollo 15 
crew to gain personally from the exercise of their astronaut 
privileges in the matter of unauthorized postal covers, but 
considering as well their ultimate rejection of such personal 
gain, scott, Worden and Irwin have been formally reprimanded. Their 
official efficiency reports as military officers reflect a formal 
finding of lack of judgment. These two actions result in severe 
career penalties~ whether the astronauts remain in Federal 
service or not (59: pp241-242). 
The investigation into what the Apollo 15 astronauts had done also 
turned up evidence about personal gain among other members of the corps. 
Fifteen astronauts had sold 500 copies of their autographs on blocks of 
stamps for five dollars apiece. Five of the fifteen gave their $2500 
to charity. Slayton and Shepard were incensed but there was really 
nothing they could do about a person selling what is ultimately his--an 
autograph. 1 NASA soon announced heavy restrictions about what the 
astronauts could do. All personal articles to go on a flight had to be 
bonded 21 days prior to the scheduled launch date. In each package 
could be no more than 12 articles weighing no more than one-half pound 
Upon return, the astronauts would have to reveal everything that they 
had taken with them or, if they did not tell what they had carried, they 
would not be allowed to break that news in a personal story. Concerning 
INASA never released the names of those 15 astronauts. 
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the autographs, Dr. George Low, the Assistant Administrator of NASA, said, 
There is a very real issue as to whether the government has 
any basis for questioning the disposition of an individual's 
property rights in his own signature .... The NASA employees that 
were involved have been personally admonished by the Director of 
the MSC L Kraft, who had taken over at the beginning of the year 
after Gilruth retired~ for this infraction of NASA policy L not 
checking with NASA heirarchy about selling their autographs / (10: 
November 25, 1972).1 -
One day in May, 1972, Slayton stopped by Irwin's office and asked 
him when he planned to leave NASA. Irwin said that he wanted to stay 
until at least Apollo 17 had flown. Then, Slayton asked, "Why don't you 
start laying the groundwork to leave this sUlTUller?" (77: p233). 
Scott and Worden were not at Houston at that time but when they 
returned to MSC, it was clear that the crew was being broken up. When 
Irwin picked up his retirement papers from the Air Force, the sergeant 
who handed them to him said that Irwin had better take those papers and 
run "before the Air Force changes its mind" (77: p234). 
Irwin and Scott were called to Washington to talk on Capitol Hill 
but not to a Joint Session. Together, they told a special hearing 
about what they had done with the envelopes. Irwin writes in his book, 
that the senators asked about lithe cancelled envelopes I had gi ven 
to personnel who worked in the mailroom down at the Cape; they couldn't 
understand how I could have given these valuable envelopes to the help." 
Until this time, Dave Scott had had an unblemished reputation, writes 
Irwin. So did the astronaut corps (77: p235). 
On May 23, 1972, NASA announced that astronauts Irwin and Mitchell 
would be retiring from NASA. The press release stated that the men did 
not know what they would be doing nor had the exact dates of their 
departures been revealed. Nothing was mentioned in regard to the 
envelope "scandal," as some people called the situation. It was written 
in the announcement that "based on Irwin's plans to retire, a new backup 
crew for Apollo 17 has been named ..•. The original backup crew was made 
I Low had been replaced by Dr. James C. Fletcher as the Administrator 
of NASA on April 27, 1971. 
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up of David R. Scott, commander; Alfred M. Worden, command pilot; and 
Irwin, lunar module pilot. 1I The new backup crew consisted of Young, 
Duke and Roosa. It was apparent that NASA was making sure that none of 
the Apollo 15 astronauts would ever fly in space again (116: MSC 72-113). 
Irwin told the Baptist press that the NASA officials had no choice 
but to reprimand him and the others. He said that the crew had acted in 
haste and under terrific pressure during the preflight times but Irwin 
added that those reasons did not excuse the three astronauts from their 
mistakes (77: p234). 
The reactions about the envelope handling incident were varied. 
Chris Kraft says that, in his opinion, the issue created the low point 
in the astronaut image and that NASA handled it all poorly. liThe 
self-flagellation was ridiculous," says Kraft. "We were as benevolent to 
the astronauts as we could be" (93). 
Astronauts Mitchell and Cunningham hold the view that the Apollo 15 
astronauts wer.e sacrificial lambs. liThe Apollo 15 fellows WE're crucified," 
Mitchell told writer Howard Muson of the New York Times Magazine. lilt 
was a political year L-1972~ and NASA was headline-grabbing so as not to 
s poi 1 the Boy Scout i mage" (121: December 3, 1972). 
Mitchell wrote this author that he agrees with Kraft's statement 
but not entirely . 
... it wasn't self-flagellation. It made scapegoats of the 
Apollo 15 crew to make NASA look good •... The crew made an error 
in judgment which they thought better of after the flight and 
corrected. However, because of the pressure from / Senators 
William-, Proxmire, '-Jacob-/ Javits and /-Walter~ Mondale, their 
careers-were ruined over a minor indiscretion (113). 
Irwin offers his comment in a letter: 
The handling of the lIenvelope scandal" was very poor in my 
judgment. I would not agree with Mitchell's assessment because if 
anything; NASA's approach destroyed the Boy Scout image. There are 
some facts revealed in my book which could shed some light on this 
topic. I will say that this issue is not dead (78). 
The Apollo 15 astronauts had not cheated in what they had done. 
But it seems that the whole incident was blown out of proportion. If the 
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politicians had come into the arena and demanded action as Mitchell 
claims, then the crew might have indeed been sacrificed by NASA. The 
entire situation could have been handled internally without any outside 
help from the members of Congress. As Mrs. Grissom describes it, 
They always tried to make the astronauts look like perfect 
little boys, but they were just people like the rest of us. Some 
knew how to capitalize on being an astronaut without getting 
caught (59: p241). 
It had been known by some and suspected by many people for many 
years that the astronauts could not have been as good as Life and other 
media made them appear but, finally, the knowledge was laid before the 
public for examination. That part of the astronaut image was long 
overdue and, regretfully, the Apollo 15 crew members found themselves 
disgraced and Mrs. Grissom had to suffer through a long lawsuit to 
establish the reality. The price was too high. 
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.... AND ONE FOR NOSTALGIA: APOLLO 17 
It is not fair to say Apollo 17 was a nostalgic flight for the 
space buffs. No one invests a half-billion dollars for the purposes of 
nostalgia. The last mission to the moon was designed to gather more 
information about earth's companion but some people still saw the flight 
as the last time to get together and identify with a dream finally coming 
to an end. The dream had not stopped when Armstrong stepped on the moon. 
It would end when Gene Cernan would step off the lunar soil to return to 
his lunar module. 
Two weeks before the flight, on Thanksgiving weekend, one reporter 
had an excellent opportunity to grab an exclusive story but he passed it 
up. Writer-photographer George Sand, working for Outdoor Life, was hunting 
ducks with Gordon Harris, the head of the PAO at Cape Kennedy. As they 
brought down ducks at the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge, in the 
shadow of the missile gantries, they heard shooting from an adjacent 
duck blind. Sands asked Harris if he knew who was there. Harris told 
Sands that astronauts Cernan and Ron Evans were also hunting ducks, 
taking a break from their strenuous training schedule but not from their 
quarantine. Harris was hoping that Sands would overlook the presence 
of the astronauts. About an hour after Sands had been told, he and 
Harris sat in a truck, waiting for Evans to move his car so they could 
leave. As Evans moved his car, Cernan stood five feet from the truck 
and asked why Sands and Harris were leaving. 1 Sands never touched his 
camera nor did he ever report the encounter. He wrote his article on 
the Merritt Island preserve but there was no mention about Evans and 
Cernan being there too. 
There was almost a carnival atmosphere surrounding the Cape before 
the launch. Life paid a visit, setting up a party in a large colored 
tent. Cars crowded around the beaches for miles. This launch was 
practically the biggest of them all. More reporters signed in for Apollo 
IAt Harris' suggestion, the windows of the truck were rolled up to 
prevent the quarantine from being broken although it seems rather funny 
in a way that the astronauts were the ones free to move about in this case. 
379 
17 1 s launch than had been there for Apollo 11. At least 3,503 members 
of the media were on hand to observe the liftoff, replacing Apollo 11 
as the third most thoroughly covered event in the history of journalism. 
At one of the parties, Bob Schwartzman of the Boston Pheonix approached 
Al Shepard and asked if he would be wi/lling to talk about his relationship 
with the medi a. Shepard deadpanned, "Sure , if you I re wi 11 i ng to 1 is ten 
to a bunch of four-letter words." Writer Tom Wolfe walked around the 
various parties, gathering information for a story he was putting 
together for Rolling Stone (131: January 4, 1973; 69: p49). 
The NASA public affairs office was busy at the Cape. It borrowed 
310 buses to transport the official visitors, 40,000 strong, around the 
space center. NASA accepted 5400 invitations, of which 2400 were for 
Congressional use, 600 for the astronauts and there were 500 car passes. 
Everything cost the Kennedy Space Center over $416,000. Of that, $141,079 
was for transportation; $213,304 for "housekeeping services;" $23,934 
for photography; $35,202 for PAO communications and $21,129 for rentals 
and equipment. Gordon Harris writes in his book that the crowd at the 
viewing stands was also the wettest--and he did not mean that the weather 
was bad. Beer bottles and cans littered the viewing area--perhaps 
because the launch was taking place at night (not many people could 
possibly stomach too much b~er during the early morning launches of 
Mercury and Gemini). On inebriated visitor fell off the bleachers twice 
and was helped back to his place. When he fell the third time, the PAOs 
let him remain where he fell (69: p102). 
The launching had been scheduled for near 10 p.m. on December 6, 
1972 but there was a small delay of two-and-a-half hours. Finally, at 
12:33 a.m. (EST), December 7,1972, the last trip to the moon began with 
astronauts Cernan, Evans and Harrison "Jack" Schmitt riding in the CM, 
"America." It was the first night launch of the Saturn 5 rocket (also 
the last) and the light of the five first stage engines could be seen by 
the residents of North Carolina. The liftoff practically provided the 
area around the Cape with a false dawn, lighting everything in sight 
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(118: September, 1973). 
Three days later, Cern an descended the ladder of the LM and Schmitt 
soon joined him on the surface of the moon. They unfolded their moon 
buggy from a bay in the descent stage of the LM and Cern an accidentally 
tore off part of one fender with a hammer. Using instructions from the 
ground controllers, the astronauts fabricated a replacement fender out of 
clamps, maps and tape to prevent dust from flying into their field of 
vision. For three days, the two astronauts performed a series of EVAs 
outside the LM, using their lunar rover to carry them for miles and miles 
across the lunar surface. Once more, the lunar rover had a TV camera 
operated by a controller at NASA who followed the movements of Cernan 
and Schmitt as they completed their collecting of rocks and soil samples 
(118: September, 1973). 
During one EVA, when the scenes of it were being transmitted to 
earth, NBC-TV reporter Jim Hart talked to Cernan's 9-year-old daughter, 
Tracy, while the images of what was happening simultaneously on the moon 
250,000 miles away were flashed on a studio screen behind the two. Hart 
had approached Mrs. Cernan about doing such a personal interview with 
Tracy and she had given her blessing since she knew Hart was a polite, 
outgoing reporter. For 20 minutes, Hart and Tracy talked in front of the 
nation. Hart asked her questions about how she felt about her father 
being on the moon, about what flights she remembers and about going to 
school. Then she shared a secret with Hart; Tracy told him that her 
father had "promised to send me a moon beam" (20). 
Cernan, in an interview with this author, says, 
She, in 20 minutes, represented what the PAO should have done 
over the years. She got_more pen pals_and notes from parents •... 
I never really knew it L the interview~ was going on. 
The interview was live, totally unrehearsed. Hart was trusted 
by my wife. If we could have, we should have done this earlier. 
The Public Affairs Office would have been better for it (20; 21). 
The last mission to the moon set several records for Apollo. It. 
was the longest flight to the moon (almost 302 hours--nearly 13 days), 
spent the longest time in lunar orbit (147 hours), contained the largest 
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amount of samples brought back from the moon (249 pounds--more than 
one-quarter of all material gathered in the Apollo program) and astronauts 
Cernan and Schmitt had the longest amount of time outside of the LM than 
any other moon visitors had spent (22 hours and 4 minutes for Cernan, 
Schmitt had slightly less). 
As the men went about their work during the EVAs, Schmitt hummed 
IITiptoe Through The Tulips." He was in rock-heaven, so to speak, for 
a geologist. At each rock, he wished he could stay a little longer but 
time did not permit it. At the end of the last EVA, the men gathered 
together their gear and lunar samples, preparing to leave. Then they 
unveiled a plaque on the leg of the LM. It read: 
Here man completed his first exploration of the Moon, December 
1972, A.D. May the spirit of peace in which we came be reflected 
in the lives of all mankind (59: p252). 
Then, after Cernan watched Schmitt ascend into Challenger, the lM, 
he stood alone and spoke his words to the world: 
Any part of Apollo 17 that has been a success, is probably 
due to the thousands of people in the aerospace industry who have 
given a great deal besides dedication and besides effort and 
besides professionalism to make it all a reality. I would like 
to thank them because what welve done here--as a matter of fact, 
what has been done for 200 years--youlve got to attribute to the 
spirit of people like those. 
And I guess there might be someone else that has something to 
do with it, too, and live been reading His signs .•.. If hels 
listening, lid like to thank Him, too. 
As I take manls last steps from the moonls surface for some 
time to come, lid like to say that I believe history will record 
that America's challenge of today has forged manls destiny of 
tomorrow. As we leave Taurus-Littro, we leave as we came and, 
God willing, we shall return, with peace and hope for all mankind. 
God speed the crew of Apollo 17 (59: p253). 
On December 16, 1972, Gene Cernan, the last man on the moon, 
stepped upon the ladder of his LM and left the lunar surface. It was 
the end of the dream. 
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CONCLUSION OF APOLLO 
The Apollo program was watched by the world throughout its history. 
In front of everyone, Apollo began in the ashes of a disaster, fell into 
a quiet re-evaluation of nearly 20 months, slowly built up to what many 
people regard as the epic flight in the history of mankind and then 
slowly subsided because of a lack of attention except for some peaks here 
and there caused by the frailties of men and machines. 
The PAO, operating under the leadership of Julian Scheer for most 
of the Apollo flights, and under John Donnelly for the rest of the time, 
performed remarkably well during these years. There was a significant 
improvement from the Gemini flights in the PAD, especially from Gemini 
8 which had proved to be a great fiasco for the PAO, costing much 
confidence in it by members of the media. Unfortunately, at the 
beginning of Apollo, the 204 fire did nothing to help build the 
credibility of the PAO either. Even though the public affairs office 
operated in a proper manner, many representatives of the media did not 
think so and they vocally let the world and NASA know their feelings. 
However, there was not much the PAO could do about the incident around 
the fire. They handled the reporting of the accident as well as anyone 
could. Their hands were tied by the accident investigation board. The 
PAD supplied information to the board when it requested material about 
different items but the board did not support the PAO other than to 
give peripheral information about what was going on. Even though Jack 
King was sitting in on the meetings of the board, it did not help because, 
as Paul Haney puts it, King was not invited to sit in when the members 
of the board did not want him there. Hence, it was a bit hard for the 
PAD to handle the reporting of NASA during those months--at least in 
relation to the fire (103; 67). 
There were others in NASA who tried to help the media as much as 
they could and, no doubt, they had good intent in their hearts as they 
attempted to pass accurate news onto the reporters. But there were 
also inaccuracies from time to time which led to rumors. The PAO, with 
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its voice officially silenced, could do nothing to squelch the rumors 
except to report "No comment," which was hardly a reply at all. NASA 
might have been better off to have allowed the PAO in on some of its 
investigative and corrective activities in early 1967. 
As Apollo 7 approached, NASA was determined to show the world that 
space flight was safe again. Demonstrations were held everywhere and, 
suddenly, engineers, who had been hiding under a cloak of secrecy that 
had been thrown over them because of the fire (which might have delighted 
some of them, according to Haney), found themselves thrown into the 
public spotlight to prove that everything in NASA was good again. 
Through Apollo 11, the next flights sold themselves, particularly 
after Apollo 8 went around the moon to illustrate that it could be done. 
That was what some NASA officials were hoping Apollo 8 would do--instill 
confidence in the public and Congress that everything worked. Apollos 9 
and 10 were checkout flights of the equipment, mostly the lunar module, 
but they also set the stage for Apollo 11. During this time, it appeared 
that the PAO went about its usual work, relaying the words of NASA brass, 
scientists and astronauts to the world that everything was going to be 
fine although there was still risk involved. Much of the work seemed to 
go into handling the crowds, dignitaries and media at the launches and 
taking care of the media afterwards during the missions and the 
post-flight activities. The PAO did not have to sell NASA to the public 
between Apollos 8 and 11. The missions did that. 
Apollo 12 just about disappeared from history. Seemingly, so did 
Apollos 14 and 16. It was as if every other flight did something to make 
news. Apollo 13 almost did not come home. Apollo 15, albeit late, made 
news when the crew was discovered to be human. Apollo 17 was news 
because it was the last mission to the lunar soil. 
Apollo 13, as mentioned, is regarded by many reporters and PIOs 
to be the most effective mission in the way that the PAO handled it. 
Apollo 15 caused a minor sore. That was not the fault of the PAO but, 
rather, Dr. Berry who forgot that astronauts also talk to reporters and 
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can tell them of their chest pains. 
During the Apollo program, the confrontation between Haney and 
Scheer came to an end with Haney leaving NASA. There is no doubt that 
Haney was an effective head of MSC's PAO but, perhaps, to save his 
position (whichever one he desired), he might have taken Scheer's offer 
to drop one of his responsibilities. Likewise, Scheer might have worked 
out his differences with Congress. Scheer's administration of the PAO 
was effective yet difficulties existed here and there. By his own 
admission, Scheer writes, "I have no problem whatsoever with a 
judgment that I was an inefficient operator ..•• "l Obviously, Congress 
agreed. It was during Scheer's tenure that the PAO had its worst and 
best times--respectively Gemini 8 and Apollo 13. There appears to be 
no radical changes in the overall operations of the PAO after Scheer 
left, which was immediately after Apollo 14 (but then this author does not 
have an official list of the invitations to the launches so it is 
impossible for him to evaluate how much of a change there was in this 
area following Scheer's departure; according to Gordon Harris, Dr. 
Maxfield did find it easier to get his people into the launches after 
Scheer left and that is the only change this author could find in the 
operations of the PAO after Donnelly took command). But, as Scheer 
stated, and this author believes, NASA was the most open of all the 
government agencies (138; 137). 
Julian Scheer comments upon the PAO under his command: 
The program is an example for the rest of the world. 
Everything was completely free for the world to know. 
A few individuals fell out along the way and the fact that I 
was criticized by others does~'t add up. That's insiqnificant. 
The major point is that the L space-' program was open for all to 
see •••• 
The proof of how well this worked was in how accessible we 
were to the media. It was an example of democracy and the press 
in action ...• 
The only regret that I have is that I thought we had set an 
example for the rest of the Federal Government to follow--there 
were no secret bombings, no secret deals--but it didn't work. 
IThis author would prefer to believe that Mr. Scheer made a 
typographical mistake in his letter. 
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The only time I was in the press was when I fired someone. 
I could have been out in front if I had wanted to but I didn't 
choose to do that. The ones who were to be out in front were the 
ones like Kraft, Webb and Fletcher--not me •... 
We forced the military--out of NASA's thinking for the press--
to put TV on ships and open up their secrecy. We spent millions of 
dollars for film cannisters .... I personally inspected the films 
for the in-school program space movies. Every flight had film 
taken on board by the astronauts and it was available 10 days after 
landing to the media to whoever wanted it. 1 
Every night we had speakers across the country free of charge. 
We had copies of our films and transcripts for any reporter that 
wanted them. 2 
We had no guidelines for our operations when I first came to 
NASA. No one had ever done lhis. We--Pa~l, Shorty and I--sat down 
and decided how to do it. / We wanted to / create a ground station 
for communications and the media, a station for the recovery on the 
ships. We p1anned unmanned satellites for carrying communications. 
We just didn't work with the astronauts and manned space 
flights. We handled everything. It was a vast, vast program of 
information. The people in all the countries got this. We were to 
tell the world something the minute it happened. 
People like me, Haney and Powers don't count. It / the PAO / 
was faceless, tough and hard, thrusting the space program out into 
the open ...• 
I can look back with nothing but good feelings on those times. 
I'm delighted to have been part of the program .... 
And God damn it, it worked (137). 
There is no question about it, in the opinion of this 
author, Scheer had the best information program of the U.S. Government. 
There were mistakes and Scheer admits to these but there was no other 
place in the government where the media could turn to and find such 
openness. In the experiences this author had with the public information 
office in Houston, no hindrances were encountered and the staff there 
attempted to supply answers to every query asked. 
Not only did the PAO supply information to the public about the 
space programs but so did the media. Magazine writers and editors 
IGordon Harris writes, that for Apollo 11, the "KSC furnished 
36,000 black and white photo prints, 5,250 color transparencies and 
30,000 feet of 16 mm color motion picture film to the media" (69: p31). 
2The air-to-ground transcripts were not exactly short. Apollo 17's 
was 2,430 pages long. Imagine what the reproduction costs would have be 
been if each of the 3,503 reporters at that launch had asked for a copy. 
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had more interest in the Apollo program than ;n Gem;n;. The first 
Gemini missions averaged around 19 articles apiece in the magazines. This 
tapered to about 12 apiece for the last four Gemini missions. However, 
Apollo started at the same level as Gemini's beginning (barring the 
Apollo fire), progressed upwards, sustained a slight dip for Apollos 9 
and 10, soared to 61 articles for Apollo 11 and then levelled off around 
34 articles per flight throughthe rest of the moon flights (127: March, 
1965-February, 1973). 
It was during Apollo that the astronauts had their last chance at 
establishing themselves as heroes through the use of the personal stories, 
if any of them had wanted to do that. Even before Apollo began, Field 
backed out of using any more personal stories, leaving Life in the running 
until July, 1970. The 1968 book contract that Life signed with the 
astronauts produced some results and a Life-sponsored book about the first 
moon mission, First on the Moon, was written by the Apollo 11 astronauts 
who were helped substantially by Dora Jane Hamblin and Gene Farmer of Life. 
Hamblin writes: 
First on the Moon grew entirely out of my work with the 
astronauts during Apollo. Gene Farmer, in New York, took my 
reports and did the actual writing. He and I were paid nothing 
except our regular salaries .•.. The book was published by Little, 
Brown, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Time, Incorporated. 
Thus it was all in-house, part of the same contract deal. One item 
of the contract, by the way, was that the astronauts would not be 
permitted to write a book or have one ghost-written until five 
years after the first moon landing. After that deadline, Michael 
Collins, one of the most literate of the whole group, published a 
book called Carrying the Fire. Very good. "Buzz" Aldrin, about 
the same time, worked with a former Life man, Wayne Warga, to 
produce a kind of true confessions book called Return to Earth .•. 
(64) . 
Writer Robert Sherrod states that First on the Moon sold only 23,000 
copies. What saved Life, writes Sherrod, was the European interest in 
Life's articles, offered through syndication to European publications. 
This pulled in almost $600,000, to be split with the astronauts. Sherrod 
offers the following figures (which he obtained in an interview with 
attorney Paul Sawyer) showing the astronauts' profits from the ventures 
taken with Life. Life's profits were exactly the same since they shared 
equally. 
Book Advance 
Foreign Syndication 
First on the Moon 
Special on Apollo 11 
Book-Record Combination 
Total 
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$200,000.00 
296,844.62 
119,843.96 
114,608.00 
25,000.00 
$756,494.58 (26: May/June, 1973). 
These figures were the earnings only through Apollo 11. The Apollo 
12 mission produced only another $12,000 for the astronaut corps. Then 
the Wolper project gave the families another $60,000 to split among 
themselves. Next, the New York Times somehow divested itself of 
$30,712.50 for what it seemed to insist was not checkbook journalism. 
Some articles appeared in National Geographic in September, 1973 and 
were written by Dave Scott and Harrison Schmitt (Frank Borman also 
narrated a record for the National Geographic Society at one time). The 
magazine's assistant editor, Ken Weaver, writes, in a letter that "our 
payment ... has totalled no more than $10,000." If the total of money 
earned from 1968 through the last magazine article written by the 
astronauts--the September, 1973 issue of National Geographic--is totalled 
(including the $200,000 per year for three years from Life), each 
family received approximately $24,500 or about $8333 per year.1 This 
is not much when compared to the earnings of the Original 7 during the 
Mercury program (26: May/June, 1973; 169). 
During its last years, not only did Life rely upon the astronauts 
to describe what was happening but the magazine also expanded its 
coverage. Dora Jane Hamblin gave insight of the astronauts' homes in a 
very human way. Poet James Dickey was hired by Life to give his 
opinions about what he thought of one mission. Normal Mailer was asked 
to contribute his thoughts--taken from his book, Of a Fire on the 
Moon--for an issue. Loudon Wainwright was brought back for the article 
on Shepard. Some writers have remarked that Life was clutching at the 
1Even this approximatio~ could be way off because, from September 
1967 through September, 1973, the number of astronaut families grew and 
shrunk as some new groups of astronauts were added and other members of 
the astronaut corps left the ranks. 
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straws by doing this, trying to maintain the attention of the public. 
This author choses not to believe this type of thought--all that Life 
was doing was diversifying its means of explaining the missions and the 
men to the public. 
As time went on, especially after the Life contracts faded from 
view, the later moon mission received less and less attention from Life. 
While Life's attention span was dropping, that of National Geographic 
was rising. National Geographic covered only Apollos 8, 11, 14, 15, 16 
and 17. It was during these missions that National Geographic carried 
some of its best work on NASA, showing the moon, the astronauts and the 
earth in some spectacular photographs. The texts on the last missions 
were not lengthy but the magazine's staff more than made up for this 
by using numerous photographs of superb quality. An interesting item 
noted about National Geographic is when it published the articles about 
the missions: it seems that the article about a mission was always 
published in the issue that was coming out for the month of the next 
mission. Examples of this are the Apollo 8 story was printed in May, 
1969--the month of the next mission to the moon; and Apollo Ills story 
was printed for the December, 1969 issue, just in time for Apollo 12. 
This may have been a coincidence but this author thinks that there' was 
some planning by the magazine's staff behind this in order to help 
publicize the upcoming missions. Overall, the magazine performed a 
great service to its society's members and to NASA. 
The magazine that wrote the most articles about the missions 
(but not about the astronauts) is Aviation Week and Space Technology. 
While other magazines sometimes played up the human drama of the misSions, 
a reader could turn to Aviation Week to learn what was going on 
technically with the missions. This magazine devoted many pages to 
NASAls efforts in manned space flight (as well as in other areas). 
It is not a magazine that is considered by many people to be published 
for distribution to the general public but rather to those people who are 
interested in flying. 
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Of all the magazines, Life still seems to be the one that is most 
associated with the astronauts. It did an admirable job of showing the 
human side of space flight from 1959-1972 but there were some faults 
too. The biggest one is that Life is considered by many people to have 
shown the astronauts with only their best foot forward; it did not show 
the astronauts as they really were. 
Mike Collins writes in his book, 
Test pilots are taught to perceive, to remember, to record 
every impression in flight--so that later, on the ground, they can 
report as fully and precisely as possible, exactly what happened. 
No one disputed this point, so that what happened during a space 
flight was discussed publicly at the post-flight press conference 
in as much detail as the press could stomach. But, of course, that 
was not sufficient. What they really wanted to know was: beyond 
all that technical crap, what did the crew feel ... ? This is what 
Life paid to find out and what the others pried to find out without 
paying and, in truth, neither unearthed very much. Life's little 
extra certainly wasn't worth the money. I suppose this because, 
as technical people, as test pilots whose bread and butter was the 
cold, dispassionate analysis of complicated facts, we were frankly 
embarrassed by the shifting focus. It didn't seem right somehow 
for the press to have this morbid, unhealthy, persistent, prodding, 
probing preoccupation with the frills, when the silly bastards 
didn't even understand how the machines operated or what they had 
accomplished .....•. we weren't trained to emote, we were trained 
to repress our emotions, lest they interfere with our complicated, 
delicate and one-chance-only duties. If they wanted an emotional 
press conference, for Christ's sake, they should have put together 
an Apollo crew of a philosopher, a priest and a poet--not three 
test pilots. Of course, they wouldn't get them back to have the 
press conference, in all likelihood, because this trio would 
probably emote all the way back into the atmosphere and forget to 
push in the circuit breaker which enable the parachutes to open 
(24: p54). 
Collins' fellow crew member of Apollo 11, Buzz Aldrin, offers his 
view of the Life articles. 
I suppose the portrayal we received in Life and subsequently 
in nearly all the media the space program a great deal. 
Unfortunately, near all of it had us squarely on the side of God, 
Country and Family. To read it was to believe we were the most 
simon-pure guys there had ever been. This simply was not so. We 
may have regularly gone to church but we also celebrated some 
pretty wild nights .... 
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I remember one day, picking up a copy of .Life magazine ... and 
thinking, "If only it was like that." Here were all the happy, 
contented wives, and children smiling from happy backyards with 
the husbands standing proudly by. Well, the fact is that the 
husband probably flew halfway across the country to pose for the 
pictures, the kids were strangers to him and the wife was scared 
to death .... 
All of us somehow had to reconcile the image and the actuality. 
My kids had been forced to reconcile the media's family portraits 
with the reality of day to day living. They had to reconcile the 
father they saw on television with the one they saw at home. The 
father at home, at least in my case, was often inattentive, tired 
and asleep on the den sofa by nine o'clock (121: December 3, 
1972; 2: pp302-303). 
Tom Wolfe's Inner Voice of the Astronauts, who narrates a story 
about the astronauts in an issue of Rolling Stone, gives his version 
of the members of the media: 
As you can gather, we never had a particularly high opinion 
of the press. The press hovered like the fruit fly. Oh, there was 
an occasional good soul, such as some of the people from Life, 
perhaps because they were our captives, come to think of ~ But, 
taken as a whole.... • .• what a swarm of silverfish and 
second-raters ..••... the writers Life assigned to us .•..... were 
our favorites I-of all outsiders /. 
Without the Life screen, we-doubt that NASA could have even 
succeeded in preserving the image of us as a bunch of God-loving 
crewcut Explorer Scouts. We ended up being protected like royal 
families, but American royal families against a backdrop of not 
marble, gold and ermine but of Buddy and Sis and Mom's pie (131: 
January 4, 1973). 
Fred Haise, of Apollo 13, gives his view of Life: 
I think the Life stories were good. The real question and 
one I cannot answer, is "How much other (maybe better) coverage 
in other magazines did we lose?" I don't know of any efforts by 
other magazines personally ••.. In fact, I've never been asked to 
write an article for free! (63). 
Jim Lovell writes in a letter, 
Due to the tremendous popularity of the program, the 
astronauts would have been inundated with requests to supply 
information about their private lives. The Life contracts enabled 
that information to be channelled to the public with a minimum 
amount of interference from the news media ...• In addition, the 
contracts provided an additional small source of income to defray 
some of the large post-flight appearance expenses which no one 
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anticipated before the flights (100). 
Ed Mitchell, was asked if the astronauts were concerned when the 
contracts with Life finally went out of existence. He replies, "No. We 
had other ways of dealing with the media. The monetary imports of this 
series of decisions was great however" (113). 
Other people besides the astronauts thought well of Life. Both 
Chris Kraft and Robert Gilruth praised the magazine's efforts to show the 
human side of the astronauts (93; 48). 
Some members of the PAO favored the contracts. Others did not. 
Jack Riley, a PIO at MSC, recalls: 
Newsmen sometimes had some problems getting the wives of 
the astronauts to talk. The PIO could arrange for the reporters 
to talk to the astronauts but not the wives. The reporters would 
then set up stake-outs around the homes of the astronauts hoping to 
talk to the wives. 
A number of the astronauts preferred the insulation that Life 
offered them. They didn't mind it at all that the rest of the press 
couldn't get to them. Some felt badly and went along because of 
peer group pressure and because the practice was already 
established (129). 
Julian Scheer, in an interview in 1976, said, 
It was confusing at times--the relationship between Life and 
NASA. It produced its awkward moments at times. It was also a 
up and down relationship. I kept the contracts when I arrived 
in 1963 because I couldn't do anything about them. I take anything 
that can work to my advantage so I accepted them even though I 
didn't like them at first. They provided me with not having to 
arrange interviews with 60 wives. I wasn't interested if the 
astronauts ate apple pie or what they did personally. If Life 
wanted to do that, that was fine. We weren't in the business of 
exploiting the astronauts. We didn't do any feature stories on the 
astronauts (137). 
Journalists appear to be split in how they look upon the Life 
articles. Leo Janos, former Houston Bureau chief for Time, says, 
Life was a brilliant decision on NASAls part. The astronauts 
made a bundle .... And it treated the ast~onauts fantastically .... 
I think NASA blundered by not having human interest in its own 
stories [-the press releases~ (79). 
John N. Wilford, of the New York Times, who broke the story about 
the astronauts of Apollo 204 not dying instantly, writes his thoughts in 
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a letter: 
Frankly, the Life pieces were not that great. They conveyed 
the Boy Scout and happy home image that, to some extent, backfired--
because it tended to make people think of the astronauts as very 
dull, uninteresting technocrats. But NASA wanted it this way, 
and the Life deal seemed to be a safe way of funneling safe stuff 
about the astronauts to the public. How much more the rest of us 
could have gotten is prob~ematic--for the astronauts did not 
really like to talk with the press on any free-and-easy basis and 
they were very busy people, as were the rest of the press that had 
to cover all other aspects of the missions (177). 
Loudon Wainwright II, who wrote some interviews of the astronauts 
from Mercury through Apollo, writes: 
Most readers of big magazines like Life are more interested 
in people than technology. I believe the editors of Life were 
happy about the way the contract worked out for the magazines. I 
didn't know about NASAls public image or more precisely what they 
wanted their public image to be, but there can be no doubt that 
publicity given the astronauts made lots of people aware of the 
existence of NASA 
The astronauts appear to be criticizing the magazines, or at 
least Life, for producing the kind of bland, namby-pamby stories 
that the astronauts and NASA insisted on. The agency and the 
pilots were generally against stories that probed, made human judgments or were controversial. At the very least, therefore, 
the astronauts were co-conspirators in the production of stories 
that made them look like Boy Scouts and all alike. They may not 
have admired the results, but they fought hard, with very few 
exceptions, to keep the material free of wrinkles and distinct 
personal flavor (165). 
Dora Jane Hamblin, another Life writer during the Apollo era, 
writes: 
I believe Life was far more effective than NASA in bringing 
national attention to the men themselves. The magazine's 
circulation was about 8 million at the time, and the Life stories 
were far more detailed, more comprehensible than most-or-the NASA 
releases. Life was very good at "haute vulgarisacion" and at 
clarification of complex subjects. Our pictures were far superior 
to anything NASA did--so much so that NASA customarily picked up 
Life's photos for service to other news media. 
-- I thi nk Li fe treated the men and thei r fami 1 i es with kid 
gloves. So did most of the rest of the press. These guys were 
heroes, most of them were very smooth, canny operators with all of 
the press. They felt they had to live up to a public image of good 
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clean all-American boys and NASA knocked itself out to preserve that 
image .... Thus there was this tendency to keep everything as Mike 
Co 11 ins says, II peaches and cream" (64). 
Life had a love-hate relationship with the astronauts. Money was 
provided to the astronauts and they held Life in the palms of their hands. 
"Life was controllable," Alan Shepard once said. His statement possibly 
could have made editors gag at the thought of someone else controlling 
their publications. But it was true.' On the other hand, Lifels editors 
had wisely forecast the drop in interest in Apollo as the missions 
progressed ,and thus limited the contract to July, 1970. It appears that 
Lifels original intentions contained many aspects: the first spacemen would 
be popular and, if a magazine held the rights to their personal stories, 
then that magazine would sell more issues, which would also sell the 
astronauts and NASA to the public. In the long run, Lifels contracts 
may have worked out to the advantage of both the government and the 
astronauts. The contracts upset other members of the media but if Life 
had not done it, some other publication might have bought the personal 
stories. As was noted, even the New York Times, which chastised Life 
for "checkbook journalism," also employed such tactics. 
The astronauts not only had to deal with the media but also had to 
get along with themselves and the PAO. There were several little bitter 
rivalries. Slayton had once said that the competition for getting on the 
flight crews was fierce but not one of outright hatred. For instance, 
Irwin had found out that Schmitt might be riding on Apollo 15 instead of 
him because of the pressure from the scientific community. Irwin 
complained to Slayton and Shepard. Irwin remained on the crew as 
Schmitt was placed on Apollo 17 1s crew. Gordon Cooper was supposed to 
fly during Apollo but he was bumped from the schedule by Alan Shepard. 
(39: January, 1973; 77: p213). 
Some of the men knew, from observing the situations around the 
first groups of astronauts, that fame could be put upon them once they 
were selected as astronauts. Jim Irwin writes in his book that, before 
he became an astronaut, he and his wife had heard that astronauts earned 
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thousands of dollars from life for their personal stories. Irwin also 
mentions that his wife distrusted the "glory and fame and adulation that 
are heaped upon the astronauts." The Apollo 15 astronaut states that he 
did not like the fame and publicity either but he had to accept it as 
being part of his job. Some others, upon confirmation that they had been 
accepted into the astronaut corps, may have wondered about how the 
publicity about their lives would affect them, their families and their 
performance as test pilots (77: p215). 
Fred Haise writes about the same subject. 
"I, of course, was aware of the pub 1 i ci ty gi ven the "0r i gi na 1 
Seven," but figured, with the group growing to about 50 astronauts 
when I joined, the individual notoriety part of it would wane. In 
any case, the thought of being in the spotlight was accepted, 
though underneath, I didn't believe I would ever be in that spot. 
It was for those older heroes! I don't particularly like it nor 
dislike it--it is just part of the job. My single, sole 
overriding motivation in joining the program was developing and 
flying spacecraft. It still is (63). 
According to various sources, some members of the astronaut corps 
thought of themselves as heroes but it seems, to this author, that the 
majority of the astronauts were not all that boisterous. Some realize 
that they have been offered places in history and have quietly accepted 
those niches, such as Neil Armstrong. Others play the role of the 
astronaut; Mike Collins describes Pete Conrad in the following manner: 
"Funny, noisy, colorful, cool competent; snazzy dresser, race-car 
driver. One of the few who lives up to the image. Should play Pete 
Conrad in a Pete Conrad movie." Matter of fact, after Conrad left the 
astronaut corps, he did play in a movie as an astronaut (24: p60). 
Many of the astronauts who left NASA went onto well-paying jobs; 
some realized the prestige of their employment with NASA and used that 
as leverage in helping to find occupations. Cooper was asked about 
the ethics of the astronauts using their names to get ahead in the 
business world. His reply appears in Dun's Review: "I don't think 
that people can well afford to criticize us for wanting to get into 
the business of making money--as long as it is in good taste." The 
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astronauts who left NASA ended up in a variety of jobs: Borman became 
the President of Eastern Airlines; Cooper went to Walt Disney Enterprises; 
Charlie Duke and Al Shepard became the Coors Beer dstributors in San 
Antonio and Houston, respectively; Cernan went onto become an oil 
broker while his partner on the moon, Schmitt, joined John Glenn in the 
Senate in 1977; and others found business positions to suit them around 
the world. The men also took part in many advertisements: Schirra stood 
on traintracks for the Association of American Railroads; Aldrin has 
appeared on television for Volkswagon and Toro lawnmowers; Jim Lovell 
talked about the importance of breakfast for children; and Al Bean 
said that having a certain credit card was more valuable than having a 
certain name since no one recognized him anymore as being the fourth man 
on the moon (35: December, 1972). 
But, when the men were still part of the astronaut corps, they did 
not agree as to how much they should participate in the public affairs 
programs of NASA. This disagreement extended back to the days of Mercury 
when it was John Glenn versus Alan Shepard. There is no attempt here to 
illustrate where each astronaut stood on this topic but some of the 
astronauts, and others outside of NASA, offer their opinions. 
John Wilford of the New York Times writes: 
Few of the astronauts really understand public relations. 
Some may have been "prima donnas," I canlt say. They were under 
tremendous pressures to do a difficult job~ and with their 
backgrounds in the military and test piloting, it just did not 
seem that public relations was either essential or a part of their job. Toward the end of Apollo, some of them tried to make a 
more conscious effort at public relations but it was wooden. 
Their best public relations was to do their job and do it well 
to be available for occasional press conferences (176). 
Edgar Mitchell comments upon the PAD and the astronauts: 
Exposure to these experiences L-public appearances:! 
always benefited the individual from a learning pOint of view. 
NASAls use of the astronauts to inform the public of the merits 
of the program and to sell the program were totally misdirected .... 
Individual PIOs were often great and worked well with us. 
Official policy was disastrous ~113). 
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One NASA official, who wishes to remain anonymous, states simply: 
The NASA Public Affairs operates in an opposite manner as 
has most of the technical NASA community (including the Astronaut 
Office), i.e., the public affairs offices operate without 
noticeable planning which leaves those they deal with in doubt 
about what's expected of them. 
This author has heard this type of statement from a few sources 
around NASA who also wish to remain unidentified: that whereas the bulk 
of NASA's offices and departments know exactly what they are doing, the 
public affairs office is sometimes loosely organized--in the opinion of 
these people--and since these people are not accustomed to this type of 
operations, they do not care to work with that office. But these people 
do agree that the public information officers have been well liked by the 
rest of the NASA community and are thought of well. 
Of course, public relations meant that the astronauts also had to 
deal with members of the media, something that none of them apparently 
relished doing too often. Again, Tom Wolfe's Voice of the Astronauts 
offers his opinion about the astronauts' relationship with the media. 
It is entirely possible ... that we misjudged and underestimated 
the press. God knows they misjudged us. I don't know how they 
could even buy the idea that a bunch of test pilots and combat 
pilots would turn into programmed Merit Badgers as soon as they 
were given the title Astrona~t.... _ 
In the picture on the L television~ screen, all you see 
is one reporter standing in front of a little house with the 
shades drawn and it all looks very cozy •.•• In pOint of fact, 
the lawn would •.• look like the clay flats three hours after the 
Marx Midway Carnival pulls in. There would be four or five 
mobile units with cables running through the gumbo •••• All these 
people would be out there wearing bush jackets with leather straps 
going this way and that .•• yelling to each other and mainly just 
milling about •.• hovering ••• like the fruit fly. They were 
desperate, of course. Give us a sign! (131: January 4, 1973). 
Of the people with whom this author has communicated, two of the 
most articulate astronauts who have opinions about the public affairs 
management are Fred Haise and Gene Cernan. Haise had been the editor 
of his college newspaper and was a reporter for seven years for the 
Biloxi-Gulfport Daily Herald, covering at times, police-city hall beat, 
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convention beat and small-time sports activities. He claims, IIThis 
doesn't make me equal in competence to anyone in the PAD but I feel I 
have a better understanding of the way that business works than most 
astronauts. II Haise writes further: 
I feel they I-the members of the PAD-I did an adequate job 
to support the newspapers and TV who are interested in punch-line 
facts, i.e., straight news stuff. This was the handout news 
release type material. A big gap was more depth, more detailed 
"feature" material for periodicals. Maybe this was restricted by 
the Life contract. I feel also they could do more with our personal 
appearance time. First, the banquet events should be screened 
to try to get max exposure from the standpoint of audience size 
and type of people. I find myself all too often talking to people 
who know all about the program and are friends who need no 
convincing of the merits of the space program. We should talk to 
those who don't know what the program is about; even those who 
might be considered adversaries •... 
This agency needs to shift to a balanced attack I-for PR 
purposes t~ sustain the space program I. Exploiting the hero is 
only one I avenue I. We need to highlight the vehicle--its design 
features,-its capabilities. We need to really highlight the things 
it does on its mission. The crew should be interwoven where 
appropriate but not made the exclusive theme .... The public 
affairs role is one then of information flow for that purpose only, 
rather than the sales pitch I Haise's last paragraph was written 
about the Space Shuttle, for-use in the late '70s throughout the 
'80s and possibly into the '90s but the author felt that the 
astronaut's point applied to other programs as well in general. 
hoping that this is not too much of an assumption to make~ (63). 
Haise also writes about the image of the astronaut to the public: 
I have never been told what I could or could not do as 
an astronaut. The image obviously implied certain constraints--a 
nasty divorce or scandal wouldn't fit. And as any other 
reputable person, you can't steal, forge checks, etc. The role 
of piloting and functioning as a crew says you shouldn't be 
seeing a psychiatrist or be a member of alcoholics anonymous. I 
suscribe fully to these unsaid, unwritten rules ... (63). 
Gene Cern an gave his views upon the astronaut image and the PAD 
in an interview in the fall of 1976. His thoughts might be considered 
as a wrap-up for the entire program. He said that part of the most 
important aspect of the public affairs was to let the public identify 
with the program, to identify with the history that was being made. 
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Cernan was critical of the top level management of the public affairs 
office, saying that the public affairs job should have been contracted to 
a firm outside of NASA. But he did not lay the blame squarely on the 
the PAD. "US astronauts had archaic ideas too," said Cernan. "We were 
professional aviators and some were better than others at PRo Most of 
us thought of the aviator job first. The astronauts were initially a 
hindrance to playing the PR game" (20). 
Cernan also mentioned that the Friday rule for interviews with 
reporters was "a very fair thing," but the reporters who had a lack of 
consideration ,for the astronauts' time made journalism "not my favorite-
profession." The astronaut who flew to the moon twice commented that 
journalists were not allowed to touch the prime mission crews and therefore 
the prime crew for the next mission was the "hot" crew (20). 
Cernan states: 
NASA-PAD overlooked the responsibility to keep the public 
informed. It had a moral responsibility to share an identity with 
the people. Now, we're trying to sell shuttle and having a hard 
time •.•. 
Life agreed to compensate the astronauts for their time. 
Personally, Life's personal stories, the ones showing the kids that 
skinned their knees, did more to share and identify than anyone 
thing the PAD has done. It was the best thing for public 
exposure that ever happened to the astronauts and Life. None of 
the stories were phonied up (20). 
Cernan said that going to the moon did not change most of the 
astronauts. He writes in a letter that, IIIt obviously affected some--at 
least the notoriety was a vehicle to push what they had been or believed 
before going" (21). 
In the interview, Cernan said, 
An astronaut isn't a guy given a house, a car and a six-figure 
income with $50,000 bonue. There was a lack of public awareness 
there. Some of the astronauts were pro's and out-going guys. 
And the opposites exist--the type who say, "Don't bother me," and 
they have their rights but they're also shirking their 
responsibility. Your life isn't your own anymore when you're an 
astronaut. You must watch what you do and say. 
We probably should have been told what to do by higher ups. 
399 
The public believed that we had psychiatric training. No. There 
was none of this--act this way, do this, do that, etc. 
The greatest rewards of the flights were coming back and 
sharing stories with the public .... 
Because our time was really tight at times, we did not know 
everythinq that the public was interested in. The journalists 
knew what the public wanted to know and they directed questions 
about those subjects to us. The journalists knew earth's story 
interests because it was over the heads of the astronauts who had 
been gone and weren't aware of what was considered to be interesting 
back here .... 
You have to admit I-if you're an astronaut-I that you're in a 
marketing program. _Once you walk on the moon~ you cannot unwaZk 
I Cernan's emphasis I. NASA had tremendous technical resources but 
the most important were the human resources for use in domestic 
and diplomatic reasons. The sad part is that we don't recognize 
the guy~ in space and don't choose to use them to help sell the 
L space~ program. 
I resent that the astronauts were called heroes. I wasn't born 
or trained to be a hero. NASA didn't train me I-to be a hero-/ ... but 
you are given one heck of a responsibility. Some guys thought of 
themselves as heroes though. You can't ignore being a hero and 
you have to accept the responsibility of being a hero. Young kids 
look at you. You represent the country in what and how you say 
something. A very significant representative of the U.S. is what 
an astronaut is. 
NASA is only a service organ to the U.S. It is on the top of 
the ladder in our country. We got on stage and we had to stay 
there with something to say, otherwise we should have gotten off ... 
go into hibernation. You take the opportunity if it's there but 
you have to be responsible for what you say. 
I'm upset with self-proclaimed experts. I've taken every 
opportunity to give speeches ..•...• 1 did some things the public 
affairs people said couldn't be done .... 
I was upsel and attacking a system and its approach to getting 
to the public L when he had told this author earlier that he_was 
not pleased with the operations of the public affairs office I. 
I'm not attacking the names of the people who ran it (20; 21T. 
Obviously, there are a lot of aspects to what Cern an said and he 
has very strong opinion about those subjects. But he seems concerned, 
quite right, about the image into which the astronauts had been molded, 
through no choice of their own, and the responsibilities that had to go 
along with that image--the image of the hero. Some of the astronauts 
accepted that image. Others rejected it, saying that they had no 
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obligations to anyone but they really did. This is not to say that the 
astronauts were supposed to give more of themselves to the nation than 
what they already were doing but some of them needed to understand that 
the nation and the world were looking at them as humans who had been 
elevated almost to the level of gods. Likewise, the journalists had the 
responsibility to show those men as they really were, not as they thought 
the public needed to see them. The astronauts had good points and they 
had faults. NASA, the astronauts and the media could have shown those 
faults for they were minor ones; if the astronauts had had large faults, 
the men never would have been selected for the astronaut corps in the 
first place. 
The astronauts were made into public images because of what they 
did, not because of what they looked like or who they had been before 
joining NASA. As Gene Cernan said, 1I0nce you walk on the moon, you 
cannot unwalk. 1I There was no escaping what the astronauts did and the 
images that were created around them will follow them forever. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This author has arrived at the following conclusions about the 
astronauts, the magazines and the Public Affairs Office of NASA: 
1. The occupation of the astronauts did much to create a public 
interest in them. They were fulfilling the dreams that people had been 
dreaming for thousands of years: ascending into the heavens without first 
having to die; to leave the bounds of his planet; and to go where no 
human had ever gone. The astronauts were cast into the image of the 
trail-blazers, explorers and men who knew no fear. Yet, as the astronauts 
know very well, they could not have done their jobs except for the 
efforts of thousands of others who never appeared in Time, Aviation 
Week or on the television networks. 
It has been said that the difference between the astronauts and 
the explorers of years ago is that the astronauts are part of a large 
team and the explorers of yesteryear operated on their own. This is not 
necessarily true: who remembers the names of everyone who participated in 
the lewis and Clark expedition? Who remembers the names of Lindbergh's 
financial backers? Who was Amundsen's assistant at the South Pole? 
Likewise, the events that many explorers participated in were what made 
the leaders of those expeditions famous; afterwards, their names were 
famous. This is what happened with the astronauts, too. 
2. What interest there was in the astronauts that had not been 
created by their occupation was created by the media. The media provided 
the public with stories on the background of the men, their families and 
their life styles. NASA's Public Affairs Office primarily supplied 
information about the men's occupations. 
It would seem that, at first during the short Mercury flights, 
the magazines provided the public with much of the in-depth material 
about the astronauts that was developed by ·their writers and the magazines 
would continue to do this throughout the moon missions. But, later, 
as the electronic media covered the longer missions, they, too, found 
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it necessary to provide in-depth material to the public to maintain 
attention to their channels of communication. 
NASA was willing to cooperate with the media in supplying material 
to the networks--note Scheer's efforts prior to Apollo Il--but NASA 
preferred to emphasize the mission rather than only the men who were 
flying it. NASA supplied little biographical information about the 
astronauts but supplied hoards on the hardware involved with the missions 
including what the mission hoped to accomplish. 
It would seem that the public was interested in the astronauts whe 
whereas NASA preferred for the interest to be in the mission. 
3. Not only were the astronauts fulfilling the dreams of many 
people by going into space but they were also a kind of political football 
player. They were the men of America against the cosmonauts of Russia 
in a race that had started with Sputnik in 1957. 
T. Keith Glennan, the first Administrator of NASA, compares how 
the publicity of NASA and the astronauts was handled under his and 
Jim Webb's administrations: 
From the very first day I was at NASA, our program was 
open--but not a program to be exploited by the media corps having 
little sense of responsibility. I, personally, was interested 
in what we (NASA) could do responsibly to fulfill the charge 
imposed upon us by the Congress in enacting the law. At that 
period (1958-61). NASA needed no special treatment by the media 
to support its operations. In fact, the media's efforts were 
less than helpful. 
My own concern was directed to the provision to the public--and 
here I acknowledge the importance of responsible elements of the 
IImediall--of solid information relating to our hopes, failures, 
progress and intentions. I suspect that I should acknowledge that 
only in my tenure could NASA have this type of conviction about 
the media. 
When Messrs. Kennedy and Webb took over, the need for an offset 
to the "Bay of Pigsll fiasco required, I suspect, a different 
approach. In my tenure, I could indulge my own convictions about 
the purpose, directions, pace and importance of specific elements 
of the IISpace Program." Mr. Webb was conmitted by President 
Kennedy's 25 May 1961 address to the Congress to an almost single 
purpose objective--man to the moon and safe return within the 
decade of the 60s (51). 
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Glennan is correct--there was a different attitude towards NASA 
during his term in office than in later years when Webb took control in 
early 1961. This might have been due to the difference in leadership, 
to the political climate or to the fact that launches were finally 
beginning to occur when Webb was the NASA Administrator (which would 
definitely create more interest than the preparations did). 
But the fact remains, for a long time, it was us against them and 
the astronauts and cosmonauts carried national prestige with them into 
the black skies every time they were launched. 
4. Some of the astronauts, particularly the first ones, did not 
care for the hero image that was laid upon them by the media and the 
public. But these early astronauts did nothing to suppress that image. 
When they first joined NASA, the Original 7 were unaware that they could 
become public heroes· because of their positions but, later, through the 
use of the Life contracts, some of them attempted to portray a certain 
image, although not one of the American hero. The image in Life tended 
to show smiling, middle-class Americans who comprised the ideal families. 
5. The later astronauts, who had seen the public image that had. 
been developed around the earlier ones, could see what might happen to 
them. Therefore, they were more prepared for the public image that was 
cast upon them once they joined the astronaut corps and made flights in 
space. But none of the astronauts went into NASA to become heroes (those 
who tried to enter for such a reason were eliminated by the selection 
boards); they became astronauts because they were fliers. 
6. The PAO helped the later astronauts prepare for future public 
exposure through the use of the "Week in the Barrel," which was helpful 
for NASA's public relations as well. 
7. The fame of NASA and the astronauts waxed and waned, dependent 
upon the nature of the mission to· which the men·were assigned--not upon 
the personalities of the men themselves. In the opinion of this author 
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the following missions were the highlights that would have drawn the 
attention of the American public to them, no matter who flew them: 
--the first man or American in space 
--the first man or American to orbit the earth (assuming that the 
first person in space did not already do this) 
--the first multi-man mission 
--a mission that occurred following a long stretch of time when no 
manned missions have been launched (such as Gemini 3) 
--the first space walk 
--the first crew-exchange that took place in space between two 
spaceships 
--the first flight to the moon 
--the first mission to the moon's surface 
--a flight during which there is significant trouble to the point 
that the crew members might not be able to return to earth (such 
as Apollo 13) 
It seemed as though the public put high value upon doing things first. 
first and not much more. Since the Russians did many of the firsts first, 
same of the firsts are not well-remembered by the Americans. The 
Americans remember that Shepard was our first man, Glenn was our first 
orbiter, White was our first space-walker and Gemini was our first 
multi-man spacecraft. Then ~e beat them with Apollo 8 going to the moon 
and Apollo 11's LM settling upon the moon. 
In this author's opinion, the flights that generated the most 
publicity were 
--Shepard's MR-3 flight 
--Glenn's MA-6 flight 
--Cooper's MA-9 flight 
--Gemini 3 (Grissom, Young) 
--Gemini 4 (McDivitt, White) 
--Gemini 6/7 (Schirra, Lovell, Borman, Stafford) 
--Apollo 7 (Schirra, Cunningham, Eisele) 
--Apollo 8 (Borman, Lovell, Anders) 
--Apollo 10 {Young, Cernan, Stafford} 
--Apollo 11 (Aldrin, Armstrong, Collins) 
--Apollo J3 {Lovell, Haise, Swigert} 
--Apollo 17 (Evans, Cernan, Schmitt) 
The flights that seem to be the most remembered by the public are 
Shepard's MR-3, Glenn's MA-6, Apollo 8 and Apollo 11. The men who seem to 
be most remembered are Armstrong, Glenn and Shepard. Armstrong would, no 
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doubt, be the most remembered man in the astronaut corps; yet it was fate 
which put him in that position. Tom Stafford on Apollo 10 or Pete Conrad 
on Apollo 12 could easily have been the first man to walk on the moon. 
8. Although the public was interested in the men, it was not equally 
interested in the machinery and the organizations that put the astronauts 
into space. That was possibly because it was far easier for people to 
identify with a man in space rather than a machine. Armstrong created 
far more interest that did the first satellite to land on the moon--who 
can remember that satellite's name? As Glennan put it, "Technology was 
interesting L-to the public~ only the extent the astronauts were 
prepared to cope wi th i til (51). 
9. NASA did nothing to promote the hero image of the astronauts 
to the public but, on the other hand, NASA did not discourage this 
image either (and NASA would have suffered greatly if had tried to do 
this). NASA's silence on the matter might have been seen as an approval 
by the media for the media to continue with what it was doing. 
10. The Public Affairs Office was an effective organization 
although there were some faults here and there through its history. 
It did very well considering that there was no precendence for its 
members to rely upon for guidance. 
11. Likewise, the magazines handled the publicity of the astronauts 
well most of the time and, like the PAO, they also suffered from faults 
at times. 
12. Life magazine was a plus for NASA although its contracts with 
the astronauts for their personal stories caused a number of headaches for 
NASA personnel. The contracts took a burden off of the PAD's back by 
handling the personal aspects of the astronauts; otherwise NASA would 
have had to play constant watchdog and nursemaid to the astronauts and 
their families during the years when great public attention was upon the 
astronauts. 
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13. Life did not hamper the work of other publications except to 
dampen the egos of reporters from some publications. A reporter could 
get the astronauts to talk if he or she tried hard enough. 
14. There seemed to be a reverent attitude towards the astronauts 
in the magazines until 1971-1972. Then, the writers started chipping away 
at the images that had been created around the astronauts and they showed 
the astronauts as human beings, something that they had been all along, 
except that everyone had thought otherwise until this time. 
15. The astronauts never set out to create a special image of what 
an astronaut should be but they realized that they had to maintain a 
certain life style in the public eye, as does any professional. However, 
there were some astronauts who thought of themselves as heroes and acted 
as such, although it seems that their efforts have gone largely unnoticed 
in public. 
The history of the astronaut began officially in April, 1959 and 
will continue into the future. But the history really began before 1959 
though, it started when the first person looked up at the skies and 
dreamed of flying like the birds. As man's knowledge developed to a 
level that would permit him to fly the blue skies, the thought of flying 
in the black skies of space took his mind. By the time 1959 came about, 
mankind had been dreaming its dream for thousands of years. The 
astronauts and cosmonauts were fulfilling dreams as old as humanity. 
In effect, everyone on this planet is an astronaut since the 
earth is constantly whirling through space but, in relation to our 
surroundings, we call ourselves ground-bound and admire the men who can 
escape our environment, although they have to take part of this environment 
to survive. 
When the astronauts first took to space, it was almost beyond the 
imagination. It was fascinating and emotional but the men were cooly 
professional and seemed to have a devil-may-care attitude. Glenn had 
once said that the men might as well be happy when they can for tomorrow 
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they may die. That's true of human life in general but maybe moreso with 
the astronauts because they were closer to death than most other people. 
Many of us among the earthbound wished that we were going along 
with the astronauts into space. It was up to the journalists and the 
media to tell the world what was happening with such unearthly exploits 
and about the men who ventured away from us. The astronauts were not 
accustomed to being in the spotlight of the world and they resented it, 
particularly they resented the journalists who put them there. The 
journalists are not that much to blame for casting the spotlight upon 
the men, only for the degree of accuracy in their reporting. The source 
of this spotlight was the public. If the journalists had avoided 
reporting about the space efforts, there more than likely would have been 
a justifiable public clamor to know what was happening at Cape Canaveral, 
to the detriment of the space program. 
President Kennedy set a goal for not just the United States of 
American but also for the world, especially Russia, at least in the minds 
of the Americans. The Russians gave the U.S. impetus to go to the moon, 
to finally do something first that involved emotion. The U.S. flew the 
first fuel cells in space--so what? The U.S. had the first men in space 
to observe a typhoon--so what? But the Russians had the first man in 
space, that's what mattered. The Russians had the first satellite in 
space, that's what mattered. Putting a man on the moon first was what 
mattered for the Americans; it was as much of an effort to restore 
national rpestige as it was a scientific achievement. 
Once the goal was attained, it was a question of "what next?'1 The 
U.S. had put a man on the moon and, therefore, more trips to the moon 
seemed unnecessary. As the men of Apollo 11 walked on the moon, 
Vice-President Agnew told the nation that the next target was Mars--that's 
what mattered. But Mars really may not matter. There have been 
budget cuts in NASAls work and the space efforts for the present are 
earth-oriented. If man goes to Mars, or any other planet, the voyages 
will be long, in tenns of months and years, and the excitement will not 
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be there (at the closest approach of Mars to earth, a radio signal 
still takes seven minutes to travel one way). Project Mercury was 
exciting because the events were happening now. Gemini began similarly 
but slowly faded into obscurity because of the assumed repittion of the 
flights. Then Apollo capped it all. Television made it all seem real 
again, to the point of acclimating the world almost too much with space 
travel. It was not the Buck Rogers type of travel where men met 
intelligent creatures from other planets. It was three days to the moon 
and three days back. For Apollo 11, those days to the moon and back 
where full of excitement and risk as seen by the people on the mother 
planet. During the later missions, the three day trips were too long 
to maintain excitement, except for Apollo 13 where the drama of death 
versus man loomed high. 
There were not only more men but more missions than almost 
everyone could keep track of. Everything became a blur to the senses 
except for missions that were of importance to the public in the terms 
of "that's what mattered." Soon, the thought of space travel became 
almost mundane to the public and might have done so no matter how hard 
ANSA and the government tried to make it appear interesting. That 
Apollo 13's oxygen tanks exploded on the way to the moon may have had a 
good side effect. The accident caused many people to lose faith in the 
moon missions temporarily but they soon regained it, convinced that the 
U.S. could solve the problem. 
When the men and the missions were few in the first years, the 
heroes were well-known to everyone. Their faces appeared on newspapers' 
front pages, the covers of magazines and on the television screens. But 
soon the occupation made the men look alike. It became difficult to ~ 
identify with them. Perhaps in the future, if nations other than the 
U.S. and Russia send men into space, the same hero-phenomenon will occur 
with their astronauts. It seems to happen every time there is some new 
quest that is being fulfilled. No one remembers the second man who flew 
alone across the Atlantic only days after Charles Lindbergh had done it. 
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He was the hero there. Magellan was the first man to attempt to circle 
the globe and, even though he did not fully succeed, 18 of his followers 
did. But the second group of men are not well known. People in the 
western hemisphere remember that Columbus came in 1492 but not the years 
of his return trips. The first is what counts--the winner. 
To the Americans, the astronauts were the competitors, the winners 
and the heroes. There will never be another group like them for a long 
time to come. 
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APPENDIX A: 
THE PAO 
There may be some confusion about the public affairs office of 
NASA and the public information office. The PAO of NASA is in charge 
of all public relations activities of NASA. At each center, likewise, is 
a smaller PAO. These offices are responsible for the public relations 
activities of the centers on an overall basis--producing films about the 
projects going on at the centers, conducting tours, handling VIPs 
visiting the centers, preparing reports for distribution to people or 
groups desiring them and almost anything else that could fit into the 
category of public relations. The public information office, however, 
is designed to handle the media primarily and is subordinate to the 
PAD. Thus, a public information officer is also a public affairs 
officer but not necessarily so in reverse. Each public information 
office is almost like a library of information for the media except they 
are a little like newsrooms of newspapers. Each person in the PIO is 
responsible for covering a certain aspect of that center's operations 
and, if something of worthwhile importance happens in his or her assigned 
area, he or she will write a press release concerning that information. 
On the next page is a chart showing the operations of the PAD as they 
were designed in late 1961. 
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APPENDIX B 
TIME CONTRACT (1963) 
AGREEMENT dated September, 1963, among lime Inc., 
New York corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Time"), C. Leo DeOrsey 
(who represents the following seven astronauts and their respective 
families; Malcolm Scott Carpenter, Leroy G. Cooper, Jr., John H. Glenn, 
Jr., Virgil I. Grisson, Walter M. Schirra, Alan B. Shepard, Jr., and 
Donald K. Slayton), and H. A. Batten (who represents the following nine 
Astronauts and their respective families: Neil A. Armstrong, Frank 
Borman, Charles Conrad, Jr., James A. Lovell, Jr., James A. McDivitt, 
Elliot M. See, Jr., Thomas P. Stafford, Edward H. White, II, and John 
w. Young). 
It has been announced by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (hereinafter referred to as "NASA") that the sixteen 
Astronauts above named (the "Astronauts") have been selected for training 
for participation in manned space flight projects to be undertaken by 
NASA. 
Time wishes to obtain rights in and to the personal stories of 
the Astronauts and their families. Messrs. DeOrsey and Batten have 
represented that they are authorized to sell such rights in respect of 
the Astronauts and their families and have submitted to Time copies of 
their agreements with said Astronauts and their families (copies of said 
agreements are annexed hereto as Exhibits A and B). 
It is therefore agreed between the parties as follows: 
1. Grant of Rights. 
(a) Time is hereby granted the right to create, and to 
authorize others to create, literary and pictorial material using or 
based upon the personal stories of the Astronauts and their families 
with respect to their experience occurring up to and including the last 
day of the term hereof. Time shall own all rights in all media 
throughout the world in and to any material so created, including any 
such material which may be created by an Astronaut or any family member 
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at the request of, or in cooperation with, Time. Time shall have the 
right to copyright all such material in its name and shall own all rights 
in the copyright thereof. 
(b) Time shall exercise its rights granted in subparagraph 
(a) only for the purpose of publishing any material so created in LIFE, 
LIFE International, and LIFE En Espanol. Time is expressly granted the 
right to use such material for such publication. Subject to any 
agreement which Time may make with others it is understood that 
publication in LIFE shall precede any other publication in any other 
media of communcation (i) in the United States and Canada by at least 
four full days, and (ii) anywhere else in the world by one full day. 
Publication in LIFE International and LIFE En Espanol shall not commence 
until at least ten full days after publication by others outside the 
United States and Canada. In no event will publication of the personal 
stories of the Astronauts be permitted in the United States and Canada 
in any weekly, biweekly or monthly magazine or periodical other than 
LIFE. 
(c) Immediately upon publication of any such material in 
LIFE, all rights in such materials, including the copyright, shall be 
considered aSSigned back to Messrs. DeOrsey and Batten or their successors, 
and Time shall be considered to have received simultaneously with such 
assignment a license or licenses by Messrs. DeOrsey and Batten, or 
their successors, granting to it exclusive first magazine serial rights 
in the United States and Canada and the non-exclusive right to publish 
such material in LIFE International and LIFE En Espanol. 
(d) Except as provided in paragraph 7(a) hereof, no rights 
to use the name of any Astronaut or any family member in any print media 
during the term hereof, or rights to create literary or pictorial 
material for use in any print media based on the personal stories and 
experiences of any Astronaut or family member occurring prior to the end 
of the term hereof, shall be granted to anyone other than Time except 
for the rights granted Field Enteprises Educational Corporation in two 
contracts dated this date, copies of which have been delivered to Time. 
(e) Each of the parties shall promptly on request execute 
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and deliver such further assignments or documents as another party may 
from time to time resonably request to evidence the rights and licenses 
referred to herein and to permit appropriate copyright protection of 
any material. 
2. Term of Agreement 
Subject to the rights of termination described herein in 
paragraphs 8 and 9, the term of this agreement shall be from the date 
hereof to August 31, 1967, provided that Time is hereby granted the 
irrevocable right and option to extend the term of this agreement with 
respect to each Astronaut and the members of his family to the date upon 
which such Astronaut ceases to be employed or detailed to NASA. Such 
option shall be deemed automatically exercised by Time unless it 
advises Mssrs. DeOrsey and Batten, or their successors, to the contrary 
in writing on or before May 31, 1967. 
3. Duration of Rights. 
Time's right to create material based upon the personal stories 
and experiences of the Astronauts occurring prior to the end of the term 
hereof shall continue after the term, as shall its right to use material 
created by Time pursuant hereto whether such material is created during 
or after the term. Except as provided above, all obliations of the 
Astronauts shall cease upon the end of the term hereof, and no Astronaut 
or member of his family shall have any obligation to consult with or 
cooperate with Time in the preparation of any such material after the 
term nor shall any material created after the term be attributed to 
any such person unless such person's consent in writing shall be first 
obtained. 
4. NASA Polices. 
(a) This agreement is made pursuant, and at all time subject to, 
the NASA policy set forth in NASA Releases Nos. 62-198 and 62-199, both 
dated September 16, 1962, with regard to the sale of literary rights by 
the Astronauts. 
(b) It is agreed that NASA shall have the absolute right to approve 
this agreement, and without such approval it shall not be 
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effective or binding upon the parties hereto. The date on which such 
approval is obtained shall be the Effective Date hereof. 
(c) Time will not at any time publish or cause to be 
published any materials deemed classified by NASA or the Department 
of Defense. 
(d) If the authorship of any article is to be credited to 
any Astronaut (as a signed piece or as an lias told to" type of by-line 
story), advance approval of such story shall be obtained both from 
such person, or his agent, and from the appropriately designated 
representative of NASA. Such approval shall be communicatoo to Time 
as quickly as possible in light of the particular editorial deadlines 
involved. 
5. Editorial Arrangements. 
As soon as convenient after the execution of this agreement, Time 
will assign writers and photographers who shall make all necessary 
arrangements to visit with and observe the training and lives of the 
respective Astronauts and their families. The Astronauts and their 
families will cooperate with such writers and photographers in 
connection with all research, writing, photographic and all other 
arrangements which are reasonably necessary for the purpose of carrying 
out the intent of this agreement. Time agrees that it will work out 
these editorial arrangements in such a manner as not to intefere with 
the training and conditioning of any Astronaut. 
6. Use of Names. 
Time may use, or authorize the use of, the names and pictorial 
material of the Astronauts and their families, and such biographical 
data as it deems appropriate, in connection with the exercise of rights 
granted hereunder. It is understood that such use will be dignified in 
nature and in conformity with NASAls policies. 
7. Other Proposals. 
(a) Because of the widespread public interest in manned 
space flights, it is recognized that the Astronauts will be sought after 
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by the press and other media to comment upon the scope of their official 
activities in such programs. It is understood that they shall be 
completely free, without having obtained permission from Time, to 
write for publication for non-competing media, to be photographed, 
interviewed, or to participate in public service television, radio, 
motion picture or recordinq activities to the extent deemed necessary 
by NASA to carry out its informational and educational responsibilities 
It is further understood that the Astronauts are expected to be 
responsive to and cooperative with NASA in such matters, and Time will 
not attempt to influence, either by advise to the Astronauts or by 
any other means, the extent or manner of the Astronauts' participation 
in such matters. 
(b) With respect to matters pertaining to their personal 
stories, subject to the grants made in the Field agreements, if the 
press or other media request the Astronauts or members of their families 
to be interviewed, write or otherwise publish, or appear on television 
or radio, whether for consideration or not, before doing so they, or 
their representatives, shall first obtain Time's approval in writing. 
It is expected that Time will grant such approval in any instance 
where the acceptance of such outside offers will not, in Time's 
opinion, materially affect the value of any of the rights granted to 
Time hereunder. 
8. Time's Right of Termination. 
(a) In any of the following contingencies, Time shall have 
the right, by giving written notice to the Astronauts or their agents, 
to terminate this agreement, including its obligation to make any 
payments which become due subsequent to any such termination: 
(i) if the United States Government shall cancel or 
suspend NASA's activities with respect to manned space projects; 
{ii} if any Astronaut is directed by NASA that he may 
not make his personal story available to Time; 
(iii) if any Astronaut is directed by NASA that his 
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personal story is in the public domain or must be made available to 
others as well as Time. 
(b) If at any time the value of the personal stories of 
the Astronauts is badly impaired or lost as a result of the 
administration or existing NASA policies of public information (as 
set forth in NASA releases 62-198 and 62-199) or as the result of 
future policies of NASA (or the administration thereof), Time will 
(i) bring the matter to the attention of Messrs. DeOrsey and Batten, 
or their successors, and (ii) discuss it with the proper representatives 
of NASA with a view to exploring the means of eliminating any impediments 
to the value of the stories. However, if, after the passage of a 
reasonable time (not to exceed thirty days), Time does not consider 
the value of the stories fully restored, it may terminate this agreement 
and be relieved of any further obligations hereunder by giving written 
notice to the Astronauts or their representatives. If Time's option 
to extend this agreement has been exercised and such termination notice 
is given after May 31, 1967, Time shall, simultaneously with such 
termination, pay Messrs. DeOrsey and Batten, for the account of the 
Astronauts and their families represented by them, an amount equal to 
one-third of the amounts which would thereafter have been payable as 
provided hereunder if this agreement had not been terminated; provided 
that the aggregate of such termination payments with respect to the 
Astronauts and all additional astronauts making agreements with Time, 
as provided in paragraph 11 hereof (whether under this agreement or 
any other agreement relating to the purchase of rights in the personal 
stories of the Astronauts or additional astronauts), shall not exceed 
$200,000 (with the termination payments otherwise payable with respect 
to the Astronauts and any additional astronauts to be adjusted pro rata). 
9. Termination of Astronauts' Rights. 
All Astronauts mentioned by name herein and their families 
represented by Messrs. DeOrsey and Batten, who are employed by, or 
418 
detailed to, NASA during the course of its manned space flight projects, 
will be eligible for payment under this agreement. However, the term 
hereof shall automatically and without notice terminate with respect 
to any Astronaut upon the termination, for any reason whatever other 
than death, of his employment by or detail to NASA. Time shall not 
thereafter make any payments hereunder with respect to such Astronaut 
or his family expect for payment pursuant to subparagraph 10(c) if 
applicable. In the event of the death of any Astronaut while employed 
by or detailed to NASA, he shall, for purposes of payments to be made 
hereunder (including payments under subparagraph 10(c», continue to 
be regarded as actively employed by NASA, such employment to be deemed 
terminated simultaneously with the termination of the employment by, 
or detail to, NASA of the last living Astronaut so employed or detailed. 
10. Payments by Time. 
In consideration of the above, and subjectto paragraphs 8, 9 and 11 
hereof, Time shall make the following payments to Messrs. DeOrsey and 
Batten: 
(a) Initial Period (through August 31, 1967) 
(i) To Mr. DeOrsey, or his successor, for the account 
of the Astronauts and families represented by him: 
Upon the effective date: $1,000 in respect of each 
Astronaut; $1,000 in respect of each Astronaut's wife, and 
$4,200 in respect of each Astronaut's family. 
On September 1, 1964: $4,250 in respect of each Astronaut 
and his wife, and $2,000 in respect of each Astronaut's family. 
On September 1, 1965: $6,250 in respect of each Astronaut's 
family. 
On September 1, 1966: $6,250 in respect of each Astronaut 
and his wife. 
(ii) To Mr. Batten, or his successor, for the account 
of the Astronauts and families represented by him: 
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Upon the effective date: $56,250. 
On Septo 1, 1964: $6,250 in respect of each Astronaut and family. 
On Septo 1, 1965: $6,250 in respect of each Astronaut and family. 
On Septo 1, 1966: $6,250 in respect of each Astronaut and family. 
(b) Renewal Period o 
In the event Time exercises its option pursuant to 
paragraph 2 hereof, Time shall make the following payments: 
(i) To Mr. DeOrsey or his successor, for the account 
of the Astronauts and families represented by him: 
On Septo 1, 1967: $6,250 in respect of each Astronaut and family. 
On Sept. 1, 1968: $6,250 in respect of each Astronaut and family. 
On Sept. 1, 1969: $6,250 in respect of each Astronaut and family. 
(ii) To Mr. Batten or his successor, for the account 
of the Astronauts and families represented by him: 
On Sept. 1, 1967: $6,250 in respect of each Astronaut and familyo 
On Sept. 1, 1968: $6,250 in respect of each Astronaut and family. 
On Sept. 1, 1969: $6,250 in respect of each Astronaut and family. 
(c) In addition, if any Astronaut's employment by, or detail 
to, NASA shall terminate after August 31, 1970, for any reason (except 
dismissal for cause which shall not be deemed to include mental or 
physical disability) and if, upon such termination Time shall not be 
obligated to make a future payment or payments in respect of such 
Astronaut for rights in his personal story pursuant to another agreement, 
Time shall pay to Mr. Batten or Mr. DeOrsey, as the case may be, with 
respect to such Astronaut and his family, the sum of $6,250, such payment 
to be made twelve months after the termination of such Astro~aut's 
employment by, or detail to, NASA, or on September 1, 1972, whichever 
shall be later. 
For the purpose of the limits on the maximum amounts payable 
set forth in paragraphs 8 and 11 and similar limits in any other 
contracts between the parties hereto, the payment date for all such 
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final payments and all final payments payable by Time under any other 
agreements to Astronauts or additional astronauts making agreements 
with Time as provided in paragraph 11, shall be deemed to be 
September 1, 19720 
11. Other Astronauts. 
Time understands that additional astronauts may be assigned to 
NASA's manned space program to participate in manned space flights in 
capacities similar to those of the Astronauts who are parties to this 
agreement. Time reserves the right to offer an agreement identical 
in all relevant respects to this agreement to each of such other 
astronauts, subject to the following conditions: (a) that such other 
astronaut shall officially have been selected by NASA for training for 
flight (as distinguished from ground duty) in its manned space flight 
projects; (b) that such other astronaut shall enter into such an 
agreement on behalf of himself and his family no later than six months 
after he shall officially have been so selected; and (c) that the 
first payment to be made to any such other astronaut shall not be due 
until the date one year after he shall officially have been so selected 
and shall be limited to this part of $6,250 as shall equal in proportion 
the part of a year from such date until the next payment date for the 
Astronauts covered by this agreement (at which time he shall receive 
the full payment then due him), and such other astronaut shall not be 
entitled to share in any payments which shall have become due prior 
to his first payment. 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this agreement, the 
aggregate of all payments to be made by Time in any calendar year to 
all such additional astronauts and to the Astronauts, whether under 
this agreement or any other agreement relating to purchase of rights 
in personal stories or experiences, shall not exceed $200,000 (with 
all payments to the Astronauts and such additional astronauts then due 
to be adjusted pro rata to the extent necessary to keep the aggregate 
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of all payments from exceeding such maximum); and Time's obligation to 
make payments to the Astronauts pursuant to paragraph 10 shall be subject 
to this limitationQ 
12. No Liability Upon Messrs. DeOrsey and Batten. 
It is recognized by Time that Messrs. DeOrsey and Batten are, 
respectively, acting on behalf of and solely in the interests of the 
Astronauts and their families whom they, respectively, represent, and 
that neither has any personal interest in the proceeds to be paid to 
him hereunder. It is therefore understood that neither shall be liable 
personally to Time for the performance of this agreement by the 
Astronauts, other than that each will be apprised of any differences 
of opinion related to the performance of this agreement that may 
arise between Time and the Astronauts or their families represented by 
him, and that the cooperation of Mro DeOrsey and Mr. Batton or their 
successors may be sought by Time to help settle any differences or 
problems involving the Astronauts or their families whom they 
respectively represent. Until otherwise notified in writing by all of 
the Astronauts represented by Mr. DeOrsey that another person has 
been authorized by them to be their agent, Time shall be entitled in 
all matters relating to this agreement to regard Mr. DeOrsey as the 
sole authorized agent of such Astronautso Likewise, until otherwise 
notified in writing by all of the Astronauts represented by Mr. Batten 
that another person has been authorized by them to be their agent, 
Time shall be entitled in all matters relating to this agreement to 
regard Mr. Batten as the sole authorized agent for such Astronauts. 
13. Miscellaneous. 
The tenn "families" as used in this agreement shall be deemed 
to include the respective wives and children of the Astronauts if not 
otherwise specified. 
All references in this agreement to NASA or any official thereof 
shall be deemed to apply and to include any successor or other agency 
or person having substantially the same authority or function. 
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14. Applicable Law. 
This agreement is made pursuant to and shall be governed by 
the laws of the State of New York applicable to contracts to be 
performed entirely thereino 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed and delivered 
this agreement as of the day and year first above written. 
TIME INCORPORATED 
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ACRONYMS 
AMU Astronaut Maneuvering Unit: the backpack designed for 
use during Gemini flights but never used because of various 
difficulties in flight. 
ADTA Augmented Target Docking Adapter: a shortened Agena target 
vehicle used only in Gemini 9 for the Gemini spacecraft 
to dock with. 
CM Command Module: the main spacecraft of the Apollo program; 
designed to carry three men for long voyages in space but 
it was necessary to have the Service Module with the CM 
as the Service Module supplied virtually all power and 
attitude control for the CM. 
EVA Extra-Vehicular Activity: Any activity outside of a 
spacecraft, such as a space walk or a walk on the lunar 
surface. 
GATV Gemini-Agena Target Vehicle: A unmanned spacecraft that 
was used for docking practice with the Gemini spacecraft; 
the Agena could also be used for powering the Gemini 
to different altitudes and orbits as it had a powerful 
engine which the astronauts in the Gemini could control 
once the two spacecraft were docked. 
GT Gemini-Titan: the manner in which the Gemini missions 
were called. 
JSC Johnson Space Center: in 1973, the Manned Sapcecraft 
Center at Houston was renamed in honor of former 
President Lyndon Johnson, one of the main supporters 
of NASA during his years in government. 
KSC Kennedy Space Center: formerly referred to as Cape 
Canveral but now only the NASA launching facilities 
where most of NASAls launchings take place; named after 
President John Kennedy. 
LM Lunar Module: the first true spacecraft which could only 
fly in a vacuum and was designed to land on the moon. 
LRL Lunar Receiving Laboratory: a section of the Manned 
Spacecraft Center at Houston set aside for astronauts 
returning from the moon and for the material which they 
brought with them; the astronauts and their support 
teams would be quarantined in here for various lengths 
of time. The last crew quarantined here was Apollo 14. 
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MA Mercury-Atlas: the manner in which the Mercury missions 
were referred where the Atlas was the launch vehicle. 
MR Mercury-Redstone: the manner in which the Mercury missions 
were referred where the Redstone missile was used as the 
launch vehicle. 
MQF Mobile Quarantine Facility: a airtight house trailer 
type of unit which carried the astronauts of moon missions 
from splashdown to the LRL; essentially, a portable LRL. 
MSC Manned Spacecraft Center: NASAls primary facility for 
training astronauts for spaceflight; in Houston, Texas; 
now called the Johnson Space Center. 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration: the agency 
of the U.S. Government responsible for conducting research 
of flight in the atmosphere and in space; conducts both 
manned and unmanned flights for research. 
OAMS Orbital And Maneuvering System: the attitude controls of 
the Gemini spacecraft that controlled the movements of the 
spacecraft. 
PAO Public Affairs Office or Public Affairs Officer: the 
office or an employee thereof responsible for handling 
the public relations of NASA 
PIO Public Information Office or Public Information Officer: 
the office of employee thereof responsible for aiding 
the media in reporting about NASAls activities; also 
prepares press releases about NASA's activites. 
PLSS Portable Life Support System: a backpack affair used by 
the Apollo astronauts to sustain themselves while they 
were on the surface of the moon. 
SM Service Module: one of the Apollo modules necessary to 
support the functions of the command module. See CM. 
SPS Service module Propulsion System: the engine that was 
used to place the entire Apollo spacecraft into lunar 
orbit and take them out of lunar orbit for the trip 
home to earth. 
MR-3 (Freedom 7) 
MR-4 (Liberty Bell 7) 
MA-6 (Friendship 7) 
MA-7 (Aurora 7) 
MA-8 (Sigma 7) 
MA-9 (Faith 7) 
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u.S. MANNED SPACEFLIGHTS 
PROJECT MERCURY 
May 5, 1961 
July 21, 1961 
February 20, 1962 
May 24, 1962 
October 3, 1962 
May 15, 1963 
PROJECT GEMINI 
Shepard 
Grissom 
Glenn 
Carpenter 
Schirra 
Cooper 
Gemini 3 (Molly Brown) March 23, 1965 Grissom, Young 
Gemini 4 June 3-7, 1965 McDivitt, White 
Gemini 5 August 21-29, 1965 Cooper, Conrad 
Gemini 6 December 15-16, 1965 Schirra, Stafford 
Gemini 7 
Gemini 8 
Gemini 9 
Gemini 10 
Gemini 11 
Gemini 12 
Apollo 1 (Apollo 204) 
Apollo 7 
Apollo 8 
Apollo 9 
(Gumdrop, Spider) 
December 4-18, 1965 Borman, Lovell 
March 18, 1966 Armstrong, Scott 
June 3-6, 1966 Stafford, Cern an 
July 18-21, 1966 Young, Collins 
September 12-15, 1966 Conrad, Gordon 
November 11-15, 1966 Aldrin, Lovell 
PROJECT APOLLO 
January 27,1967 
October 11-22, 1968 
December 21-27, 1968 
March 3-13, 1969 
Grissom, White, Chaffee 
Schirra, Eisele, Cunningham 
Borman, Lovell, Anders 
Schweichart, McDivitt, Scott 
Apollo 10 May 18-26, 1969 Young, Cernan, Stafford 
Charlie Brown, Snoopy} 
Apollo 11 July 16-24, 1969 Aldrin, Armstrong, Collins 
Columbia, Eagle 
Apollo 12 November 14-24, 1969 Bean, Conrad, Gordon 
Yankee Clipper, Intrepid 
Apollo 13 
Odyssey, Aquarius 
~nollo 14 
Kitty Hawk, Antares 
Apollo 15 
Endeavor, Falcon 
Apollo 16 
Casper, Orion 
Aoollo 17 
America, Challenger 
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April 11-17, 1970 Lovell, Haise, Swigert 
January 31-February 9, 1971 Shepard, Roosa, 
Mitchell 
July 26-August 5, 1971 Irwin, Scott, Worden 
April 16-27, 1972 Young, Mattingly, Duke 
December 7-19, 1972 Cernan, Evans, Schmitt 
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